https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/9a0cf7ed0d0b00c3a887a2adbc01fcb3.pdf 9610604199af45a5b60f883eab19044b PDF Text Text CSC /.IS EXTERNAL 694 PRIORITY •to INFO WASHDC PRIORITY LDN EMBASSYPARIS BONN ytf**-? .::: 2 I0«*9>V59 _ / y X/asi'}'"' REF YOURTEL DL112 FEB 16 AND OURTEL 363 FEB20 ACQUISITION AND CONTROL OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OUR REFTEL WE SHOULD LIKE TO ADD THE FOLLOWING MORE GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.SEE ALSO OURTEL 2883 N0V28 AND GEN NORSTAD°S LET TO US OF FEB3CWHICH RELATES MAINLY TO IRBMS AND STOCKPILES,BUT WHICH ALSO REFERS TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS). 2.OUR UNDERTANDING OF THE POSITION ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS AS FOLLOWS.MC70 REQUESTS NATO COUNTRIES TO ARM THEIR FORCES WITH CERTAIN TYPES OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS;AND SOME NATO COUNTRIES IN ANY CASE WISH TO ACQUIRE THESE WEAPONS.TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY DECIDE TO DO SO,THEY WOULDCUNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES)ACQUIRE THE WEAPONS FROM THE USA UNDER MDAP OR,IF THEY WISH BY PURCHASE.IN EITHER CASE THEIR ACQUISITION OF THE WEAPONS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO AN AGREEMENT WITH THE USA GOVT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS STANDARD PRACTICES,AS WE UNDERSTAND IT,THE ONLY NEGOTIATIONS WHICH SACEUR WOULD HAVE WITH USER COUNTRIES WOULD BE THE NORMAL DISCUSSIONS WHICH TAKE PLACE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNTRIES0 DEFENCE PLANS IN NATO. 3.WE SUPPOSE THAT THERE WOULD BE NOTHING TO PREVENT THE USA GOVT FROM TURING OVER TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO NATIONAL GOVTS FOR DEPLOYMENT WITH THEIR FORCES SERVING UNDER NATIONAL COMMAND BUT,SO FAR AS NATO EUROPE IS CONCERNED WE WOULD PRESUME THAT PRIORITY WOULD BE GIVEN TO FORCES SERVING UNDER NATO COMMAND.WE DOUBT IF, UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES,PURELY NATIONAL FORCES IN NATO EUROPE WOULD SOON RECEIVE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. 4.WITH RESPECT TO THE AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED BETWEEN NATO AND NATIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITIES,WE AGREE THAT THESE WOULD RELATE, INTER ALIA,TO OPERATIONAL DETAILS CONNECTED WITH USE OF THE WEAPONS.WE ALSO AGREE THAT THIS WOULD NECESSARILY REFLECT WHAT° EVER PATTERN DEVELOPS IN NATO WITH RESPECT TO CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF © O 0 C* 000521 �USE OF THE WARHEADS FOR THESE WEAPONS.AS YOU SAY,THIS CONTROL WOULD BE EXERCISED THROUGH USA CUSTODY OF ALL WARHEADS IN PEACETIME.THERE IS A CLEARLY-DEVELOPED PLAN FOR ALLOTTING NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN STOCKPILES FOR USE BY NATIONAL FORCES UNDER NATO COMMAND.THIS I S CONTAINED IN DOCS TO WHICH YOU WILL HAVE ACCESS; THE CDN BRIGADES PRESUMED REQUIREMENTS ARE COVERED IN THESE DOCS. DETAILS OF CUSTODY AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOT RPT NOT OF COURSE SPELLED OUT IN THESE DOCS,WHICH RELATE PRIMARILY TO THE INSTALLATIONS. 5.WHILE A SYSTEM FOR OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF IRBMS AND FOR CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF THE NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THEM HAS STILL TO BE WORKED OUT(OURLET 1 5 3 2 MAR24)AND WHILE THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN FINALIZED,THE ARRANGEMENTS COVERING THE ACQUISITION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS SEEM TO BE GOING FORWARD WITHOUT SERIOUS DIFFICULTY.THE UK NOW HAVE SOME SERGEANTS AND CORPORALS,AND WE UNDERSTAND THE GERMAN FORCES HAVE SOME TACTICAL NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS-AT LEAST A FEW HONEST JOHNS. 6 . R E YOUR ASSUMPTION THAT THE GOVT WOULD WISH TO BE ABLE TO SAY, AS A MINIMUM,THAT CONTROL OF THE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS A JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL NATO GOVTS AND WOULD BE EXERCISED THROUGH NORMAL NATO CHANNELS,PLEASE SEE OURLET 1 5 3 2 IN WHICH WE PUT FORWARD SOME CONSIDERATIONS WHICH SEEM TO POINT-AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE-IN FAVOUR OF SUCH CONTROL OVER IRBMS.WE APPRECIATE THE COGENT POLITICAL ARGUMENTS WHICH WOULD CALL FOR SIMILAR CONTROL OVER TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS,BUT,WITH RESPECT TO CONTROL,THERE I S AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IRBMS AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. 