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CD H) CD ct P CD CO CD 4 •d CD <J CD o F> < Pi p p ftf o CD ct 3 sX P ct P O CD CD ts' »d CD p F CQ 4 CQ 53 P c t P H P O 4 H. 33 E? r~> p P ^ 4 4 <^ t-3 ^ a* CD P 3 ts 0 CO CD P o P P H CD P M ct O ct s ct er 53 P ct P O ct FO P O H) CQ CD a o P 4 p p o p- CO o CT CD CO H Q -! O "< C i" 9 a —n Q. <B =? <B < e (S 3 a 3 i = = o 3 D �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 3 atomic weapons, without which the Free World would be at a disastrous disadvantage in the face of Communist superiority in conventional weapons. And the fear provides aa opportunity for the Soviets to use Western European cities, and later American cities, as hostages with which to attempt political blackmail. Furthermore, Massive Deterrence now places a virtually impossible air and civil defense burden on the West, a tacit understanding of which is reflected in public apathy and resignation toward the problem. Reliance on the deterrent effect of total war provides no deterrence to Communist aggression by "nibble", using their, superiority in conventional arms, or frequently merely the threat of massed armies coupled with active measures of aggressive subversion, coup d'etat, and supported rebellion. To save Korea or Formosa or Indo-China, or perhaps even a nonvital NATO area, the West will simply not bomb Moscow, particularly as it now assures destruction of London, Paris, and New York. Moreover, as Dien Bien Phu shows, by depending primarily on the threat of mass destruction, we have frightened ourselves from taking adequate action to repel local . aggression out of fear of general destruction if war spreads. A defense strategy relying on massive destruction rather than on military battle risks a situation where we might commit genocide and suicide in case of provocation by a lesser violence. By threatening more force than necessary, it rests on neither civilized nor moral nor practical principles. Most relevant to the problem of Big 4 talks is perhaps that reliance on the threat of total war for defense creates an ever-increasing fear of world destruction. The Soviets have already extracted a propaganda advantage from this fear in their "pea.ee offensives", in their provocation of Allied dissension, and in attempts to identify themselves as champions of peace and the West as war-mongers. They now will try for �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation - 4a diplomatic advantage in attempts to divide and weaken the West through negotiations for neutrality, disengagement, and full atomic but only partial conventional disarmament. Their immediate power objectives are a stalemate in "strategic" arms and a superiority in "tactical" arms, Soviet propaganda and diplomacy, already convincing to Mr. Sevan, Mr. Nehru, and the large body of opinion they represent, will be intensified during Four Power and disarmament talks. Compelled by popular pressures to do something to lessen the risk of world destruction, and yet committed to uphold a defense policy which relies on the threat of massive destruction and total war, Western negotiators will be severely handicapped by their cross-purposes and may well give away far more than they should and far more than they obtain in return. Although the neutrality of Germany has apparently been ruled out as a bargaining point, the neutrality of other noncommitted areas may be too readily bartered, thus effectively denying tham any future protection from collective defense action* In negotiating disengagements, Western tactical military strength might be weakened relatively; failure to appreciate, the critical importance of tactical military strength1 as strategic military power approaches equality could lead to unfortunate concessions and.careless weighing of the military and political differences between even a partial Anglo-American withdrawal from Europe and a Russian withdrawal from satellites perhaps "neutralized® in government but still controlled by the Communist Party. . . • • Even if the pitfalls in neutrality and disengagement are recognized (which increasingly seems to be the case in Western capitals) there is little evidence that the pitfalls in the disarmament proposals have been surveyed, other than the weak control provisions. For the disarmament stages now being discussed are inadequate for the protection of the West, a point that will be returned toxin later .paragraphs. .. i :>.?. .. -vi-•• >x r,... t .. • ;;c..'-..a aeat^j'ction, <*.'ki 731 civ. •' ;.-ca " • Lu.dl» essence, the main issue-jb.o^he}Tapproac,he.4."i.i^ tne,.Four Power t a l k s i s arreduction^infcworld r ^ d j ^ p ^ ^ i s e ^ i ^ a ^ ^ l y othe : ^ai?ioi to.talcwar.^ . ^ t ^ . ^ ^ ^ j a ^ ^ v ^ B . O j p j ^ ' QM th^ty;%isettlemeii%y fEx> *Lao*'e t?'.m tvj -/ ^ r i t i and far more than they obtain In return, •,.:j;>'.-v.. -v Xi-s- ^ ..<ir ..•..-•• ; .;..