https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1aa87bd69cc2485e4707ec0abbbeeb59.pdf cd573105ae1266c65a4e963f55eaa80e PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET MINUTES OF MEETING TO DISCUSS STUDY,OF.NATIONAL:.SECURITY POLICY July 20i 1955 PRESENT; Mr; Ri B. Bryce, Clerk of the Privy Council (Chairman) General Charles Foulkes, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Mr; K. W. Taylor, Deputy Minister of Finance Mr. J. Leger, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Mr; E. Armstrong, Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence Mr* R. A. MacKay, Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Mr* G. Ignatieff, Defence Liaison Division, Department of External Affairs Mr. \t. R. Martin, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Secretary) 1. The Chairman said he thought a start should be made on re-assessing Canada's defence policy and some preliminary consideration given before seeking direction on specific terms of reference for the study. It had been about five years since the main outline of our present defence programme had been formulated. Now we were spending approximately ..& billion a year but the whole background had changed and it was desirable to have another look at the basic fundamentals on which our policy was based. The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff had prepared and circulated a document entitled "Re-assessment of Canada's Defence Policyj Aims and Programmes in the next five years j 1955-60"*The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs agreed. In order to pursue their own work more effectively, he and his officials felt it was time to re-consider the assumptions on \>rhich Canada's defence policy was based. He hoped that in due course it might be possible to submit jointly, to the Cabinet Defence Committee, what recommendations, if any, might be made. It would also be helpful if it was possible to co-operate in the production of documents which would be prepared in the course of the study since foreign policy considerations should not be divorced from military considerations. The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff had suggested that, first, the aims and objectives of Canada's defence policy be examined, then, our commitments, and then an attempt might be made to establish priorities. This appeared to be a satisfactory approach. External Affairs would probably have a good deal to gray on the first matter but perhaps not too much on the question of commitments. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation BEST AVAILABLE COPY - 2 - He assumed there was no such thing as a Canadian concept of defence, We were part of an alliance , which included in it the United States. Decisions of the alliance, accepted by the U.S., inevitably had a serious impact on Canadian policy. 3. The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff felt it was urgent to get on with the study proposed. Initially he would like to see our aims clarified. At present, our major defence commitment was to I^TO and all our resources were devoted to that organization. From this he inferred it was clear we could not embark on small wars except under the U.N. and with forces borrowed from NATO commitments. This had quite an impact on the organisation of the services. Then there was the question of priorities. Developments respecting the CF105 and missiles of one kind or another, for example, meant there would not be much money left over to carry out many of what were now regarded as Canada's present objectives. We had to be clear what Our priorities were and then it would be "relatively simple" to take off the bottom of the list those things for i.\rhich money was not available. Another question he would like to see. examined was that of the Canadian-U.S. projects in North nmerica. Difficulties were being encountered on all these and criteria should be laid down as to the share of the projects Canada might undertake, and the cost. At present, different decisions were being made on each one. Another matter that required study was our "•position vis-a-vis Europe on the one hand, and North America on the other. Originally our maximum effort had been placed in Europe but things had now changed. For example, the Brigade had perhaps a very valuable moral purpose when it was originally sent to Europe, but was it of such great value now? Was this the best way of spending money, in the light of a Contribution to NATO of 15 German divisions? these and other problems were "rearing their head'r more and more in the Chiefs of Staff, 4. Mr. Brvce thought the re-assessmerit, of our1 defence policy should include a study of the following problems: (i) Does Canada provide for small wars outside of NATO? Do we anticipate other small wars? How do we provide for them? (ii) Do we anticipate a non-nuclear large war? (iii) The question of U.S. forces in Canada and Canadian forces in Europe, (iv) Our general policy in relation to the scale of the effort contemplated. (v) disarmament (vi) China and the Far East 000378 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation - 3(vii) Policy in relation to Colombo Plan countries. Is there a security interest in our Colombo Plan contributions? (vii) Our attitude towards large and small atomic weapons? Should Canada use small atomic weapons? 