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I-Lo-t
COPY NO .
8-3
Owing to special securit y of infbr- j TOP SECRET
mation r e c i p i e n t is r e q u e s t e d not
to c i r c u l a t e or have e x t r a c t s m a l e
25 Sep 52
The Minister
Canadian C o m m e n t s on UK paper
"Global Strategy,and Defence P o l i c y "
1
The Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the United Kingdom Chiefs of
Staff paper on Global Strategy and Defence P o l i c y . Because of security
r e s t r i c t i o n s placed on this paper and its c i r c u l a t i on it is not deemed
possible at this time to make a complete review of the United Kingdom
views on global s t r a t e g y , nor is it felt that a complete review at this time
on this p r o b l e m would be profitable. However, it is felt that c e r t a i n
a s p e c t s of this p a p e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y those r e f e r r i n g to the build up of
forces for NATO, a r e worthy of consideration and our defence c o m m i t m e n t s r e - e x a m i n e d in the light of implications of this p a p e r , the Ismay
paper on the Background of the Annual Review, and the views of the US
Chiefs of Staff. We have selected p o r t i o n s of this paper which have a
d i r e c t b e a r i n g on Canadian defence planning and have attempted to
examine the UK and US views and make a p p r o p r i a t e deductions applicable
to our defence p r o b l e m ,
2
One of the m a i n points in the paper is the question of the r i s k of
w a r . The UK a u t h o r i t i e s conclude that war is unlikely provided the Cold
War is conducted by the A l l i es in a patient, l e v e l - h e a d e d and d e t e r m i n e d
m a n n e r . They further state that for R u s s i a the b e s t opportunity of using
war as a m e a n s of furthering her a i m s has a l r e a d y p a s s e d and she is
unlikely to do so u n l e s s she is lead to believe that she is about to be
attacked or is unbearably provoked by r a s h and p r e c i p i t a t ed action.
F u r t h e r , they state that it now s e e m s to them that provided the g r e a t
d e t e r r e n t of atomic attack is kept in being, together with the i n c r e a s e d
strength of W e s t e rn E u r o p e , the likelihood of war is m o r e r e m o t e than
it was thought two y e a r s ago. The UK view is that the m a i n r e a s o n for
the r i s k of war being l e s s e n e d is based on the knowledge by the R u s s i a n s
of the build up of the United States atomic strength and only secondary
the i n c r e a s e in strength in W e s t e r n E u r o p e . The United States a u t h o r i ties do not agree that the r i s k of war has been l e s s e n e d to this d e g r e e
and state they cannot find any m i l i t a r y r e a s o n for any such a s s u m p t i o n .
They clai m that from information available to them the R u s s i a n s a r e
continuing to build up their f o r c e s of all types at a r a t e equal to if not
g r e a t e r than the build up over the past five y e a r s , and the US Chiefs of
Staff point out a s an example that the i n c r e a s i ng number of jet fighters
available in Korea and in the satellite c o u n t r i e s show v e r y c l e a r l y that
there is ample p r e p a r a t i o n being made to wage another war should the
Soviet choose such action. The A m e r i c a n s further emphasize that if>
there a p p e a r s to be l e s s tension and fear in the W e s t e r n world it is
because of the build up of force s on the p a r t of the Western p o w e r s and,
t h e r e f o r e , we a r e not as sensitive to each move made by the R u s s i a n s
as we w e r e some five y e a r s ago, but this does not in any way indicate
that the r i s k of the R u s s i a n s embarking on a war has in any way l e s s e n e d .
The Chiefs of Staff a r e inclined to a g r e e with the A m e r i c a n a s s e s s m e n t
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that there is not available to us any information which would lead us to
make the assumption that the r i s k of war is any l e s s than it was two
y e a r s ago, but the m o d e s t build up of force s of the W e s t e r n p o w e r s puts
us in a s t r o n g e r position to deal with a war should war o c c u r . However,
if t h e r e is a slackening off of the build up of the D e t e r r e n t F o r c e as a
r e s u l t of economic or other p r e s s u r e s which may become evident in the
Annual Review then the r i s k will tend to i n c r e a s e as the force contributions tend to lag behind, as t h e r e a r e no indications of any slackening of
the Soviet build up. The views of the Joint Intelligence Committee on the
r i s k of war a r e shown in Appendix "A" attached.
