https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/de4c4242825ce9a1b7869cbafbde80de.pdf a0781273aa497b1c6f0bae02f0a331f6 PDF Text Text DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA €•• y >yy\ 7tJ OUTGOING MESSAGfl DATE BU .-'•'• EXTERNAL OTT 1 APR 25/63 • '\ TO:- NATO PAHIS t . • LDN . . £13 2 /?*>4-L-A ~ • W . ' ¥£' PRECEDENCE OPIMMED - . • .-•:.:: - . - , . . • ^ \ . j \ a - ' f.W- BONN ROME . CCOS . .; r ' EMB PARIS SECRET , ' . . . - ' - WASHDC * # NUMBER BL-585 , 1NFO: SECURITY FILE ' •• .. .. a m'<&7 x u OPBMED ' . l f *0 ' *&**: ^ , **'-"' YURTELS 861 APR 22 AND 880 APR 23. ' ^biect: : *- • • - - . . . . • 1EPQRT BY SEC-GEN ON NATO DEFENCE PLANNING — CDN COMMENTS. THE FOLLOWING'COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS ON.THE SEC-GEN«S DRAFT REPORT ON NATO DEFENCE PLANNING SHOULD BE USED BY YOU AS BACKGROUND TO ANY DISCUSSIONS YOU HAVE WITH THE SEC-GEN ANB WHEN THE QUESTION NEXT COMES BEFORE THE NATO COUNCIL. WE ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE PROCEDURE ENVISAGED IN THE SEC-GEN*S&EPORT, BEARING IN M32iD THAT IN CREATING THE INTER-ALLIED NUCLEAR FORCE: (A) THE OVERALL STRATEGIC BALANCE OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE WILL NOT BE AFFECTED) (B) THERE WILL BP NO MAJOR CHANGES IN THE PRESSJT NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE OTHER THAN THE ADDITION OF A NUCLEAR DEPUTY TO SACEUR; (G) POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE FORCE WILL IJPIAIN FOCUSED IN THE NATO COUNCIL (D) FAaTICIPATIOMRTOcT^NFOHCE WILL INVOLVE FULLER INFORMATION BEING PROVIDED/ON THE NUCLEAR FORCES AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIANCE* AND ON THE BROAD POLICY REGARDING'TARGETTING. • '' .... 2 LOCAL DISTRIBUTION SSANDASD .. ORIGINATOR "'•.'. PHONE DIVISION APPROVED BY Nv A, ROBERTSON NAME.. B,P. BlacteJRo/W. .C3rapbell EXT. 18 (REV. 12/61) D.L. (1) 2-3795 000947 �-2 - (E) THERE W I I i ^ ^ y F U ^ m ^ L A N N I N G R0I TMING/TOT WTWsSmm^l^m NUC1 INFO ON^MGETTINGiT 2, WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS ON THE PAPER ITSELF: (A) COMMAND STRUCTURE. TO BISPOSE OF AM CONCERN THE1E MAY BE THAT, BY PLACING A DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE IANF. IN THE NATO CHAIN OF GOM5AND, PRESENT NATO COMMAND BESPONSIBILITIES WILL BECOME BLURRED AND UNWORKABLE, WE WOULD WELCOME SACEUR»S TIEifS ON THIS PROBLEM. EOULD IT BE POSSIBLE FOR SACEUR TO PROVIDE A BRIEFING TO MINISTERS AT OTTAWA ON THE COMMAND STRUCTURE. TO SOME EXTENT THE SMOOTH FUNCTIONING OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AFTER IANF IS SET UP WILL DEPEND ON THE ARRANGEAND MENTS WORKED OUT BETWEEN SACEUR/ STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND FOR LIAISON ON TARGETTING ARRANGEMENTS AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE USA AUTHORITIES HOPE TO HAVE THIS PROBLEM SETTLED BY THE TIME OF THE OTTAWA MEETING. (B) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FORCE. WE HAVE NOTED THAT THE SEC-GEN'S PAPER ASKS MINISTERS "TO ESTABLISH THE INTM-ALLI^D FORCES AT 0TTAWAfl. WE HAD UNDERWOOD THAT THE,SEC-GEN WAS IN THE PROCESS OF TRYING TO DEVISE A FORMULA THAT WOULD AVOID THE NECESSITY FOR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES having TO TAKE A FORMAL PGSTION FOR OR AGAINST IHE INTE&-ALLIED NUCLEAR FORCE AT OTTAWA. IS THE SEC-GEN*S FORMULA A BARGAINING POSITION TO ... v - ^tfoUiXP BE USED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FRENCH? /THE OBJECTIVE FOR THE OTTAWA MEETING SmOU) BE A FORMULA WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE FORCE TO BE BROUGHT INTO BEING BUT WHICH WOULD LEAVE OPEN THE OPPORTUNITY FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL NATION TO ASSOCIATE ITSELF ON A BILATSKAL BASIS WITH THE FORCE? (C) POLITICAL CONTROL. WE'SUPPORT THE SEC-GEN IN HIS EFFORTS TO ENSURE THA? THE COUNCIL WILL BE IN A POSITION TO SERVE AS A FORUM FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATION IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY AND THAT, FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE IMPLICATIONS (E.G., MILITARY ALERTS, TARGETTINGf ETC.) OF AN5T RECOMMENDATiONS THEY . 