https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/96165e737dd42173c4bd579bb7ef6bed.pdf 766e9e72eaf4d20f174a30c5b7830ebb PDF Text Text IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTI .CSC.?.,21.0$.0.1 department of JSattonal defence ATTACH?SECRET CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE CANADA ADDRE8S REPLY TO. SECRETARY CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE, OTTAWA. 20 October 1961 Chairman, Chiefs of Staff CAS CNS CGS CDRB Aide Memo-ire Provision of MRBMs for NATO Shield Forces 1, Attached for your information is a copy of a paper prepared by the JS/DSS concerning the above subject, dated 18 Oct 61, McPhee) lander, RCN Acting Secretary c c DM JS/DSS (less attachment) �SECRET as§c / i7 ¥e • •* -•*-• s-y ILSL. iXj/f-/ CSC 2195-4 (JS/DSS) 18 Oct 6 1 J o i n t Staff Aide-Memoire on PROVISION OF MREM-S'frQR NATO SHIEID FORCES 18 Sep 6 1 In the North Atlantic Cottneil9 the Secretary General urged Governments to take final positions on the end=1966 force requirements in order to give real meaning to the triennial review procedure. In the course of discussions on military strategy, Turkey in particular emphasized that the fringes of the Alliance were not expendable and must be defended from the outset with all possible weapons. UK proposed that the Council continue to work on the problem of whether or not the existing political directive and strategic concept were still applicableo It was argued that shield forces should complement strategic forces not duplicate them. UK authorities were not anxious to adopt weapons for shield forces which could reach deep into enemy territory and could affect the enemy's civilian population,. For that reason, UK authorities accorded very low priority to the provision of MRBMs. USA indicated that it believed the importance of long term planning had been overtaken by the urgent need to bring into being immediately the forces necessary to deal with the developing Berlin crisis. It was stated that **the USA has withheld its comments in the Military Committee on the proposed MC-96 requirements because these requirements call for major new weapons programmes. Particularly j, the MRBMs pose basic political, strategic and resource questions that are difficult to resolve and which require extensive further consideration. As soon as planning for the Berlin crisis has been completed, attention should again be directed to these questions'*a USA then proposed a resolution the operative portion of which reads as follows? North Atlantic Council oo°ooo.. requests the Military Committee, in its action on NATO Commanders proposed 1966 requirements, to develop an agreed statement of priorities to govern the development of country programmes by the NATO Military Commanders, in accordance with the triennial review procedure, which would accord high priority to enhancing NATO non-nuclear ground/air capabilities in the forward areas of Allied Command Europe. Pending further guidance from the Council, the Military Committee should defer action on the NATO Commanders proposed requirements for MRBMs and SSN(B)si o o o o o o o e DND supported the development of priorities but suggested that the resolution be amended so as to make clear that nuclear capability must not be neglectedo 26 Sep 61 Council gave further consideration to the problem of NATO planning. At this HBetiag, UK agreed to postponement of the discussions on long term aimso The question of provision of MRBMs was again raised. Norway indicated that it was confused by the USA wishing to defer consideration of NATO's military need for MRBMs, since a decision on this matter would have considerable influence on national defence programmes over the coming years. USA stated that its government simply wished to reserve judgement on land based weapons in the 1,500 mile range category. At the same time, USA was interested in seeking to find out what kind of force NATO needed over the next five years which, at one and the same time, would deter USSR attack and yet avoid offering 8/2 ' ]V001337 M ^ �- 2 - SECRET oo^y one"choice in the event of such an attack = the choice of a major conflict involving nuclear weapons. "USA believed that the Alliance needed great power in its weapons, that it should have the capability to prevent the overrunning of NATO territory and that its forces should be so disposed as to minimize the risk of accidental war. He also stated that the heavy sense of responsibility and problems of control of nuclear weapons required the attention of the "highest officials of the US government and they simply did not have the time required to devote their minds to this problem at the same time as they were dealing with the Berlin build-up. West Germany put the most pointed question with respect to the triennial review process* It asked if there would be any real value in discussing the end-1966 force requirements if MRBMs were to be removed from them0 and suggested that what would be left would be a torso without valueo 30 Sep 61 A draft revision of a proposed Council resolution (P©/6l/779) concerning end-1966 force requirements, prepared by the international staff to replace the US draft resolution, was passed to the Canadian representative. The operative portion read as follows? B The North Atlantic Council ........ requests the Military Committee, in its action on NATO Commanders0 proposed 1966 requirementss (a) to ensure that the end-1966 requirements are in line with the high priority which the Council considers should be devoted to NATO non-nuclear capabilities without prejudicing the continuing existence of an effective nuclear capability for NATO forcesj (b) to defer, pending further guidance ffom the Council^, action on the NATO Commanders5 proposed requirements for MRBMs and SSN(B)sJ- ......... DND suggested that (a) be amended to permit build-up- of nuclear capability in accordance with current programmes to which NATO is already committed. ay. KS>A6l This draft resolution (F0/6l/779) was considered by the Council in restricted session. It became clear, as a result of substantial amendments which were proposed, that much wider issues were in question than simply the end-1966 requirements. At the suggestion of the Secretary General, consideration of the subject was deferred until some more acceptable solution could be developed. In addition to amendments proposed by USA, UK and France, a West German amendment to para (b) was put forward reading as follows % w (b) to ensure that action is taken on NATO Commanders8 proposed requirements for MRBMs and SSN(B)s and at the same times (i) to investigate the problem which would result for the defence of the area of Allied Command Europe by a delay in the introduction of MRBMs, (ii) to examine if there is any alternative to the introduction of MRBMs, (iii) to request SACEUR again to give his views on the MRBM problem.® .../3 001338 �- 3 - SECRET In support of its amendment, West Germany argued that NATO Commanders required these weapons and any postponement of them would detract seriously from the credibility of the deterrent. The USSR was" increasing its nuclear potential? so too should NATO forces. MRBMs represented a decisive factor in the survival of "other NATO strike forces. The requirements put forward by NATO Military Commanders represented "a balanced entity. A statement of force requirements without MRBMs would be a hollow shell. 15 Oct 61 In order to clarify some previous External Affairs statements, the Canadian representative pointed out to that Department that it was somewhat misleading to suggest that NATO decisions on the positioning of MRBMs in Western Europe have been deferred. MRBMs are already in position in Western Europe (e.g. in Italy, Greece, Turkey and UK). It is not these MRBMs but the additional MRBMs proposed in the end-1966 requirements which are under discussion and on which the USA is proposing to defer a decision. The German representative has opposed deferral. Other representatives have gone on record that their support of deferral of decision is not to be taken as an indication that their governments would eventually decide against the provision of these MRBMs. All that could be said at the moment therefore was that the provision of additional MRBMs for Western Europe remained under consideration. In the same message, in reference to an earlier External Affairs suggestion, the Canadian representative concluded that there is'no reasonable basis for assuming that a bargain involving a prohibition on the stationing of MRBMs on both sides of the Iron Curtain could be struck at this time. He pointed out that the installation of such weapons on NATO European territory would provide a better balance of missile capabilities between the opposing sides. 16 Oct 61 The Secretariat produced a new draft resolution on end-1966 force goals which may be discussed early next week. The operative portion of this latest draft reads8 w The North Atlantic Council „..0.0... requests the Military Committee, in its action on NATO Commanders' proposed 1966 requirementss (a) to ensure that the end-1966 requirements take into account the necessary increase of conventional forces without prejudicing the development and maintenance of the nuclear capability essential to NATO forces % (b) to note that consideration of the proposals of the NATO Commanders for MRBMs and SSN(B)s has not progressed far enough for decision at this times w O . O O O O O O O This draft resolution does not reflect th® proposed West German amendment but it does remove any suggestion that consideration of MRBMs has been shelved.. DND finds this acceptable. The Secretary General has discussed with SACEUR the ramifications of deferral of MRBMs in relation to the revised force requirements and the financial implications. SACEUR has indicated that the need still exists for certain targets of concern to his Command to be engaged by missiles and that discussions are going on to decide if such targets could be taken care of by different agencies. There were three ways of dealing with the targets: (a) by use of SAC forces, (b) by forces available to US CINCEUR, (c) by NATO MRBMs. // 001339 �m - 4- SECRET A. preliminary attempt has been made by the international staff to estimate the cost of the total MRBM programme as'proposed by SACEUR in the end-1966 requirements. The estimate was in the region of $1.-5 billion but no expenditure would be required before late 1964 or early 1965. SUMMARY Of the three draft resolutions prepared for consideration by the Council since 18 Sep 6l, the first two recommended that action be deferred on the proposed requirements for MRBMs and SSN(B)s and the third, which is about to be considered, recommends only that the Military Committee wnote that consideration of the proposals of the NATO Commanders for MRBMs and SSN(B)s has not progressed far enough for decision at this time". The UK and USA have supported deferment. The majority of the remaining nations support deferment with considerable reservation. West Germany strongly advocates th® acquisition of MRBMs by shield forces as soon as possible. DND has been striving to ensure that MRBMs in so far as they represent build-up of NATO nuclear capability, are not shelved, although it is appreciated that action on the remaining end-1966 requirements should not be held up pending solution, of the complex political aspects of the MRBM question© 001340 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04396 Title A name given to the resource "Aide Memoire: Provision of MRBMs for NATO Shield Forces" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 4, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 20-Oct-61