https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/deea2e1af83664949efc3ebb526705f1.pdf 41c1bc9b7390e165a8fdcf151e9c00de PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information SECRET Draft Paragraphs for Memorandum to Cabinet on the "Fourth Power" Problem 12. It is recognized that the most satisfactory means of preventing any 4th power from manufacturing nuclear weapons would be an international disarmament agreement. The U.S. has recently proposed that any fissionable materials produced after March 1958 should, provided an effective system of control had been accepted, be used only for non-weapons purposes under international supervision. If such a proposal were to be generally agreed it would solve the 4th power problem as far as the manufacture of nuclear weapons is concerned. Moreover, because it is connected with other proposals for 7 reductions of existing stockpiles of fissionable materials and nuclear weapons by means of transfers to stocks under international supervision and because it would"be implemented only as part of a programme involving reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments, acceptance of such a proposal would diminish and render less urgent the pressures for the emergence of 4th powers possessing nuclear weapons or having nuclear weapons under their operational control or having A t nuclear weapons on their territory earmarked for use by their forces. In such an approach there is no need to seek to distinguish between the dangers of manufacture and the dangers of possession by 4th powers or to try to draw a line between long and short range or strategic and tactical or offensive and defensive or deterrent and operational warheads. Nor is it necessary to propose to guard against the emergence of a 4th manufacturing power by expediting the emergence of several powers possessing or controlling nuclear weapons of some /^description./ The U.S. proposal appears to be the most practical which has yet been advanced in disarmament negotiations. However, although the Soviet Union appears anxious to reach some disarmament agreement and in particular to p • ••c 000081 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a (information SECRET - 2 solve the 4th power problem in such a way as to ensure that Germany does not emerge as the manufacturer or possessor of nuclear weapons, it would seem overly optimistic to rely on agreement being reached along the lines of the above U.S. proposals. It therefore seems desirable to consider alter- native policies which might offer partial solutions to the 4th power problem. Particular consideration has been given to a possible system which might serve to prevent a 4th power manufacturing large-scale nuclear weapons arising among the NATO members, although it would not affect such other possible contenders as Japan, India and Sweden. Introduction of Nuclear Weapons in Shield Forces in NATO 13. It does not appear reasonable to refuse to assist other NATO members in gradually streamlining their shield forces in the same manner as the United States and the United Kingdom have done by the introduction of small nuclear warheads for air defence and ground support weapons. It might/perhaps / be possible to limit the possession of nuclear warheads to certain specific short-range air defence and ground support weapons which are to be released to the NATO partners in the near future. These weapons would consist of HONEST JOHN, a ground-to-ground missile; MATADOR, an air-to-ground missile; and some air defence weapons of the NIKE type. 14. Such atomic weapons of limited range and size would not enable a NATO power to embark on a war against a major power possessing larger, long-range weapons of mass retaliation with the hope of success; nor should this modernization programme, including the possession of limited range nuclear weapons, provoke a preventive war by a major power. (In this connection Germany is a special case which will be discussed in separate paragraphs below.) We should not attempt to minimize the grave dangers of a general war if the smaller weapons were used. However, a decision has ...3 000082 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a (information SECRET - 3already been taken by two NATO powers, the U.S. and the U.K., to strengthen their ground forces and air defences in Western Europe with these weapons. Thus it is proposed that we recognize that the other nations in NATO may also wish to reorganize their shield forces in a similar manner to those 7 of the United Kingdom and the United States, which would entail the limited possession of nuclear warheads for air defence and ground support weapons. This is consistent with the proposals concerning United Kingdom and German plans which were discussed in NATO in recent months. 