https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e35a7928ed3acc887e74f4f2f4b5aec4.pdf 674817c26adfcfa5aff32c747e5501f2 PDF Text Text Gentlemen! In this paper, we have examined the question of the proposed NASO mid range ballistic missile with a view to establishing a Chiefs of Staff position on firstly, SACEUR's stated requirement secondly, on the US proposal for meeting it with the POLARIS missile and lastly, on three specific questions raised fcy the Department of External Affairs in connection with the requirement* In approaching this question* ve have endeavoured to separate the military aspects from the political overtones which are receiving considerable attention both In the press and in Western Governments* In general, we are convinced that there ia a clear and valid military requirement for such a missile to augment SACEUR's strike aircraft* We feel that you should give this requirement your full support, maintaining some reservation in regard to the specific figures of 1500 miles maximum range and the quantify ef 300 missiles* While there Is a general presumptive case In support of these figuresj SACEUR has not supplied specific Information to support them and we cannot therefore specifically agree or disagree with them if-callod upon to do-oo. In giving the requirement your full support from the military viewpoint, ve feel that it would be negligent not to recognize the major political implications involved* fhe$e are twofold* Firstly, the acquisition of a 1500 mile missile may be considered both hy the USSR and by Western governments to have placed SACEUR, wittingly or unwittingly, in the strategic deterrent business because it gives him the capability of destroying Russian strategic targets* Secondly, it tends to precipitate the problem of nuclear sovereignty in Western Euroje* Our analysis indicates that these two questions are essentially for political rather than military decision. With regard to the direct Canadian Implications of the proposal, we feel that the 6P 204 programme should not be affected by it and that Canada is evmntyiwily to be involved in the manning or production of the missiles* It is, *../2 001596 �J^ m 2 m however, quite possible that we may be called upon to contribute to the programme through infra-structure or some other form of common financing* I should like to run through the specific conclusions reached as a result of our study* (ft) SACEUR has a valid requirement for a weapons system, capable of attacking military targets in Eastern Europe, which is less vulnerable than strike aircraft In the period after 1963 to surprise enemy attack and to enemy air defences* This requirement can best be met by ballistic missiles* (b) There is a presumption that the maximum range of 1500 n.m* and the recommended force level of 300 missiles can be justified, but some reservation must be maintained until SACEUR's deployment plan is clarified* (c) from a military viewpoint, there is no reason why the MRBM must be regarded as raising a fundamental issue of military policy since the program can be justified in terms of the efficient execution of SACEUR's presently approved mission* (d) On political grounds, there may be valid reasons why the MRBM should be regarded as raising a fundamental issue of military policy* Whether or not the MRBM must be so regarded is a matter for political decision* (e) From a military viewpoint, the MRBM need not raise the problem of nuclear sovereignty since present arrangements are or can be made satisfactory* (f) It is not possible to say if there is an alternative military solution which would not pose the question of putting SACEUR in the strategic deterrent field, should this become a critical consideration* However, such a solution will be difficult to find* (g) SACEUR's dates for deployment (1963*65) are fully defensible, (h) If SACEUR's deployment dates are to be met, there ia no effective competitor to the POLARIS missile* •. */3 001597 �* 3 • • (j) the MRBM is complementary to, rather than competitive with, maimed strike aircraft such as the CF104. (fc) It seems unlikely that the question of Canadian manning will arise* (1) It is unlikely that Ganada will be able to share in production contracts to any significant extent* (m) Although a specific proposal for financing has not as yet been advanced* JQpt Is possible that Canada may be called upon for a substantial contribution to the MRBM program* Finally we have recommended that you: (a) support SACEUR's requirement for a mid-range ballistic missile, reserving •»*»£* position with regard to the specified maximum range of 1500 n.m* and quantity of 300 missiles pending clarification of SACEUR's deployment plan} (b) support the US proposal for meeting the requirement with the POLARIS missile, the decision on production in the USA or Europe to be determined with due regard to relative costs and delivery dates} (c) approve the draft letter to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs attached at Appendix flC** 001598 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04312 Title A name given to the resource Speaking notes Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 4, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource n.d. 1960