https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/8001af83510a94a6e9fa28068a2996f9.pdf d904e25d42aa80202a5d0250d66dd509 PDF Text Text £ ' : ' DOCUMENT ED 6 - 5 7 l/\~yju\*4. -—* - ' i -. L MJ>^A^'^^ ^ £ xJU«vuj>jt, QJP/^«AA-> . ^ (V^o ___ TOP SECRET «^ 3>^D oU-^r i C~-Sw~*t • COPY NO. S MEMORANDUM TO TH-E PANEL ON THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF DEFENCE QUESTIONS; Stockpiling of atomic warheads for tactical weapons in Europe The Council has already approved in principle of the equipment of the shield forces with atomic weapons. MC/48 adopted at the 1954 December Meeting of Council approved a new NATO strategy based on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to counter an all-out attack by the Soviet Union. The Political Diredtive (CM(56)138 Final) approved at the December 1956 Meeting states that: "The shield forces must include the capability to respond quickly, should the situation so require, with nuclear weapons to any type of aggression. They must, of course, also have the capability to deal with the situations envisaged in 4(6) (Local actions) without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons". MC/4-8/2 confirms this agreement. The implementation of this agreed strategy by the stockpiling of atomic warheads for tactical weapons in Europe will be raised for the first time in December. It involves a number of problems for NATO, not all of which can be decided at the December meeting. The main problems would appear to be the following: The Problem of Control The Political Directive sets out The Principle of Civilian Control: "The responsibility of governments to make decisions for putting NATO military plans into action in the event of hostilities is not affected by this directive". It is clear that the SAC, which is not only the nuclear deterrent for NATO, but also for the U.S., would be governed by decisions of the President of the U.S. The principle is not clear for_tactical nuclear-.weapons. We Y^ understand that the U.S. intention is to stockpile the 11^^i*t> nuclear warheads in Europe but to retain ownership and (J\ u*\ control in U.S. hands through an American logistic chain. Ifc^ •"" LSACEUR would have operational control under the NATO t^\\ CouncilTjf The real question at issue is whether a de_Jj__-jtiJi.o.iq of war "by NATO governments would imply that SACEUR would have full control over the fuse of nuclear weapons}under his command or whether Council should retain a degree ...of control over the use. of_ tactical atomic, weapons. The'" PoiiticaTTJirective recognizes the possibility of localized hostilities. It is evident that an important element in ensuring that localized hostilities do not turn into all-out nuclear warfare may involve the decision as to whether or not to use._nuc.lelar,n,w.e.apons. Many governments will feel that this decision should" rest with the Council. In practice, however, this might prove a most difficult responsibility for Council as presently constituted and might involve unacceptable delays for countries whose forces are directly involved. id J o_* w ~ ~~*£**Jz«^ ** UJ^r^^ 11 000757 �- 2 - TOP SECRET Before a decision to stockpile atomic warheads is taken, some .countries may feel that the Political Directive should be modified to make more explicit the manne.r in which the decision to use them could be taken. In our view, this would be a most difficult subject to take up at the Heads of Government Meeting and we feel that the Canadian Delegation should support the view that it should be considered at the Ministerial Meeting which will be called to consider MC/70. The Problem of Acceptance . It would appear that the European countries will be primarily concerned with the problem of acceptance and the terms under which they would accept the stockpiling of nuclear warheads on their territories. In order to restrict the Fourth Power Problem, the Canadian Delegation should support the present U.S. plan for stockpiling under U.S.- control in European countries. Under present U.S. lawr no other plan could be implemented. It would not appear that there will be any immediate decision necessary on the provision of atomic warheads for the use of our Brigade in Germany. Our agreement to the stockpiling scheme would, however, pave the way for eventual equipment of the Brigade with atomic weapons should this meet the requirements of the military authorities and the agreement of the Canadian government. T-he-s ame—c on-s-iderat-i-ons-woul-d—appi-y-t-o-the—A-xr—Dxvi-sl-on-FThe Political Problem ..... While there is an obvious and accepted requirement for strengthening the shield forces, a decision to provide atomic stockpile^ in Europe is certain to give rise to violent reactions for the Communist countries, particularly if Germany is involved. The reaction from India and other uncommitted countries is likely to be unfavourable and there are already indications that the announcement will have a mixed reception in Europe. It will therefore be necessary to consider very carefully the context in which these and other announcements (missiles) will be presented. To meet this problem, the United States have in mind: j) r (1) A widening of the knowledge of the total capabilities of security that are in being or in prospect. (2) An assurance that this power will In fact be available in case of need for common security. (3) An assurance that it will not be used for purposes other than individual or collective self defence as authorized by the United Nations. We have made a proposal in the Council that a Declaration should be drawn up for the Heads .of Government with a view to meeting this political problem in a wider context. Our views on what this Declaration might contain are considered in a separate paper-. Department of External Affairs, November 18th,"1957. 000758 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04039 Title A name given to the resource CDNW04039 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en