https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/bfa61748e1df0a8e6a81b558e925bc9e.pdf c2c4261d0d32f235be52558f92b5acaa PDF Text Text esc /.is LJ F FM N A T O P A R I S J U N 2 / 5 9 S E C R E T TO EXTERNAL OTT U 0 6 r, c OPIMMEDIATE ^am* re sf s^ • r •'^•oro ••<&*>-&:u± £/.££•/ a./ox-/ REF OURTEL 1 0 8 4 MAY26 STORAGE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS ON FRENCH TERRITORY FOLLOWING FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY I CALLED ON MR SPAAK TO DISCUSS WITH HIM THE COMPLICATIONS ARISING OUT OF THE DECISION TAKEN BY GENERAL DE GAULLE ABOUT THE STOCK* PILING OF ATOMIC WARHEADS ON FRENCH TERRITORY.I TOLD MR SPAAK THAT I WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS BUT THAT SINCE THIS DECISION WAS OF CONSIDERABLE MOMENT FOR THE CDN AUTHORITIES AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME,I WISHED TO HAVE AS CLEAR A PICTURE AS POSSIBLE OF THE SITUATION. 2.MR SPAAK REPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE GENERALS DECISION BY GENERAL NORSTAD WHO HAD ASKED HIM NOT RPT NOT TO MENTION IT TO ANYONE.ON ARRIVAL IN WASHDC HOWEVER TO ATTEND MR DULLES FUNERAL SOME PRESS CORRESPONDENTS HAD ASKED HIM FOR HIS COMMENTS ON GENERAL DE GAULLES DECISION.ON RETURN HERE,HE HAD FOUND OUT THAT SEVERAL PERN REPS WERE FAMILIAR WITH THE PROBLEM.HE FELT HE WAS IN A MOST UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION AND HIS FIRST INCLINATION WAS TO RAISE THE ISSUE IN COUNCIL.BEFORE DOING THIS HE INTENDED TO SPEAK TO THE FRENCH AND USA PERM REPS DURING THE NEXT DAY OR TWO;HE MIGHT LATER ON SEE GENERAL DE GAULLE. 3.MR SPAAK WAS MILDLY CRITICAL OF GENERAL NORSTAD ON THIS AND RELATED ISSUES.HE IS DISSATISFIED WITH THE WAY THE COUNCIL IS BEING BY-PASSED IN THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON ATOMIC MATTERS AND ALSO'tMORE FUNDAWENTALLY,VITR THE LACK OF PRECISION OF THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL OVER THE USE .OF ATOMIC WEAPONS.AT ONE POINT DURING THE CONVERSATION HE SAID THATMNORSTAD EST UN ETAT DANS LETAT". 'V, . HE ADDED THAT THIS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT HE WAS OPPOSED TO THE NUCLEARIZATION OF NATO FORCES,BUT WHAT UPSET HIM WAS THAT THERE WAS NO RPT NO POLITICAL CONSUL* TATION OVER THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE MILITARY.I ENQUIRED WHETHER • • .2 000329 /bO �• u PAGE TWO . ... uo6 ' *•"•-,. . .:'•- '* r<^:i 3w.it - \vr\u m HE MEANT OVER THE SETTING UP OF IRBM •SITE^AND HE , REPLIEDt rt PRIMARILY n , HAVING SAID ALL THIS HE ADMITTED THAT HE HAD NOT RPT MOT YET tFOUND* A FORMULA THAT MIGHT PROVE SATISFACTORY. . '• • " '" • • ' • ' :0Aj?0'f3 4 . A S REGARDS THE IMMEDIATE POINT AT ISSUE MR SrMAK-'-AlD THAT: 0 ~ '"n GENERAL NORSTAD HAD INFORMED HIM THAT IN VIEW OF>TH£ SITUATION IN BERLIN HE HAD TO TAKE CERTAIN PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AND SINCE *^ J NO RPT NO ATOMIC WARHEADS WERE AVAILABLE FROM* FRENCH TERRITORY'--*"* HE HAD TO RE-DEPLOY SOME OF THE SQUADRONS NOW STATIONED IN*FRANCE ON* WEST GERMAN AIR FIELDS.THIS,HOWEVER,WAS A MAKESHIFT ARRANGEMENT AND IN DUE COURSE,IF GENERAL DE GAULLE WAS TO ABIDE BY HIS PRESENT' DECISION,AMERICAN SQUADRONS ON FRENCH TERRITORY WOULD HAVE TO _£"?• ' RE-DEPLOYED AND**IN DUE COURSE SOME OF THEM MAYHAVE^TO BE SENT BACK TO THE USA". T - 5.DURING THE CONVERSATION I POINTED OUT THAT THE STAND TAKEN BY GENERAL DE GAULLE HAD SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CDN SQUADRONS NOW ON FRENCH SOIL,PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN THE CDN GOVT WAS FACED WITH THE DECISION OF HAVING TO CONSIDER THE RE-EQUIPMENT OF THE AIR DIVISION.I WAS ALSO CONCERNED LEST THE GENERALS DECISION* GOT TO BE KNOWN PUBLICLY.LASTLY I THOUGHT THAT WE SHOULD PLAY FOR TIME AND TRY TO PERSUADE ALL CONCERNED I.E.SACEUR,THE FRENCH AND USA AUTHORITIES THAT NO RPT NO ACTION BE TAKEN THAT WOULD AUTO=> MATICALLY BREAK THE STORY. 