https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2339e5708a24ab4ff11bb2305846f400.pdf bc9a8a82a35082f30c19156d14784dbf PDF Text Text D *3AS5 FM WASHDC N0V19/57 UNCLAS CSC/JS aov n .957 HOY 2 ! 10 39 AH'57 TO EXTERNAL 2 4 5 4 OPIMMEDIATE NATO STOCKPILING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS //i/iZ4/ FILE CHP'OIQ JJ&.£y p C-j~£. YOU MAY WISH TO HAVE THE TEXT OF THE QUESTIONS PUT TO MR DULLES AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY ON THE ABOVE SUBJECT AND HIS ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS.BEGINS: Q0MR SECRETARY,IN THE LIGHT OF COMMENTS WHICH YOU HAVE MADE ABOUT CREATING A NATO STOCKPILE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS,AND WHICH DEFENSE SECRETARY MCELROY HAS MADE ABOUT HAVING SOME MISSILES BASES IN EUROPE,IS IT PROPER TO SAY,OR COULD YOU TELL US WHETHER YOU ARE CONTEMPLATING NEGOTIATING FOR A SYSTEM OF ATOMIC MISSILES BASES IN THE NATO AREA IN EUROPE? A.WELL,WE ALREADY HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE UK,WHICH IS PART OF THE NATO AREA IN EUROPE,WHICH WAS ARRIVED AT AT BERMUDA LAST MAR. IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT WE WILL EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF SOMEWHAT SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE.THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WILL,PRESUMABLY,BE CONDUCTED,IN THE FIRST INSTANCE,WITH GENERAL NORSTAD,AS THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE EUROPEAN AREA,AND WOULD,WE HOPE,RESULT IN THE POSSIBLE PLACING OF SOME OF THOSE MISSILES ON THE CONTINENT UNDER SIMILAR CONDITIONS TO THOSE WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN NEGOTIATED OUT WITH THE UK WITH RESPECT TO WAR HEADS. Q.IN THAT CONNECTION,MR SECRETARY,THERE ARE PERSISTENT REPORTS THAT OUR EUROPEAN CONTINENTAL ALLIES DON'T WANT— PARTICULARLY IN RESPECT TO THE IRBM—THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILE BASES .THAT THEY FEEL THAT,ACCORDING TO THESE DISPATCHES,IT WOULD MAKE THEM A TARGET FOR RUSSIAN REPRISALS AND THAT THE ONLY THING THAT WOULD ENCOURAGE THEM WOULD BE A MORE DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN THE WAY THESE BASES ARE RUN. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THAT,SIR? A.MY COMMENT IS,FIRST,THAT OBVIOUSLY WE ARE NOT GOING TO FORCE THESE MISSILES ON ANYBODY THAT DOESN'T WANT THEM.THE SECOND COMMENT IS THAT GENERAL NORSTAD WHEN HE WAS HERE A FEW DAYS AGO DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH ME,AND INDICATED THAT IN HIS OPINION THEY WERE VERY MUCH DESIRED, MY THIRD COMMENT IS THAT THERE WOULD BE A VERY CONSIDERABLE MEASURE OF ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN THE HANDLING OF THESE MISSILES. Q3MR SECRETARY,THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY o o »2 .. ^ / * ' 000748 �PAGE TWO 2454 —' OF NEGOTIATING TREATIES.WHAT IS THE LEGAL POSITION THERE?DOES THE EXECUTIVE NOT HAVE AUTHORITY ON ITS OWN,SO THAT IT COULD NEGOTIATE THOSE WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE SENATE? A,I THINK THE WORD"TREATY-WAS USED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IN ITS BROAD SIGNFIFICANCE AS AN"AGREEMENT,"AND NOT WITHIN THE TECHNICAL MEANING OF AN AGREEMENT OF THE TYPE WHICH HAS TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE FOR RATIFICATION.WE BELIEVE THAT THESE MATTERS CAN BE CARRIED OUT BY THE EXECUTIVE UNDER ITS AUTHORITY,AS WAS THE CASE WITH THE AGREEMENT WITH THE UK,AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO HAVE A TREATY IN THE TECHNICAL-LEGAL SENSE OF THAT