https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e866ae3b7eff421470852f7ff8b5e92d.pdf 7f52925af34e65e3c3918660b902a07a PDF Text Text q/\ '\ A S E C R E T STOCKPILING OF ATOMIC WARHEADS IN EUROPE PROVISION OF IRBMs TO EUROPE THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL The stockpiling of atomic weapons and the provision of missiles to European Countries will almost certainly reopen the very difficult problem of the control of these weapons* They raise distinct problems however. On the one hand, the atomic warheads to be stockpiled are intended to be available for the shield forces and are thus in a tactical role. On the other hand, intermediate range ballistic missiles are strategic weapons and would be used in a deterrent or strategic offensive role. The basic problem is to ensure that these new weapons will not enable any NATO country to embark unilaterally on a nuclear war against any other power, or accidentally to provoke a situation which could lead to preventive or retaliatory action by a major power. It is certain for example that the Scandinavians would look with the greatest concern upon a situation in which the Turks or the Greeks could, in a moment of over-estimated danger, let go an atomic attack - thereby involving the whole Alliance. Under the United States scheme for the provision of these weapons, safeguards against such involvements have been carefully worked out. The atomic warheads for tactical weapons are to be stockpiled in American hands and provided through ah -American logistic chain, and under the military control of SACEUR. The IRBMs would lie issued only to national forces assigned to SACEUR and would be under his military control. ' While this appears a satisfactory system of military control which guards against the risk of unilateral action, it does not solve the problem of the relationship between civilian and military control. The Political Directive sets out the principle of civilian control: "The responsibility of governments to make deoisions for putting NATO military plans into action in the event of hostilities is not affected by this directive". This implies that the use of nuclear weapons must await a political deoision, which presumably could only be taken by the Council that there was an act of war and that it was an all out act of war and not merely a local war. The real question at issue, however, is whether a declaration of war by NATO Governments would imply that SACEUR would have full control over the use of nuclear weapons under his command or whether the Council should retain a degree of control over them'. The Political Directive recognizes the possibility of local conflicts developing on the NATO frontiers. It is evident that an important factor in preventing local conflicts from spreading into all out nuclear warfare may involve the decision as to whether or not to use nuclear weapons. Many governments v/ill feel that' this decision should rest with the Council. In practice, hov/ever, this might prove a most difficult responsibility for Council as presently constituted and might involve unacceptable delays for countries whose forces are directly involved. 2 000781 �- 2With regard to tactical nuclear weapons the problem is particularly acute as these v/eapons will in part replace normal artillery support for the forward echelons. In case of attack there might be little time for political decisions, communications might be disrupted and unavoidable delays might prejudice the whole defensive effort of the Alliance. On the other hand, the decision to use tactical nuolear weapons is of such critical importance, because it could cause a local conflict to spread into general nuolear warfare, that the maximum practical degree of political control would seem desirable. With regard to the control of IRBMs, the position is perhaps less oritical but equally contentious. The use of IRBMs would depend on a decision to launch the strategic offensive. Up to the present, all strategic nuolear foroes have been held outside the control of NATO viz; the U.S. Strategic Air Command and the U.K. Long Range Bomber. Force. The decision to use these Forces rests with the Governments concerned, although they could be expected to consult other NATO Governments if time permitted. With the introduction of IRBMs into the foroes of SACEUR, a new problem of control and coordination is created for the NATO Governments. These problems of control cannot be solved at the December Meeting. The manner in which solutions might be developed will become clearer after the U.S. has held more detailed bilateral consultations with the host countries. The solutions will probably have to take into account political realities in the European countries as well as the military realities which require quick and efficient machinery for taking decisions. It is recommended that the Canadian Delegation should not take a firm line at the December Meeting on the problems of control. These problems raise far reaching issues which should be thoroughly studied on a bilateral basis before they are brought to Council for whatever decision might be considered necessary. Brief for NATO Ministerial Meeting December 16 - 18, 1957 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04047 Title A name given to the resource CDNW04047 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en