7,SACEUR DOES NOT RPT NOT SEEK TO HAVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.USA CONTROL OVER USE OF THE WEAPONS IN WARTIME WOULD BE EXERCISED THROUGH ITS CONTROL OF THE NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY EXERCISED THROUGH SACEUR.WE HAVE SO FAR OBSERVED NO RPT NO EFFORT TO SET UP NATO CONTROL OVER TACTICAL NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS EITHER IN PEACETIME OR IN WARTIME EXCEPT THROUGH THE NORMAL CONTROL WHICH SACEUR EXERCISES OVER 30.0 000522 �PAGE THREES694 • FORCES UNDER HIS COMMAND.THERE WOULD BE NATO CONTROL TO THE EXTENT THAT SACEUR MUST OPERATE WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE POLITICAL DIRECTIVE AND IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTING,HE IS BOUND TO CONSULT COUNCIL REGARDING THE COMMITMENT OF NATO FORCES IN DEFENCE OF THE NATO AREA.IN THIS SENSE WE BELIEVE THE REQUIREMENTS IN THE SENTENCE QUOTED AT THE BEGINNING OF PARA6 ARE MET?BUT NOT RPT NOT IN THE SENSE THAT THERE IS PROVISION FOR ANY SPECIAL OR SPECIFIC NATO CONTROL OF THE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS DISTINCT FROM CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.IN PRACTICE IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE USED WITHOUT POLITICAL CONSULTATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AND,UNLESS CIRCUMSTANCES ENTIRELY PREVENTED IT,CONSULTATION WITH SOME OR ALL NATO GOVTS WITH A VIEW TO USE OF THE WEAPONS BEING DECIDED JOINTLY.HOWEVER WE DOUBT WHETHER THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES WOULD WISH,OR WOULD SEE ANY NEED FOR,POLITICAL CONTROL BEYOND THAT ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN ACCEPTED NATO POLICY DECISIONS. 8.CLEARLY IT IS OPEN TO ANY GOVT RECEIVING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR ITS NATO FORCES TO NEGOTIATE A CONTROL ARRANGEMENT GIVING IT A VETO OVER THE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY ITS FORCES;BUT, AGAIN,WE DOUBT IF THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES WOULD WELCOME SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.INDEED,SINCE IT MIGHT INTRODUCE A VARIETY OF CONDITIONS AND SINCE IT WOULD CUT ACROSS NORMAL COMMAND CHANNELS, SUCH ARRANGEMENTS ARE PERHAPS OBJECTIONABLE IN PRINCIPLE;IN ANY CASE WE DEDUCE FROM THE TEXT OF YOUR REF TEL THAT YOU ARE SEEKING SOME GENERAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD BE SATISFACTORY BOTH TO NATO AND TO OUR OWN GOVT. 9.WE AGREE THATeBEFORE PURSUING OUR OWN NEGOTIATIONS WITH SACEUR WITH RESPECT TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR THE BRIGADE,ITI WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO OBTAIN MORE INFO REGARDING THE PATTERN WHICH DEVELOPS AS A RESULT OF THE ARRANGEMENTS SACEUR IS WORKING OUT WITH THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF OTHER GOVTS.WE ALSO AGREE THAT THE UK EXPERIENCE IN THIS CONTEXT WILL BE PARTICULARLY RELEVANT TO THE CDN CASE. 10.SO FAR AS THE UK EXPERIENCE IN GERMANY GOES,TO WHICH YOU REFER IN 000523 �PAGE FOUR 6 9 4 THE LATTER PART OF PARA3 OF YOUR REFTEL,WE HAVE ASCERTAINED FROM THE UK DEL THAT THEIR AUTHORITIES RATHER EXPECT THAT THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH AROSE OVER THE STATIONING OF UK FORCES ARMED WITH TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS NEAR DORTMUND WILL ULTIMATELY BE CLEARED UP. IF NOT RPT NOT,THEY WILL HAVE TO SEEK ANOTHER SITE FOR THE FORCES IN QUESTION.AT ANY RATE THEY CONFIRM ONCE MORE THAT THE DIFFICULTY AROSE ENTIRELY FROM THE ATTITUDE OF THE LOCAL GERMAN AUTHORITIES,AND THAT AT NO RPT NO TIME HAS THE FEDERAL GOVT SHOWN THE SLIGHTEST DISPOSITION TO WISH TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BE ASSIGNED TO UK FORCES IN GERMANY. 11.WE WOULD ADD FOR CONSIDERATION THAT,ALTHOUGH<AS INDICATED IN PARA6 A30VE)THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS I S IN A SENSE MORE MANAGEABLE THAN THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL OF IRMBS,IT I S ALSO SLIGHTLY MORE COMPLICATED.IN THE CASE OF IRBMS THERE ARE THREE PARTIES-SACEUR,THE HOST COUNTRY AND THE USA;IN THE CASE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE ARE FOUR-SACEUR,THE USER NATION,THE HOST COUNTRY,AND THE USA.ON THE OTHER HAND,SO LONG AS THE MAIN HOST COUNTRY-GERMANY-MAINTAINS THE ATTITUDE DESCRIBED IN PARAIO AND I S ALSO ABLE TO COPE WITH THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES-THIS COMPLICATION MAY BE MORE HYPOTHETICAL THAN REAL.AS IN THE CASE OF IRBMS,THE FUTURE PATTERN WILL DEPEND PARTLY ON THE ATTITUDE WHICH GERMANY MAINTAINS TOWARD STOCKPILES OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS UNDER USA CONTROL ON HER TERRITORY.AT THE MOMENT THIS ATTITUDE SEEMS BENEVOLENT. 12.WE ASSUME THAT,AS MATTERS STAND,WE ARE FREE TO MAKE WHATEVER ARRANGEMENT WE WISH WITH THE USA WITH RESPECT TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BE PROVIDED TO CDN FORCES IN CDA AND WITH RESPECT TO ANY STOCKPILES OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THE WEAPONS TO BE SITUATED IN CDA,WE SUPPOSE,HOWEVER,THAT ANY ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO WEAPONS AND WARHEADS FOR USE BY OUR NAVAL FORCES EARMARKED FOR NATO WOULD HAVE TO CONFORM TO THE NATO PATTERN.""' 000524 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04115 Title A name given to the resource CDNW04115 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en