https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/819b4516d145a9c02102124726bbe261.pdf 1fe5c7983f113029b1afa4233ba82d6e PDF Text Text *r bj^fi >' DELEGATION OF CANADA TO T ..•' ^NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL 1 !/'• DELEGATION DU CANADA AU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE-NORD ,7/6/*' 9$ a r i s , May 7, 1963 PERSONAL AND SECR Dear R o s s , gballl-fll) "Tfitscussiofi on the multilateral In force I thought that you ought to see the attached paper entitled n The Control of Western Strategy" which has been prepared by Alastair Buchan and his staff in the Institute of Strategic Studies. It was sent to me privately as a member of the institute. It may be that others have received it in the Department, but as it is my only- copy I should be grateful either to have it returned or have photostat copies made. I do not agree with all the ideas contained in this paper, particularly that of transforming the Western European Union into a European defence authority. I think however that the analysis of the problems raised by the multilateral force is very helpful. I was concerned to see in of May 3 that Rostow is reported as Kennedy is now completely convinced validity of the MLF. I do hope the precipitately on this one. Washington telegram 1326 saying that President of the importance and USA does not move too The main question to be decided before this project can Be expected to have much support in the Alliance is, as stated in the paragraph at the foot of the left-hand column of page 10 of the attached paper, the folloxving: "The multilateral plan seems to raise the question of whether political confidence can be enhanced by creating a force for which there is no obvious military requirement and whose operational employment might be hamstrung by a system of multiple vetoes." Put in another way, it seems to me that instead of trying to sell participation in this force on a bilateral Ross Campbell, Esq., Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. ....2 000772 �- 2 basis, rather like the shares in a new stock company, the USA would be well advised to put to the Alliance their views on the answers to two questions. First, what is the military justification for the proposed multilateral force, i.e., is there a need for more strategic nuclear x^eapons to meet the Soviet threat in missiles, or will this force merely add to the American margin of strategic superiority ? The second question relates to its political justification. If there is to be a political justification, then presumably it would be that the force would increase the political unity of the Alliance and give all its allies a greater sense of participation in the control of nuclear weapons. How does this square, v/ith the idea that the force would be controlled by a new executive body consisting of representatives of four or five countries all of which would have a veto ? If the force is not controlled by a small body but by the whole Council, with each country having the right of veto in accordance with the traditional interpretation of the North Atlantic Treaty, would such a body be any change from or improvement over the present situation ? My own view is that the ansvrers to these two questions are unlikely to be convincing and we should therefore be well advised in the Alliance to go slowly. Perhaps the most sensible thing to do is to proceed with the kind of exercise envisaged by the Secretary General in the paper I referred to in my telegram No. 646 of March 22 and forwarded to the Department under transmittal slip on the same day. Thus, before deciding whether a multilateral force was necessary or desirable, the Council would examine its strategy and consider what further forces, nuclear or conventional, if any, are necessary to meet military requirements. It may well be that the seaborne strategic force, particularly if based on submarines, would provide a more invulnerable deterrent than land-based MRBMs and aircraft to deter the use of the Soviet capability in missiles. But if this is so, I vrould have thought that the case for such a seaborne a a f a 3 000773 �77 - 3force should be based upon a Council review of the NATO defence problems as a whole, rather than being based on assumptions put forward in Washington and which are by no means generally accepted in the Alliance. Of course if there had been a really enthusiastic response in Europe to the multilateral force idea (which there does not seem-to have been except perhaps among • some Germans), then the force might have been justified on political grounds. I hope to be able to have an opportunity of discussing these questions further once I am in Ottawa. <^V � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW03621 Title A name given to the resource Letter to Ross Campbell, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs from Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy - NATO long term planning," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5960, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 8-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 7-May-63