WORD. QoWOULD THAT APPLY ALSO IN ATOMIC WARHEADS? A.YES,BECAUSE,OF COURSE,OUR ARRANGEMENT WITH THE UK ALSO INVOLVES THE PLACING THERE OF ATOMIC WARHEADS.NOW THEY ARE STILL UNDER THE TECHNICAL CUSTODY OF THE USA,IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT, I DOUBT WHETHER IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CHANGE THOSE PARTICULAR PROV.ISIONS(OF USA LAW INSOFAR AS THEY MIGHT BE APPLICABLE IN ANY FUTURE AGREEMENT WITH THE CANADIANS,FOR EXAMPLE.)IT IS CONTEMPLATED THEY WILL WORK OUT SATISFACTORILY WITH THE UK,WHICH IS STILL PROSPECTIVE, BUT WHERE THE TERMS IN THAT RESPECT HAVE BEEN AGREED UPONjAND A CERTAIN TECHNICAL CUSTODY IS QUITE COMPATIBLE,I BELIEVE,WITH THE VIEWS OF SACEUR.WE UNDERSTAND,OF COURSE,THAT IN THE EVENT OF WAR THE PRESIDENT, UNDER HIS WAR POWERS,WOULD BE ABLE TO TURN THEM OVER TO THE ALLIES IN THAT WAR WHO WOULD PREVIOUSLY HAVE BEEN TRAINED AND WHO WOULD THEMSELVES POSSESS THE EQUIPMENT FOR USING THE ATOMIC OR NUCLEAR WARHEADS,, Q,COULD YOU CLEAR UP THIS POINT.I WAS NOT CLEAR FROM YOUR EARLIER ANSWER—ARE YOU CONTEMPLATING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS,SUCH AS THE USAUK AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USA AND THE CONTINENTAL COUNTRIES,OR WERE YOU IMPLYING THAT THERE MIGHT BE A CONTINENTAL AGREEMENT WITH NATO AS SUCH ON PLACING MISSILES? A.I WOULD THINK THERE COULD BE AN ARRANGEMENT MADE WITH NATO-SACEUR* NOW,OF COURSE,YOU RUN INTO A CERTAIN COMPLICATION BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT NATO,THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION,IS NOT TECHNICALLY A LEGAL ENTITY,IS NOT ITSELF A CORPORATE BODY,A GOVERNMENTAL BODY.THEREFORE,THE EXTENT TO WHICH YOU GET ARRANGEMENTS DEALING,FOR �PAGE THREE 2 4 5 4 E^WPLE.WITH THE INFRASTRUCTURE ON WHICH MISSILES WOULD BE BASED,ON THE LOCATION OF THESE THINGS—THOSE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE MADE WITH THE GOVTS IN WHICH THE TERRITORY I S LOCATED THAT YOU ARE USING.BUT,IN THE MAIN,WE WOULD ASSUME THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS BASICALLY WOULD BE WORKED OUT BY AND THROUGH SACEURjTHE IMPLEMENTATION MIGHT IN CERTAIN RESPECTS REQUIRE ACTION BY INDIVIDUAL GOVTS. Q.MR SECRETARY,WHEN WE REFER TO THIS NATO NUCLEAR POOL,ARE WE JUST REFERRING TO THE IRBM;AND,IF NOT,HOW DOES THAT ARRANGEMENT DIFFER FROM WHAT I S PRESUMED TO BE THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE TODAY? A.WELL,WHEN WE TALK ABOUT A NATO NUCLEAR STOCKPILE,WE ARE TALKING ABOUT MUCH MORE THAN THE INTERMEDIATE MISSILES,OF THE WARHEADS FOR THE MISSILES.THERE ARE IN EXISTENCE TODAY QUITE A LARGE VARIETY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH ARE ACTUALLY,MANY OF THEM, IN EUROPE AT THE PRESENT TIME.THEY ARE IN EUROPE AT THE PRESENT TIME ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY,I WOULD SAY ON THE CONTINENT EXCLUSIVELY, FOR THE USE OF OUR OWN USA FORCES.THESE WOULD BECOME SO SITUATED THAT THEY WOULD ALSO BE AVAILABLE TO THE FORCES OF OUR ALLIES, Q.MR SECRETARY,WHAT I S THIS AGREEMENT WITH CANADA,WHICH YOU IMPLIED A MOMENT AGO,ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS? A.WELL,WE HAVE A SYSTEM THERE,THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM,THE DEW LINE, AND SO FORTH,WHICH(COULD BE)REINFORCED BY MISSILES WHICH HAVE NUCLEAR COMPONENTS,(PROVIDED THAT SATISFACTORY)ARRANGEMENTS(WERE MADE)WITH CANADA IN THAT RESPECT. Q.ARE THERE NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN CANADA NOW? A.YES,I BELIEVE SO,ALTHOUGH I AM NOT ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN AS TO WHETHER THEY ARE ACTUALLY THERE OR NOT.YOU WOULD HAVE TO GET THAT INFO FROM MILITARY SOURCES.THEY ARE EITHER THERE OR IN A POSITION TO BE QUICKLY PUT THERE. Q.MR SECRETARY,YOU HAVE PLANS FOR A MEETING THIS WEEKEND WITH MR VON BRENTANO.COULD YOU TELL US WHAT THE PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING WILL BE? A.THE MEETING WAS SUGGESTED BY THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER FOR THE PURPOSE,I THINK,OF DISCUSSING TOGETHER SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THAT MAY COME UP AT THE NATO MEETING.IT IS VERY DESIRABLE,OF COURSE,THAT THERE SHOULD BE PRELIMINARY EXCHANGES OF VIEWS BETWEEN NATO MEMBERS BEFORE THE MEETING TAKES PLACE.VARIOUS MEDIA WILL BE SOUGHT FOR HAVING THOSE ...4 000750 �PAGE FOUR 2454 EXCHANGES OF VIEWS,TO SOME EXTENT BY PERSONAL TALKS,TALKS WITH THE AMBASSADORS,THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.IT WAS FELT DESIRABLE BY THE GERMAN GOVT TO HAVE A PERSONAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.I THINK THAT CHANCELLOR ADENAUER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER ARE GOING TO LONDON NEXT WEEK,AND IT WAS THOUGHT USEFUL TO COME AND HAVE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH US BEFORE THEN,NATURALLY,WE WELCOMED THAT. Q.MR SECRETARY,WILL WE SPEAK WITH GERMANY ABOUT BASING IRBM'S THERE—WITH VON BRENTANO? A.I DON'T THINK THAT WE WILL START OUR DISCUSSION? ABOUT OUR IRBM'S WITH INDIVIDUAL GOVTS.I THINK OUR DISCUSSION IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WOULD BE WITH THE SUPREME COMMANDER,WITH SACEUR,AS TO WHAT HE THINKS I S A SOUND MILITARY DISPOSITION TO MAKE,IF THAT DISCUSSION THEN LEADS TO A RESULT WHICH CALLS FOR DISCUSSION WITH INDIVIDUAL GOVTS,THAT WOULD TAKE PLACE AT THAT STAGE.BUT THAT WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST STAGE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS,AS FAR AS I AM AWARE. Q.MR SECRETARY,I WOULD LIKE TO ASK ON ONE POINT YOU RAISED A WHILE AGO,YOU HAVE ALWAYS SPOKEN AND I THINK THAT THIS DISCUSSION HAS BEEN CONDUCTED IN TERMS OF AN ATOMIC STOCKPILE FOR NATO.NOW,THE IMPLICATION OF YOUR EARLIER DISCUSSION HERE I S THAT IN FACT TO MAKE THOSE WEAPONS AVAILABLE WHEN AND IF NEEDED,THERE WOULD ACTUALLY BE SEVERAL ATOMIC STOCKPILES IN THE EUROPEAN NATO TERRITORY,IS THIS WHAT YOU ARE THINKING ABOUT STUDYING? A.YES,WHEN I SPEAK ABOUT A NATO STOCKPILE I AM NOT IMPLYING THAT ALL WEAPONS WOULD BE IN SOME SINGLE PLACE»THAT WOULD NOT BE A PRUDENT WAY TO ARRANGE IT.THERE SHOULD BE DIVERSIFICATION,OBVIOUSLY.SO THAT IT WOULD BE STOCKPILES THE LOCATIONS OF WHICH WOULD PE DETERMINED BY NATO AND WHICH WOULD BE DESIGNED FOR USE BY NATO FORCES. Q.MR SECRETARY,IN CONSIDERING THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THIS NATO MEETING,DO YOU CONCLUDE AS OF NOW THAT THERE IS ANY NECESSITY TO GO BEYOND THE CURRENT NATO PHILOSOPHY OF"AN ATTACK ON ONE IS AN ATTACK ON ALL"?IN OTHER WORDS,DO THE OTHER COUNTRIES NEED A HARDER COMMITMENT OF THE AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO COME TO THEIR AID IF ATTACHED THAN THE ONE THEY NOW HAVE IN THE NATO TREATY? A.NO,I DO NOT THINK SO.I THINK THE COMMITMENT,AS FAR AS THE TREATY IS CONCERNED,IS AS STRONG AS IT COULD BE MADE.IT I S HARD TO GET MUCH .5 000751 �PAGE FIVE 2 4 5 4 FURTHER IN AN AGREEMENT THAN"AN ATTACK UPON ONE I S AN ATTACK UPON ALL.'