https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/be622dbb6e8d8676cd72c22bc9f9dc4e.pdf eb913ff7b9e36686f4a5c8970b991397 PDF Text Text 5% UIII &Q2/9~'1t4-'-?C7i FM NATOPARIS MAR12/63 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY ^ ^ TO EXTERNAL 553 PRIORITY iiii— 'Km ^02>oJ'~fV^'r'' i t \ / A ^ T ^ / ' INFO CCOS LDN WASHDC EMBPARIS BONN ROME PRIORITY REF MYTEL 482 MARS ^>%'\)/1 (D NATO DEFENCE PLANNING-VISIT OF SECGEN TO WASHDC V STIKKER GAVE ME A BRIEFING TODAY ON THE RESULTS OF HIS'WASHpC TALKS,HE WAS SATISFIED THAT HE HAD MANAGED TO GO SOKE WAY T O T R D S " REACHING AGREEMENT ON A PLAN CF WORK FOR NATO FOR THE REST fepYEAR IN THE FIELD OF NATO DEFENCE PLANNING.THIS PLAN WILL COVER (A)TARGET DATES FOR DECISIONS EMANATING FROM THE NASSAU AGREEMENT; (B)OTHER ASPECTS OF NATO DEFENCE PLANNING,INCLUDING BALANCE BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MENTIONED BY MACNAMARA IN H I S STATEMENT AT THE DEC MINISTERIAL MTG?ANDCOFURTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR SHARING BY USA OF INFO ON TARGETTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. 2.STIKKER SAID THAT THE MOST USEFUL TALKS HAD TAKEN PLACE DURING H I S FLIGHT WITH MACNAMARA FROM #ASHDC TO OMAHA,I GATHER GILPATRICK, MAXWELL TAYLOR,NITZE AND MCGEORGE BUNDY HAD ALSO BEEN PRESENT. 3.0N THE NASSAU AGREEMENT,STIKKER HAD PUT TO MACNAMARA THE DESIRABILITY OF TRYING FIRST TO CONCENTRATE ON CLARIFYING PARA6 SO THAT SOME BASIS OF COOPERATION COULD BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN USA AND I T S ALLIES WITH REGARD TO EXISTING NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS BEFORE. ATTEMPTING TO SOLVE THE MORE FAR-REACHING PROBLEMS OF A MULTILATERAL MIX-MANNED FORCE.WITH THIS IN VIEW STIKKER HAD SUGGESTED THAT AS A TARGET DATE THE ALLIANCE SHOULD AIM AT TAKING WHATEVER DECISIONS MAY BE NECESSARY IN REGARD TO A PARAS FORCE BY THE TIME OF THE OTT MTG.AT THE SAME TIME IT WOULD BE AGREED THAT DECISIONS ON THE MULTILATERAL MIX-MANNED FORCE WOULD BE HELD OVER UNTIL THE DEC MINISTERIAL MTG. STIKKER SAID THAT- MACNAMARA HAD READILY AGREED BUT THAT THE STATE DEPT SEEMED HESITANT.IN CONSEQUENCE STIKKER WAS TOLD THAT MACNAMARA AND RUSK WOULD DISCUSS HIS PROPOSAL WITH THE PRESIDENT MAR9.STIKKER SAID -HE HAD NOW BEEN INFORMED USA .AUTHORITIES AGREED WITH HIS TARGET o* e e o C 000354 �* PAGE TWO 553 DATES AND HOPED TO BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE DECISIONS ON A NATO NUCLEAR FORCE UNDER PARA6 AI THE MAY MINISTERIAL MTG IN OTT AND ON THE MULTILATERAL MIX-MANNED FORCE AT THE DEC MINISTERIAL MTG. (COLERIDGE HAS SINCE INFORMED ME THAT SECGEN IS CONSEQUENTLY ASSUMING DEFENCE MINISTERS WILL WISH TO ATTEND OTT MTG AND WILL SHORTLY PROPOSE THIS TO COUNCIL). 4, AS TO THE PLAN CF WORK TO COVER OTHER ASPECTS OF NATO DEFENCE PLANNING, STIKKER HAD PUT IT TO MACNAMARA THAT OTHER ASPECTS OF NATO DEFENCE PLANNING HAD BECOME CONFUSED BECAUSE TOO MUCH' EMPHASIS HAD BEEN PLACED BY USA AND UK ON THE NASSAU AGREEMENT.HE URGED THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD TAKE UP IN A CONSECUTIVE AND ORDERED WAY THE PROBLEM OF HOW BEST TO IMPLEMENT A FORWARD STRATEGY IN EUROPE, INCLUDING THE PROBLEM OF BALANCE BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES.HE ALSO ARGUED THAT THE QUESTION OF THE GAP BETWEEN MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE DEALT WITH ON THE BASIS OF SOME ROUGH AND READY FORMULA SUCH AS THE OVERALL INCREASE OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURES OF 20 PERCENT SUGGESTED BY MACNAMARA AT THE DEC MINISTERIAL MTG BUT THAT ANY BUDGETARY CONCLUSIONS OF THIS SORT SHOULD FLOW FROM AN ORDERED STUDY OF WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT A FORWARD STRATEGY IN EUROPE,AS A RESULT GOVTS WOULD BE FACED WITH CLEAR ALTERNATIVES EITHER TO(A)SPEND MORE MONEY TO CLOSE THE GAP? ORC B) CHANGE THE FORWARD STRATEGY; OR(C) INCREASE RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR OVER CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. 5.STIKKER SAID THAT HE HAD PREPARED A DRAFT OF A PAPER WHICH MIGHT SERVE AS BASIS FOR SUCH A STUDY.