6.WE THEN WENT ON TO DISCUSS MORE GENERALLY THE POSITION OF THE FRENCH GOVT ON ATOMIC WEAPONS.I SAID THAT I WAS NOW FAIRLY CLEAR IN MY MIND THAT WHATEVER THE ARRANGEMENTS NOW ARRIVED AT BETWEEN- * WASHDC AND HOST COUNTRIES,IN THE END,A POLITICAL DECISION WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN BY THE HOST COUNTRY TO AUTHORIZE ANY FORCE STATIONED ON ITS TERRITORY TO USE ATOMIC WARHEADS.MR SPAAK AGREED WITH THIS WITH THE FOLLOWING DISTINCTION?IN HIS VIEW IN CASE OF AN ALL-OUT ATOMIC ATTACK,THE FORCES.OF RETALIATION SHOULD ENTER INTO PLAY IMMEDIATELY AND POLITICAL CONSULTATION IF A>JY WOULD BE ... 3 000330 �s> PAGE THREE 1106 REDUCED TO A MINIMUM.HIS MAIN CONCERN WAS THAT A STITUATION COULD DEVELOP WHEN A DECISION WOULD HAVE TO B£ TAKEN AS TO WHETHER OR NOT RPT NOT ATOMIC WEAPONS SHOULD BE USED AGAINST SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES.IN THIS INSTANCE HE FELT STRONGLY THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE CONSULTED AND HE ALSO BELIEVED THAT THERE WOULD BE TIME FOR SUCH CONSULTATION.HERE AGAIN/HOWEVER,THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL WAS UNCLEAR AND MORE THOUGHT WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN TO THE PROBLEM. 7.HE ASKED ME IF I HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS TO MAKE.I REPLIED THAT GENERALLY IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE CDN AUTHORITIES,WHILE NOT RPT NOT WISHING TO PARALI2E THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER IN USING ATOMIC RETALIATORY CAPABILITY AT HIS COMMAND IN THE EVENT OF AN ALL-OUT ATTACK,WOULD CERTAINLY INSIST THAT IN ANY OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES THEY BE CONSULTED.IF TIME PERMITTED.SPEAKING PERSONALLY I FEARED THAT THE ATOMIC ISOLATION IN WHICH FRANCE WAS PLACING HERSELF COULD BE VERY UNHEALTHY FOR THE ALLIANCE IN THE LONG RUN.TIME MAY, THEREFORE.BE RUNNING OUT WHEN A COMPROMISE MIGHT STILL BE POSSIBLE.MR SPAAK FEARED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT ANY COMPROMISE AT THIS TIME THAT WAS NOT RPT NOT BASED ON JOINT .CONTROL OF THE ATOMIC WARHEADS STOCKPILED IN FRANCE,AND THAT • THEY REALLY WISHED TO HAVE A SEPARATE KEY AND A NATIONAL KEYHOLE TO THE CUPBOARD.I REPLIED THAT I WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE TOO UPSET \ BY SUCH A PROPOSITION IF IN TURN SOME ASSURANCES COULD BE OBTAINED •>FROM GENERAL DE GAULLE THAT HE WOULD PROVE MORE CO-OPERATIVE . •!> : GENERALLY NOW AND,EVEN MORE SOfWHEN FRANCE BECAME AN ATOMIC POWER f . . >*Xti'tHBrOtfN RIGHT. &*VWifot . * 4EA«^ED fWm . . . ; • * \ ^.AUTHORITATIVE FRENCH:SOURCE THAT THE '' j - _ • • _ . - * - FRENCH ALREADY HAVE THE PLUTONIUM AND THE KNOWHOW NEEDED FOR AN ORDINARY NUCLEAR EXPLOSION.THEY •• * i t HAVE HOWEVER DECIDED TO CONSERVE THEIR PLUTONIUM SO OUR INFO GOES, FOR A TEST. OF A HYDROGEN BOMB WHICH THEY HOPE WOULD PUT THEM • ... 4 " ' 000331 �PAGE FOUR 1106 ROUGHLY WHERE THE UK WAS; TWO YEARS AGO,RATHER THAN WHERE THE USA WAS 14 YEARS AGO.THEY THINK THAT THEY ARE NOT RPT NOT FAR FROM SOLVING THE REMAINING PROBLEMS,MOSTLY IN THE ENGINEERING FIELD. WHEN THEY HAVE SET OFF THIS DEVICE,IT MAY REASONABLY 3E ASSUMED THAT THE FRENCH WILL SEEK TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE USA 0-1 ARRANGEMENTS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD ROUGHLY COMPARABLE TO THOSE! ENJO/EDJ3Y THE UK. 9.MR SPAAK WHO IS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED OVER THE WHOLE ''ROBLEM WOULD WELCOME VIEWS FROM US AND I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS. PERSONALLY I DO NOT RPT NOT THINK I COULD ADD MUCH TO THE VIEWS ALREADY EXPRESSED IN MY LET N01532 OF MAR24 AND MY TE.. 1084 VAY26 LEGER: 000332 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04057 Title A name given to the resource CDNW04057 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en