https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3fed0cf2b942f8496ae0029f22641298.pdf aa17a6df4294c3dab0907ff9aaed6170 PDF Text Text FII zsxii ^ c f ^ J S ^ ' V ^ * j ^ \T NATO DEFENCE PLANNING:NASSAU AGREEMENT PARA6 ii> *yj^r • t INFO CCOS LDN WASHDC EMBPARIS BONN ROME jJ\V, . ftfl REF YOURTEL DL393 MAR25 -* 4 5 • 7 FM NATOPARIS MAR28/63 SECRET TO EXTERNAL 6 9 3 OPIMMED -'x 4 .10 N ™ ,* § ^U)h0 COUNCIL ACCEPTED THE REVISED T ^ P O R T ~ O T 1 L HE~ AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON THE INVENTORY OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN C-MC63M6 WITHOUT CHANGE MAR27. 2.SECGEN SAID WITHOUT UNDULY STRESSING IT AND MENTIONING NO RPT NO NAMES THAT THE INVENTORY EXERCISE HAD SHOWN THAT ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTING TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THE HANDS OF A NUMBER OF NATO COUNTRIES WERE INCOMPLETE .THE PROBLEM NOW FACING COUNCIL WAS WHAT FOLLOW-UP ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN .COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS WITH THE DISCUSSION OF A PARA6 FORCE I F SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WERE TO BE READY TO PRESENT TO MINISTERS IN TIME FOR CONSIDERATION AND DECISION AT THE OTT MTG.WITHIN THE NEXT FOUR TO FIVE WEEKS COUNCIL THEREFORE WOULD HAVE TO AGREE ON CERTAIN BASIC PROPOSALS TO BE PUT TO MINISTERS .THESE WOULD NOT RPT NOT OF COURSE CONSTITUTE FIRM COMMITMENTS BY MEMBER COUNTRIES TO CONTRIBUTE TO A FORCE UNDER PARA6.HE THOUGHT THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TOsCDOBTAIN INDICATIONS FROM GOVTS AS TO WHAT UNITS THEY WOULD BE READY TO CONTRIBUTE TO SUCH A FORCE. <2)0BTAIN THE VIEWS OF SWCEUR AND THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES AS TO WHAT WEAPONS SYSTEMS MIGHT APPROPRIATELY BE INCLUDED IN AN INTER-ALLIED FORCE,(3>DEVISE FORCE SHOULD BE UNDER SACEUR WITH EXISTING COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS DISTURBED AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE.SUITABLE COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES.SECGEN SAID IT WOULD HELP IF COUNCIL COULD HAVE DEFINITE PROPOSALS FROM COUNTRIES ON WHICH MILITARY AUTHORITIES COULD W0RK.C4)MAKE PROVISION FOR CL0SERC6RP CORRUPTUN NUCLEAR TARGET PLANNIN6-AND IN CASE THIS MIGHT REQUIRE FORMALIZING OR INSTITUTIONALIZING, SEEK THE VIEWS OF THE STANDING GROUP AND SACEUR ON SUITABLE • • .2 �• • PAGE TWO 6 9 3 MACHINERY,ON THE BASIS OF INDICATIONS FORMULATED IN THE COUNCIL. <5)CONSIDER WHAT ACTION MIGHT BE NECESSARY IN RELATION TO THE TERMS OF ASSIGNMENT FOR EXISTING NATO FORCES AND FOR THOSE NOW UNDER NATIONAL COMMAND WHICH MIGHT BE COMMITTED TO NATO UNDER PARA6. <6)C0NSIDER THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL CONTROL.DISCUSSION OF THIS MIGHT BE LEFT TO A LITTLE LATER.IN THE MEANTIME THE ATHENS GUIDE LINES COVERED THE BASIC CONTINGENCIES.POLICY TO GOVERN OTHER CONTINGENCIES COULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE NUCLEAR CTTEE AT ANY TIME. 3,SECGEN ALSO SUGGESTED COUNCIL SHOULD SETTLE ON SIMPLIFIED NOMENCLATURE FORTHWITH.HE PROPOSED AND COUNCIL AGREED THAT PARA6 FORCE SHOULD HENCEFORWARD BE REFERRED TO AS THE QUOTE INTER-ALLIED NUCLEAR FORCE UN QUOTE C IANF )AND THE PARAS 7 AND 8 FORCE AS THE QUOTE MULTILATERAL FORCE UNQUOTE. 