https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5c6f541c2e34b70fb66390ecc6cbf493.pdf bf7c9cbfc50e43583e6e803561e037bf PDF Text Text J%a> TOP SECRET THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA MEMORANDUM FOR CABINET. Acquisition and Storage of Defensive Nuclear Weapons and Warheads in Canada 1. Recent decisions of the Government regarding the introduction of the BOMARC air defence missile into the air defence system in Canada and the inclusion of the LACROSSE ground-to-ground missile in the Canadian Army have raised-the question of the provision of nuclear warheads for these missiles. Investigations are also being carried out to ascertain whether the United States MB1 nuclear air-to-air rocket can be fitted to Canadian interceptor aircraft to enhance the air defence of Canada. The Commander-in-Chief NORAD has indicated that consideration is being given to arming the United States air defence squadron in Goose Bay with an MB1 nuclear rocket, which will involve stockpiling nuclear air defence weapons for United States use in Goose Bay. 2. Because of these circumstances mentioned above, it is considered advisable to review the problem of the provision and storage of defensive nuclear warheads and air defence nuclear rockets in Canada for use by both Canadian and United States forces. Following are the anticipated requirements of defensive nuclear weapons for this purposes a) nuclear warheads for BOMARC missiles stationed in Canada; b) nuclear warheads for the LACROSSE weapons stationed in Europej c) storage of MB1 nuclear air-to-air rockets for United States use at Goose Bay| d) probable storage of MB1 air-to-air rockets for use of the RCAFf and e) the probable storage of nuclear anti-submarine weapons for Canadian and United States use from Canadian bases. 3. Under the existing United States law, nuclear weapons cannot be released by the United States in peacetime to any other nation without Congressional approval. Therefore arrangements" would be required to be negotiated with the United States authorities whereby nuclear weapons or warheads would remain in their custody until released by the President when a state of war exists or is anticipated. 4-. It will be recalled that arrangements are now being made for nuclear weapons and warheads to be stockpiled in Europe for use of the NATO partners in the custody of the Supreme Allied Commander Europein his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of the US forces.' Storage facilities are to be constructed in close proximity to the forces requiring such nuclear weapons but these weapons are to remain under United States custody until released by presidential order. Therefore arrangements would have to be made with the US authorities for the provision of warheads for the LACROSSE weapons to be allocated to the Canadian Brigade in Europe and with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in his capacity as Commander-inChief of the US forces in Europe, for the custody and storage of these weaponso TOP SECRET /2 * / 000524 �-2* TOP SECRET 5. Insofar as the requirements for the defence of North America are concerned, it is anticipated that similar arrangements could be made for the provision and storage of the nuclear warheads and weapons in Canada for Canadian and United States use by arranging with the US authorities for the provision of these weapons, to be placed in the custody of the Commander-in-Chief NORAD in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief CONAD insofar as air defence weapons are concerned, and in the custody of the appropriate United States commander on the East and West coasts in respect to nuclear anti-submarine weapons. 6. While this method may appear to be cumbersome, there are some distinct advantages in Canada following the NATO pattern and not requesting special arrangements for the defence of North America. As the United States will have custody of these weapons, the ownership will remain with the United States. Therefore the cost of these weapons would be expected to be^bome by the United States. The Canadian responsibility would be restricted to the cost of construct-* ing storage facilities on bases for solely Canadian use and sharing the cost of similar facilities on bases where there would be joint use by Canada and the United States. 7. Insofar as Canadian law is concerned, suitable arrangements can be made for the importation, movement and storage of such weapons in Canada by amendments to existing regulations under the Atomic Energy Control Act, the Explosives Act and the Customs Act. 8. The control of the use of air-to-air nuclear missiles in Canadian airspace by the USAF has been established by an exchange of notes with the United States. Relevant extracts of these notes are shown in Appendix "A". This exchange of notes limits the use of air defence nuclear weapons to actual conditions of an attack or an apprehended attack on North America. It is=,suggested- that if and when authority is given for Canadian squadrons to be armed with such weapons, similar limitations will apply. It is further suggested that as and when BOMARC missiles are equipped with nuclear warheads, similar arrangements for the control of the use of such warheads will be worked out With the United States and applicable to both United States and Canadian missiles operating in Canadian airspace. 9* It is recommended that agreement in principle be given to investigate with the United States authoritiess the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Commander-in-Chief NORAD the possibilities of negotiating agreements to provide for? a) nuclear warheads for BOMARC missiles stationed in Canada; b) nuclear warheads for the LACROSSE weapons stationed in Europe; e) storage of MB1 nuclear air-to-air rockets for United States use at Goose Bay; d) probable storage of MB1 air-to-air rockets for use of the RCAF in Canada; and e) probable storage of nuclear anti-submarine weapons for Canadian and United States use from Canadian bases. 