5. The Deputy Minister of Finance agreed that these were the sort of problems that should be examined. He thought a re-assessment should be concerned with the general scale of bur defence commitments and broad political priorities. For the last five years the government had limited its defence spending to about ->2 billion per annum. One could perhaps envisage conditions compelling the government to set aside a larger share of the national product for defence. He agreed that conditions had changed enough in the last five years to the extent that our whole policy should be carefully examined. One natter which he thought would be well to consider was the question of industrial backing for defence materiel. It was excessively costly to maintain lines in being producing only ''dribbles" of equipment. This was a complicated and technical problem. 6. . General Foulkes agreed it would be advisable to look closely at our industrial organization in the light of the new concepts of what the next war would be like. /ar involving the use of nuclear xveapons had changed to the point where it was generally felt it. would have to be fought and ivon with the forces in being at.the time hostilities broke out. everything depended on this first phase which was thought might last no longer than six weeks.. The main effort of the West then should be to build up a deterrent to avoid war and, if necessary, win, or at.least not lose, a war in the first phase. If this defence concept was correct, our attitude toward reserves of men, material, stockpiling, etc. changed. Should we, for example, order equipment in a certain line sufficient for the needs of the required forces in being at the beginning of a war and then cbse down the assembly line concerned rather than keep it going for years turning out small quantities of materiel? 7. Mr. Brvce said the problem involved a determination of what type of war we might become involved in. Did we gamble on only having to participate in a large war involving nuclear weapons, or would we be participating in small wars? If so, how much provision should be made for small wars? What safety factors should we allow for if the war turned out to be different than what xve thought it might be? 8. General Foulkes said that fortunately the same requirement existed for creating a deterrent as for fighting phase 1 of a large war. If our main aim of defence policy was to deter aggression on a large scale and to do our share in that effort, that cleared the way to consideration of the necessary priorities. 9. Mr. Bryce added that it might be found we couldn't do much beyond our share in creating the deterrent. 10. Mr. Armstrong observed that this and the opening phase of a large war involved the same things. 000379 �..... ... ..,......,,...,., , . , „ ^ , ~ .„ . „ Docarrieht disclosed under the Access tormformation Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation -—• THe Under-Secretary of State for Exterrial^ Affairs said that; the. matter o f deterring aggression dn a large scale and ghase 1' of a large war should be related to NATO and-.;tovEu^Qpe*.;' There was another; type o f i:. war which presumably could occur in. the. Far J^ast whicii .would probably h ^ a local; and limited war. Canadian participation in this .type o f war • he, felt j; would arise probably because of our commitments to'^he United Nations |ihd if the U . S . had taken the initiative' in obtaining United Nations' „ sanction for intervention. The,U.S. could no longer assume that a majority bbuld, b e obtained in any.body of the U.N. in suppbrt^df its Far Eastern policies, Especially if these involved military.measures, as they had done in Korea. From this he concluded j tentatively at least, that the U . S . would be more cautibus before launching into another Korea. He suggested that the possibility could hot b e ruled out o f Canada participating with the U . S . in military action without any U.N. sanction, if trouble developed in the Pacific n o t too far from ou r shores, for example in Japan. 12. Mr/ Bryce thought .it would be wrong to base our policy on certain geographical.assumptions. It should fit into a general concept. If the object, fo r instance, was to contain China, should Canada join with the U.S. in doing so whether there was a U.N, commitment or not? The world was really one and he thought it w a s obsolete to think in terms o f certain areas only. Decisions, he thought, would have" to b e iv.ade therefore on the question of how far we would prepare our forces to participate in local small wars. 13. General Foulkes thought such wars might require from Canada a token contribution o f , say, a few naval ships or some aircraft. 14. Mr;* Bryce observed* in re£>ly, that if we were associated with the U . S . , the latter would want the political comfort o f larger fortes than that* Apart from the character of Canadian forces j should. W e as a nation, take into account the likelihood or otherwise of joining with the U . S . in conventional wars? 15. M r . Armstrong thought this might best be determined after at least tentative conclusions had been reached in regard to what our N A T O and N o r t h American forces might b e . 16. M r . Bryce agreed but added that this involved a decision on any role we might play tdth the U . S . in conventional w a r s . To his mind this went further back to the problem of China which would appear to him to b e a trouble-maker for the next 1 0 y e a r s . 