https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e86c072af777948e221d9facda8aa75f.pdf 86bb641a4369ed008a79ed2ff0c6ec93 PDF Text Text NATO—SECRET V- 125 /j/tZ J/d 2- NATO - SECRET COPY NO, J?/Cars MC 99 (Discussion Draft) (Referral Note) 1 May 1962 NOTE FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN CHIEFS OF STAFF SESSION Military Aspects of the Introduction SUBJECT: of MRMBs into NATO 1. At Enclosure is a draft paper prepared without national guidance on the above subject for use as a basis for informal discussion at your 28th Session in Paris on Monday, 21 May 1962. 2. Concurrently copies of this draft have been transmitted to Major Commanders who have been invited to comment at the MC/CS Meeting. N. S. GRANT Captain, Royal Navy Deputy Secretary t <?«- p/ccrs CCOS Comments are not requested C/JS Hiairmem, Jar C I S (W) c o * ( cbae \ V OM ) •ocy>y / / I is*/* 'yZky, 7 y« 1 ENCLOSURE 1 MC 99 (Discussion Draft) *f*^ DISTRIBUTION: A B C D E6,10 F Gl-3 Kl L NATO - SECRET -I MC 99 (Discussion Draft) (Referral Note) This document consists of fourteen pages NATO-SECRET i �JP» NATO SECRET MC 99 (Discussion Draft) 1 May 1962 A REPORT BY THE STANDING GROUP to the MILITARY COMMITTEE on MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF MRBMs INTO NATO THE PROBLEM 1 1. To study the military aspects of the introduction 2 of MRBMs into NATO as directed by the Military Committee 3 in Chiefs of Staff Session, at its 27th Meeting. 4 2. The problem has two distinct, though largely 5 inter-related aspects: 6 a. The need, on military grounds, to replace 7 with MRBMs those of SACEUR's strike aircraft and cruise 8 missiles which are becoming obsolete as indicated in 9 MC 26/4(Final). 10 b. The possible need to integrate MRBMs into 11 NATO in a multilateral force for other than purely 12 military reasons. 13 3- The following study considers some of the more 14 important military aspects of the problem. It is not 15 intended to cover fully all the aspects of the introduction 16 of MRBMs into NATO, DISTRIBUTION: NATO SECRET MC 99 (Discussion Draft) - 1 - Enclosure 1 000456 �*» mSsssamK ' W*-1 NATO SECRET REQUIREMENT 1 4. At the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 2 1957 at the Heads of Government level, it was agreed that 3 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) would be 4 put at disposal of SACEUR. 5 of a NATO Military Requirement for the IRBM was con- 6 tained in MC 70 (Final). 7 tially implemented by the establishment of four THOR squad- 8 rons in the United Kingdom under national command, and two 9 squadrons of JUPITERS in Italy, and one squadron of JUPITERs 10 in Turkey, under national command and SACEUR's operational 11 control. 12 5- The first formal expression This requirement has been par- In October 1959;, SACEUR expressed the view that 13 by 1963 the Soviet offensive capability would include the 14 use of new weapons of various ranges and in large quantities 15 which would increase the danger in ACE aircraft and instal- 16 lations. 17 ration by manned aircraft and cruise missiles increasingly 18 difficult. 19 Basic Military Requirement (NBMR) for a Mid-Range Ballistic 20 Missile (MRBM), indicated an initial requirement of 300 21 missiles and pointed out that the ultimate ACE requirement 22 would be a much larger number. 23 and tentative view a phased programme providing for the 24 deployment of about 80 missiles in 1963, 100 in 1964 and 25 120 in 1965. 26 aircraft on about a one for one basis. 27 Standing Group, after consultation with the Military 28 Committee, established a "Mid-Range Ballistic Missile Improvements in Soviet defences would make penet- To meet this situation, SACEUR proposed a NATO He gave as a preliminary These first 300 MRBMs were intended to replace NATO SECRET MC 99 (Discussion Draft) - 2 ~ In March i960, the Enclosure 1 000457 �1 NATO SECRET •r' (MRBM) NBMR-1-60", as proposed by SACEUR, indicating that 2 quantity and time phasing of the requirement- would be 3 decided upon later. 4 6, On 2 December i960, the Standing Group determined 5 that, inter alia, the POLARIS missile's military character- 6 istics would adequately meet a seaborne portion of the MRBM 7 requirement for Allied Command Europe as outlined in NBMR- 8 1-60. 9 adaptations of POLARIS, would require further study. 10 7. Systems to meet a land-based portion, including Subsequently, a research and development design 11 study of a new missile, adaptable to a land-based and/or 12 surface ship mode, has been undertaken by the United States. 13 This missile is being designed to take advantage of all that 14 has been learned in previous missile developments; it is to 15 be relatively lightweight, rugged and accurate and to include 16 special control devices to preclude unauthorized or inadver- 17 tent use and permit positive centralized control. The United 18 States' intention is that the POLARIS missile would continue 19 to meet the submarine requirement. 20 8. The number of MRBMs required by SACEUR to fulfill 21 his forecast balance between missiles and strike aircraft has 22 been stated in MC 26/4(Final). 