https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4a45a39f64ae065c1939d51ad0f8e443.pdf f4efa1146fea8b8672478bbd2715591c PDF Text Text D.L.(l) *v E.P.Black/ep DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM TO: U*. .R.. Cam$&Ll Security . S e C X e t Dbte May. .15,. 1963. File No S&tl^4l-'^0 FROM: P. • h • iA ) .Pi.Ti.S i.OJ.. REFERENCE: Cr* SUBJECT:. .^.® NATO M u l t i l a t ; e r a l Nuclear Foree . .{MLF) Attached, for clearance by you, is a brief on NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force for inclusion in the brief of the NATO Ministerial Meeting. CMCAC^-p Defence \ L i a i s o n (1) CIRCULATION Ext. 326 (6/56) 000743 13 aCLf/o ^ �S E C R E T HATO Spring Hinlsterlal Meeting 1965 Tho HATO Multilateral Huclear Foree (MLF) The essential problem posed by the Hassau Agreement Is how the United States Is to share control of nuclear weapons with its allies, particularly tha Europeans. In recant years the United States has become jnore vulnerable to a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. In these ciroumstances soma Europeens have come to doubt whether the United States would risk its omi destruction ia a crisis la which European Interests xmr® primarily at stake* Successive United States administrations have attempted to devise ways for reassuring Europeans by assigning U.S, strategic forces to HATO and by proposing different schemes for giving Europeans a greater sense of participation In the strategic defence arrangements of the Alliance. The latest of these schemes has been the proposal for a multilateral mixed-manned sea-borne or submarine force armed with the Polaris missile. Tha proposal raises problems of great complexity which will take considerable time to clarify. There is the question whether the United states Congress can be persuaded to amend the HacMahon Act so as to permit the United Jtates Administration to transfer the ownership and control of auclear warheads for suoh a force to some sort of multilateral legal entity under HATG# There is also the question -whether satisfactory control arrangements can be devised which v/ould permit a number of members of the Alliance to participate in collective decisions about the use of the v/eapons in the forco. A catting edge has been introduced into the discussions of the paragraph S foroe by the US "Campaigning" for consideration of a foroe of surface ships armed with Polaris type missiles. This force could be multinatlonally owned, controlled, and manned by HATO In the 1966-70 time period. The concept of a force of surface vessels armed with MRBM*s is aot new and predates Nassau* However, the main evolution in the characteristics of the multilateral nuolear foroe from those envisaged at the Hassau meeting is the inclusion of this mxed-maaaed surface element. Some confusion exists as to the composition of the proposed paragraph 8 multilateral force. This confusion is due in part to the somewhat free use of multiple terms. However, all versions of the HATO multilateral nuclear force comprise one or more of the following elements; (a) A British submarine Polaris force of as yet unspecified aumbers to be equipped with US Polaris missiles aad armed with British nuolear warheads. ...2/ 000744 �«»2— (b) \?hat is termed "USA foroes at least equal" to those in paragraph (a) above. Presumably these forces could be either Polaris submarines or Minuteman ICBM's or some other delivery system. (c) A multilateral sea based URKS foroe. The Hassau agreement only makes meatioa of a HATO multilateral auclear foroe la paragraphs 7 aad 8. However, the ourrent U3 proposal for a surface ship foroe adds multilateral owaership and mlxed-maaalag to the original plaa. It should be noted in passing that this element is referred to by the US as "The Multilateral Force (MLF)", Although there are reservations amoag some HATO members ; particularly on the part of Germany, oa the eventual composition of a sea based IfflBM foroe, the US proposal envisages a force of approximately 25 surfaee vessels equipped vdth 8 Polaris type missiles each. The mala features of this forco are listed at Appendix. The US has produced a detailed feasibility study of this force and has appointed special Ambassador Livingstone Merchant with a teaa to tour HATO capitals on request and brief natloaal authorities oa the ma^or aspects of the proposal. Some of the argumeats for aad against Caaadiaa partloipatioa in the MLF are: Argumeats for Caaadiaa support 1) The proposal to establish the imaginative idea v;hioh by eaoouraging a force within the Ailiaaoe oould go some a aew basis for defenoe co-operation in MLF is aa supra-national way to creating the ftest. 