https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/607716f579d02967995a29d33115dce1.pdf 0cef23d70da3d19e351ddc41b75f703e PDF Text Text ORGANISATION PU TKAi'j E I'>l:. IP AT! .AN'I KMJIE NOKD NORTH ^ M . ^ N T I C i P j ^ l - A T Y K n |< a ,\ Nf / . A T I ON M> - /D/'&Js', %• A O # ' f PLACE DU MARIX'HAI OK T ASSIGNY D);. L A T T R K (Porto l);ni|)hin(.') PAULS-XVI Tel. 0 I? 7 \j ORIGINAL : PNGLISH 9th October, 1961 " NATO SECRET PO/61/785 Limited d i s t r i b u t i o n CCycf To Permanent From Secretary General : KLEber 50-20 Representatives THE QUESTION OF THE "POLITICAL AUTHORITIES" Reference: P O / 6 1 / 7 6 5 )o> /K^ud ^ fyrt~f a/*Al $3 In the Council's discussions of the suggested instructions to NATO-military authorities contained in Annex B to PO/61/765? one of the aspects of the problem touched upon was that of the political authorities who would be required to take certain decisions (paragraph 6(b), 6(d)(3)* 7 and 8 refer). 2. There appeared to be a general consensus of opinion as to the need to consider further,, and to clarify, this general problem. -3. p\ The Council will recall that the German Delegation, has given us the benefit of their views on one aspect of this matter - the control and use of nuclear weapons - in PO/6l/573«6<:-/7<^"-/ This aspect of the problem has also been dealt" with by the Greek'Delegation in PO/61/750. 2/og./ h. In the course of discussion in the Council, reference v/as also made to certain personal suggestions I put forward at SHAPEX 61 and to some ideas which I had previously formulated on a personal basis. I was asked to circulate these and do so in Annexes A and B on the understanding that they are, of course, no more than one of the elements on v/hich the Council may like to base future discussions. ( Signed) D„ U. STIKKER NATO SECRET 001343 �NATO . SECvr/p l'ii:.i co O70O./7B5 on EXTEJaC'i^FRp^ A STATEMENT EaiPP BY THE J3ECRETAPY GEIPPPAL ''Z*:Lli:Pj]SJ® 1.. As NATO is basically still a military Alliance,, lot mo now finally turn to some of our military .problems., 2. As I have mentioned before , Ministers at Oslo had somo discussions on military questions. Although some of the • Ministers expressed grave doubts on the wisdom of the introduction of the conception of "a limited war" in our doctrine, mar impression v/as that most Ministers recognised.that the now wellknown expressions of "raising the threshold'1' and "calling for a ' pause" arc compatible v/ith our political directive and strategic concept, v/hich, perhaps, need some ro-lntcrprctation. .At the end., of the discussion Ministers instructed the. Permanent Council to prepare a document on the' military posture of our Alliance for discussion at tho December Ministerial Meeting -- a document based on the Political Directive, the Strategic Concept and on MC 70. 3. It would not bo proper for me to anticipate what the North Atlantic Council may finally decide to recommend in its report. But I feel I v/ould be failing in my responsibilities if I, as Secretary General of TPaE0.; v/ere to shy away from giving you an indication of some solutions on those basic problems of the Alliance. P., Let me, however, first make some preliminary remarks. 5. Probably the Council report for. December v/ill deal with the need to increase tho conventional forces in Europe, 6. At the same time that Plin ;.sters in Oslo discussed the _ necessity of putting more emphasis on our conventional forces5 Soviet Marshal Greshko, who io also 'Commander in Chief of.the '• '"Parsaw Pact forces, said that: "Soviet armed forces now have arms whose fire power exceeds that of all arms p.ny other army ever had at its disposal", He, went on by saying: "'the rocket' troops capable of destroying the aggressor in any part of the world form the backbone of the combat .might of the armed, forces of the USSR" 7. P'hen I, read this in Oslo, I thoxight: "Is this the answer to .our emphasis on conventional forces?'"', I must confess that at tho moment I had some doubts whether it.was sufficient that Ministers in their instruction to the Permanent Council only But '/hen I read, some days ago, the r e f e r r e d GO PC 70. by President Kennedy to the Canadian Senate and s t a t e m 0 n t m p. d 0 cc /go/. 3 7 >) £> -3- •LLil^.ai^PEET'' " 001344 �HATO SECRET -U- j ,pr;fb';r ,-7" -ja-, House of Commons, that the United States is willing to establish a NATO seaborne missile force which is multilateral, both in . ownership and control', I felt, reassured"P ': ••••••• 8. Let mo, therefore, refrain, also at this moment, from touching upon the right -balance between conventional and- nuclear PPErO-forces and upon the need to strengthen our shield forces both in conventional and nuclear armament, Time permits me.only to deal- with some aspects of our military problems* ••••therefore, I v/ould. only speak on this occasion about control of nuclear weapons.' 