https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/6d03dc30e99d1f6f0d33feb6cfa35be1.pdf d662186106d01ded8503056b44d3107f PDF Text Text /eos(L) aoopij. ^C'JS li'.r- af) SECRET ii £* AM *r" 20th March, 196j. . JO/CJs NATO NUCI£AR JORCE 1. I had a discussion this morning with Genoral O'Connor, D/C.D.S., on the recent proposals for the formation of HATO nuclear forces. Vo discussed it under the two proposed patterns that have been outlined for these forces, namely, multi-national and multi-lateral. Tte definitions of these two are as follows»(a) A multi-national force is that force which is composed of national units, e.g., submarines, aircraft, ships, etc. belonging to, and manned by, the parent nation and allocated to a NATO command. (b) A multi-lateral force is that force manned by crews of mixed nationalities; that is to say, there would bo a mixture of, for example, British, German and Araarioan personnel throughout the ship, the mixing to be truly on itttoif&Cdastaio in all departments. 2. Tho thinking and the reasoning behind the formation of this nuclear forco, of either type, are based on being required to fulfil three functionstFirstly, to give the European NATO nationo greater control over, and participation in, the nuclear deterrent. • Secondly, it is an effort to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thirdly, and most important, to prevent Germany from getting her own nuclear weapon at this time because of the effect it would have on Russia. This fact is agreed to, and fully understood by Germany. 3. There are differences of opinion, not antagonistic one to the other, as to which of the two forces would be the most appropriate or would best fulfil all the requirements. With the multi-national force, each nation has reserved to itself, or is likely to reserve to itself, the right to withdraw their forces from NATO control for vital national needs. This leads some to believe that the force might not be as strong as would be desired or ne ces saury in case of need. This is the force that is more commonly referred to as Para 6 of the Nassau Agreement. Britain fully supports this type of force and io prepared to allocate her V-Bomber force. Tha United States in its desire to overcome one of the main fears of some nations regarding ths multi-national force - that is the possible withdrawal by nations of allocated forces - and in addition to permit non-nuclear nationo to havo a more tangible part to play in control and operation, has proposed o Eulti-loterol force of surface ships with POLARIS missiles and mixed crews. �ODJ u.L SECRET 2 - « 4> The U.K. has given, and intends to continue to give wholehearted support to ths U.S. proposal, not however to tho extent at the moment of providing man and material, her supporting argument being that she has recently taken upon herself an unexpected additional financial commitment to build four POLARIS submarine and purchase missiles. Her conventional force commitments in the world have not reduced, and she just cannot afford it. However, she will continue to lend it her full support in tho interests of Anglo-U.S- relations and NATO strength and unity. 5. When Mr. Merchant was discussing this multi-lateral force with the separate NATO nations, he was careful to point out this was merely a preliminary investigation being carried out bi-laterally between the U.S. and individual NATO nations. Ths American thinking in this regard is that it is better at this stage to ascertain the feelings and thoughts of the countries outside of NATO rather than start it off within NATO. Britain does not entirely agree with this approach, but, again, is giving full support. There have been statements in the newspapers recently that this investigation by the U.S. is merely an exercise in educating the European NATO nations in the problems of owning, operating and controlling nuclear weapons, and that it is not expected that it will come to fruition. In answer to a direct question about this statement, I was left in no doubt whatever that such is not the case and that the Amsricans are absolutely sincere and are giving it their full weight, and it is their earnest desire that it come into being. There is more political reason for the formation of this force than military. Not that the military aspects should be entirely ruled out, because if it is agreed tlmt H R B M B are of value, this force would help to fulfil that rolo. 6, Some of the details of the thinking with regard to the formation, distribution of costs, manning, etc. are as followst' (a) It is proposed that the forco consist of 25 ships, the estimated cost to be five hundred million dollars per year for the next 10 years; this to include all costs except re-equipping with new weapons as they become available. (b) The agreement should be an open-ended one, which will peimit the entry at a later date of those NATO countries who have been unable, or declined, to enter initially. (c) It is proposed that no contribution by any one nation should exceed 40$. (d) The manning in any one ship is not to be less than three nations, no one of which should exceed 40^ of the total. (e) Germany has offered to provide up to the maximum allowablo, namsly 40?o. The U.S. would probably contribute something in the order of 35^» and it has been suggested that Britain's contribution should be of the order of 5^ to 1 0 & (f) There were differences of opinion as to whether or not thio marine force should be surface ships or submarinas. Germany favours submarines; Amsrioa strongly favours surface ships. \ One of the other NATO nations favoured submarines^T^fffiritain supports the U.S. proposal. �it ,y V on 1 Hf ** * SECRET 3- (g) There are many other such unanswered questions which it was realised will be problems. One is whether or not the ships would be visably distinguishable as POLARIScarrying missile ships or whether they would be disguised. (h) The question of control has not yet been agreed to. The Americans are holding out at this time strongly in favour of an unanimous agreement. The Goreano are strongly in favour of a majority agreement for ths exproos purpose of ruling out the possibility of a single nation veto. The Germans, I believe, have reluctantly agreed that in the initial stages unanimity should rule, but that eventually the majority rule should control. The U.K. is open-minded at this time on the problem. (i) The forco would probably be controlled by a nuclear commander - a new appointment probably under SACEUR but with a direct line of communication and some responsibility to SACLAWT. This authority would almost certainly not be an American. 7* The question of the right to search at sea was brought up. The problem has been discussed and considered, but far from resolved. In answer to a question as to what it was thought the Russian reaction might bo to the fowration of such a force, it was felt that the Russinno would not necessarily produce a similar counter force, but would most cortalnly Increase their maritime activities throughout the world with all the implications that trtiuld ensue. 6, It Was not known at this time whether it was ths intention to discuss this specific forde at the NATO Conference in Ottawa in May. Probably not. 9. To summarize the British position - whole-hearted support to further good Anglo-U.S. relations and NATO strength and unity, but no material contribution at the present time. A.G. Boulton, Cmdje-R.C.N. Chairmali Canadian Joint Staff, London X i , H •'-- • 000230 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW03459 Title A name given to the resource Letter from A.C. Boulton, Cmdre R.C.N., Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, London Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy - NATO long term planning," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5960, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 7-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 20-Mar-63