https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ee435ab64bf83396b59c1b8c9bcf23a0.pdf f391a864348efc1ea0ef288d6b158f93 PDF Text Text .. OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA" NUMBERED LETTER CONFIDENTIAL TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA. FROM: Security: ...............•....•.......... No: •••.•• ' •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • f ••••••••• ITALY RavlE, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 0 • • • •• • ' •••••• •· •• Reference; ............................... · . · · ...... · · · · · · · · · · · . . -. July 29, 1963 THE CAI'JADIAN EMBASSY ••••••••••• • +..1 ............ ·......... . The Italian Navy and the MLF SubJect: ..................................................... . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .... . .. .. .. . . . .. . .. . .. . ... . . . .. .. . . . . .. Date: ........................••....•.... Enclosures: ..... -:- ............. · .. · · ... . . Air Ai r or Sur f ace Ma1 1: .................. , . Post File No: . •..•.....•...•.... • .... · Ottawa File No • .. . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . .. ... . . .. .. .. .. . .................... ...... . I References On July 18 President Segni, in his capacity as Supreme of the Italian Armed Forces, reviewed the entire Italian fleet at anchor in the Bay of Taranto, shortly after Naval manoeuvres had been held involving 48 surface vessels, one submarine and ASW aircraft. 't -( ·---..._j ---' \D •. -)· \) L L " M 1 · · · ,1; l \W\\ vi' 2.The significance of this event assumes more than symbolic importance in the light of changing power relationships in the 1Jedi terranean and also with regard to the proposed fuul tilateral Nuclear Force. Taranto, the site of Italy's largest Naval base, is located on the Ionian coast in the centre of the Mediterranean; President Segni reviewed the Fleet from aboard the missile-launching cruiser naaribaldi 11 , and was accompanied by Minister of Defence Andreotti, Under-Secretary DeMeo, Chief. of Naval Staff Admiral Giurati, Naval Secretary General Admiral Ghe, Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Squadron Admiral de Pelligrini, the Chairman of the Chamber and _of the Senate Defence Committees Italo Giulio Caiati and Senator Giovanni, Cornaggio-:. It in [ \)\I _, J\f\ Italy since 1938 when a review took place in the Bay of Naples .n . Jlv/&;) to honour Hitler's visit to Italy. Of interest also in this ____\..:..-·_Vt>_..,..,.'"Y \ll context is that the manoeuvres fell between the twentieth anni··Internal Circulation Distribution to Posts NATO Paris London ·washington Bonn versaries of two important events: the allied landings in Sicily (June 10, 1943) and Mussolini 1 s.resignation (July 25, 1943) which marked the end of 2. Since its surrender i:rlm 1943 the Italian Navy has made a slow but impressive comeback; 172 new or remodelled vessels totalling over 75,000 tons l1ave been put into service since Italy joined NkrO; 15 vessels amounting to 22,000-tons are now under construction and another 12 amounting to 16,000 tons are on the drawing boards. These figures do not include an existing 16,000 tons of landing craft and 80,000 tons of auxiliary vessels, three groups of aircraft and the helicopters assigned to the new frigates and light cruisers. The Italian combat fleet will shortly reach a target of 5 missile-launching cruisers, 2 large launching torpedo-boat destroyers, 21 frigates of several types, 25 corvettes, 12 submarines, 94 minesweepers of several types, and 10 gunboats. 3• "While the Italian Navy is making steady progress towards becoming the largest (although not the most powerful) naval force in the Mediterranean, as far as vessels are concerned, they are faced with a serious shortage particularly in specialist 000391 Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52) - �2 personnel; The Navy is undoubtedly the best of the three Italian services and attracts officers of high calibre and considerable devotion who have been successful in creating a creditable degree of esprit de corps within their service. However, service efficiency is impeded by competition from the expanding Italian economy for the permanent cadre of specialist Petty Officers. Of 2500 places subject to entry by examination only 500 could be filled at the most recent competition, largely because of inadequate · pay scales. Similarly at the end of their 18 months compulsory training, 80 per cent of the conscripted sailors leave the service. A programme is now under study to rectify this situation and we Understand new terms of service may be submitted to Parliament in 1964. 4• Despite the gravity of manpower difficulties the most serious problem facing the Italian Navy is its search for a meaningful role in the nuclear age. As a member of NATO Italy has certain duties of defending coasts and trade, and in ensuring the availability of Mediterranean seaways to the West which are not without importance to the present balance of power within the compass of a nuclear stalemate. Moreover the weight of the Italian Navy within the confines of the Mediterranean has not only been increased by its ambitious building programme but also by the diminished significance of the British Navy in this area after Suez and by the effect of Tunisian and Algerian independence on the French Navy. 5. Given this situation the most serious competitor (if one can put the question in such terms) to Italian Naval hegemony in the Mediterranean has been the American Sixth Fleet which has an offensive and peacekeeping role in contrast with the predominately defensive and ru1ti-submarine role · assigned to fhe Italian Fleet. Several years ago the Italian Naval Staff, perhaps looking forward to the day when the Sixth Fleet might be deployed in other waters and perhaps also anticipating modified conditions for the control of nuclear weapons, began experimenting with· apparatus for the launching of ballistic missiles from surface vessels, Italian missile vessels being only armed with "Sea Slug" surface to surface and with anti-aircraft missiles. We understand that considerable technical success was achieved by installing compressed air tubes of Italian design vertically in the hull of the "Garibaldi" which made it possible to carry and launch Polaris missiles. In November 1962 the "Garibaldi" visited the U.s. Naval· Base at Norfolk where trials were conducted with dummy Polaris missiles. According to our information the "Garibaldi" impressed the American Naval authorities with its ability to pop these simulated missiles. into the air under a variety of trying conditions a...'1d the Italian Navy seems to have assumed first steps l1ad been trucen towards a surface Polaris missile force then being discussed in NATO circles by the so-called ::Snr:Ltb: technical group. American cautioning about political barriers to the assigning of Polaris missiles to other powers, about Congressional regulations for the control of nuclear warheads and about the technical problems and expense of attempting to adapt the 11 Garibaldif' to accommodate necessary electronic guidance and navigational gear do not appear to have been regarded by the Italians as insuperable obstacles. 