9. I thin.]: that doubt exists whether present methods of control of nuclear v/eapons arc satisfactory, both from the point, of view of NATO as a whole and from the point of view of individual member states. At present the political decision as. to the -employment of nuclear v/eapons rests principally with the United States, to a lesser extent with Great Britain. In the future it will rest probably-also v/ith Prance. .Additionally, there arc, as you knov/, the double control systems, based on bilateral agreements of host countries with the United States.. 10P How can we ensure that.in the future those nuclear weapons essential to the d.ofence of NATO Europe v/ill be available to-the Alliance and that they will be used in accordance with- the policy a:id plans of our Alliance as a whole? .11. President Kenned;/ stated in his .Ottawa speech: * "'re must make certain that nuclear weapons will continue to be available for the defense of the entire treaty aarea and that these weapons are at all times under close and flexible political control that meets the. need, of all NATO countrj.es. E'e are prepared to join our allies in working out suitable arrangements for this purpose". 12. It seems to me that in this statement we find the . guarantee that these v/eapons will bo available. 13'. But hov/ can these suitable arrangements be worked out? Let me first, 'however5 point out that ITATOashould.- be wise to identify the nuclear weapons to which such, arrangements could apply. .Iks President Kennedy made it clear in his statement at .-. Ottawa that"'the'United States will commit to the NATO' Command. Area -: five and subscguantly still more Polaris atomic - missile . submarines subject to any agreed NATO "guidelines on . . their control, and use", etc," P. . HATO SECRET 001345 �NATO UCRET ANNEX A to •5- EyMIMi Somewhat later President Kennedy said: "Beyond this we look to the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO seaborne missile force, which would be truly multilateral in ovmers|iip_ and control, if this should be desired and found possible by our allies once NATO's non-nuclear goals have been achieved?1, • 15. In this last paragraph the possibility of multilateral ownership is ^ c __ introduced but, as you will have noted, only after r r s no: NA.TO It seems to me, " NAT0 s non-nuclear goals have been achieved, "' therefore, that NATO would be' wise if, in its studies on a suitable arrangement for control or on NATO guidelines, NATO Would now concentrate on the employment of existing and committed nuclear v/eapons and the additional new v/eapons- mentioned in the statement by President Kennedy, It would to my mind.be better not to start a discussion on the control of.nuclear weapons. assigned to the United States Strategic Air Command, the United Kingdom Bomber'Command and the future French Force de Frappe. __ - \S J- V> U A i V X \J -L, W X \SXL A '.n..L ^ ' ( ^ U A \A.\S J . J. J. XV.' KJ t, J. i - .'-J. \S 1.6. Now what "suitable arrangements" and "guidelines" could possibly be discussed in the Council? 17. Surely none of you will doubt that by background, by upbringing and.by my philosophy of life, I am profoundly convinced of the necessity of civilian supremacy and political control. .The great question facing our Alliance, however, is the extent to which political supremacy can actually be ensured in a nuclear age, without leading through a paralysis in decision, to surrender or nuclear suicide. • 18. When I start from the assumption that the availability of nuclear weapons to NATO will be. guaranteed by the United States, then such weapons should be used in accordance.with the policies, the plans and the rules of the Alliance. 19» T be policies can be found in the Political Directive and other documents and decisions as a consequence of our continuous consultation. 20. For the plans we can look to MC M\.> it8 and 70 and other approved papers. On the basis of these documents our military• authorities, will have worked out more detailed plans. We can, furthermore, rely .on the existing systems of targeting and their co-ordination. Ch -5- NATO SECRET 001346 �EATO J?ECR:TT -6- AJJNEX A. "to "" wifyyy 21. But NATO rules for employment do not yet exist J Some time ago, when I read, in Sir ""'inston Churchill' s book' on the History of the English Speaking Peoples, his vision On the Civil War in' the United States, there v/as one reflexion-y/hich struck me. He says: . "No rule can be laid down upon command of states and armies in time of war. All depends upon the facts and the men. But should a great'general'appear, the'civil government would be wise to give him full scope at ••'.