15. Specifically, it is proposed that, after consult- ation with the United States and the United Kingdom, Canada crystallize this new policy by proposing that nuclear warheads for air defence and ground support weapons should be made ^ available in gradual stages to NATO members. The nuclear warheads would be stored in stockpiles- under the formal custody of the Supreme Allied Commander "in Europe. SACEUR ihfi& would have to give his permission before the warheads were used in any circumstances and he would give it only after receiving the authorization of the NATO Council. This would 1\ j/f* *** (be in line with the interpretation made by NATO Foreign ^ 8 ft/^tA -v Ministers, including Mr. Dulles, and by General Gruenther, of f^°\p^ MC 48, the report of the Military Committee of NATO on the rtjE^O most effective pattern of NATO military strength over the next few years. This report was approved by NATO at its Ministerial Meeting in December 1954. Its interpretation left to Governments through the NATO Council rather than to the NATO military authorities the decision as to when NATO nuclear weapons would be used. 16. Initially, the nuclear warheads would be provided to other NATO countries by the U.S. or the U.K., although other NATO countries would not be prevented from manufacturing them. Under the policy we propose they would be free but > ^ / ^ ^ * ^ 000083 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a (information *fi ^ h\Ii* ^ SECRET - 4- would not be encouraged to do so. The supply of U.S. and U.K. warheads under a military aid programme would, on the contrary, be designed to discourage other NATO countries from manufacturing them. Whenever other NATO countries did begin to manufacture their own they would cease to -,- ' u ^ i^^tJ^ // (^ %\^k ^sP ZK receive the mutual aid supply from the U.S. and the U.K. Under the new policy the nuclear warheads manufactured by any other NATO member would also be under the custody of SACEUR and would be placed in the same stockpiles with the warheads provided to the country concerned by the U.S. or U.K. The new policy would, of course, require an elaborate system of inspection to make sure that all warheads provided to or manufactured by NATO countries were kept in the stockpiles under SACEUR's control. This inspection would be carried out by a joint NATO inspection organization or possibly by the WEU Armament Control Agency on behalf of j NATO in WEU countries. 17. , To facilitate the launching of this new policy Canada might offer to provide as Mutual Aid, within reasonable financial limits, the uranium required for the manufacture by the U.S. or the U.K. of the warheads for the short-range defensive weapons to be provided to other NATO countries. This Mutual Aid supply would not be extended to other NATO countries if and when they began to manufacture their own warheads for these weapons. Until this policy is accepted, Canada^ is only free to sell uranium in small, experimental reactor quantities. Once this policy is accepted Canada should be able to sell uranium more freely to other NATO partners. A separate memorandum is iA/Hk vj being submitted on this subject. Difficulties Presented by the New Policy 18. The new policy presents several difficulties which ...5 000084 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a (information SECRET - 5must be reckoned with. Under present U.S. legislation U.S. forces would have to retain formal custody of the nuclear warheads to be provided to NATO members. Our policy thus rests on the hope that the U.S. Congress would agree to permit the U.S. Government to provide NATO members with nuclear warheads for the tactical, defensive weapons described in paragraph 13 under the safeguards of the new policy, unless, as__in_the_ case of the U.K., the U.S. Government can provide such warheads without amendment to the present legislation. If Congressional consent is needed, it should be facilitated by the fact that SACEUR is and will probably always be a U.S. citizen but it must be recognized that Congressional consent may still prove very difficult to obtain. If necessary to this end, it might be possible to persuade other NATO members that the troops maintaining custody of the stockpiles should always be United States troops when any of the nuclear warheads in them were of U.S. origin. 19. The new policy is based on a distinction between long-range, strategic, offensive weapons of mass retaliation and short-range, tactical, defensive weapons of the type mentioned in paragraph 13. This distinction is open to criticism on the ground that the nuclear warheads of the weapons cannot be thus categorized: so devastating is their effect that even a so-called "small" one can be used in a strategic role; conversely tactical roles are being envisaged for some of the more powerful ones. Nonetheless the general distinction between the two types of weapons seems valid for the short-term purpose of the new policy. The policy is designed to cover the next few years when the short-range, defensive weapons with nuclear warheads will be made available to the NATO �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a (information » SECRET - 6partners and when NATO members other than the U.S. and U.K will either not be producing their own nuclear warheads or will have barely begun to do so. A time will come, however, when the policy will be overtaken and.outmoded by events; possibly a disarmament agreement and almost certainly further developments in