23 awaits further political guidance of the North Atlantic 24 Council on the introduction of these weapons before it can 25 finally deal with this requirement. 26 problem should be reached as early as possible since the 27 capability to continue to meet the portion of SACEUR's tar- 28 geting requirements for which these MRBMs are intended is 29 essential. However, the Military.Committee A resolution of this 7 NATO SECRET - 3Enclosure 1 MC 99 (Discussion Draft) (Page revised by Corrig.No.l, 1 May 62) 000458 �1 NATO SECRET 1 2 3 9. Purposes of MRBMs a. The purposes of introduction of MRBMs for Allied Command Europe are: 4 (1) To continue to provide a modern reliable 5 and effective nuclear weapons delivery means for 6 attack against those targets now scheduled for 7 attack by such of the strike aircraft or cruise 8 missiles which are forecast to become obsolete 9 during the last half of the decade; 10 (2) To continue to counter-balance, militarily 11 and psychologically, the Soviet MRBM threat which 12 is now and will be in the future posed against 13 NATO Europe. 14 b. The plan to introduce MRBMs into SACEUR's 15 forces is not Intended to expand his responsibility for 16 nuclear attack beyond that presently assigned him. 17 stating the NATO requirement for the MRBM, SACEUR has 18 emphasized repeatedly that the MRBM is to perform the 19 same function now performed by those of ACE tactical 20 nuclear strike forces which are becoming obsolete, thus 21 providing a continuing effective missile/strike air- 22 craft capability. 23 c_. In Introduction of MRBMs into ACE would provide 24 a modernized survivable delivery means. 25 to their other functions, MRBMs in an Initial counter- 26 attack, suppressing Soviet air defences, would permit 27 improved reconnaissance and attack capability in NATO 28 nuclear and non-nuclear strike aircraft. 29 ments are required to counter the growing Soviet anti- 30 aircraft defence capability as well as to reduce the NATO SECRET MC 99 (Discussion Draft) - 4 - In addition Such improve- Enclosure 1 �m NATO SECRET 1 vulnerability of NATO strike forces to Soviet missile 2 attack. 3 d. Not modernizing SACEUR's nuclear attack 4 capabilities would weaken the ability of Allied 5 Command Europe forces to fulfill their role in NATO 6 strategy. DEPLOYMENT AND CONCEPT OF OPERATION 7 10. In MCM-88-60 the Military Committee considered 8 that the greatest value of this weapons system, including 9 the maximum flexibility and dispersion, would be obtained 10 by the broadest possible geographic and national deployment 11 throughout NATO Europe, although an effective capability of 12 the system did not necessarily depend on MRBMs being 13 14 stationed in any particular country. il. Targets that would be scheduled for immediate 15 attack in general war consist of known airfields, missile 16 sites, air defence complexes, control centres, and nuclear 17 storage sites which constitute the highest priority targets 18 for NATO and which would be within the range capability of 19 the MRBMs. In addition there may be contingencies wherein 20 the flexibility of the MRBM would be suitable for 21 attacking such targets as large tank and mechanised 22 troop concentrations which the Soviets may hold well to 23 the rear and could move quickly to exploit any tactical 24 opportunity. Further, although the character and scope of 25 a nuclear conflict are difficult to predict, there will be 26 a requirement for MRBMs in support of continuing military 27 operations, as reconnaissance and intelligence reveals new NATO SECRET MC 99 (Discussion Draft) - 5 - Enclosure 1 000460 �NATO SECRET 1 or previously unknown or unlocated targets which threaten 7 2 the successful accomplishment of the Commander's mission. 3 12. To fulfill the purposes stated above, they 4 could be based on land in hardened sites, on mobile vehicles, 5 on barges, coastal and sea-going surface vessels or sub- 6 marines. 7 The mode or combination of modes chosen must: a.. Provide assurance of timely response to 8 the military needs of war; i.e., the system should 9 be capable of quick response when authority for 10 use has been received and the command given by the 11 Major NATO Commander. 12 have a quick firing capability and the communication 13 system which serves the MRBM must be secure, certain 14 and immediate. 15 b. The missile itself should Be dispersed or hardened so that the 16 enemy would have to expend an unreasonable number 17 of weapons to destroy each or any group of MRBMs. 18 19 20 c_. Be capable of great accuracy and flexibility in targeting and nuclear yield. d. Be tamper-proof and incapable of inadver- 21 tent and unauthorised use by means of incorporation 22 of the latest technological developments. 23 13. The MRBMs would complement other ACE tactical 24 nuclear strike forces in the attack of suitable targets 25 where considerations of timing, range, enemy defences, 26 or base vulnerability make the MRBM the logical, and, 27 in certain cases, the only effective weapon. NATO SECRET MC 99,(Discussion Draft) - 6 - Enclosure 1 �NATO SECRET ORGANIZATION 1 14. Appendix A to MC 53 (Final) defines the policy 2 for the integration of forces in Allied Command Europe. At 3 the higher levels of command, integration presents no parti- 4 cular problems. 