https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/338cae3fad31bcf99ce1faf01e41e0fe.pdf 70d1143c07c8251c2c37846504269a8d PDF Text Text Defence Liaison (1)/J.A. McCordick/j.J. McCardle/ th I-HJ DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM • • ••• The. Under-Secretary TO: ''^'^tr^'; i FROM: . . . . . Defence Liaison (1) Division REFERENCE: Security SECRET Date May 1 3 , 1957- File No. lo a .Atomic Weapons Policy and the "Fourth Power" Problem SUBJECT: It would seem desirable to clarify further some of the major arguments employed in the Draft Memorandum for Ministers on atomic weapons policy and the "Fourth Power problem. With this object in mind, the following brief comments occur to us. We should like to have an opportunity to elaborate them orally. Strategic or Tactical Weapons 2. It is our understanding that the most recent technological advances in the nuclear weapons field make it likely that soon it will be possible to produce nuclear weapons which are small in bulk, high in explosive effect and low in radiation effect. We understand that some defence scientists at least hold the view that it is artificial and misleading to attempt to distinguish between "strategic" and "tactical" nuclear weapons; in their view there are simply nuclear weapons which can be used in one role or another. The draft paper does not seem to reflect fully this concept. It leaves the impression that, while great care should be taken to keep "strategic" weapons out of Fourth Power hands, it might be possible at some stage to extend the ownership of "tactical" weapons. The paper might deal more distinctly with the war-head and the range of weapons. Is not the effect of any nuclear war-head so devastating as to make the qualifier "tactical" somewhat inaccurate, no matter how limited the range? 3. If it is true that small and "clean" nuclear weapons can be produced (and relatively cheaply), the ...2 A0027623 101-000101 / y- . C i/us) �SECRET - 2 distinction between strategic and tactical no longer valid and if we are to be guided of the draft memorandum, we shall be faced blem of keeping all nuclear weapons out of Fourth Powers. weapons is by the philosophy with the prothe bands of Canadian Objectives 4. We are inclined to believe that Ministers should be made clearly aware that at best a Canadian policy of the type recommended in the draft memorandum would only delay the programmes of Fourth Powers who were desirous of possessing nuclear weapons, since such a development seems to us to be almost impossible to prevent in the long term unless a general agreement on disarmament is achieved. Canada's Self-Denial 5. We tend to believe that Canada's willingness to deny herself the right to manufacture nuclear weapons will not appear to other countries as much of a self-denial. Whatever Canada does in this field, we know that in the final analysis we shall be protected by United States nuclear armament. We have no worry of the kind that France might have, for example, that we would be left without such nuclear protection, nor are we afflicted with the same prestige yearnings. The Problem of National Prestige 6. In paragraph 20 this problem is stated but we feel » it should be given much greater emphasis. In fact, it is our fear that there is a real risk in the proposed Canadian policy of offending and alienating the French to such a dangerous degree as to threaten the whole future of NATO. This problem may not be insoluble but the face-saving devices suggested will need the most careful thought and elaboration. We are not sure of the meaning of the last sentence in paragraph 19, but we are inclined to doubt that some of the more important NATO members, specifically ...3 A0027623 102-000102 �SECRET - 3 France and Germany, will readily accept the logic of the policy. It follows, therefore, that every effort must be made to make this logic even more convincing and acceptable. y . *A~% CrS-ejt—^ Liaison (1) Division Delence A0027623 103-000103 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00861 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum from Defence Liaison Division to the Under-Secretary Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 13-May-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived ÒAtomic weapons - Canadian policy,Ó RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5960, file 50219-AM-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource Atomic Weapons Policy and the "Fourth Power" Problem Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en