the manufacture of warheads, such as the production of high power, smaller weight, "clean" ones usable in eltner a flrto^ jjip 0 tactical or a strategic role, which will further blur the distinction between the warheads themselves as far jP^ |1- (J^Tfl^as the terms "tactical" and "strategic" are concerned. Then, & - # v- » ,/J X 4\^W$ *)% j^ would seem, the only valid remaining criteria will be the type of launching or delivery apparatus and the defensive or offensive objectives of the user. Neither criterion will ojj k / m ^ be applicable to determine what warheads should be provided ^mHJ «/"' to or manufactured by NATO members under the new policy. (P* It seems evident that at that stage the policy would have to R xW^ $ come under review and it might then be possible to set up an effective NATO control system over the launching apparatuses '"'Ikf o r wea P o n s with nuclear warheads. Such a control would be facilitated by the likelihood that the United States will d/Kjfir] remain the main manufacturer of these apparatuses, though a further complication must be admitted in the fact that some NATO members are capable of manufacturing such apparatuses ^tP p/ft ^J/f if they decide to devote the necessary resources to this purpose. v/P\Jv "P 20. The new policy might become difficult to retain when the new ground forces of the NATO members become equipped with weapons largely or entirely dependent on nuclear warheads and their air defences become similarly dependent. NATO members would then be unable to take effective action to lW- ^ ^ Q&^ repel invasion until the NATO Council's consent had been received. ...7 000086 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information SECRET - 721. Another problem that will probably arise is that no NATO country will wish to foreswear the right to manufacture the whole family of nuclear weapons and to develop and use the short- and long-range methods of delivery. This is on the assumption that the U.S. (and now the U.K.) will not agree to place the warheads for all its long-range, strategic nuclear weapons under SACEUR's custody and NATO Council control, if only on the sound practical grounds that a decision of the NATO Council could not be given quickly enough in the circumstances where the U.S. would wish to use its long-range fir fj^ Qs deterrent weapons. (If they could not be used quickly, they would, of course, cease to be deterrents.) 22. As mentioned in paragraph 14 above, Germany is an exceptional and difficult case. Because of its division and its geographical position, hostilities involving NATO are more likely to break out along the border between the two Germanies or in Berlin than at any other point in the NATO area. A revolt in East Germany would create an extremely delicate situation because of the temptation of West Germans to go to the assistance of their East German brethren. Moreover, the classic invasion route to Western Europe lies across the North German plain. 23. For all these reasons the Germans may well wish to have access to nuclear weapons in case of need. Although they are explicitly bound by the Paris Treaties not to manufacture atomic, biological or chemical weapons, they are technically and scientifically able to develop their own nuclear weapons and may in the future seek a revision of their obligations under the Paris Treaties if they are not satisfied with alternative measures to make it possible for them to defend themselves with the latest tactical weapons. At the same time there is strong opposition within Germany . . .8 000087 �. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a (information » ^ SECRET - 8to any German Government manufacturing nuclear weapons. A NATO policy which made nuclear weapons available to German armed forces in case of war might therefore satisfy German public opinion and meet Germany's essential defence requirements, although no one can predict that in the long run, if other NATO countries such as France are to develop their own atomic weapons, Germany (possibly in cooperation with France) may not also wish to manufacture its own. 24. Although, as was stated in paragraph 14 above, the supply of nuclear weapons under SACEUR's custody and NATO Council control in peacetime to NATO members should not provoke a preventive war, the Soviet Union's genuine alarm . at the prospect of Germany either manufacturing or possessing its own nuclear weapons should not be under-estimated. Although Germany could not embark on a war for the liberation of East Germany with any hope of success, a Germany manufacturing or possessing its own atomic weapons even under the safeguards we propose would be very anxiously regarded by the Soviet Union, since Germany would be in a position to involve the other NATO powers. Department of External Affairs May 29, 1957- 000088 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW05230 Title A name given to the resource CDNW05230 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (SCIENTIFIC) - Atomic Energy - Nuclear Weapons Policy; Fourth Country Problem," RG2-B-2, Box 72, file R-100-1(p), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en