000948 �HAVE TO MAKE TO GOVERNMENTS CONCERNING THE 3 USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIANCE. , IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT NATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN SACEUR'S NUCLEAR OPERATIONAL STAFFS IN/PARISAM' OMAHA AND GREATER .', USE OF THE NUCLEAR INFORMATION COMMITTEE SHOULD PROVIDE NATO MEMBERS WITH MORE INFORMATION ON NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING. IT, WOULD BE USEFUL HOWEVER IF: AT OTTAWA GOVERNMENTS MADE CLEAR TIffilR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PERMANENT COUNCIL IS THE CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH GOVERNMENTS WILL 3EXERCISE POLITICAL CONTROL OVER THE-INTER-ALLIED NUCLEAR FORGE AND THAT SACEUR HA§ AftESPONSIBILlTY-TQKEEP THE COUNCIL INFORMED ON A REGULAR BASIS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN NATO NUCLEAR DEFENCE PLANING. 3. WE TAKE THE PBBST OF THE "SEC-GEN THAT THE COMING'.INTO BEING / OF THE IANF INVOLVES N© NEW DECISION FOR NATO GOVERNMSiTS ON THE ROLE OR ASSIGNMENT OF THEIR FORCES BUT THAT UNITS. INVOLVED IN THE INTERALLIED FORCE SHOULD BE FULLY OPERATIONAL.' FOR OUR'OWN PART, YOU MAY INFORM THE SEC-GEN IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE OPERATIONAL READINESS OF THE) / CDN FORCES GGNesaSEB" IS NOW BEING GIVEN. URGENT STUDY. BY THE CANADIAN (Uf ":THAT ' GOVERNMENT. " 4. ''.-, ' "" .-....-; \> •.-.•• WE DO NOT EXPECT/AM DECISIONS WILL BE TAKM AT OTTAWA ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATO MULTILATERAL FORCE, THOUGH IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A PROGRESS REPORT FROM THE US DELEGATION TO BE NOTED BY MINISTMS ON THE DISCUSSIONS THAT HAVE AIREADY TAKEN PLACE REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS FORCE. WE "ARE ALIVE TO THE IMPORTANCE fe THE US ADMINISTRATIGN PLACES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A^5§SEpifF FORCE OF THIS KIND BUT WE WOULD WISH TO HAVE MORE TIME TO STUDY THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA. 5.. . / y 7. . .:•• 7 "•'•:,' '.f WE AGREE THAT THE QUESTION OF NEW PROGEDURESa FOR DEALING WITH THE RELATED PROBLEMS. OF A FORWARD STRATEGY; A CONVENTIONAL' BUILD-UP AND THE RIGHT BALANCE. BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES, Aft SET GUT BY MR. MoNAMARA AT THE DEC 1962 MEETING, WILL NOT BB READY FOR DISCUSSION IN DETAIL AT THE OTTAWA* MEETING BUT NEITHER SHOULD IT BE LOST SIGHT OF IN THE CURRENT PREOCCUPATION WITH THE NATO M S NUCLEAR FORCE. WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE USA ADMINISTRATIS GIVES ••.•"••• ' 000949 /j �HIGHER PRIORITY AT THIS TIME TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE IANF AHD PRELIMINARY DECISIONS'ON THE MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE AND WOULD WISH TO TAKE UP THIS PRQBI^ ONLY AFTER-CERTAIN BASIC DECISIONS HAVE BEEN REACHED AT OTTAWA ON THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE. WE AGREE WITH THE SEC-GEN THAT THIS PROBLEM SHOULD BE DISCUSSED BY THE COUNCIL IN DETAIL AFTER OTTAWA. 9\Q^J^fZ^^ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW03563 Title A name given to the resource CDNW03563 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy - NATO long term planning," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5960, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 8-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en