https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/364fbe0b7d22012d65bf45879dab3a06.pdf a3f1192a316f6339fb1ba39177aabe3b PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information J)-too - rjj/Ff June 6 t h , 1957 Jules Leger, Esq , Under-Secret Qttav .e for Kxtei ira, Dear Mr. Leger: I have now had an opportunity to study your letter of June 4th on the 'Fourth Power' .blent as well as the first Instalment of suggested amendments enclosed with your letter of Hay 29th on the suae subject. a» writing to suggest some means of reconciling .lews of your department as expressed In these letters witn those of the rest of our group as proposed in the tnird draft of the memorandum dated May 30th, and with which I nad thought you ,reed in general substance at our earlier meetings. There Is such a radical difference between the views of your department and the views we had reached in our previous meetings that I thought it would be desirable to hav* r meeting, but before the meeting I think we should explore the possibilities of some reconciliation. 1 suggested to General Foulkes that he might discuss with you the substance of the problems relating to the use of the weapons and the NiTO arrangements. I gather that he has not yet done so. The first problem we should consider, I think, is th timing. I do >not want to rush consideration, either by officials or Ministers, what is a most important problem and >osal 1000035 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information - 2 da should take some initiative on It. On tta other hand, there Is a good deal of ctlvity going on in this field, not only at the Disarmament Suo-Committee but in HATO and in the capitals of our allies, and I am not sure whether any Ideas that we might put forward would be much less effective in September and October than in June and July. I think we should consider tnls time element on Monday. If we cannot get this subject before the Cabin Defence Cossftittee next Thursday morning, we have not much hope of getting any proper collective Ministerial consideration of it before late August or early September. Perhaps, however, it would be wiser to leave it for further discussions of substance between officials during the next few weeks and not try to get anything to Ministers until late in the sunsner. In regard to the substance of tue proposals, 1 get the Impression that you have In Blind a S iCEUR-Council control that would have to be i'Cleed at the time of any crisis before the pons were used, although this is only implied rather than stated in your draft. I tnink th such an arrangement is impractical in regard to the use of nuclear anti-aircraft weapons and I would think that is probably the case with regard to others as well. Your own suggested paragraph 20 recognizes this possibility. I would suggest that we propose that the Council would instruct SvCEUR in advance as to the circumstances under which these various specific types of weapons would be used - there stay be different circumstances for anti-aircraft weapons than, say, for HONEST JOHN. SaCEUR in turn would then delegate his authority, subject to tne U.S. law if necessary, to his subordinate commanders to the extent necessary to get it to a practical operating level. This would �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -3 preserve the principle that you appear to have in mind and could be covered; and I think it is worth some effort to achieve. In fact I think this could be covered by reasonably modest changes in the wording of tne new paragraph 15 you have proposed and to which I am suggesting amendments below. Your draft is not clear as to whether the U.S. and the U.K. tactical nuclear weapons would also be under SACSUR and Council control. The implication is that they would be. I would think we should not be firm on this point in discussing it with the U.S. and the U.K. If the Council is going to lay down policy and a general instruction to SACEUR in advance, this would surely be one which would be consistent with what the U.K. and the U.S. will be doing in regard to their own units on the continent and those units will in any case be under SACEUR command. Consequently it seems to me that one would not need to be specific that the formula you are suggesting would apply to other than those weapons that are provided on loan or as mutual aid. Perhaps, however, this is a vital point in the view of your department which will require discussion in substance. I may say I find it hard to believe that a decision of France on this major issue would really be dependent on the nature of the arrangements between SACEUR and the Council in respect of U.S. and U.K. weapons which they themselves produce. In regard to procedure, I would much prefer one single memorandum along the lines our group has had in mind than to have a separate one on uranium export policy. The immediate issues with which Ministers are faced are those in the field of uranium exports but they are now well aware of the relation of it to this 'Fourth Power' problem. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 4 It seems to me that a single longer memorandum makes more of a logical whole in this field than would two separate ones. I have not yet seen what your officers have In mind on the export situation, however, and until I do I am not familiar enougn with what they feel is deficient in the group draft and needs to be spelled out separately. In regard to the form of the memorandum, your department has suggested so many changes, some of them so radical and so many of them admonitory rather than leading to recommendations, that I am somewhat at a loss as to what to suggest in reaching agreement on a text. I find myself unconvinced of the need for a number of the changes in detail, but perhaps the others In the group whoa I have not yet been able to consult will be prepared to accept them subject to consideration of changes in the substance. I have no serious objection to many of the changes in form, provided