https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/918cc5e86631cc0b33bdd3762daade38.pdf c30f3eb66346b8109f5db6bb0f09313c PDF Text Text ^GrUR-^ir yz^ WWN8RADSD TO SSHET * REOUiT A SECffl [K/M4 Canadian Eyes Only BmpffLjg. tions. h (Copy Bo. 2 of e> copies t«u sent to Mr* Pearson by Mr* Claxton under cover of a letter dated March &$ 1954) Kotos Some of the iftforaation contained in this paper was secured on a personal basis en the understanding that its use would be seriously restricted. Therefore, this paper should not be circulated, nor should it be quoted in such a way as to reveal the source of the inf onaatioa* 2. In private conversation General Bedell Smith mentioned that tho US v/as concerned about some adverse comment in NATO regarding the US statements on the "new look" and on continental defence. He said he knew that some NATO nations seek Canadian views on these matters and he v/as anxious to enlist our support. I suggested that it vrould be useful if Admiral Radford wont to the CPI Exercise in April and v/as prepared to explain the "new look" insofar as it effects NATO and also queries on continental defence. VJhile I knew that General Collins v/ould be there, I felt the fact that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff v/as attending v/ould show US continued interest. General Bedell Smith spoke to Admiral Radford who has agreed to go to the exercise. I informed them of my intention to attend. Discussions with Admiral Radford 0845-0930 hours Friday, 5 Mar 5k J-X# •• • e 12. I then raised several points in regard to the "new look" which I x/as not too clear about and v/hich were not covered in the discussions the day before. The first point was "prompt retaliation at places of our choosing, etc". Admiral Radford explained that this was an e7fort to regain the initiative and not continue to bo dra'./n into local aggressions on the ground of enemy choosing. It './as designed iiainly as a warning to the Communists that the US v/ill not hesitate to risk a major war to prevent future aggression. This theory is based on tho assumption that the Communists x/ill not risk a uajor war unless they are prepared to wage an all-out war and it is in accordance with their preconceived plans. Admiral Radford continued by saying that the statement ./as meant mainly as a warning to the Soviets. Ho admitted that there were many practical difficulties in worsting out such a policy. I asked tho question, "Jhat about your allies in such circumstances?". He replied that of course they would have to be consulted and I replied that this appears to nullify the ./ord "prompt" in the policy statement. I pursued the point by A, referring to oho circumstances in case of hostilities again in Korea.!' Adniral Radford replied that he did not t:*ink that hostilities v/ould A be reopened but if I wanted to discuss this situation as a case in J point ho ./ould go along. I suggested that if shooting started age in in Korea, especially at night, who v/ould kno./ or who v/ould admit -./ho reopened the war. *.Jho ./ould they bomb ./ith the Soeul or IIosco./. He agreed this v/ould create a and 7o replied that this v/as a case where the A used immediately, but he emphasized that if the that the US could not accept the Yalu sanctuary in using all v/eapons at their disposal to bring 3peedy conclusion. Hov/ever, he reiterated that A bomb - Peking, difficult problem bomb could not bo Korean war reopened and would insist the ./ar to a A bombs ./ould only 000097 i �be used against military targets and not against Chinese cities. He said that much more had been read into the statement of "places of our choosing" than v/as intended, and it did not imply bombing , Peking and Moscow. Admiral Radford continued that he v/as convinced j that the Chinese had only entered the Korean conflict after they had ascertained sufficient information from the UN and other sources such as India, that if they entered the Korean war there was little likelihood that the UN forces v/ould extend the war to the mainland of China. Therefore, they v/ere prepared to take a calculated risk fully expecting to be able to drive the UN forces into the sea -./ith little risk of A bomb retaliation on the mainland of China. I then asked about the use of the A bomb in the event of further Chinese aid to Indo-China, here again he said it would be hard to prove further Chineso aid and thex^e woro no suitable targets on which to use A weapons. .1 A I 13. By this time. I v/as convinced that the statement about "prompt retaliatory action at places of o./n choosing" v/as mainly for propa- </ ganda purposes and would not be applied without consultation \/ith allies. ' 000098 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW05469 Title A name given to the resource CDNW05469 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO and global strategy," RG25-A-3-b, vol 4903, file 50115-P-40, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en