https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5f07be447d2472016b042bff97b8af07.pdf f7519242569d319e71409eda873a572e PDF Text Text DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (PjU^^jU MEM0RANDUM A*W%^ ' l»mu% i^^) Security . . . S E C R E T TO: a=a«7t.-^j FROM • Date ....?/.?.:. JDryrsiow/A. G.a .GAMPBELL/MKJ i REFERENCE: * /O^LtUt^ '.. - , .^y.. 13,.. 1957 File No. ... / So*/?-A/*.-V» l)raf>'€*Memorandum'on Atomic Weapons Policy 61 \ SUBJECT: .?£?.• PJ9.G..!%.Ph: .??.¥£?..Ri*pblem" The "i).th country problem" has been a consideration in disarmament negotiations for two or three years. It has acquired special importance during the present negotiations in London because of the U.S. proposal for setting a target date following which all production of fissionable materials would be for non-weapons purposes under international supervision. Connected with this is the further proposal that following that date powers possessing stocks of fissionable materials should make transfers from their national stockpiles to internationally supervised stockpiles which would be used exclusively for non-weapons purposes.. These proposals together would . not only have the effect of providing an answer to the problem of production of nuclear weapons by "fourttpowers" but also would serve to reduce existing s tocks of weapons and weapon materials. There are two points in particular to be noted, (1) Stassen has indicated that the United States does not contemplate reducing their stockpiles to anything like zeEO^agd (2) the question of the provision of nuclear weapons/not now possessing or manufacturing them is not covered. 2. The Soviet Union position is a rather simpler one and would ensure that no [(.th country would secure possession of nuclear weapons either by transfer or manufacture. The impression we have received from the London discussions is that the Soviet Union is very much concerned with the "lj.th country problem". 3. One matter to which the United States is at present addressing itself is that of making the Ext. 326 (3/S3) A0027623_104-000104 7F~F./0/us) �-2- renunciation of nuclear weapons manufacture attractive to countries which have the capacity to produce them. This appears to us to be a consideration of very real importance to which Mr. Bryce's draft memorandum has not directed sufficient attention. The attitude which has been taken by Mr. Johnson privately with Stassen is that Canada would not xtfish, by subscribing to an agreement concerning future production, to arrive at a position where we would have no access to weapons which the United States considers indispensable for its own aerial defences. However, publicly in the Sub-Committee general support has been given by Canada to the U.S. proposals. Assurances have been given that Canada is not being overlooked in U.S. defence planning and it is conceivable that in future revisions of U.S. legislation preferential treatment might be provided for Canada because of North American defence arrangements. It seems to us that other countries may have other special problems of defence which they consider can best be met by their possession of nuclear weapons under their own operational control. In this connection we recall that one of the reasons given by the U.K. some years ago for embarking on weapons manufacture was that unless they did so they could not rely on the targets they considered of the first priority being engaged in an emergency. if. It seems to us that more attention might be given to this problem of attractiveness. Stassen spoke at some length in the Sub-Committee on April 12 on this matter and expressed the hope that a proposal to prohibit production for weapons purposes might be viewed favourably by other countries for the following reasons: (A) The fact that such an agreement would improve the prospects of a lasting peace, (B) it would reverse the present trend of the three countries with nuclear weapons towards ever-increasing stockpiles, more effective weapons and more effective means of delivery, (C) if a sound agreement could be accepted other countries vrould be saved the economic burden of developing weapons and (D) the agreement could accelerate advances in the peaceful use of atomic material. As one of the countries possibly concerned we are perhaps in a good position to consider what else might make the proposal attractive. 5* We understand that the pressing reason for approaching this matter is the need to establish- a uranium sales policy. We wonder whether it is essential at this ..3 A0027623 105-000105 �-3s t a g e to connect t h e s a l e s p o l i c y c l o s e l y and d i r e c t l y w i t h the i^th country problem. That i s , we wonder whether the q u a n t i t i e s now involved i n contemplated s a l e s a r e so l a r g e t h a t t hey would be of s i g n i f i c a n c e i n any weapons p r o d u c t i o n programme. I f i t were a c c e p t a b l e t o e n t e r i n t o d e l i v e r y agreements f o r e x p e r i m e n t a l r e a c t o r q u a n t i t i e s i n the immediate f u t u r e w i t h o u t g i v i n g u n d e r t a k i n g s f o r f u r t h e r l a r g e - s c a l e d e l i v e r i e s i t would be p o s s i b l e to make a f u r t h e r review of the ifth c o u n t r y problem i n a wider c o n t e x t t h a n t h a t of an arrangement w i t h i n NATO. Moreover, i t would then be p o s s i b l e to have the advantage of any developments which may t a k e p l a c e in the p r e s e n t disarmament meetings in London. 6. There a r e a good many p o i n t s of d e t a i l i n t h e d r a f t memorandum which appear t o us to c a l l f o r c o n s i d e r e d comment b u t in view of t h e d e s i r e of t h e Under-Secretary to make a r e p l y tomorrow we thought i t was w e l l to p u t in t h i s p r e l i m i n a r y memorandum. United N a t i o n s D i v i s i o n 7. tae^ cZfi &toJZj2^zyt' tTf u^a^Xoc^ Ce^LS /A* /U&~ sb&^oS^ epoehjUZZ £~~.*7eU,&/*- ^ - ^ J* -vU^^ g^^/^cUZZZ £&-&#/ ^ <&jUi7Z~. Off*^ c*t- f**^ L-~U2~ £~~aCx*X&C^h~. &~*7 ^ w ^ t > ^t^e/x^a***^- C^Cu^y d- <*^ U ^te^^e^^ / * ^ ~ -e^e~ C^^ ty^^UeTS CSoUtT&f. /£? ^ ^ O Z T ^ ^ - < *-~ £J<U*^y e*~ffi ^~^>"y c~-^ « ^ ¥r / /*o^s<~a?f> CZ^Ci ff &£- 6-€y-d^7eUZZ&— - -r=y7 ^V Ir /^SA0027623_106-000106 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00860 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum from U.N. Division to Mr. Matthews Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 13-May-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived ÒAtomic weapons - Canadian policy,Ó RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5960, file 50219-AM-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource Draft Memorandum on Atomic Weapons Policy and the "4th Power problem" Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en