https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/0ece7538aab23b3070e1fb84062871c3.pdf fea6aa8c751b5bbc072469f94aac6b8e PDF Text Text CSC 2108-1 CSC 2195-1-1 2 Sep 60 Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Sect Block, Ottawa, Ontario* MloVRattro Ballistic Missiles for SATO 1* Reference is made to your letter of 29 July I960 in whioh you raise, three questions concerning SACEUR's requirement for raidrange ballistic missiles. 2. With regard to your first question, while supporting a continued need for aircraft as part of a mixed strike force offering •nirHwm flexibility, SACEUR based hie requlr araent for the MRBM upon the Increasing vulnerability of NATO strike aircraft to surprise attack and their decreasing ability to penetrate enemy air defences. The Canadian representative on the Military Committee expressed agreement in principle* Tbe Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that SACEUR's argument is sound and that he has a valid requirement for a relatively long range ballistic missile to complement hie air strike forces* 3* The Chiefs of Staff have some reservation with regard to the necessity for the specified maximum range of 1500 miles and the quantity of 300 missiles* These are related to targets, deployment, and other operational factors* SACEUR has not yet put forward his deployment plan, so that tbe Chiefs of Staff cannot agree or disagree specifically. At the same time, it should be noted that if the MRBM is to be available to SACEUR by 1963 it will probably be necessary to accept the POLARIS missile because no tested competitor yet exists* It is clear that, if the fullest use is to be made of NATO geography, a missile with a range approaching 1500 miles is necessary* Such a missile would also give SACEUR a useful measure of flexibility and would tend to minimiae total missile force requirements* Lasser ranges would be increasingly restrictive* 4* With regard to your second question, it Is primarily a matter for political judgement as to whether or not the MRBM raises a fundamental issue of SATO strategic policy* On the one hand, from a military point of view lt need not be so regarded, since the requirement for the M O M can be justified in terms of the efficient execution of SACEUR's presently assigned mission. On the other hand, it can be I & argued that the MRBM might represent an extension into the strategic deterrent field of SACEUR's mission which would have significant politloal consequences. If the litter view were adopted by NATO Council, a thorough review of the political and military policies of the alliance might become inescapable* This le also likely to be the ease if lt le judged that the present arrangements for the custody and control of nuclear warhead* within NATO are not acceptable* Which of these views should be adopted is a matter for politic 1 rather than military consideration* *../2 �-2 - S E C R E T 5* From the point of view of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, it is not necessary to regard the issue as one of strategic policy, sincet (a) lt is not contemplated that Canada would play any part in tbe manning or operation of the proposed POLARIS force, and (b) any resulting redefinition of NATO strategy will, almost certainly, not affect Canada's present military commitments to NATO* This point is discussed in more detail below* 6* With regard to your third question, the Chiefs of Staff consider that SACEUR has a valid requirement for both the MRBM and strike aircraft such as the CF1Q4* The missile is superior in the role of attack on previously selected targets but the aircraft is markedly superior against targets of opportunity* Moreover, it has greater flexibility for uee in such roles as pre-strike and post-strike reconnaissance. If SACEUR is to have the ability to make a limited response to Soviet aggression in circumstances which would not immediately warrant the use of MRBMs, or indeed nuclear warheads, he requires manned aircraft such as the CF104 and in the numbers presently programmed* This situation will persist throughout the useful life of the CF104. The missile and the aircraft are therefore essentially non-competitive* 7* It seems clear that the NATO MRBM his no bearing upon the need for or value of the Canadian Infantry Brigade Oroup* 8. It must be noted, however, that Canada might be called upon to share in the cost of the MRBM through infrastructure or otherwise* At present, it is impossible to say what financial arrangements will be proposed* In the event that Canada were called upon for a substantial financial contribution, the Canadian Government might feel bound to regard the NATO MRBM as a major issue of defence policy bearing upon Canada'a future participation in NATO* Again, this is a political rather than a military question* (7. R. Miller) Air Marshal Chairman, Chiefs of Staff / 001594 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04314 Title A name given to the resource CDNW04314 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 4, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en