<: (5*,3%i^ *\as a-OT;xreutly tv^-L " rule t 000715 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a I'information . ' - 5- in.Europe is hardly negotiable in the present political context. Thus, the Four Powers must seek an approach to limitation in warfare. The Soviets have very clear ideas how they would limit warfare - neutrality, disengagement, atomic disarmament, and partial conventional disarmament, all constructed to improve their relative tactical power position. But the West has no clear idea how it would limit warfare. In this context where the Soviets know what they want and the West does not, the negotiations can hardly advance the purposes of the West, More likely, they will get nowhere, each side trying to attach blame for no desire results on the other. But if the West can propose no alternative to Massive Deterrence, the Soviets will at least be successful in casting the Western Powers in the role of obstructionists to peace as regards diminution of world fears of nuclear destruction. THE ALTERNATIVE OF GRADUATE!) DETERRENCE Is there an alternative strategy for the West which provides adequately for the defense of the Free World and which does not rely primarily on the threat of mass destruction and total war? Increasing evidence and debate point toward the very considerable promise in a defense policy based on Graduated Deterrence, sometimes called measured deterrence. By Graduated Deterrence is meant reliance on a series of graded threats of counter-actions and retaliations, each designed to deter a particular type of aggression,-instead of primary reliance on.the threat of total destruction to deter all warfare - Such a scale of deterrents would involve some limitations on the type of weapons used, but mostly limitations on the targets attacked. It would involve a distinction between cities and military targets. The ultimate threat of mass destruction of Soviet cities would be reserved to counter the ultimate aggression of mass attacks on Free World cities and populations. �~J o o o ct • P ct P P P P O et FO ft & a* H CD P CD •a H. 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Q Q. 33 O — R < ft- o -5 Q ""• *+ 2 R 10 » a. .-» c 3 It »(B C g (D A iCT 5 3 r+ (B 2: S ? a- ii n = o o t- ation �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 7 2. The reaction must be undoubted. The threat to deter each type of aggression must be based on real strength, and there must be a strong will to act in accordance with the threat, if necessary to repel an attempted aggression. Thus to deter, a deterrent must be designed to permit prompt and unwavering execution by the Free World. Massive Deterrence, for example, presents no useable strength against local aggression and is a bluff already called to our embarrassment. 3- The extent of Free World counter-action to each category of aggression must be well debated and accepted beforehand In the democracies. The speed and violence of modern war do not permit rational debate on limitation after a conflict has started. To prevent war becoming "hyperbolic, limitations must be thrashed out and accepted before" the passiohs and pace cs^ the conflict take over. Also, a potential aggressor-must have sure knowledge of his probability of loss; It is not desirable to keep him guessing, % s he may guess wrong and underestimate the consequences of his aggression. (This is not to say that .the means and techniques of military counter-action need be revealed, otp.y the consequences). 4* Aggressors must not be confronted wi,th terms of unconditional surrender in case of war. Cease-fire terms containing face-saving features must.be the essence of • moderation and presented as the carrot held out with the stick of continued war. Broadlyv terms should be restricted to free election and disarmameht matters» and penalties confined mostly to destruction of military forces as occurring during the war* Certain cherished military notions of the West, as developed in this century of total war* must be abandoned« 1, The .enemy's will to resist - a favorite target of naval, and air pcwer enthusiasts and of formerly water-Isolated Powers �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a I'information - 8such as the U.S. and Britain - must be excluded from target systems in limited warfare and included only in the ultimate deterrent against mass destruction. It is necessary to recall that with modern weapons, terror bombing to destroy the communist will to resist is tantamount to genocide and is increasingly an invitation to mutual suicide. 2. Modern weapons mean that just as the world's N° 1 Continental Power (Russia) can achieve virtual equality by saturation in strategic warfare vis-a-vis Anglo-American air-naval supremacy, so can Free World land power, using tactical atomic weapons, achieve equality at least in defence against Soviet-Chinese armies. Containment in the military sense must be pursued, and this means Free World land power must exist on the Free Continent of Asia under bilateral and collective security pacts. 3. The notion that the object of war is total victory must give way to the concept that the object of war is more workable peace; there can still be victory in specific battles, but the idea of victory in modern war is nonsense. 