-THAT I S IN TURN REINFORCED BY THE PRESENCE AT THE FORWARD P O S I TIONS OF AMERICAN FORCES WHICH WOULD PRESUMABLY BE THEMSELVES ATTACKED.SO,IN ADDITION TO THE TREATY OBLIGATION,THERE WOULD BE THE EXERCISE OF THE BASIC RIGHT AND OBLIGATION OF A COMMANDER TO DEFEND HIMSELF IF ATTACKED.I DO NOT THINK THAT AS FAR AS THAT ASPECT OF THE MATTER I S CONCERNED THERE I S NEED OF ANY FURTHER REASSURANCE.NOW THERE IS PERHAPS THE BROADER QUESTION,WHICH YOU MAY ENVISAGE,AS TO WHETHER, IF THERE SHOULD BE AN ATTACK WHICH WOULD NOT INVOLVE USA FORCES PHYSICALLY ON THE GROUND,WOULD THERE BE A RESPONSE IN TERMS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND.I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THAT WAS THE POINT OF YOUR QUESTION. Q.THAT I S , S I R . A.THAT,OF COURSE,IS A MATTER IT I S NOT POSSIBLE TO GIVE ANY LEGAL COMMITMENTS ON BEYOND THOSE WE HAVE GIVEN.THAT IS PART OF THE EXERCISE OF THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY A? THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN TIME OF WAR AND HOW HE CONDUCTS THE BATTLE.I THINK THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT,AND PERHAPS THE NEXT NATO MEETING WILL BE ABLE TO REINFORCE THAT CONVICTION,THAT THERE I S NO DOUBT,BUT WHAT IN FACT THE USA WOULD REACT THROUGH THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND IN THE EVENT THAT THE SITUATION SEEMED TO CALL FOR I T . Q.MR SECRETARY,HAVE WE REALLY GOT AN OPERATIONAL IRBM,AND,IF SO, HAVE WE GOT ENOUGH TO BE DISTRIBUTING THEM AROUND TO OTHER COUNTRIES? A.NO,WE HAVEN'T GOT THEM AT THE MOMENT.WE HAVE THEM IN PROSPECT.THIS WOULD NOT BE AN OPERATION WHICH COULD BE ON INSTANTLY.I WOULD SUPPOSE THAT THE END OF THE NEXT YEAR,THE NEXT CALENDAR YEAR,WOULD BE ABOUT AS SOON AS THEY WOULD BE COMING OUT ON AN OPERATIONAL BASIS. Q.MR SECRETARY,.SOME YEARS AGO OR A FEW YEARS BACK,OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WERE SAfD TO HAVE BEEN FEARFUL THAT WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN TRIGGER HAPPY IN THE USE OF-OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS.BUT NOW DO YOU SUGGEST THAT THEY MIGHT BE,THAT THEY ARE,FEARFUL THAT WE MIGHT NOT USE THEM IF NOT ATTACKED ON THE GROUND IN EUROPE?CAN YOU TELL US WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THIS CHANGE IN ATTITUDE? A.WELL,! DON'T THINK THAT THERE I S A CHANGE IN THEIR ATTITUDE.I 000752 �PAGE SIX 2454 THINK THAT THERE IS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FEELING OF CONCERN ON BOTH COUNTS.I THINK THAT THE COMMUNIQUE OR THE DECLARATION OF COMMON PURPOSE ISSUED BY PRESIDENT EISNEHOWER AND MR MACMILLAN INDICATES THAT FACT,WHERE IT POINTS OUT THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD BE REASSURED ON BOTH COUNTS—ONE,THAT THEY WILL BE USED IF THERE I S A PROPER OCCASION,AND,SECONDLY,THAT THEY WILL NOT BE MISUSED. THE TWO CONCERNS GO HAND-IN~HAND.IT I S EXACTLY THE SAME AS THOUGH WE WERE DEALING WITH A POLICE FORCE HERE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, EVERY CITIZEN WANTS TO BE SURE THAT THE POLICE FORCE WILL BE USED TO PROTECT HIM IN CASE OF NEED.ALSO,WE WANT EQUALLY TO BE SURE THAT THE POLICEMAN WILL NOT BE GOING OUT IN THE STREET BEATING THE HEADS OF INNOCENT CITIZENS,NOW,THOSE ARE PARALLEL CONCERNS WHICH ARE ALWAYS FELT WHEN YOU ARE DEALING WITH A COLLECTIVE DEFENSE FORCE OF THIS KIND.I THINK BOTH CONCERNS ARE FELT AND BOTH ARE ENTITLED TO RECOGNITION AND SATISFACTION,ENDS 000753 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04037 Title A name given to the resource CDNW04037 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO Cooperation Regarding Nuclear Weapons And Missile Bases (IRBM)," RG24-B-1, vol 21468, file CSC 2108:1, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en