-• once in the military sphere." I am sure that all generals present will agree with that conception but does this reflexion, which was justified as regards the civil war, which, could also be accepted in principle (but was not always applied in practice) during the last world war, still hold true with regard to the employment of nuclear weapons in these years? 22. I do not believe that this question can be answered in so simple a way. On the contrary, some clear distinctions have to be made as between, clear-cut and more doubtful situations. 23. The situation, would certainly be clear-cut in the case of an all-out nuclear attack against the Alliance. The reply should be immediate and with all weapons available; the time '•' element will be such that no political consultations, either between.some states or in the Council will be- possible. 2it, As the ultimate responsibility should always rest with the political authorities, it seems to me that the only solution in this case is, that the political decision of authorising the NATO military commanders to employ nuclear weapons could only be taken as it were in theory ahd before the event occurred. This political decision could take the form of a final and joint.Council decision or the form of an advice - to those governments that have nov/, alone or together with other governments control over nuclear weapons - that the Council as such agrees that these weapons can and should, be used. ' 25. A similar but less clear-cut case is that of an allout Soviet conventional attack. 26. If the right definition of whet an all-out conventional, attack, is can be found, the' same system could be applied, 27. Much more difficult are the doubtful cases of incursions or local hostilities, v/hich are getting out of hand. NATO SECRET -6- 001347 �-w -7- ' NATO SECRET ' ANT^EX"! to" . ' vo/'GT/fm ~. 28. To my mind, it is indeed far from certain that the Soclet Union will in a given' situation begin by launching an all-*out attack of a nuclear or conventional nature. .It seems to meat least equally possible that she might start,'either herself •. or through her satellites, a limited military action, with a limited objective, - a kind of probing action, to test our reactions and to see how. far she dare go • In this large area of doubtful situations a political decision carefully considered is, in fact necessary and practically possible. In. doubtful cases-of. this nature we will have the time - not much time but a sufficient margin - to fall back on something like traditional decisionmaking processes by our political authorities. But whatever system we were to follow, the political authority should first receive an evaluation from the competent commanders of the military situation and needs. 29. In those cases, however, it seems to me more than doubtful that we could afford to rely on the rule of unanimity, which we have rightly established in the North Atlantic Council for the general conduct of our affairs, 30. Some ideas have, therefore, (not always in. the Council) been launched as to how we could arrive at a decision which would be speedy and efficient enough adequately to meet the situation and yet contain a maximum of democratic control. 31. Some have tentatively suggested a decision bydfchree of our members, but the mere suggestion is bound to give rise to protests and to demands that it be four or five and more. This does not seem to be the right way towards a solution. Because, hov/ could those countries which, would have no say in this vital decision, which can ultimately lead to the extinction of their whole population, be reconciled? 32. When I was still Netherlands Representative in the Permanent Council, I made a suggestion (on a purely personnel basis) , that the North Atlantic Council could also make' its decision by a majority vote according to a schedule of v/eighted votes. The weighting could be such that at least four of the powers (not necessarily always the same four) of the Alliance, if they were agreed, might have already a decisive majority, but that in case they were not agreed, a majority could also be made up by one or two of the major partners with several of the smaller partners. I do not pretend that this would be an ideal solution, and perhaps other suggestions will come forward. 33. It is also quite possible that, after v/e have discussed all the possibilities, we will have to reach the conclusion that v/e should not alter the present situation. -7- NA.TO SECRET �NATO^rXPPPT AHNEX' A_to"" -8- EPZFIZZ 8 ^ 3k. I might add one other remark, and that is that whatever system of control could be found, the targets in doubtful cases should be only those which have an actual and immediate.bearing on the incident.which has occurred. In esse of extension of the incident up to a major war the targets should relate to the immediate defence of Europe. 