https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1e06f2184ae59e0ae98c5b0e820472e7.pdf 4b9b8c43dbd52e1bf33199e058ab2faf PDF Text Text D.L.(l)/A.R.Menzies/bj k DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS / TO: MEMORANDUM M*\»..panrtfbe/l __ Security .. SECRET Dbte..A J ? r i l . 2 2 , ,196f3 FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division REFERENCE: SUBJECT: File No. <ZJ s ¥£?$. .9?£ s V ^ . ^ i o n s .9?. .?.e.^®.^?.® Planaing and .the Nassau Agreement Attached is a copy of Mr. Blacks draft of April 17 on this subject. I should be grateful to know whether you think it should be held until after we have had our meeting on April 25 with Air Chief Marshal Miller or whether you think that it would be wiser to send forward this much in order to fill in the Minister on the background of this subject before formulation by officials of their recommendations to Ministers. In the latter case, would you be good enough to suggest any amendments that you think should be included. 2. I am inclined to favour putting up a memorandum to the Minister now because CIRCULATION IJJ/L Ext. 326 (6/56) (a) we may be requested to produce something very similar before the end of the week to brief the Prime Minister for his visit to London, and (b) it may take some time to reach agreement on a position with the Department of National Defence. ^ -fcXtf^ ' DEFENCE LIAISON (1) DIVISION /f^ ^~si -lL~~ A 4*s ****--- U(X^"^ gj£ 7 000432 �„....„ . ••• SHAFT D.L.(l)/SPBlaek/sh S E G El T April 17, 1963. waTft Consultations on Defence Planning and the Sassau Agreement Since the beginning of the year discussions have been taking place in the HATO aouneil on the implications of the Nassau Agreement. Particular attention has been directed towards Paragraph 6 which calls for the "subscribing to HAfO of some part of the forces already in existence". This could include allocations from USA strategic forces, from U. K. bomber command and from "tactical nuclear forces now held in Europe". Discussions have also taken place on the implications of Paragraphs 7 and $ of the Communique which deal with the ttdevelopment of a multi* lateral nuclear force in close consultation with other HATO ., allies0. Two-separate concepts are now evolving as a result ;aof Nassau: An interallied HATO nuclear force. This force would be made up of various national elements with a nuelear capability which are now operational in Europe ar soon will be* The fundamental Mvlssues to be faced in trying to create such a force are: (I) What will the interallied force consist of? It Is likely that this force will consist of all of the British V bomber force (if suitable terms of assignment can be arranged), the three Polaris fubmarines on station in the Mediterranean (replacing the Jupiter lEBMtjs in Italy and Turkey), and an as yet unspecified contribution from tacticalnuclear forces X:••'•.; now in Europe. To decide what tactical nuclear forces yZ-y' might be available, an ad hoc working group has pre* pared an inventory of units equipped with nuclear delivery systems in Allied Command Europe and deli* very systems eicpeoted to be introduced between now y and the end of 1966; *. • / *> �The IATO military authorities have been asked by the Secretary*Genera! to express their views with regard to the military practicality of establishing an lnter*allled nuclear force as outlined in Paragraph 6. Meanwhile, there appears to be a general consensus that the new force should not include battlefield weapons and should include only those weapons that lend themselves to pretargeting. .(2) On what terms will contributions to the force 'be made? Britain has stated that she will commit all of her f Member force to an Inter-allied force provided suitable terms of assignment can be worked out Which will permit her to withdraw these forces "when supreme national interests are at stake"* If Britain Is able to do this, will not other HATO countries wish simi* lar terms of assignment? The USA is concerned about this iritisb insistence on their "independent nuelear deterrent" and are of the opinion that if these terms of assignment are maintained, the inter»allied force will represent little change from present arrangements. We understand tbat the British right to withdraw is «POW under discussion with SACEUR> who understandably wants to know how much of the V bomber force he can count on in most circumstances. (3) What type of command arrangements are appropriate? yThere appears to be a consensus^within the Allianee that present command arrangements should be disturbed as little as possible, that the inter*allied force should be under the command of SAGEUE and that it should have a separate Deputy Commander who would be a Euro* 000434 �•' ' \ ^ X ' ' (4) 3 " What about political control? This Is the most difficult problem as it raises the Whole question of whether one country can vet© use of the force, whether majority rule prevails and just |y how the HAfQ Oouncil aad governments maintain control over the force; We understand that the present views of the USA administration are that there need be no - change la present politifal control arrafiiements which y ean be exercised by means of the "Athens guidelines" iXZi m |fy changer In existing bilateral arrangements between NATO 7 i countries and the USA relating to custody and use of 777 ' nuclear'Weapons. It appears generaily^agreed that it & y % h® KAfO Council. The USA also; doyitot"envisage any -. : would be best to leave this problem to: the last. y- It is ^xpfected that sufficient progress- will have h&m ,y made by the time of the Ottawa Meeting to enable iiaisters to ,'consider the creation.of an inter-allied nuclear force, fhe $AfO aiecretary-Generai has stated that he will not ba in a position tuntll after April 25 to say whether preparatory work on the inter* Z. iallled nuelear force is sufficiently advanced to permit Ministers iito take decisions at Ottawa. He has, however, agreed that it is almost certain that an int@r»allied nuclear force will form -» part of the agenda of the Ottawa Meeting and thatfiefenceMinisters will attend the meeting. yy Latest USA thinking at the official level is that governments will not be asked to take any formal action with regard to an Interallied nuclear force at Ottawa since the sort of arrangements envisaged do not involve any substantive departures requiring formal governmental approval. The most likely procedure to be used would be a report to the Sound! by the Seeretary*&eneral which would include? 