2) The experience gained in operatiag the MLF could have importaat implioatloas for U.H. peaoe-keepiag maohiaery and the establishment of the MLF could provide useful experience in any future internatioaal arms coatrol organizatioa« 3) Caaadiaa participation la the l£U? might provide Caaada with a worthwhile military eoatrl&utiou withia HATO la the 1970»s. Ylhether or not this would be the oase would require detailed study by the Department of national Defence. <&) In view of the stroag oommltmeat to the establishmeat of the MLF oa the part of Presideat Xeaaedy aad the USA Administratioa, Caaadiaa laok of iaterest ia partioipatiag ia the foroe could have aa adverse effect oa other areas of Caaadiaa-U.S. defeaoe oo-operatioa. 5) Germaa agreemeat to teke part ia the MLF aad coatrlbute substaatially to it will encourage ualty withia the Ailiaaoe aad offset to some extent Freach efforts to establish a "little Europe" under Freach leadership. eee.3/ 000745 �*»3*» 6} Si&WB. has a requiremeat for a laad-based mm force aad the M1F although aot land-based vjould go some way to meet this request. Arguments against Canadian support I) Since all aucloar weapons systems are extremely expensive, the shariag of the finaacial burdea of a HATO foroe will raise a major issue for tho Ailiaaoe. Even if a basis for fiaaacial arraagomeats oaa be agreed to ia terms of ourreat or kaowa systems it is iacreasingly difficult to forecast future requiremeats for moderalzatioa aad replacement. Precise iaformatloa is laokiag oa loag term oosts but the ourreat USA estimate of total cost is ^500 M aaaually for tea yearsj a 10 aatlonal share is ^5 M aaaually. 2J It Is by ao mesas clear at this time how the force will fit into tho HATO Ailiaaoe aor ifxdeed is there aay assurance that this novel ooncept can be traaslated iato an effective military force* 3) The establishmeat of the MLF is aaathema to the Freach Governmeat and it is questioaabio whether at this time it is worth proceeding with a polioy whioh risks a further split la the Ailiaaoe. 4s) ".'est Germaay*s position ia the MLF will give it aa extremely importaat aay ia the auclear policy of tha Alllaaee aad it is for ooasideratioa whether it is ia the interests of HATO to give the V.'est Germans such aa importaat role ia the force. 5} Tho Soviet Unioa has ladiested that it regards th<^3LF as an absolute increase in Western strategic power v&ioh has la it the seeds of aa iadepeadeat German nuolear capability. Extreme Soviet reaotioa to the establlshmeat of the LUF is a risk that must be taken lata account. 6) Participaats ia the- ~.LF may be uaable to speed the additloaal fuads which v/ould be required to meet their ooaveatioaal force goals. 7) It is fcr ooasideratioa whether the West Is ready at this stage for the abaadoameat of aatloaal sovereigaty to the exteat that will be required if aa HW Is established. &ay 13, 1963. �APPENDIX SECRET mill FBATUR5S OF US PROPOSED MULTILATERAL FORCE The mala features of th© ourreat US proposal for a multilateral KATO auclear force oaa be briefly summarized; (a) Purpose; Permanent Representatives from several HiiTO aatioas have stated a aeed for more participation by European HATO aatioas la auclear weapoas matters as oae means for lacreaslng the cohesiveaess aad solidarity of the alliance. SAiClUR has stated a requirement for ballistic missiles with which to aeutralise, lasofar as possible, the Goviot threat to Allied Commaad, Europe. The US proposal would help to meet both "Of these requiremeats* (b) Organization; The ULF will be composed of 200 Polaris A-3 missiles la 25 merohant ship hulls maaaed by mixed crews dravra from at least three aatioas. (o) Commend; The Force Commander would be respoasible to a multilateral force Commission made up of Commissioners from each partloipatiag country. The Commissioa would be respoasible for force administration aad supervlsioo. Targets would be assigaed by SAGEUR. (d) Qperatioaal Coacept; The ships would be clearly v*ar ships aad would have aa eaduraaoe of some 100 days* Four crews would be organised for each three ships to allow for leave and rotation. The ships would operate from oae or possibly > two European bases, possibly oae Horth Atlaotic the other Hediterraneaa aad would cruise freely off the Europeaa coasts limited only by the 2500 mile missive raase. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW03636 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum to Ross Campbell from Defence Liaison (1) Division Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy - NATO long term planning," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5960, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 8-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 13-May-63