4.ALM0ST ALL PERMREPS SPOKE.FOLLOWING I S A SUMMARY OF NATIONAL VIEWS EXPRESSED? 5,BELGIUM .THE WORKING GROUP OF MILITARY ADVISERS WHICH HAD PREPARED THE INVENTORY SHOULD BE RETAINED AND ASKED TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEMS ENUMERATED BY THE SECGEN .POLITICAL PROBLEMS SUCH AS CONTROL WOULD HAVE TO BE LEFT TO THE COUNCIL.POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS MIGHT AFFECT SOLUTIONS SUGGESTED FOR SOME MILITARY PROBLEMS SUCH AS COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS. € , C D A . I SPOKE ALONG THE LINES OF YOUR REFTEL.I QUESTIONED WHETHER COUNCIL SHOULD TRY TO ANSWER SECGENS QUESTIONS IN THE ORDER IN WHICH HE HAD POSED THEM.GOVTS WOULD FIND IT HARD TO INDICATE WHAT FORCES THEY MIGHT BE READY TO COMMIT UNTIL THEY HAD A CLEARER IDEA OF THE ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE OTHER PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE CREATION OF THE FORCE.SO FAR AS ASSIGNMENT WAS CONCERNED,IT WAS CONFUSING TO SPEAK OF QUOTE ASSIGNING UNQUOTE FORCES UNDER PARA6 WHEN THE GREAT MAJORITY OF POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS CONSISTED IN PRACTICE OF FORCES WHICH WERE ALREADY ASSIGNED TO NATO, « 0 # W 000210 �« • PAGE THREE 6 9 3 7.DENMARK.N0 RPT NO COMMENT. S.FRANCE.ON A PERSONAL BASIS,FRANCES PERMREP POSED TWO HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS.HE NOTED THAT THE WORKING GROUPS REPORT COVERED A NUMBER OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS HAVING BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY.SHOULD DUAL-CAPABLE SYSTEMS BE INCLUDED IN THE INTERALLIED FORCE?THE CREATION OF AN INTER-ALLIED FORCE WAS NOT RPT NOT A MATTER OF BRINGING NEW FORCES INTO EXISTENCE;IT WAS A MATTER OF THE REORGANIZATION OF EXISTING FORCES .THUS THE QUESTION AROSE, WHAT WOULD THE DIFFERENCE BE BETWEEN AN ASSIGNMENT OF FORCES UNDER PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS AND AN ASSIGNMENT TO THE INTERALLIED FORCE? GOVTS WOULD NEED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT THE DIFFERENCE WOULD BE IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE THEY COULD SAY WHAT FORCES THEY WISHED TO ASSIGN. 9.GERMANY.SOME COUNTRIES HAD ALREADY INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT SPECIFIC UNITS TO THE INTER-ALLIED FORCE ;0THER3 HAD SO FAR MADE NO RPT NO COMMITMENT WHATSOEVER. GERM AN POSITION WAS IN BETWEEN. GERMAN AUTHORITIES WERE IN PRINCIPLE IN FAVOUR OF THE FORCE AND PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO IT BUT THE EXACT FORM AND TIMING OF GERMAN CONTRIBUTION HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN DECIDED .BEFORE THIS DECISION COULD BE TAKEN^GERMAN AUTHORITIES WOULD WISH TO BE CLEARER ABOUT THE MILITARY MISSION OF THE FORCES.WOULD THIS DIFFER FROM THE MISSION ALREADY BEING PERFORMED BY FORCES WHICH MIGHT BE REASSIGNED TO I T , AND IF SO,IN WHAT RESPECTS? 