https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3b1a2c06e34134358c5f3dcc42cc9170.pdf bebe0b0f598b30c617243fd4f576a329 PDF Text Text V DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (/'•• Subject.. Date.. MW161957 ..Publication, NEW YORK TIMES Arms and the Mom—III A Survey of How U.S. Forces Stress 'Readiness' Instead of 'Mobilization' /•' By HANSON W. BAIiDWIN " ~ New weapons expose the Unit The Tactical Air Command is ed States for the first time in its ! being for instance; the modern history to the danger of Army, reduced, it Is said, will be able to devastating- attack through the provide'its own close air support fir or by sea. with its own guided missiles. We have "live frontiers" vul- And yet no guided missile has nerable to assault. been produced or envisaged^that This fact dictates emphasis on possesses the sense of judgment factors influence our entire de"readiness" rather than on or power of analysis of the hu fense structure. "mobilization." In any future man brain, and the piloted We are reducing numbers of war the threat of atomic attack, plane, when used against a mov- men and units. The basic reason whether fulfilled or not, means ing target on the battlefield, is is budgetary; the rationale ofthat we must have a highly far more flexible and probably fered is that the "Big Bang"—' trained professional regular far more accurate than any ex- the increased firepower and force ready to fight and suffi- cept the shortest-range missiles. speed and destructiveness of cient equipment and arms on Actually the advent of the new weapons—compensates for hand and in being at the out- missile age and the development the reduction in numbers. break of war to fight it. of faster and faster planes cap- To some extent this is true, We no longer can depend upon able of flying higher and higher but there is a point of no return. having time to mobilize our m e n ' a ( I d l i t t l e t o o u £ capability for The reduction of numbers of and factories and to create conventional-war. Instead they men and of numbers of wings of armed forces after war starts. -'•-•'-- push us even further towjird de- ! planes means more dependence-' Atomic war would disrupt mo- pendence on nuclear weapons. upon utilization of atomic weap-j bilization, destroy industry; if A supersonic jet is of limited ons, less capability of fighting our armed forces were not in- utility in close ground support, with conventional weapons. stantly ready to retaliate we and a long-range ballistic missile Moreover, there is np cer-. .would be doomed. , is so expensive and complex and tainty that the missile and 1 On the other hand, if nuclear has such limited accuracy that atomic age actually means fewweapons were not used or were it will demand as payload a nu- er men, in uniform. greatly restricted in use, re- clear or thermonuclear warhead. The complicated, intricate serves and mobilization potential - There is still another anachro- missiles now being produced still would- have considerable nism- The Army is streamlining may actually require more men importance; they could well its divisions for the new age of t6 service, transport and fire mean the difference between vic- warfare and has created an air- than are now . required to fly __ tory and defeat in any limited borne division all the elements and maintain planes. war fought with conventional of "which can be—for the first Redistribution is Seen time since World War II—transweapons. '• The United States has resolved ported by air. Yet the air trans- The atomic age ee'rtainly| ohly partly the resulting dilem- port to lift that division does not means a redistribution of men ma. We are taking administra- exist. At the time of the Suez in uniform; there may be fewer tive, incentive, morale and other crisis last fall we could have air- in forward areas, or they may measures to improve the long- lifted to the Middle East one be more widely dispersed areas, term professional quality of our regimental combat team a t a or they may be more but there time—no more. may be nood for more in support. regulars. >. No one yet knows; the new . But we still depend upon tbe The budgetary squeeze and weapons technology is still too draft, and the,. resultant large the Air Force concentration upbiennial tumoVfer in the Army on delivery of nuclear weapons young. Nevertheless, we are re—which is the, osly service usipg have prevented the procurement ducing numbers of men and it—is wasteful'«j& not conducive of sufficient transport aircraft units, actually because of the budget squeeze, theoretically to to professionalism. ' .. make the —. Army, really air [because of the "Big Bang." 1 Britain's hew defense policy ,..transportable. . And yet this is,•i The new weapons and consewhich commits thaP nation to the fundamental requirement of quent changes in our defense dependence upon nuclear weap- the land, forces in an age-wheni set : up also, ^re supposed to elions to a greater degree than we mobility an(i'lpeed>re primary minate the need for some timehave yet done^hvisages the end criteria. "^ * a*1• _ of the draft.-^definitely down...-:'. — ——* tried^ reh>bjes. grades her reset-ve forces, disThe United Statteiresfer^e polbands some of them and com-' icy' today definitely" l e n g t h e n s mits her Territorial Army our capability -to fight a long (equivalent to • our Natidnal, conventional war but weakens Guard a.nd Reserve divisions) somewhat our readiness potenpurely to a home-defense role,, tial for a nuclear war. with some special units trained The sarffe uneasy compromise for civil defense. has been made in the industrial mobilization field. The services U. S. Building Reserves prodidng, particularly On the other hand the United —despite the Ait^Force—have not States, while cutting down its from completely the idea that ready regular forces, Is building bought must fight the next war with up its reserve forces to a higher we what we have'lfi equipment and peak than ever before and is weapons at thyfetart of the war. training and equipping them for Yet planninM«b* production duty and action overseas—not for civil or home defense in this or mobilizaltioiSw the nation's country—even though an atomic resources forj fiiore than six war might be over in days, hours, months after tKe^tart of hostilities has been shelved. or weeks. In this phase of defense preparation, as in others, we are trying to eat our cake ,and have it, too. Contradictions and compromises induced by new weapons, A0027623 80-000080 budgetary restrictions and other � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00870 Title A name given to the resource New York Times article Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 16-May-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived ÒAtomic weapons - Canadian policy,Ó RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5960, file 50219-AM-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource Arms and the Atom III Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en