that we are in substantial agreement on the substance of what we want to recommend on this important matter. ,er studying your suggestions In detail, I would make the following proposals for a compromise draft which I hope you can consider before our meeting on Monday. I shall have a revision along these lines prepared for consideration then if you think well of it. The following comments are related to the group draft of May 30th and refer to the suggestions in your two letters as read together. Paragraph 1 I do not see the need for watering down this paragraph as you have suggested when it is our own secret Internal memorandum In question. I do not see why it is injudicious to discuss the relative stability of some of our allies when that Is central to the issue that is troubling us. 000038 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information - 5Paragraph 2 No change suggested. Paragraph 3 I would prefer to leave in the last two sentences and have re-drafted the later paragraphs on Germany taking this into account. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 No changes suggested. Paragraph 7 To be changed as you suggest. £|a*g*rej>hJB; I would accept your first suggestion but I would prefer not to accept the others. Adding the words "or manufacture" in the context you have suggested in the first sentence changes the substance significantly here. If you prefer, we could add at the end of this sentence something to the effect "and artght well avoid a fourth power entering upon the manufacture of nuclear weapons". I would prefer to keep the last two sentences notwithstanding the comment in your letter because I cannot see that the Council-SACEUR proposal that we are making will really remove the French and German objections and I think we should make Ministers aware early in our argument that we are proposing something quite serious that will encounter difficulties. Paragraph 9 To be changed as you suggest. 1000039 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information . 6Paragraph 10 Again I would like to retain this reference to lack of stability in France and to lack of full confidence in our recent enemies. This memorandum is a purely domestic document asking Ministers to approve a difficult initiative which is bound to get us Into some difficulties with our French and German allies and It seems to me we should not pull our punches in arguing for it. If the argument is wrong in substance, that is another matter and we should discuss it on its merits. Paragraph 11 To be ciianged ae you suggest. New paragraph following paragraph 11 Y >ur suggestion here for a new paragraph 11 is acceptable to me if its first two sentences can be put positively and constructively rather than way they are, and also if the third sentence which I consider highly dangerous Is eliminated. As paragraph 20 of the group draft recognized, we are asking Canada and otner NaTO countries, apart• from the U.S. and the U.K., to remain second class powers and we think that we and they should remain such for good reasons. On the other hand, I would not throw in a provocative group of catch words like this without arguing the matter in its context we have tried to do. The last sentence of this new paragraph should not be necessary now if we retain the present paragraph 18 which I am suggeetlng below. Paragraph 12 This should be revised as you propose (in your first letter) but I hope that you would agree 000040 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a (information - 7to omit the fifth and sixth sentences which I think are unnecessarily critical of the conclusions tnat we I would also suggest that the last sentence of this paragraph should read ae follows: "Particular consideration has been given to a possible system which might serve to prevent or dissuade any NATO member becoming a fourth power manufacturing nuclear weapons." Paragraph 13 This should be changed as you suggest but without the word "ssull" in the first sentence which ie unnecessary. I think "might perhaps be possible" £3 weak in the second sentence, but If your department does not feel more convinced than that, I do not want to ask you to say more than you believe. It is possible tnat the last sentence will have to be changed In view of what Mr. Zimmerman tells me about MATADOR, both because it is a ground-to-ground missile ani because it seems to me it has a large enough range and potential size of yield that may make it the type of weapon we would not wish to have possessed by a fourth power. This we should discuss in substance. Paragraph 14 I think your suggestions here are satisfactory but I would eliminate the sentence you put in brackets as being unnecessary In view of what we say later about Germany. Paragraph 15 This of course Is the central point. I would be prepared to accept your proposal of substance that we should not ask NATO to declare that no mentoer state should become a fourth nuclear power, if you feel that this would better achieve what we have in mind. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information - 8I would ala ept your proposal in regard to the role of the Council if it is changed in substance in eordanee with what I have said above. I wo ..arefore suggest that your revision be further revised to read as followsi "15* Specifically it is proposed that, if the U.S. and the U.K. agree after consultation, Canada crystallize this new policy by proposing at NATO that certain specified nuclear warheads for specified air defence id ground support weapons should be made available on loan by the U.S. (and to a nominal extent by the U.K.) to other NATO members who require them. These nuclear warheads would be stored in stockpiles under the formal custody of SACEtH They would be used only in accordance with the specific military directions of this commander, which would be given only In accordance with general directives of the NATO Council regarding the use of such weapons. This would be In line " (The remainder would