5 integration presents difficulties and where it had been 6 found necessary, from the point of military effectiveness, 7 to continue the chain of command on a national basis. 8 Experience has shown that units up to and including those 9 of battalion size should be organized on a national basis 10 if military efficiency is not to be seriously impaired. It Is at the lower levels of command that 11 15. Through bi-national agreement the majority of member 12 nations already have, within their national forces assigned to 13 NAT0_, several nuclear delivery systems ranging in capability 14 from the small tactical systems up to the equivalent of 15 MRBMs. These national forces function within the integrated 16 NATO command structure which includes separate channels of 17 command and control for the delivery systems and the warheads. 18 16. But several national authorities have expressed 19 the opinion that these MRBMs should be organized into a 20 NATO force which is truly multilateral in ownership and 21 control. 22 lateral MRBM system could be organized, of which the following 23 are examples: 24 There are a number of ways in which such a multi- a_. A force consisting of national units operating 25 within the framework of existing national forces 26 assigned to NATO and under the operational control of 27 the Major NATO Commander. 28 logistic and infrastructure support would be provided NATO SECRET MC 99 (Discussion Draft) The weapons system and - 7 - Enclosure 1 �.'i NATO SECRET 1 on a NATO common funding basis. This arrangement would 2 have the advantage that it conforms to the existing 3 organization, and would require the minimum of additional 4 communications facilities. 5 lateral identity to the system particularly if all, or 6 most, member nations participated in the provisions o f 7 units. 8 b. It would give some multi- A force organized on the lines of a, also con- 9 sisting of national units, but with a separate chain of 10 command and control responsive directly to SACEUR. 11 task force organization would provide a higher degree of 12 flexibility than that at a, provided deployment throughout 13 much of NATO Europe was possible. 14 disadvantage of increasing the requirement for staffs 15 and communications. 16 distinct multilateral identity than that at a above, and 17 might more fully satisfy a multilateral requirement. 18 _c. This It would have the It would, however, provide a more A force organized on the lines of b but with 19 units composed of several national sub-units on a 20 functional basis. 21 costs, would be multilaterally funded, 22 tion would present legal problems, and would be 23 militarily less efficient, but it might be the only 24 acceptable solution for those nations which could only 25 provide sub-units. All support costs, except personnel Such an organiza- A LAND OR SEA-BASED OR MIXED FORCE 26 17. A land-based force has the advantage of being capable 27 of striking with more accuracy. 28 the maximum flexibility and survivability would necessitate harden- 29 ing or a high degree of mobility and the ability to disperse down NATO SECRET MC 99 (Discussion Draft) However, the requirement for -8- Enclosure 1 (Page revised by Corrig.No.l, 1 May 62) 000463 �0 NATO SECRET 1 to individual weapons. 2 prehensive supporting organization which would be further 3 complicated if units were multi-national. 4 place a heavy commitment upon custodial and security forces. 5 In addition, mobile deployment would present very difficult 6. problems, vis-a-vis, the civil population, from a psychological 7 point of view. 8 eliminate some of these difficulties. 9 Such dispersal would require a com- It might also Complete hardening, when feasible, would 18. For shipborne forces, although liable to detection 10 and shadowing, an acceptable standard of flexibility and 11 survivability could be achieved, even though it were necessary 12 to concentrate several missiles in one vessel. 13 force would probably require the smallest additional support 14 facilities, as a ship must, of necessity, be self-supporting 15 at sea and would make use of existing port and afloat facilities 16 for routine support requirements, although special technical 17 facilities would be required to support the missile system. 18 A ship's complement consisting of different national elements 19 for ship management, the missile system, and the custodial 20 requirement, although complex is nevertheless feasible. 21 19. A shipborne A submarine force offers the best chance of 22 survival. 23 efficiency required would probably rule out any multi- 24 national participation in ship management and the missile 25 system, although the custodial element could possibly be of 26 another nation. 27 expensive mode of deployment. 