https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/40969fdb442ed0a0c3c50b9f7e419d34.pdf 7b0efc445e21abefc2572010fa869325 PDF Text Text TOP SECRET THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA MEMORANDUM FOR CABINETAcquisition and Storage of Defensive Nuclear Weapons and Warheads in Canada 1. Recent decisions of the Government regarding the introduction of the BOMARC air defence missile into the air defence system in Canada and the inclusion of the LACROSSE ground-to-ground missile in the Canadian Army have raised the question <>f the provision of nuclear-we^Fp^is for these m i s s i l e s . Investigations a r e also being c a r r i e d out to ascertain -whether the United States MB I nuclear a i r - t o - a i r rocket can be fitted to th f* GjiwUMK^nterceptor aircraft to enhance the air defence of Canada until t^e_jLOMARC missile is-ava43aMe. The Commander-in-Chief NORAD has indicated that consideration is being given to arming the United States air defence squadron in Goose Bay with an MBl nuclear rocket, which will involve th* pnrgibilifrya^f stockpiling nuclear air defence weapons for United States use in Goose Bay. 2. Because of these circumstances mentioned above, it is consi- dered advisable to review the problem of the provision and storage of defensive nuclear warheads and air defence nuclear rockets in Canada for use by both Canadian and United States forces. Following a r e the anticipated requirements of defensive nuclear weapons for'this purpose: (a) (b) nuclear warheads for BOMARC missiles s^tioned in Canada; "ajiclear "warheads for the LACROSSE ^eaponsSstationed in Europe, TOP'SECRET T ONLY. < * $ 000528 �A / n TOP SECRET (c) storage of MB1 nuclear air«t©-air rockets for United States use at Goose Bay; (d) probable storage of MBl air~to-air rockets for use of the RCAF; and (e) the probable storage of nuclear anti-submarine weapons for Canadian and United States use >^rBis^feF&^A*teBctit. 3. Under the existing United States law, atomic-weapons cannot be released by the United States in peacetime to any other natioi without Congressional approval. |Therefore^n^krranRemenis mgdclsrith.the United States for the provision of nujclear - jwa*h«aiiS""o^^^^e*s]^ f Canadian foreesqmist be[ne^soJAa*e*Pwith the US authorities/feyid"sab-ittiei|]3iir3^ngre^ eby the atomic -weapons or -warheads would remain in the>^cnstod\ 0 Sfca^glBartil released by the President -when a state of -war exists or is anticipated % _j 4. It will be recalled that arrangements a r e now being made for nuclear -weapons and-warheads to be stockpiled in Europe for use of the NATO partners in the custody of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in Ms capacity a s the Commander^in-Chief of the US forces* Storage facilities are to be constructed in close proximity to the forces requiring such atomic -weapons but these -weapons a r e to remain under United States custody until released by presidential order. Therefore arra^dgetnents •would have to-be made with, the US authorities for t h ^ p r e v ^ k m of warheads for the LACROSSE -weapons to be allocated to the Cana^©^ Brigade in Europe and with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in M£ capacity / as Commander-in-Chief of the US forces in Europe, for the custody and storage of these weapons. © RET 1W iil^y^ 000529 �f ! ?• Insofar a s Canadian law. i s concerned, suitable a r r a n g e m e n t s can be made for the i m p o r t a t i o n , m o v e m e n t and s t o r a g e of such -weapons in Canada by a m e n d m e n t s to existing r e g u l a t i o n s under the Atomic Energy Control Act, the Explosives A c t and the C u s t o m s Act. i V 000530 �8. The control of the u s e of a i r - t o - a i r atomic m i s s i l e s in Canadian a i r s p a c e by the USAF h a s been established by an exchange of notes with the United S t a t e s . Relevant e x t r a c t s of t h e s e notes a r e shown in Appendix "A-1'. The at: notes limitsthe use of a i r defence TWPHceerr -weapons to a c t u a l conditions of an a t t a c k or an apprehended -v, attack on North A m e r i c a . It is suggested that if and when authority is given for Canadian squadrons to be a r m e d with such weapons, s i m i l a r l i m i t a t i o n s will apply. It is further suggested that a s and when BOMARC m i s s i l e s a r e equipped with atomic w a r h e a d s , s i m i l a r a r r a n g e m e n t s for the control of the use of such w a r h e a d s will be worked out with the United States and applicable to both United States and Canadian m i s s i l e s operating in Canadian a i r s p a c e . 000531 �•7 Add to p a r a . 5: insofar a s a i r defence weapons a r e concerned and in the custody Of AAHT,ANT ir) h i 3 c a p a c i t y nw flinmmftniiioiP. TT S Fnrr^fr, <s*r s~™~*' /*•/!> yC^o' A t l a n t i c , in r e s p e c t of n u c l e a r a n t i - s u b m a r i n e w e a p o n s . Wnntwyw ^ 000532 �TOP SECRET 5. Insofar as the requirements for the defence of North America are concerned, it is anticipated that simitar arrangements could be made for the provision and storage of the nuclear warheads and weapons in Canada for Canadian and United States use by arranging with the US authorities for the provision of these weapons, to be placed in the custody of the Commander-in-Chief NORAD in his capacity as the Gommander~in* Chief C O M A l W ^ ^ 6. y ^ _ ^ ^ ^ l v *+, #& &~* ^U^^r^ While*this method may appear to be cumbersome, there are some distinct advantages in Canada following the NATO pattern and not requesting special arrangements for the defence of North America. As the United States will have custody of these weapons, the ownership will remain with the United States. Therefore the cost of these weapons would be expected to be borne by the United States. The Ganadian res-* ponsibility would be restricted to the cost of constructing storage facilities on bases for solely Canadian use and sharing the cost of similar facilities on bases where there would be joint use by Canada and the United States. iJb& U lb tkpe'cieti, IhaL fee working out of an^giEe^jaasnt • S . tasgEgfor tlfe~p~rogi4s4QTi and 4 ' storage^oi^t&esewdefi ^^mm^^U^sxaifre considerable. .•^feofb«*ne^©*larti^ns«>^5h^o5 &, It is recommended that agreement in principle Jje given to investigate with the United States authorities, the Commander Europe and the Gommander-in~Chief me Allied the possi bilities of negotiating agreements to provide for: . . .4 BMAF w l±z? li H 000533 �'* • " t ' T O P SECRET * 4 * (a) n u c l e a r w a r h e a d s for BOMARC m i s s i l e s stationed in Canada; (b) nuclear w a r h e a d s for the LACROSSE weapons stationed in Europe; (c) s t o r a g e of MB 1 n u c l e a r a i r - t o = a i r r o c k e t s for United States u s e at Goose Bay; (d) probable s t o r a g e of M B l a i r - t o - a i r r o c k e t s for u s e of the RCAP in Canada; and (e) p r o b a b l e s t o r a g e of n u c l e a r a n t i - s u b m a r i n e weapons for Canadian and United States use^m the—North Alhwitk.. fay If and w h e n such a g r e e m e n t s a r e negotiated, approval of the a g r e e m e n t s will be sought. MINISTER OF NATIONAL.:DEFENCE D e p a r t m e n t of National Defence, 3 October, 1958. T O P SECRET 40 IDMAFT ©NILY 000534 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW03914 Title A name given to the resource CDNW03914 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Untitled, TD No. 15A re: Nuclear Weapons/Canadian Forces," RG24-C-1-c, Box 24, file CSC 1888:1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en