10. If and when such agreements are negotiated, approval of the agreements will be sought. t MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE. Department of National Defence 8 October 1958 TOP SECRET ft 000525 �APPENDIX "A" 4. SECRET Extracts from Notes Concerning Use of Air-to-Air"Nuclear Weapons By the USAF in Canadian Air Space US Note of 19 February 57 (1) The initial period during which the"Canadian Government will authorize the carriage of" MB-I weapons over Canada will extend to July 1, 1957. More" permanent arrangements will have to be worked out to cover the period after July 1957. (2) U.S.A. Air Force planes so'armed will enter Canadian air space only in the event an 'a"Ir""o"efehse warning yellow or red is declared. Iii such an event, the U.S.A." planes will confine their activities*in the main" to^Canadian territory bordering on the Great Lakes and extending northward to about 50 degrees north latitude. "U.SoA. planes" armed with MB-1 weapons, under air defense warning yellow or "red", will be authorized by the Canadian Government to land at, or take off from, Canadian bases in the territory over which they have authority to operate. (3) In the circumstance's visualized above, rules of interception and engagement over Canadian territory shall continue to be those established from time to time by the" Canadian Government for interceptor aircraft of the Royal Canadian Air Force operating over Canada. Canadian Note No. 91 of 19 February 57 The terms and conditions set out in your Note under reference are acceptable to my Government which concurs as well with your suggestion that your Note and this reply shall constitute an agreement effective the date of this Note, and to extend to July 1, 1957 <> US Note of 28 June 57 My Government wishes in the near future to enter into negotiations for long-term arrangements providing a basis for greater integration of atomic capabilities in the defense of our two countries. In the meantime, we request that the interim overflight agreement be extended for an additional period of twelve months. The amended terms would now read as follows s (1) The period during which the Canadian Government will authorize the carriage of MB-1 weapons over Canada will extend to July 1, 1958. (2) USA Air Force planes so' armed will enter Canadian air space only in the event an air defense warning yellow or red is declared. In such an event, the USA planes will confine their activities in the main to Canadian territory bordering on the Great Lakes and extending northward to about 50 degrees north latitude. USA planes armed with MB-1 weapons, under air defense warning yellow or red, will be authorized by the Canadian Government to land at, or take off from, Canadian bases in the territory over which they have authority to operate. �- 2 - SECRET Canadian Note No. 362 of 28 June 57 The terms and conditions set but in'your note under reference are acceptable to"the"Canadian Government, which' has approved the extension of the'existing "agreement for aTfurther one year from July 1, 1957, under the same conditions as 'outlined' in the exchange of notes of February 19, 1957.' The"Canadian "Government also concurs with your suggestion that your note'under"reference and this reply shall constitute an agreement effective the date of this note, and to extend to July 1, 1958. US Note of 12 May 58 Further deployment of"atomic" weapons to northern continental United States bases"will soon make it possible for the United States Air Force to range as far" north as 54-° north and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific"Ocean, including the areas" to which the coastal Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) procedures apply. Canadian Note No. 262 of 12 May 58 In your further note of May 12, 1958, it is indicated that further deployment of atomic weapbns to northern continental United States bases will soon'make it possible for the United States Air Force to range as far north as"54° north, and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, including the areas to which the coastal Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) procedures apply. This proposed amendment to the" agreement of June 28, 1957, is acceptable to the Canadian Government. US Note of 30 June 58 Exploratory discussions are currently being conducted between the military authorities of our" two countries regarding ways and means of bringing about a closer integration of the atomic capabilities of both countries. Following the military planning talks, my Government expects, in the relatively hear future, to make specific proposals for long-term arrangements providing a" basis for the greater integration of atomic capabilities in the defence of the two countries. In the meantime, my Government requests that the interim MB-1 overflight arrangements be extended for an additional period of twelve months to July 1, 1959 under the same terms and conditions as set forth in the Exchange of Notes dated June 28, 1957 as amended by the Exchange of Notes of May 12, 1958. Ganadian Note of 30 June 58 The Ganadian Government is happy to approve the extension to July 1, 1959 of the existing Agreement under the same conditions as outlined in the exchange of Notes of June 28, 1957 as amended by the exchange of Notes of May 12, 1958. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW03913 Title A name given to the resource CDNW03913 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Untitled, TD No. 15A re: Nuclear Weapons/Canadian Forces," RG24-C-1-c, Box 24, file CSC 1888:1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en