(THIS IS THE PAPER TO WHICH I REFERRED IN MYTEL 31 JAN7).STIKKER SAID THAT NEITHER MACNAMARA NOR RPT NOR ANY OF THE OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS HE SPOKE TO HAD SEEN A COPY OF THE PAPER.HOWEVER AFTER MACNAMARA HAD STUDIED IT HE INDICATED HE WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT IT AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE COUNCIL BUT BEFORE DOING SO HE WOULD CONSULT THE STATE DEPT AND OTHER OFFICIALS AND PERHAPS SUGGEST SOME MODIFICATIONS. 000355 �"\ PAGE THREE 553 6. STIKKER. SAID THAT IN THE COURSE OF THIS DISCUSSION HE HAD POINTED OUT THAT WHAT MIGHT BE DECIDED IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE NASSAU AGREEMENT WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON THE MRBM PROBLEM. THE MRBM REQUIREMENT AS SUBMITTED BY SACEUR FOLLOWING UP THE DECISION OF HEADS OF GOVTS OF 1957 AMOUNTED TO 450 ADDITIONAL LAND-BASED MISSILES.STIKKER RECALLED THAT THE SEABORNE FORCE UNDER PARAS7 AND 8 OF THE NASSAU AGREEMENT WAS SUPPOSED TO PRODUCE ABOUT 200 MISSILES WHILE THE USA AND UK POLARIS SUBMARINES WOULD PRODUCE ALMOST THAT NUMBER ALSO. IN ADDITION THE CONTRIBUTION OF UK BOMBER COMMAND HAD TO BE RECKONED TOWARDS MTG SACEURS REQUIREMENT.AS FOR LAND-BASED MRBMS MACNAMARA INDICATED THAT IN PRINCIPLE USA ADMIN DID NOT RPT NOT OBJECT TO PERSHINGS BEING USED SINCE THEY HAD A LIMITED RANGE CF ABOUT 400 MILES AND COULD THEREFORE NOT RPT NOT BE USED AGAINST STRATEGIC TARGETS IN USSR.THUS THE ELEMENTS FOR A SOLUTION OF THE MRBM PROBLEM SEEMED TO BE EMERGING. 7.0N TARGETTING, STIKKER EMPHASIZED TO MACNAMARA THAT MUCH OF THE DISSATISFACTION IN EUROPE ABOUT PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTROLLING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY USA STEMMED FROM THE FACT THAT SO LITTLE WAS KNOWN ESPECIALLY BY RESPONSIBLE MINISTERS ABOUT TARGETS AND INTENDED USE OF THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS AVAILABLE TO FORCES ASSIGNED TO NATO.STIKKER HAD TOLD MACNAMARA THAT IN THIS RESPECT THE CABAL BRIEFING HAD NOT RPT NOT PROVED SATISFACTORY AS IT HAD BEEN TOO THEORETICAL.HE SAID MINISTERS HAVING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS IN PARLIAMENT MUST KNOW THE PURPOSE FOR -WHICH DELIVERS SYSTEMS ASSIGNED TO NATO WERE TO BE USED.THIS WOULD NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVE TOO DETAILED A KNOWLEDGE BUT DID MEAN A GRASP OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES I AND ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVED SO THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY I' MINISTERS MIGHT KNOW WHAT PRECISELY THEY WERE AUTHORIZING.STIKKER SAID HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THIS NEED FOR FURTHER INFO ABOUT TARGETTING AND THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS GOING TO CONSULT MCCONE AND MACNAMARA ABOUT WHAT FURTHER ACTION MIGHT BE TAKEN.STIKKER SAID h w 01(1 000356 �PAGE FOUR 553 THAT OF COURSE ARRANGEMENTS ABOUT SHARING INFO ON TARGETTING WAS CF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE TO WHAT MIGHT BE WORKED OUT BY WAY OF CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS UNDER PARA6 OF THE NAUSSAU AGREEMENT. 8.ALL IN ALL STIKKER SEEMS TO BE SATISFIED THAT HE HAS MADE SOME PRMGRESS AS A RESULT OF HIS wASHDC MTG PARTICULARLY THROUGH HAVING DIRECT ACCESS TO MACNAMARA AND SENIOR PENTAGON OFFICIALS AND IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW MUCH OF THE UNDERSTANDINGS HE WAS ABLE TO REACH WITH MACNAMARA WILL BE TRANSLATED INTO INSTRUCTIONS TO USA DEL IN NATO. 9. AS STIKKER ASKED ME TO TREAT WHAT HE TOLD ME WITH PARTICULAR CARE I HAVE MARKED THIS MSG FOR CDN EYES ONLY IGNATIEFF0 000357 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW03403 Title A name given to the resource CDNW03403 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy - NATO long term planning," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5960, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 7-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en