'eeelUXrr 000435 �ri-1 (a) * * 4> * A description of arrangements concluded between SAGEUR and the USA and UK authorities regarding the assignment of their strategic forces, {fe) •-.X.. (e) Summary of new staff arrangements relating to tar* geting. Announcement of the officer to head the force. This report would be for comment by those Ministers who wish to participate in the discussion but no attempt would be made to ( conclusions or .reach formal/decisions though some appropriate reference to the inter*allied nuclear force would have to be made in the communique. A mult H a t Ml NATO nuclear fore e. f^ls force would consist of U.S.-manned Pblaris submarines, British^aanned Polaris*submarines, and a mixed-manned surface fleet equipped with Polaris .missiles. It would not be expected to be operational before the end of the I960's. The essential problem posod by the Nassau Agreement is how the UnitedaStates is to share control of nuclear weapons with aylts allies, particularly the Europeans, In recent years the United States has become more vulnerable to a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. In these circumstances some Europeans have come to doubt whether the United States would risk its own des* ^ruction in a crisis in-Which European interests were primarily at stake. Successive United States administrations have attempted to devise ways for reassuring Europeans by assigning U. S. strategic forces to SATO and by proposing different schemes for giving Europeans a greater sense of participation in the stra* ; tegic defence arrangements of the Alliance. I The latest of these schemes has been the proposal for a multilateral mixed-manned sea-borne or submarine force armed with the Polaris missile. The proposal raises pr&blems of 000436 �- * •< y : '••-. _. gr^« • 5 * complexity which will take considerable time to clarify. There is the question whether the United States Congress can be persuaded to amend th© MacMahon Act so as to permit the United States administration to transfer the ownership and control of y^nuclear warheads for such a force to some sort of multilateral /„ /-legal entity under lATO* There is also the question whether satisfactory control arrangements can be devised which would fsermit a number Of members of the Allianee to participate in / . f* • ya-collective decisions about the use of the weapons in the force, y; V Livingston Merchant has been charged with this problem - b / t h e U. S. administration and has already made a report to the NATO Council and visited certain KATO countries. The USA considers- that, to ej-eate such a force, German participation is yi|essentiali Germany has indicated its interest but has reser* y^Vatlons about political control over the force (they would ; a prefer a decision by a majority rather than unanimity) and the ytype of carrier (they would prefer a submarine to, a merchant ship). Merchant hasother HATO countries to visit and it is not expected that the USA administration will take a decision -; •-y;;yconcerning the opening of negotiations to establish such .a force •". X-for some time to come. We do not es^ect that this subject will come before ,the Ottawa Meeting though it is conceivable that the USA and Germany might table a progress report which could merely be 4 noted by the Council, 1 The Canadian Position • ' The last instruction sent to tho NATO Delegation by Mr. Green instructed the Delegation to direct Canadian efforts to obtaiirJlariflcation of Paragraph mt the Hassau communique A , �6/vt TU^ - * • * • ••••-•• -- X ^ T ^ j y j y " 7 a/y\„*y* / / Hi. #ry to speed up the present discussions insofar as they • r ' relate to Gahadian forces to the point where the Canadian Government would be in a position to make fi'nal decision® on both role , /' / and armament by May". -y . S '•-''• ' • • / . * The only Gahadian foree Which could form part of the a'iftter*allled nuelear force is/the First Canadian Air Division _*'• /• J " ^ -:-.•• / / : '- '-'at- .-•' -; s '•" Which by December 1963/January 1964 will have eight aamtesos .••.'•* Scm adrons ' . ' • • • / . $f 144 CF*104/alrcraft in France and Germany with a •' ia '• ^nuclear strike role*-Alt / ' ' '. '• It is decided that Canada should agree .that the Air Division should form part of the inter*allied .nuclear force, bilateral arrangements would have to be made with tho USA to acquire the nuclear Wo^pons for the Air Division.. y':s It is also clear from the recent inventory of-nuclear weapons systems availably to Allied Command Europe between now and the end of 1966 that: (a) The Canadian Air Division and the British? bomber force are the two air forces in HATO gurope that have a nuclear strike capability only (b) ":.__. ..,_.:.• / Apart fr©m the nuclear forces of the USA and the UK, t- the Canadian Air Division will, at the end of 1963 and if it acquires its weapons, be the largest nuclear strike force in Europe. ?"" � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW03530 Title A name given to the resource A.R. Menzies, Defence Liaison (1) Division to Mr. Campell, Draft Paper on "NATO Consultations on Defence Planning and the Nassau Agreement" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy - NATO long term planning," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5960, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 8-1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 22-Apr-63