https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/0c02e8e9e00f0d6dbd41f6639e0067c4.pdf a70d3911df2a98caf6277e6fabe86603 PDF Text Text >£^hll •• Vk£0 RtfPkODOCiiD BY THE aTaKDXHG QrtOU'P KMCLOSUPE 1 Fa,gas 1 X&1K ATLAOTIC T&aATY OBGANIZaTIOS ORGANISATION DU TRAITE OR L-ATL&KT10& H0KB Office of the Standing Group Representative Bureau du Representant du Groupe Permanent Palais de Chaillot PARIS (tu*) MATO SaOKBT 5 February 1959 LQM 8/59 KEKGRANDUM FOR ; THE SECRETARY, STAi©BJG CROUP HaTO WASHINGTON D.C. SUBJECT : General Operational Requirements for ACE IRBH Weapon Systems. REFERENCES j (a) STAND 2810 b) AG 6800 PANDP, 9 December 1953 (c) LCK 4/59 1. In response to the request of the Standing Group (reference (a)}, tho Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics was asked ft?r his comment a on reference (b). 2. The attached letter from the Assistant Secretary General for Pror ducti«*n and logistics contains hie remarks. These remarks derive from ccaaents developed in informal discussion with members of delegations expected to have an interest In these weapon systems. FOR THE STANDING GROUP RSFRESEHPATm / A*E. Stoll Colonel Enclosure : copy «f PL/EHM(59)24 EfcTO SECRET • * ~ » * y * ) w ' A " •'*"» * T V - ' * * ? ^ . iinclo^urt 1 000545 �SE&U^.--NATQ REPRODUCED BY THS STANDING GROUP APPENDIX A Pages 1 - 3J Ir.6l 30th January, 1959 Tos Chairman, SGK Through? Standing Group Representative Front: Assistant Secretary General for Production & Logistics 1. Reference the request of the Standing Group (SGLP 686/58 dated 2nd January, 195Q) for comments or recommendations on the General Operational Rfenuirement for ACE IRBM Weapon System, prepared bv SHAPE ana dated 9th December, 1958, the Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics concurs in this document ^n general with the following minor comments and recommendationss (a) Range of Operation: Since some NATO countries have national requirements for ranges in excess ©f 1,500 miles (see UK comments), the range should not be arbitrary held to this maximum, particularly since it appears feasible within the present state of the art to obtain greater ranges without unduly compromising the other requirements of the missile. (b) Physical Dimensions It Is felt that the overall size and weight of the assembled missile should not be specified as 'as small as possible without degrading performance . Rather, the size and weight, as well as other characteristics of the missile, should be determined in a way to "reduce cost per successful mission after attack to a minimum". In this way, confusion engendered through the possible use of perhaps extremely expensive hard to handle propellents, would be avoided. Provision for packaging in sections to provide for easy handling during transit as well as assembly operations, may be misleading. It is distinctly possible, even probable, that the entire missile will be sufficiently small to be transported quite easily over typical European highways and railways, and under these circumstances, it is strongly felt that shipping the unit in one piece will greatly cut costs, since it will permit a large reduction of trained assembly staff at launching points for re-assembly and checkout. This problem rather than being stated In the GOR, should be resolved by study groups prior to determination of the size of missile, (c) Guidance x As a minor point, the stated requirement that the guidance system be capable of existing in a power on status SECRET - NATO -1- Appendix A 000546 �SECRET - NATO • '" P * E ; *. " • j. . . ' over extended pex»_$d without degradation^^in.,accuracy, is -fioSjrcgs-jgedas realistic. This rather should be worded "without degradation of accuracy below acceptable limits", since some degradation is inevitable. (d) Communications: <MMW*iAfMw*«>*4MrNhv>tt**tai—*"CM^ In addition to the requirements as laid but in paragraph 8 of the GOR^ it Is felt, that the. communications system should be de'signed, fabricated arid installed in. a manner to assure a degree of survivability in consonance with the rest of the system. That is,the communications system should not constitute the obvious "Achilles heel" inviting attack by the enemy to knock out the entire system. 2. The only major question regarding the paper Is the required date of deployment. In view of current US policies with regard to participation in the program, it appears that lt will not now be possible to meet the required operational employment date of 1963. A more deliberate development approach than originally envisaged will now be required^ capitalizing on existing US developments and techniques, but resulting in a missile more pecularly suited to European requirements. It is felt that this approach with sufficient &upgx>x*t can provide a missile available to operational units not later than 1965. Informal discussions with SACEUR Indicate that he will accept such a time schedule, and the European nations have confirmed that they prefer this approach, 3. The following comments are offered on the UK views on the requirements: (a) Fuel (propellant): While this office has no objection to the consideration of liquid propellants, it is felt that the following considerations must be kept in mind. Whereas solid propellants exist today capable of being stored for several years with relatively insignificant variations In physical or ballistic properties, and no effect on affiliated hardware, this is not the case for any known storable liquids of adequate performance. Although little doubt exists that svich liquids can be prepared and employed in a manner analogous to the solid application, much work remains to be done before it Is well established by surveillance proof that no unacceptable deterioration will occur. Because of this fact, the development of a storable liquid as compared to a solid IRBM, would unquestionably require more development time. In addition to this, it is felt that inevitably the liquid will suffer some disadvantages everi after surveillance tests have established adequacy in the qualities discussed above. The liquid rocket Is not nearly so amenable to "scaling" as is the solid. This is particularly important in relation to the European IRBM, because, if the solid is employed, it will permit us to draw upon the extensive experience in the United States, while at the same time, allowing the use of a more nearly optimized engine design than any existing unit is apt to offer. (b) Payload: The UK comments on payload indicate a requirement warhead on 1 megaton plus the capability to carry SECRET - NATO OT 23S/B/1MPO -2- for a Appendix A 000547 . J �SECRET - NATO anti-defensive devices as needed. While this may prove to be desirable, it is felt that a firm requirement for this capability would be premature at the current time and may unnecessarily penalize the basic design of the device. It Is not clear that provision of space for decoys, re-entry staging devices, etc., would be well spent for each missile. It is believed that the GOR should not, at this time, specifically require this capacity to be built into the basic design, but rather should direct that studies of this aspect of operation be completed along with other studies establishing the specific design of the vehicle. (c) Development Potential: The first ballistic missiles scheduled for operation . out of NATO countries were necessarily designed with early availability as the overriding requirement. The design criteria for this second generation should surely be the best availabla. It is felt that the best manner of ensuring this requirement is to state that they should be "capable of operation for the lowest cost per successful mission after attack". This criterion, upon study, will be found to contain all of the critical elements such as vulnerability, missile cost, manpower required, elaborateness of base, and cost of ground support equipment. 4. This document appears to be an excellent starting point, with the reservations noted above, for use by a stud? group In developing more detailed characteristics. It is felt that military and technical experts of the NATO nations concerned should be asked to participate with the NATO military authorities in such a group, to ensure that military, technical and economic considerations are all reflected in the requirements finally adopted. E. H. Melli ggCRET - NATO -3- Appendix A iff PSZ/U/WPO 000548 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04128 Title A name given to the resource CDNW04128 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en