10.GREECE.GREEK AUTHORITIES WERE IN PRINCIPLE IN FAVOUR OF THE CREATION OF THE FORCE .THEY HAD NOT RPT NOT DECIDED YET ON A SPECIFIC GREEK CONTRIBUTION.il WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO HAVE A REPORT FROM THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES ON THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CREATION OF THE FORCE BEFORE DECIDING THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED .THE QUESTION OF COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. 1 1 . ICELAND .NO RPT NO COMMENT. ... 4 000211 �• » PAGE FOUR 6 9 3 !2.ITALY.WHILE THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE FORCE COULD 3E DISCUSSED IN THE WORKING GROUP AND ADVICE OBTAINED FROM THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES AS SUGGESTED BY THE SECGEN,ITALIAN AUTHORITIES WOULD WANT TO HAVE GREATER INFO ABOUT THE VIEWS OF THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES ON WHAT WEAPONS SYSTEMS MIGHT APPROPRIATELY BE INCLUDED IN THE FORCE AND WOULD WISH TO KNOW MORE ABOUT PROVISION FOR CLOSER ASSOCIATION OF MEMBER COUNTRIES IN TARGET PLANNING BEFORE MAKING FINAL DECISION ABOUT ITALIAN FORCES TO BE COMMITTED, 139LUXEMB0URG,N0 RPT NO COMMENT. H.NETHERLANDS,THERE WAS NO RPT NO POINT IN TALKING ABOUT AN INTER-ALLIED FORCE UNLESS THERE WERE ACTUALLY GOING TO BE FORCES AVAILABLE TO COMMIT TO IT.FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW IT OUGHT TO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ONLY INDICATED WHAT FORCES MIGHT POSSIBLY BE AVAILABLE AT THE END OF 1963 AND THE END OF 1966f IT DID NOT RPT MOT INDICATE WHAT FORCES WERE ACTUALLY IN EXISTENCE.THERE WAS AN INCONSISTENCY IN THE QUESTIONS WHICH WERE BEING ASKEDs GOVTS WERE BEING ASKED WHAT FORCES THEY WOULD COMMIT; AT THE SAME TIME SACEUR WAS BEING ASKED WHAT FORCES WERE NEEDED,BOTH QUESTIONS HAD TO BE ANSWERED BUT WHICH SHOULD BE ANSWERED FIRST WAS A CHICKEN AND EGG PROPOSITION.CONSIDERATION MIGHT PROCEED FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT PRE-TARGETTED WEAPONS SHOULD BE THE FIRST TO BE CONSIDERED FOR INCLUSION. SACEURS ADVICE MIGHT BE SOUGHT ON THIS.THERE HAD BEEN SOME CRITICISM OF THE CONCEPT OF AN INTERALLIED PORCE ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS SIMPLY A RESHUFFLING OF EXISTING FORCES BUT THIS UNDERRATED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONCEPT. THE POINT IN REASSIGNING FORCES TO THE IANF WAS TO TRY TO MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF THE WEAPONS NATO ALREADY HAD. SOME OF THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN MAKING EXISTING WEAPONS SYSTEMS MORE EFFECTIVE MIGHT BE CONSIDERED IN A SMALL WORKING GROUP. i5.N0RWAY.N0 RPT NO COMMENT,, 16.P0RTUGAL.N0 RPT NO COMMENT, 59 B 000212 �PAGE FIVE 6 9 3 17.TURKEY.IT MIGHT NOT RPT NOT BE FEASIBLE TO ATTEMPT TO ANSWER THE SECGENS QUESTIONS IN THE ORDER IN WHICH HE HAD POSED THEM, IT MIGHT NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY BE BEST TO LEAVE THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL CONTROL TO THE LAST. 18.UK.BRIT AUTHORITIES WERE PREPARED TO ASSIGN THE ENTIRE V-BOMBER FORCE TO THE IANF AND TO INCLUDE THE 2 4 VALIANTS AND 24 CANBERRAS ALREADY UNDER NATO CONTROL.THE BRIT CONTRIBUTION WOULD THUS TOTAL 22 SQUADRONS< 182 AIRCRAFT5ALL CAPABLE OF BEING PRE-TARGETTED. THE ONLY FORCES WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR INCLUSION IN THE IANF SHOULD BE THOSE IN