4. The plea of the military never to have their hands tied must not be unreservedly accepted. The very idea of limitation in war is restraint of the military, primarily as regards their objectives, and sometimes their means. The idea never to permit the enemy sanctuary must be abandoned? sanctuary in the long run is two sided and thus a useful approach to limitation. Who would not exchange a Detroit or a Coventry for a Kiev? 5. The mobilization base for a very long war - vast raw material stockpiles, standby war industry, and conscript man-power reserves - is unnecessary and costly. In nuclear times, the decisive air battles will be fought in the early weeks, what is required thereafter is sufficient resources to show that we can if necessary continue the fight more intensely than the aggressor for months, but not years, and this requires stocks of military supplies more than �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information mobilization potential. The issue will be decided with military forces in being at the outset; although some mobilization might be possible in a period of tension before war, post-D-Day mobilization can contribute essentially no military forces to the decisive actions. Furthermore limitation in fast-moving modern warfare requires that early battle victories be quickly exploited for peace with pre-announced, moderate terms. After the short decisive phase is over, massed counter-offensives to teach the enemy a lesson may be emotionally satisfying to a wronged, indignant, and self-righteous people, but it is not the civilized approach of limitation in warfare. To avoid total war means to avoid total ends (i.e. total victory). After the decisive weeks of battle, a peace of reconciliation must be promptly negotiated using the carrot and stick technique already mentioned. ADVANTAGES OF GRADUATED DETERRENCE In an article of this length there is no space for an analytical comparison of the political, economic, military, and moral aspects in a strategy of Graduated Deterrence as compared with Massive Deterrence or Non-Atomic Deterrence (no atomic weapons used unless used by the aggressor). This has been done in previous studies, by the author and others, and the conclusion has been drawn that Graduated Deterrence now offers impressive advantages« In 1. 2. 3. summary, Western strategy must be designed: To deter minor and major armed aggressions and total war. In case minor or major war, to limit its spread. In case of minor or major war, to limit attacks to military forces and avoid the maiming of future generations and the destruction of civilization as represented by cities. 4. To reduce the fear of world destruction. Massive Deterrence meets only one third of the first requirement (it does deter total war) and none of the others. Non- �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a I'information - 10 Atomic Deterrence meets the fourth requirement, part of the third, but neither of the others. Graduated Deterrence meets all requirements. Against minor aggression, our deterrent would be increased by our ability to use atomic and perhaps chemical weapons tactically and locally, when absolutely necessary. We would, in effect, at last have deterrents between the extremes of local "conventional" retaliation and "massive" retaliation. There would therefore be less scope for misunderstanding between the two extremes, and our deterrents would be more convincing because so clearly dissociated from attacks on cities. A real deterrent to local aggression by massed armies makes it less likely that a series of Communist successes would force action upon us leading to general war. And whereas no direct answer to .subversion, coup d'etat, and supported rebellion, it makes these instruments of aggression less effective by checking the threat of armed attack and thus encouraging the victim to resist non-military aggression. Without diminishing the deterrent to general war, Graduated Deterrence achieves these gains, while simultaneously reducing the' fear of total war and the temptation, for the Soviets to "Pearl Harbour" us. Of the objections to Graduated Deterrence, most are due to misunderstanding and adherence to old doctrines. Some, objections, such as apprehensions about the tactical strength of the West, can be overcome.; The remaining objections are considerably less, on balance, than the objections to Massive Deterrence and Non-Atomic "Deterrence. THE ADOPTION OF GRADUATED DETERRENCE Should Graduated Deterrence as a defense policy contributing to enforcement of world peace be announced or negotiated? The U.S., or better the Western Powers together, can approach the matter in three phases - announcement of principles, declaration of promises, and negotiation of conventions. The United States could immediately and unilaterally announce �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 11 - their aim of future reliance on the broad principles of Graduated Deterrence. Some of its advocates, particularly in England, believe the West does not yet have quite enough tactical strength to make an announcement. In the U.S. there is hesitation in certain circles not so much because of our tactical striking power but because of our supposed poor ability to reconnoitre tactical targets and because of tragic inattention to the problem of the vulnerability of our poorly dispersed military bases and logistic systems. But it is not really requisite to have "enough tactical strength" to announce broad adoption of the principles of Graduated Deterrence, as contrasted to announcing promises. We never will build a great superiority