7• The Nassu meeting of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Wmcmillan which followed so quickly after the successful Italian experiments seems to have reinforced Italia...'1 expectations on the possibility of enlarging their naval and nuclear role, although accompanied by something more than disappointment about Italy's exclusion from the discussions. Prime Minister Fanfani, motivated by.domestic political considerations not entirely connected with defence, sought an interview with President Kennedy and visited Washington in January 1963 where he learned of the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Itali&'1 and Tuxkish territories and their replacement Polaris submarines operating in the Hediterrru1ean. Prime Minister Fanfani at that time gave his approval in principle to the Nassau decisions on the understanding that details would be discussed in NATO and by means of visiting experts. 000393 •• �;,b. L .. 3 There seems to be little doubt that at that stage the Italian Government, despite the neutralist tendencies implicit wHhin -the "opening to the left", hoped the Nassau agreement would contribute to parity at least within EUrope where the German Army had already attained predominant size and where France had separately achieved a measure of nuclear The Defence and Foreign Ministries displayed noticeable anxiety about being able to make an acdeptable contribution to the Inter Allied Nuclear Force so as to gain admittance to whatever control body was established. So far the IANF has proved to be both a· source of satisfaction and a disappointment to Italy in achieving these ends. 9. However the greatest disappointment has been with the l\1LF. Shortly after Mr. Fanfani 's Washington visit the 'Roreign ML"listry began seeking technical clarifications of American views on the many imprecise factors devolving from the Nassau decision. Foremost among these was the possibility of installing Polaris missiles and related equipment on the four cruisers being constructed in shipyards. Little progress was made and thevisit- of :Mr. Livingstone Iv1erchant, accompanied by Admiral Ricketts and Mr., Smith,to Rome in J,furch proved to be a further disappointment in that they expounded the adva"ltages of a multi-national mixed-manned force of merchant type vessels and claimed to be without authority to discuss the possibility of employing missile-equipt warships. 10. Thereafter the Italian Government displayed little enthusiams for the .American version of the IvlLF. The national election on April 28 and the succeeding political crisis made temporizing conveniently expedient but the Foreigij Ministry was not reticent in questioning the cost, efficacity and other factors involved in using surface ships. Here, it was generally assumed that the Italian Navy preferred missile submarines and it may be that for tactical reasons they hoped to obtain terms similar to those offered to Britain at Nassau. It seems evident however that the Italian Navy not opposed to missile-carrying surface vessels per se; they had·gone to considerable lengths to develop surface cruisers for this purpose. We suspect, without having specific evidence, that the Italians are merely opposed to the mixedmanned principle although we imagine they would probably be prepared to accept the two-key arrangement for warheads (which had previously applied to the Jupiters) provided the missiles were located in Italian vessels - probably cruisers, possibly submarines and parhaps merchant vessels.11. A new phase has begun in these negotiations following President Kennedy's visit to Rome on July 1. The. .American Embassy informs us that the President came prepared to suggest renewed discussions on the MLF in Washington under a umbrella so as to make it easier for the interim Leone Government to participate. However Prime Minister Leone surprised the President not only by immediately agreeing to resume discussions on the MLF but also by spontaneously suggesting that Admiral Ricketts visit Rome for the purpose.- One implication of this gesture was that the Italian Navy had finally agreed to accept the American proposal for multi-national manning of surface vessels. Hovrever, as you know, the Admiral's visit scheduled for July 25 has now been postponed and the Italian Navy does not appear to have abandoned its previous drive to obtain the nuclear fire-power which would significantly alter its role and In this, the Navy would seem to occupy a strong negotiating position. It has influential political backing within Italy; is the dominant power in the Mediterranean as witnessed by the Naval review held on July 18; and is the only Italian service capable of assuming more than a tactical nuclear role. !viore important, British hesitancy about the .MLF makes Italian participation particularly valuable to prevent the force from being merely a German-American sharing of nuclear capacity. There are·also indications that France would not be disappointed if Italy remained aloof. L1 000394 �. , } .-. . t. " 4 The implications of the Italian policy decisions on this question are of considerable magnitude involving several different solutions for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons while at the same time meeting the growing European desire for more direct participation and control over some aspects of the nuclear deterrent on which their wellbeing depends. Italian delay apparently has motivations similar in some respects to French policy for encouraging the regional diminishment of the American presence, while at the same time preparing to assume the role so far filled regionally by the United States. To our mi.TJ.d the objective of the Italian Navy is to take over the role of the U.S. Nruzy in the Mediterranean. t To accomplish this they need nuclear weaponry and see no reason why missiles previously shared by the U.S.A. with Italy on Italian territory cannot in · effect be transferred under similar or improved conditions to Italian ships: 14.· We will continue to keep you posted by telegram on their efforts to achieve this end. THE :ID.ffiASSY ·• 000395 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW03823 Title A name given to the resource Numbered Letter from USSEA to Rome 476 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 29-Jul-63 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy - NATO long term planning," RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5960, 50219-AL-2-40, part 10, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource NATO, nuclear weapons Description An account of the resource The Italian Navy and the MLF Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en