SACEURS SCHEDULED PROGRAM AND REGIONAL STRIKE PROGRAMS.SECGEN WAS RIGHT TO SUGGEST THAT THE FORCE SHOULD BE UNDER SACEUR AND THAT EXISTING COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE DISTURBED AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE. 19.USA.SECGENS STATEMENT WAS A USEFUL GUIDE TO PROBLEMS FACING COUNCIL.USA AUTHORITIES STRONGLY HOPED THESE PROBLEMS COULD BE DEALT WITH SO THAT THE FORCE COULD BE ESTABLISHED AT THE MAY MINISTERIAL MTG.WHILE THEY AGREED THAT EXISTING COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE DISTURBED AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE, SOME DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE NEEDED TO PERMIT ANY CHANGES IN COMMAND WHICH MIGHT APPEAR ADVISABLE. 2 0 . SECGEN CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY ASKING DELS TO CONCENTRATE ON THE PROBLEMS HE HAD LISTED.HE THOUGHT ONE OF THE MAIN ADVANTAGES OF THE IANF WAS THAT IT COULD BRING ALL THE ALLIES INTO CLOSER CONTACT WITH NUCLEAR PROBLEMS AND GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE RESPONSIBILITY AND KNOWLEDGE MORE FULLY.HE WOULD NEED A LITTLE TIME TO THINK OVER WHAT HAD BEEN SAID SO AS TO BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE PROPOSALS FOR THE FURTHER PROGRESS OF THE DISCUSSION AT NEXT COUNCIL MTG.WHILE A NUMBER OF PERMREPS HAD FAVOURED TURNING OVER SOME OF THE PROBLEMS HE HAD LISTED TO THE WORKING GROUP FOR CONSIDERATION IN THEIR MILITARY ASPECTS, PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO PERMIT PERMREPS WHO WISHED TO PARTICIPATE IN THESE D I S CUSSIONS THEMSELVES BECAUSE OF POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS TO DO SO. ...000213 �• # PAGE SIX 693 2 1 . 1 UNDERSTAND THE SECGEN I S HAPPY ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE MTG REPORTED ABOVE INSOFAR AS THE REVISED INVENTORY GOES.HE WOULD NOW LIKE TO TRY TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS ON THE POINTS WHICH WERE RAISED IN THE MTG THROUGH INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH PERMREPS .HOWEVER I T IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT BRIT ARE ANXIOUS TO STAGE SOME MAJOR POLITICAL DECISION IN OTT BASED ON THE NASSAU AGREEMENT AND ARE CONSULTING WITH USA WITH* A VIEW TO PUTTING FORWARD FURTHER PROPOSALS NEXT WEEK .NITZE,WHO I UNDERSTAND I S THE SENIOR USA OFFI^ CIAL WORKING ON PARA6,IS MTG WITH BRIT OFFICIALS FOR THIS PURPOSE AT THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK.WHAT WOULD BE HELPFUL FROM YOU NOW WOULD BE COMMENTS WHICH WE MIGHT PUT FORWARD INFORMALLY TO THE SECGEN ON THE POINTS HE HAS RAISED.OBVIOUSLY THESE COULD NOT RPT NOT CARRY ANY COMMITMENT AT THIS STAGE BECAUSE THE EXPLORATION OF WHAT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE UNDER PARA6 REMAINS EXPLORATION EVEN ALTHOUGH I T S PACE MAY HAVE BEEN ACCELERATED IGNATIEFF . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW03468 Title A name given to the resource CDNW03468 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy - NATO long term planning," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5960, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 7-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en