in tactical strength until policy demands it. And as Bernard Brodie points out, a great danger today is that we will build so much of our force structure rigidly from weapons only capable of intercontinental wars of mass destruction, that if war comes we should be incapable of effectively fighting any other kind of war, even if we want to. As Indo-China, Korea, and now Formosa demonstrate, when limited aggression occurs or is threatened, we do in fact reply in a limited way. Thus, should we not prepare in advance for limited reactions, and thus construct the limited deterrents we need? The political needs of the hour require political action now. Soviet initiative makes it mandatory that the V/est clarify its own ideas regarding limitation. Military measures, to meet the political objectives of applying the minimum force necessary to repel and therefore deter aggression, can be limited in various ways: 1. By the weapons used - conventional, chemical, bacteriological, atomic, or hydrogen. 2.. By the type of target attacked - surface forces deployed in the battle zone, military and naval surface forces In rear areas, air bases, the military supply system, industry, or population centers. 3. By restricting action to geographic boundaries - to 000722 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a I'information - 12 - political boundaries, natural boundaries, or arbitrary distances from the line of surface contact. Limitations on military action can be handled publicly, or by instructions from the civilian level in Government to • military commanders, or by delegating discretionary authority to the appropriate commander. It would seem that the democracies must now publicly approach limitation along the following lines: 1. Restriction on any use of hydrogen or bacteriological weapons, unless the aggressor initiates their use. 2. Restriction on the use of any mass weapon against population centers irrespective of the targets contained, unless an aggressor deliberately attacks ours, with the exception of towns and cities in the battle zone of land fighting not declared and proven to be open by U.N. inspection. There is every reason to think that the first restriction could be publicly promised today. The second restriction means that in the case of general war (i.e. a NATO -^Soviet conflict) Soviet cities or targets in them would not be attacked with weapons of mass destruction unless cities of the Free World are first attacked, and that "strategic*1 targets (cities except) non-"open" ones in the battle zone).are differentiated from "tactical" targets (military forces). Even conventional bombings might be avoided if U.N. observation could be arranged to prove the cities contained no aerial bases, and perhaps certain other military targets. Further detailed study is required before a public promise could be made regarding this second restriction. Even if the distinction between cities and military forces should break down during war, it must be recognised that the �t\J trj F- o P to ct FO P O ct F- OH CD P ct P CD 3 P to P 4 P. F CD 4 P CQ P OH ct P FCO P 4 1 4 cr CD P F- O Hj « W 53 fe S P J> pj S •^ P 4 Fet P 3 F O ct FCQ H CD p p o < 4 CQ CD cr O 4 Hi O CD P P o O H> ct FCD CQ P F- ct 4 P M CO O CD P O H H cr P c+ P P P <g F- 4 4 CD ct CD P P F- < CD CD O ct F- HJ HJ CO O O S3 cr CD ct H ct F- ct CD ct O P 4 Hj 3 P 4 O CD ts ct Hj O P ct FO P FK P O P P P CQ P CO CQ FO 4 P CD p o p £ta P CD O ct HP9 ct CD OH P CD cr P 4 CO > . 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Q r Q- 3 - 5" 9 Q -5 O C " »• 9 R Q. rt » 3" — A = ? 3 s- a. c s < 3 (B S 2: 3 r+ i = = 8 a O �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a I'information - 15 is only partial, as now proposed by the Soviets. In addition to the virtually non-existent control provisions in the present proposals, atomic weapons are eliminated whereas conventional weapons are maintained at levels in which the West can have little confidence that aggression can be deterred. Three, are the proposed stages designed to minimize danger that the Soviets, who can rearm more quietly and quickly than the democracies, could achieve a major relative gain by breaking the agreements after disarmament were under way? Again, retention of atomic weapons until a later stage of disarmament could mitigate this possibility. Four, today as contrasted with 1947, are not the technical problems almost insurmontable of controlling burgeoning nuclear bomb stockpiles of decreasing size and cost, even with freely operating inspection? If so, the means of mass delivery - i.e. military forces - must be eliminated at least simultaneouslyi. And through world law restricted to armament matters, enforceability must be on individuals to reduce the possibility of a nation state shielding organized circumvention of control provisions. Further, small nations may a few, years hence come into possession of nuclear weapons. Disarmament cannot achieve its purposes unless "complete, universal, and enforceable on individuals". It will be many years before such disarmament can be organized, during which period Graduated Deterrence is needed to enforce world peace. Disarmament should begin with Graduated Deterrence based on mass weapons, and this will forestall