35» Only in this way could the principle of the high threshold and the pause before an all-out nuclear v/ar is unleashed attain its real purpose. 36. At the same time it would be clear that when local hostilities or incursions develop into serious conflicts-nuclear weapons will be used to defend the NATO area. NATO SECRET- -8- �*5* -9- . EP}1P_SPCRET yimC'B to PO/61/785 -^P-TQ 3TR:,T;,GY- ,PPD NUCLEAR WEAPONS ; Some Personal. Thoughts developed by Mr. D.U. Stikker in March I960 5. The political decision, as to the employment of nuclear weapons is at present a responsibility of only a few "governments: theEUnited States, the United'Kingdom (to a lesser extent), Prance (in the future). Additionally, there are tho "doublecontrol" systems, based on bilateral agreements between the United States on the one hand, Italy-Turkey-Pederal Republicthe iietherlands-Greece-Bclgium on the other hand. The present .situation is not satisfactory from a NATO point of view, as may bo clearly illustrated, e.g. by the' fact that any country possessing an. inc.ependent atomic capacity could involve itself and also probably its allies in nuclear war without^ agreement from other PATO partners.'' The availability of those nuclear aooapons essential to th- ae.fe.noe of NATO Europe must be guaranteed to the Alliance and such v/eapons should be used in accordance with, the policies,, the plans and the rules of the Alliance. 10. Another problem is.that of "targeting". Targeting, for Allied Command Europe is done on ah international- basis at SHAPE. This targeting by SHAPE includes nuclear capability of all American forces, land, air and sea (6th Fleet), as well as the other aA'PO' nuclear forces assigned to SHAPE. It is equally true, that SHAPE co-ordinates its targeting with the United States Strategic Air Command and that there exists, through, different . channels, co-ordination between the United States Strategic Air; Command, SHAPE and the United, Kingdom Bomber Command. . Is this situation satisfactory from the NATO point of view, in particular from the E;uropean point of view (see paragraph 13)? 11. There are two casus in which the political decision on the employment of nuclear weapons could be taken in theory and before the event occurred: (a) (b) in the case cf a Soviet all-out .ouclear attack; in the case of a -Soviet all-out conventional attack. �NATO SECRET AH'Pi'BX B to P07517785 -10•""'•;;"". In none of these two cases (although the second might offer complications) there would be need or possibility of a Council-decision top authorise ,tha...aAT0 military authorities to employ all nuclear weapons as from tuo outset. 12. p. There are.j, however., • a number, of. possibilities of Soviet aggression in the NATO area, as. .already.,,soi out in the political directive (C-M(56)l38 Pinal). Under the prusent nuclear arrangements the United States now has a very special position and: has.the. preponderant-responsibility.in deciding upon- the employment of nuclear Weapons in these situations. '."/hat r6le should the other members of the Alliance play in making .the decisions on '•' doubt f ul....ca.s.0: s".?.. . In these .cases -more • time, may well be available in which to take the necessary political decisionson the basis of the ..military appreciation of the situation. .In any ..vent ,..wheteVer procedures are adopted, they should allow for immediate action ane also not permit a small minority to impede action. 13. n. political decision of the Council would appear to be the best'solution. This could possibly take the form of the delegation by the Council as a whole of responsibilities in this field.to a nloia restricted! group of countries, that, is to say to seme kind of executive committee, though this obviously v/ould involve, sorious diificulties. a. second approach v/ould be to agree on a system of ..-eaching decision by a simple majority of weighted votes. Such a system would ensure full participation by all members in th... decision and could be devised so as to require the E concurrence of at least four members.. Alternatively, it may be found upon .careful consideration that the present system ought not to be changed.S.lk. If the suggested procedures for greater a.l lied participation could be accepted^ then this system might in. the first instance be applied to the [employment Of existing nuclear weapons, extension in the future always being possible in the light of developments. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04395 Title A name given to the resource Message from Secretary General, NATO to Permanent Representatives Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 4, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 9-Oct-61