be as you propose.) Extra paragraph following paragraph 15 I would include here your proposed paragraph 16 revised to read as followst "Under the policy proposed, NATO countries, other than the U.S. and the U.K., would be free to make nuclear weapons if they decided to do so, but It would be understood that tney would not be assisted In any way in this endeavour by their allies. Indeed the supply of U.S. (and to a nominal extent U.K.) warheads under a loan rangement would be designed to discourage these .TO countries from manufacturing nuclear weapons themselves. Whenever any other NATO country began to manufacture its own nuclear weapons, 000042 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 9 it would cease to receive warheads on loan from the U.S. or U.K. and would be obliged to return forthwith what they have already received on lo This policy would require a system of inspection to ensure that 11 warheads provided on loan were kept in the form provided and for the purpose for which they were provided and under SaCEUR control. is inspection would be carried out by a joint NATO inspection organization or possibly by the W£U armament control agency on behalf of NATO in the WEI uries." Paragraph 16 I much prefer to keep this than to incorporate your suggested paragraph 18, but I would be prepared to discuss what advantages you see in your approach rather than what we have suggested. Paragraph 17 I prefer our group draft to your suggested paragraph 17. I think this is also an illustration of how desirable it is that we should not separate the export problem into a different memorandum. Paragraph 18 I would like to retain this paragraph in general subject to amendment Paragraphs 19 and 20 I think these are still worth retaining unless you disagree with the substance on which you have made no comment. l'-vr proposed paragraph 19 The changes in weapons that are now being owed may blur but need not, I think, destroy the 000043 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 10 distinction we are trying to make if, as proposed, the policy is Implemented in terms of specific warheads for specific weapons, retained subject to inspection. I have been over the technical aspects of the problem with Mr. Zimmerman, Dr. Longair and Dr. Arnell and I think It Is not necessary to recount these technical difficulties to Ministers at this time. Perhaps Ministers should be briefed on the technical problems when there is an opportunity. If we officials agree in substance to do what we have in mind, let us take the responsibility for advising Ministers th we believe that the technical difficulties can be surmounted. Your paragraph 20 what is now proposed for paragraph 15 would make this unnecessary and indeed it is the consideration indicated in this paragraph which it seems to me makes the revision of 15 essential even at present. Your paragraph 21 I think this detracts from the essentials of the arguments and does not contribute to the argument as a whole. Paragraph 21 . I would agree with the suggestion that there should be a separate paragraph about Germany and that this one should end after the third sentence. New paragraph 21A I would suggest the following concerning Germany to cover the points in your three paragraphs 22, 23 and 24i �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information • - 11 "Germany presents a spec ad difficult eas Presently bound by the Paris Treaties not to manufacture nuclear weapons d rent by arguments as to whether or not her forces should even use tactical nuclear weapons, she will undoubtedly wish within a few years to use at least the tactical variety. Her circumstances seem bound to lead to this conclusion. Her frontiers BMHrgst with the East; her planes are the traditional invasion route; upon her will fall the main initial burden of both air and ground defence; she will shortly be much the strongest Western military power on the continent. the other hand, she has a delicate problem in her relations with East Germany where the use of even tactical nuclear weapons might easily insurrection or border Incident into a major war. Moreover, Russia would be apt to view with jpeclal concern the possession of any nuclear weapons by Germany unless there was convincing reason to believe these could only be used in a limited defensive role. Many people in the west also feel strongly that Germany above all must be prevented from using her great technical ity to arm herself with weapons which would enable her or provoke others to start a major war. The policy proposed in this paper shouldImake it more possible than any other that has been suggested to maintain the treaty limitations on Germany, to give her the .ti-alrcraft and ground defences she needs In order to be an effective member of NATO and yet keep her from acquiring the types ot weapons which neither East nor West would wish her to have." Paragraphs 22 to 26 I would retain these rather than deal separately with tries outside NATO in different memorandum; otherwise Ministers might well feel our consideration was incomplete in this respect. 000045 �Document divulgue en venu ae ia to - 12 Paragraph 27 To remain. Paragraph 28 I cannot understand the suggestion that this accumulation of the whole should be deleted and should be put in a memorandum on sales policy where it simply does not belong. Paragraph 2ft As I have already indicated, I would prefer to keep this rather than have a separate memorandum on export policy. I will be glad to discuss this with you or with any of your officers on Friday or during the weekend if you so desire and will let me know so that I can come in to the office for this purpose. Yours sincerely, � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW05250 Title A name given to the resource CDNW05250 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (SCIENTIFIC) - Atomic Energy - Nuclear Weapons Policy; Fourth Country Problem," RG2-B-2, Box 72, file R-100-1(p), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en