https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ff80f7f0e48081529490a8e65d5c71b3.pdf 05d58560a9a00f6b42713bf88a51bbd9 PDF Text Text BRIEF FOR THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE IN CHIEFS OF STAFF SESSION MAY 1962 . SECRET ffi PCSC 2108 ol (JPS/N) i6 Mhy 62 GOPY k) 6 MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE INTRODUCTION 0F: MRBM's pINTO'NATO '- References? In Briefs MC 99 (Draft) In Library? (a) MC 53 (Final) •(b) MCM, 8 8 ~ 6 o •(0) M C 95 BACKGROUND I, *P At their 2?th meeting,---the--MC/OS agreed? • ' -• • .* J a 0 --••^--"^edr^-"^tfe^^-"-r^<io^-^%-i-pii" of the importance from a military point of view of early Council action pn MC 95 (Military Aspects of the Control of Nuclear Weapons); bo For members of the Committee to emphasize the urgency of this problem to their respective governments in order to expedite handling\of MC 95 by; the Council; and c Directed the SGN to continue the study of the problem of the military aspects of the control of nuclear weapons after the Council has acted on MC 95. 2o This.subject has been studied by the S&N (MC 99 (-draft)) who have reached the following conclusions? a, Modernization i (i) The present organization of nuclear weapon's systems within n a t i o n a l forces i& satisfae'tqry from the m i l i t a r y point of view; (ii) The intr oduction of mobile MRBMs i s l i k e l y t o r e s u l t in complications, t h e degree of v/hich r e q u i r e s d e t a i l e d study. 000/2 .. . ? r _.,.,.. . , .. . . . . . . . ^r 000448 ^ �SECRET bo Multilateral Forces ,' ' E* "s •(•'•' (1) ,'-' Elf ari MREM. rcultilateral force i s tppbe fqrni^dsj t h e orgkni^ation a t ? l6^,v-y70,uldpp^ovide the b e ^ faiance between m i l i t a r y e f f e c t i v e n e s s and m u l t i l a t e r a l i d e n t i t y pf the fprqe; (ii) A ,mlxedfprce c o n s i s t i n g of land,.. and sea-based u n i t s WPUId offer the g r e a t e s t f l e x i b i i i t y and would have the added advantage of.allowing p c o u n t r i e s t o c o n t r i b u t e e i t h e r landbased orPsea^based u n i t s accprdingf to "their n a t i o n a l ; p r e f e r e n c e s ; (iii) M u l t i l a t e r a l c o n t r o l oyer thi^.use of MiRBMs including' m u l t i l a t e r a l ' c o n t r o l p v e r t h e r e l e a s e ( o f warheads, cajd, . only'be Exercised at p o l i t i c a l l e v e l . Co General (if The .greatest value of the MRBM weapons system ;wpuld be obtained by the brpadrest possible gepgraphic deployment, and national participatiph throughout NATO .Europe, including adjacent maritime area's;-' (ii) More detailed informations, including that on tbe, proposed, new missive,., particularly regarding methods ^ Of \eqnf* trpl and s&fegua|>ds,8v%ili -be' requ|re'q.:> before any final conclusions can be made 0. CANADIAN POSITION 3« This paper has been reviewed by the GhiefS, of Staff who are in general agreement with the conclusions contained therein. ,;,;.'• 4. The hest deployment of MRBM*s depends upon geographical considerations such as,density of road and. rail networks, and on the standard of enemy intelligence in different areas* As'a result.it is unlikely that the def>lpymerit which is best in one .country would jae; bpst in. all' ptherso In, particulara the vulnerability - pf ship bprneP.. missiles relative to^land based missives is an open questiprio pHoweyeiv, it is'; jmdP^btediy 'true "that an MRBil f pr|>e in any of th^se .depipyaentsEwould be' muph'l.ess vulnerable than the air strike force9 so it js perhaps not unreaspnable to design the MRBM force for convenience in design and control, rather than for the absolute minimum vulnerability o . 7 :':,....'.. \ • '• - ' . 5. The use pf MRBM?s against mobile tank and mechanized forces (Para 11) is quest!onedo .The. MRBM: is inherently an inflexible weappn at the tactical level pf pperations which, combined with the inadequacy of surveillance methods, lowers the probability pf its effective employment against tr.ansitery targetsc It wpu Id appear any casual capability in this regard should not be over-emphasized0 »„o/3 000449 �'$•.. It is agreed th^t any co]jpi|nIeat}ipns 'system serving the MRBM's must be fast, certain and secure. jfW p.. ' It is qohsidered that; the composition Cpf missiid units, should 'h§ asrna^£pnallyi.hpmpgenepus as^possiblep ' .. fbi|sih%entIwiibi" th£> ; pSl'ltical: requirement f pr'Ja!;;:i|u$ti|? p fiatipnal force. M.the'jihtereSts pf^economy;in manppwe^, * Ihd communications^ and^pf' military effidi'enc'y',.;^J would Support the organization" proposed in paragraph 16 (a) as the most desirable. We recognize9 however, that limitations in manpower, or technical skills-within some member natidns, coupled with the requirement for a multinational forSe, may require the establishment pin some areas of missile units staffed by mixed nationalities in accordance with paragraph 16(c)„ 000450 J � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04474 Title A name given to the resource "Brief for the Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session May 1962" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21469, file CSC 2108:1, part 5, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 16-May-62