28 29 20. However, the high degree of crew skill and In addition it is undoubtedly the most Sea-based deployment has an advantage when away from major ports in that these important targets would be NATO SECRET MC 99 (Discussion Draft) - 9 - Enclosure 1 000464 �NATO SECRET 1 removed from the vicinity of populated areas and important 2 military installations. 3 21. A mixed force consisting of both land and sea- 4 based units would offer the greatest flexibility and would 5 enable countries to contribute either land-based or sea- 6 based units according to their national preferences. COMMAND AND CONTROL 7 22. Any multilateral control established over the use 8 of MRBMs will have to be set up and exercised at the political 9 level in accordance with such procedures as may be laid 10 down by the North Atlantic Council in connection with their 11 considerations of the control of nuclear weapons. 12 military standpoint, it is essential that political control 13 can be exercised in a timely manner in consideration of the 14 aspects highlighted in MC 95. 15 23- From the Whatever the organization for the introduction of 16 MRBMs into NATO under multilateral control, it is essential 17 that the military command 18 weapons should be directly responsive to the Major NATO 19 Commander once political authority has been given to use them. 20 24. and control for the use of these It is assumed that a separate chain of command for 21 control of nuclear warheads will be a continuing requirement 22 irrespective of political and legal considerations. 23 a military point of view, the custody of warheads could be 24 exercised on a national or multilateral basis. 25 lateral custodial agency should be directly responsive to the 26 Major NATO Commander. 27 of warheads would only be possible at the political level. From Any multi- Multilateral control over the release NATO SECRET MC 99'TDiscussion Draft) - 10 - Enclosure 1 000465 �* NATO SECRET LOGISTICS 1 25. From the military standpoint, logistic support of 2 MRBMs can be national, bilateral or multilateral so long as 3 they are adequately and sufficiently supported and maintained 4 in accordance with logistic guidance to be provided by SACEUR. 5 Irrespective of whether NATO MRBMs would be organized on the 6 basis of land-based or seaborn© units, a programme for 7 infrastructure additional to th® arrangements presently 8 available would be necessary for stockpiling nuclear war- 9 heads and for providing essential technical support 10 facilities, FINANCIAL 11 26. Cost estimates for the new missile referred to in 12 paragraph f above are not yet available. 13 system of the POLARIS type, the costs, excluding any fixed pl4 For a missile infrastructure required, would be approximately $2,5 million 15 per missile for a seaborne version, excluding the cost of 16 the ship's hull, but including the cost of hull conversion, 17 and $7.5 million per missile for a nuclear submarine with 18 16 missiles. 19 27. There will be certain financial and personnel 20 resources now utilized to support strike aircraft and cruise 21 missiles which will become obsolete and which could become 22 available to support the MRBM programme. 23 these resources, and the personnel and maintenance costs of 24 the MRBM programme cannot be estimated until more details 25 of the missile to be adopted are available. NATO SECRET MC 99 (Discussion Draft) - 11 - The,extent of Enclosure 1 000466 �» NATO SECRET CONCLUSIONS 1 28. Modernization 2 a. The present organization of nuclear weapons .3 . systems within national forces is satisfactory from the 4 military point of view. 5 . b. The introduction of mobile MRBMs is likely to 6 result in complications, the degree of which requires 7 detailed study. 8 29.. Multilateral Forces 9 a. If an MRBM multilateral force is to be formed, 10 the organization at l6b would provide the best balance 11 between military effectiveness and multilateral identity 12 °f the force. 13 . b. A mixed force consisting of land and sea-based 14 units would offer the greatest flexibility and would have 15 the added advantage of allowing countries to contribute 16 either land-based or sea-based units according to their 17 national preferences. 18 £. Multilateral control over the use of MRBMs 19 including multilateral control over the release of war- 20 heads, can only be exercised at political level. 21 30. 22 General a. The greatest a value of Pthe MRBM weapons system 23 would be obtained by the broadest possible geographic 24 deployment.and national participation throughout NATO 25 Europe, including adjacent maritime areas. NATO SECRET MC 99 (Discussion Draft) - 12 - Enclosure 1 000467 �NATO SECRET b. More detailed information, including that on the proposed new missile, particularly regarding methods of control and safeguards, will be required before any final conclusion can be made. NATO SECRET MC 99 (Discussion Draft) - 13 - Enclosure 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04441 Title A name given to the resource CDNW04441 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21469, file CSC 2108:1, part 5, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en