https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2282415166db922279d5d25babe3b4b7.pdf 197c66216f5d74a9f5d8bd8b3daa5b9d PDF Text Text per* / t-^ EGRET *w 3 12 01 P/i'60 MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES FOR NATO 7l/oS-l At the 1959 December Ministerial Meeting, General Norstad underlined the need for "second generation" light, mobile, solid-fuelled medium range ballistic missiles which would have a range between 300 - 1500 miles. He spoke of a NATO military requirement for 50 to 100 by 1963 and a total of•300 by 1965. To meet this requirement, the United States Secretary of Defense made an offer at the NATO Defence Ministers Meeting in April I960 to provide Polaris Missiles for sale to European countries who would make their own arrangements for the production of launching equipment. He specified that the programme should be approved by NATO Council, that the missiles should be under SACEUR's control, and that there should be advance commitments: (a) to accept storage of nuclear components; and (b) to employ the missiles to meet SACEUR's requirement s. He made it clear that the nuclear warheads would be provided by the United States which would retain custody of them until their release was authorized by the President in the event of hostilities. As an alternative (less satisfactory to the United States), the United States was prepared to provide technical assistance for the establishment of a multilateral production capacity in Europe but with the same conditions regarding control and deployment. The French representative did not react very favourably to the proposal; the preliminary British view was'that purchase of the missiles would probably �S E C R E T - 2 - be the most expeditious and economic solution. It was agreed that the proposal required further study by the military authorities and in the Council but that further discussion in the NATO Council should, for political reasons, be postponed until after the Summit meeting. The military authorities of most of the NATO countries are agreed on the military requirements for such weapons. General Norstad has adduced impressive evidence to prove that the number of targets which have to be successfully engaged if NATO shield forces are to fulfil their function as part of a credible deterrent, could only be dealt with if NATO forces in Europe were provided with a second generation ballistic missile in the period 1963-65. He considers that a mobile flexible system of MRBM's is necessary to remedy major deficiencies in the shield forces, including the vulnerability of currently planned- strike forces, which mainly consist of aircraft on fixed bases. He maintained, however, that strike aircraft would be required for at least the next ten years because, unlike missiles, they can be used selectively. Moreover, strike aircraft would not be able to carry out their proper function unless the way through the Soviet Air defence system was cleared for them by MRBM's. It is clear that the United States attaches considerable importance to this question, and for production reasons is anxious to have a NATO decision by September 1st. The main difficulties involved are essentially political. ...3 �S E C R E T *-«*A"> - 3 - While the Americans are emphasizing the NATO character of the arrangements, i t seems c l e a r t h a t (a) t h e French w i l l not accept the USA proposal on the terms offered; and (b) that the Americans have in mind b i l a t e r a l control arrangements similar t o those worked out in the-case of IRBM's in I t a l y ( i . e . before the weapons can be used t h e r e must be a j o i n t decision involving both governments). A r e s u l t of the French a t t i t u d e may well be t o increase t h e number of weapons s i t u a t e d on German t e r r i t o r y . In a d d i t i o n , t o set up these weapons in Germany and other European countries under a s e r i e s of b i l a t e r a l arrangements would undermine the c o l l e c t i v e character of NATO defence and tend t o weaken t h e p o l i t i c a l s o l i d a r i t y of t h e Alliance as a whole* The NATO Secretary-General, who i s acutely conscious of these problems, indicated when he was in Ottawa r e c e n t l y t h a t he i s currently considering a compromise whereby European c o u n t r i e s , with t h e exception of France, would receive NATO P o l a r i s Missiles and would permit warheads to be stored in t h e i r t e r r i t o r y under U.S.A. custody. France would receive t h e same m i s s i l e s but with no conditions regarding storage a t t a c h e d . M. Spaak did not know whether the French would be w i l l ing t o accept such an arrangement nor was he able to say whether he had convinced the United S t a t e s of i t s feasibility. He had, however, been given the assurance in Washington t h a t i t would be s e r i o u s l y considered. Another important p o l i t i c a l aspect i s t h a t any decision or announcement by NATO regarding t h i s .»*4 001648 �SECRET - 4 question would tend t o introduce an element of i n f l e x i b i l i t y i n t o the Western negotiating position on East-West problems. I t would also open the West to Soviet charges t h a t i t i s not s e r i o u s l y i n t e r e s t e d in moving towards the settlement of current i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e f i e l d of disarmament. In the circumstances, i t would be highly important t o avoid any p u b l i c i t y regarding current or future Council discussions of t h i s s u b j e c t . Ministers might, t h e r e f o r e , wish to discuss with t h e i r United S t a t e s counterparts two p o i n t s : (1) the a d v i s a b i l i t y of attempting to a r r i v e a t a decision regarding the introduction of MRBM's into the European area of NATO at t h i s p a r t i c u l a r juncture i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l events; (2) the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved for NATO and t h e extent to which the whole future of t h e Alliance may hinge on the formulation of an acceptable atomic policy, possibly one involving a wider degree of control over such weapons than would appear to be contemplated by the United S t a t e s . I t would seem appropriate t o give high p r i o r i t y to t h i s question in the proposed NATO longrange s t u d i e s . 001649 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04360 Title A name given to the resource "Medium Range Ballistic Missiles for NATO" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 4, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource [undated]