17. M r . Leger agreed that China w a s a: potential trouble spot. Since it w as probable that t h e U . S . would be unable to obtain support in the U . N . for its policies, it was more likely that the U . S . would act through S E A T O than through t h e U . N . let. M r . Bryce observed that apart from SEATO there was a possibility last spring of becoming involved in some kind o f an arrangement guaranteeing Formosa. It looked then that the U . S . might b e drawn into a major war in the Pacific because other so-called western nations were not willing to participate in a venture to stop what appeared to 000380 �Document disclosed under the Access t&'lnformation Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a Finformation * • • ••• ^ ' 5 " be imminent Chinesemilitary activity. Should we be prepared to join in a venture of this kind in the hope that possibly We might prevent the War from becoming a large nuclear orie"? Should w& ;be prepared, to provide part of the forpes for a collective guararitee of Formosa? Mr;-Leger observed that pur air defence system was now so closely Co-ordinated with that of the U.S. that it was unavoidable becoming Involved to some extent. It would be almost impossible to refuse to let the Americans use the facilities on Canadian soil if they were engaged in a war with China. Geheral Foulkes pointed Out that if this latter eventuality /demurred j the war would not have been a minor one. The use of tactical atomic weapons at least was contemplated* i^; - ' •' "- ... ' Mr. Bryce asked whether it was possible to limit wars in the Far East? If .Canada, the U.K., and certain other nations joined the U.S. in some collective arrangement regarding Formosa,.for example, would that prevent a great war? Had the passage of time, during which the Americans seemed to have become more and more impressed with the horrifying results of the. use of nuclear weapons, changed their ideas in regard to employing them? ^Priorities for defence were not absolute. Possibilities of engagements in Asia certainly had a bearing on the character of our forces employed in NATO and North .Americai These questions could not be considered in isolation. While the study might start on European arid North American defence problems, the Far East and China in particular were important secondary matters which should at the same time be kept in mind* The next aspect of the problem was the relative priority to be accorded to the defence of ftorth America as compared with Western Europe., There were broad political considerations inherent in this,problem which could not be overlooked. General Foulkes said that the deterrent involved the defence of the whole of the N A T O area, of which North America was a vital.part* If we accepted the defence of the riiiciear detfeirent, it seemed to him that our defences should be weighted in favour of this Continent, because of the importance of protecting the deterrent capability of the Strategic Air. Command against the increasing capacity of the U.S.SiR* to attack this continent by air. Mr. Taylor agreed that five or six years ago the real threat was in Europe. Now there was at the very least an equal chance of a major attack on North America. Mr. Bryce asked what the obstacles were to increasing Canada's share for North American defence-at. the expense of Europe. General Foulkes thought the: initial approach, to this question might involve an estimate of what the Brigade in Europe was costing us and .an assessment of its usefulness in relation to the relatively large German % , �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a Finformation , 6contribution for the future. From a military point of view, he thought SACEUR would rather see the Brigade returned to Canada than say thrae or four squadrons from the Air Division. 26. Mr. Bryce said that from the point of view of the alliance it would be more understandable to have the • air division in Canada. He agreed there were, however, symbolic factors not to be overlooked. Soldiers on the ground appeared a more tangible contribution to the Europeans, and possibly to Canadians, than aircraft. 27. General Foulkes added that the problems of North American defence would soon be intensified. Our commitment consisted of 18 squadrons of all-weather fighters, only 9 of which were regular. It was now generally agreed that the anxiliaries.could not operate CFlOOs. How was this gap to be met? The U.S., he felt, would soon ask this question and if the Canadians answered it could not be done for the present, the U.S. would then suggest that it meet the deficiency. The easiest way appeared to hira for Canada to deal with the problem to bring back some squadrons from Europe. 28, 29. Mr. Bryce said that if the Brigade was returned the manpower involved should be transferred in one manner or another to air defence. The big problem was the provision of trained squadrons. Mr. Armstrong observed that the smallest part of the problem was the manning of the fighters. Many more men would be. involved in manning control stations, ground to air missile sites, etc. All told* air force estimate of the additional manpower needed to play what it considered the appropriate part.in the defence of North America was 10^000^ and a probable additional financial outlay of 2 billion to be spent over' a period of two years. Mr*yirmstrorig wondered to what extent the proposed re-assessment would be undertaken independent of financial considerations. 30.- Mr. Bryce said it could not be. 31. Mr. Taylor agreed. He thought that there should be an initial re-assessment of the assumptions governing our defence first. Financial considerations would have to be taken into consideration in.establishing priorities for the various defence projects. 32. Mr. Bryce said that one big factor in the study was that we were a prisoner of the past. If we were starting afresh on defence plans we would probably have no Navy. There would be radical changes in the character of the other forces. However, pressures were such that many changes just could not be made. Freedom of action in the re-assessment was therefore limited, but a fresh look was needed. For example, how important was the defence of Europe. He thought it was now less important for the •Russians to attempt to secure the whole of the Rhur complex than it was to overcome air fields in the U.K. and North America from which long-range bombing strikes could be launched. In five years' time, Europeans might be relatively much safer than North Americans. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a I'information J. 7 L Mr. Leger said it would be important not to overlook recent Soviet trends. The Russians wanted the U.S. troops out of Europe. Personally, he thought that in four or five years' time they might well be successful in this objective. The Russians could appeal to lar&e elements in France, Italy and even in the U.K., and make concessions like recent ones respecting Austria and in connection with the acceptance of the international atomic . '. pool. He could also foresee, if present trends in Soviet conciliatory attitude continued, some difficulty in maintaining defence expenditures. It might be difficult for a Minister of Finance to maintain Canada's defence budget at its present level unless possibly if the U.S. government and the U.S. public continued to demand more expenditures on continental defence. An example of the kind of reaction he had in mind was the statement of the French Premier in the current meetings at Geneva which seemed to go further towards meeting the Soviet position than the U.K. and the U.S. had. There was no doubt that the meeting at the summit, whether or not any tangible results were achieved, would have an effect on U.S. opinion, if this were followed by meetings of the Foreign Ministers at which a fuller climate of confidence were created, the Europeans might be in a mood where they no longer thought our troops were necessary on their continent for their defence. Germany was the major problem in Europe. He doubted if Russia would accept our conditions in relation to Germany, but nevertheless if they played on the French fears of German militarism while advocating a European security system involving the gradual thinning out of U.S. troops, public opinion in Europe and even in the U*S. could, he felt, change radically in a short space of time. Mr. Bryce thought the will to,coexistence was greater but the fundamental feature of the case was that this was an armed coexistence. The shifts in public opinion added to the problem of maintaining the strength which would be necessary to enable us to coexist. Mr. Bryce thought another problem which we should look at was disarmament. How, if at all, should our views be changed in the light of recent developments? General Foulkes was of the opinion that nothing would be achieved in this field unless a way was. found of carrying out effective international inspection. There was not sufficient good faith between the two sides and therefore disarmament should be confined to what was practicable. Mr. Leger pointed out that until recently the position had been frozen by lack of a U.S. response. However, with the appointment of Mr. Stassen there were indications that the U.S. was now willing to consider new ideas. Mr. MacKay added that one thing being examined and considered was the question of checking on the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Mr. Bryce asked whether it was in the interest of the free world to have disarmament. We might be roanoeuvered into a very difficult position vis-a-vis our own public opinion. It was possible to conceive an ill-informed public opinion obliging governments to weaken �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation - 8 'their defence effort even though this was not in the public's best interests, 40. Mr. Leger thought we should clarify Soviet intentions about disarmament. The recent Anglo-French proposal was acceptable to us, and the Russian representative at the last talks had put forward proposals on conventional armaments which were similar. If these were turned down, there would be a serious effect on our own public opinion. The deterrent to aggression was SAC. The West had a special interest in considering plans for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. 41. Mr. Bryce asked whether it was worth modifying our proposals for inspection. He said it would obviously be necessary to look at disarmament. 42. General Foulkes said another problem which should be examined was the question of military support of civil defence. There had to be a means of organizing the population to withstand as best it could the terrible onslaught if ever it came. 43. The Committee, after further discussion, agreed: (a) that the following papers be prepared for consideration at a meeting about three, weeks hence: (i) (ii) nims of Canadian Defence Policy (by National Defence). The International Setting of the Aims of Canadian Defence Policy (by External Affairs). it being understood that these would not be drafted in isolation; (b) that after these first two papers had been drafted and considered in a preliminary way, other papers might be prepared on the following: (i) The expanding Needs of Air Defence' of North America and the Canadian role in it* (ii) (iii) The role of the Canadian Forces in Europe. The scale of the Canadian Defence Effort (including financial considerations) . (iv) Should Canada plan to aid in the containment of China directly or indirectly, (v) (vi) Survival policy in civil defence or otherwise. Disarmament policy, and (c) at the next meeting consideration be given to the terms of reference of the proposed study of National Security Policy, the obtaining of ministerial approval for it and of the method of carrying it out. July 26, 1955. W. R. Martin, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00153 Title A name given to the resource Minutes of Meeting to Discuss Study of National Security Policy Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 7/20/1955 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Study on Canadian National Security Policy, RG25, file 50333-40, LAC. 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