the use of armed force. All disarmament stages must respect the principles of Graduated Deterrence and continue with such deterrence on use until controlled possession of arms throughout the world approaches internal police proportions. Life has its dangers and its opportunities, and when the dangers are greatest, so can be the opportunities. The new weapons, which threaten civilization itself, present the greatest 000726 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a Finformation - 16 - ; opportunity in the history of man to eliminate warfare as a calculated means of achieving national ends. In rising to the challenge, the first step is for the West to contribute to the enforcement of world peace through organizing Graduated Deterrence. Once there is Graduated Mutual Deterrence in the world, and not just Massive Mutual Deterrence, determined negotiations can lead to eventual success in universal and complete disarmament enforceable on individuals. ELIMINATING THE FEAR OF SURPRISE ATTACK It is commonly recognized that free inspection is essential to control in disarmament. But to date, primary emphasis by the West has been given to inspection of nuclear stock-piles and factories. Little attention has been paid to inspection of the means of mass delivery, even though the Soviets now propose limiting inspection to airfields and other major military and transportation installations. But would not such partial inspection, if coupled with aerial inspection throughout the world to locate major military installations, represent a big and worthwhile step toward full and free inspection? And might not the Soviets agree to aerial inspection, as it would not interfere with their internal, police-state system of control? Such limited inspection would go far toward eliminating the mutual fear of a surprise mass attack a la Pearl Harbor. Thus it would bring a major "lessening of international tension" and could provide a better climate for further steps toward disarmament. And, as a matter of fact, if the Soviets did not agree to aerial inspection, it could be done secretly by the West, which could deliver the aerial photography and other data obtained to the U.N. Inspection Agency, to which the West would grant aerial inspection privileges over its own territory. The technical means exist today for carrying out such aerial inspection at minor cost, even in the face of determined Soviet military opposition. But probabilities are that the Soviets would be forced 000727 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 17 to agree, as the addition of the aerial inspection feature represents such a minor and logical addition to their present inspection proposals. Disarmament in the sense of limitation on the possession of weapons probably cannot rest on such limited inspection. But elimination of the mutual fear of surprise attack would be another tangible step in limitation on the use of mass weapons. . WESTERN INITIATIVE Soviet initiative with proposals for neutrality, disengagement, and disarmament must command an imaginative response from the West. If the Western negotiators simply hold rigidly to previous positions, they will have failed the world. If the Western negotiators allow the Soviets to progress with their approach to limitation in warfare through neutrality, disengagement, and full nuclear but partial conventional disarmament, they will weaken the relative tactical military strength of the West, and thus actually increase the risks of eventual war. The Western powers can find scope for initiative in the following proposals to limit the use of weapons as a prelurie to limitation on their possession: 1* Announce Western adherence to the principles of Graduated Mutual Deterrence until disarmament can eventually be arranged which is complete, universal and enforceable on individuals* 2* Publicly promise to withhold any H-bomb or bacteriological attack, unless an aggressor attacks with them first. 3* Indicate that the West is studying ways of distinguiishing between cities and armed forces» and if a distinction Can be drawn, the West will promise not to attack cities with weapons of mass destruction, unless an aggressor does so first* 000728 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a Finformation - 18 4. Propose a limited inspection system comprised of aerial inspection throughout the world, and ground inspection at major military installations, as a measure to eliminate the mutual fear of surprise mass attack and as a first step toward full and free inspection upon which disarmament can later be based. Richard S. Leghorn Colonel, U.S. Air Force Reserve Eastman Kodak Company Rochester 4, New York. 000729 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00156 Title A name given to the resource Report, "Western Weakness in the Four Power and Disarmament Talks" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 6/26/1955 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Study on Canadian National Security Policy, RG25, file 50333-40, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Canadian National Security Description An account of the resource "Western Weakness in the Four Power and Disarmament Talks" Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en