3
In the f i r s t section of the UK paper the UK Chiefs of Staff have
attempted to f o r e c a s t the n a t u r e of a future w a r . This a p p e a r s to the
Chiefs of Staff as a v e r y r i s k y b u s i n e s s . In the p a s t many pseudo m i l i tary e x p e r t s have attempted to f o r e c a s t the type of w a r f a r e that may be
expected, but h i s t o r y shows that w a r s do not n e c e s s a r i l y follow the
p a t t e r n as f o r e c a s t by even the m o s t qualified e x p e r t s . No one p r e d i c t e d
that in the beginning of the l a s t war that we would be faced with a "phony"
war for the first nine months of our conflict with H i t l e r . While it is
agreed that the opening stages of war with R u s s i a will be intense and
furious in c h a r a c t e r we consider it is unwise to attempt to p r e d i c t the
length of the initial s t a g e s and the possible outcome of these s t a g e s . It
is m o s t probable that if we do not succeed in building up the n e c e s s a r y
D e t e r r e n t F o r c e which will be well enough trained and equipped to withstand the initial onslaught of the R u s s i a n s , the Allies may find t h e m s e l v es
behind the P y r e n e e s within the first few months of a w a r . On the other
hand, if we succeed in containing the initial outbreak of the R u s s i a n s
which may provide opportunities for attacking their formation s with
atomic weapons there is no a s s u r a n c e that a s t a l e m a t e may not r e s u l t .
There is also the possibility that e l e m e n t s of the R u s s i a n A r m y may
continue to fight even after the m a i n government of R u s s i a may have
capitulated. The l a s t war was full of s i m i l a r s u r p r i s e s . The G e r m a n s
w e r e not supposed to hold the channel p o r t s as it was not considered
sound m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y , but they did so and upset our s t r a t e g i c a l and
tactical p l a n s . The US Chiefs of Staff feel that the cumulative effects of
s t r a t e g i c air attack may not make itself felt on the land battle until after
D plus 90, because enemy stockpiles in the forward a r e a a r e considere d
adequate for that p e r i o d . They further consider that the s t r a t e g i c air
attack will have a m a t e r i a l effect on long r a n g e force r e q u i r e m e n t s for
mobilization, but not on the initial land, air and naval forces r e q u i r e d
nor on the r e s e r v e s n e c e s s a r y to m a i n t a i n the c o u v e r t u r e and launch the
counter offensive. The Chiefs of Staff s h a r e the views of the US Chiefs
of Staff and consider that it would be unwise to accept the UK p r e m i s e
that the opening s t a g e s of war may only l a s t a few weeks and that forces
not available for the opening stages of the conflict a r e no longer a r e q u i r e ment,, but consider that further study should be given to r e q u i r e m e n t s for
forces which will not be available for combat until after D plus 90.
4
The UK Chiefs of Staff further argue that as there a r e difficulties
in providing for both a short and a long war that the guiding principle of
the r e a r m a m e n t p r o g r a m m e should be to e n s u r e the survival in the opening s t a g e s . This a p p e a r s to the Chiefs of Staff to be the s a m e policy that
was adopted by the B r u s s e l s T r e a t y and l a t e r by NATO that first p r i o r i t y
m u s t be given to the c r e a t i o n of "a force in being" which would provide
the n e c e s s a r y d e t e r r e n t to a g g r e s s i o n and only after this force was built
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up would the nations p r e p a r e other forces to be used in c a s e the
d e t e r r e n t failed. The cold hard facts r e v e a l that there is c o n s i d e r a b le
difficulty in even providing this d e t e r r e n t at the p r e s e n t time . The
initial r e q u i r e m e n t s for this D e t e r r e n t F o r c e by 1954 was 46 divisions
on D day, built up p r o g r e s s i v e l y to 98 on D plus 30, with a total of over
9,000 a i r c r a f t to be read y in 1954 for the D e t e r r e n t F o r c e . This did
not take into account the f o r c e s r e q u i r e d for G r e e c e and Turkey. To
date the forces p r o m i s e d in 1952 a r e 25 divisions on D day i n c r e a s e d to
50 by D plus 30 and 2,912 a i r c r a f t . SACEUR's a s s e s s m e n t of these
forces by D plus 30 has now r e d u c ed the effectiveness to 38 divisions
and 2, 105 a i r c r a f t . T h e r e f o r e , t h e re a p p e a r s to be v e r y little new in
the UK a r g u m e n t that p r i o r i t y m u s t be given to the build up of the
D e t e r r e n t F o r c e , and t h e r e is still a long way to go before the D e t e r r e n t
F o r c e is built up to the size and efficiency that will provide the s e c u r i ty
against a possible R u s s i a n attack. It is a l s o hardly likely that much cons i d e r a t i o n is being given by any government, except p e r h a p s the US, UK
and Canada, to build up of f o r c e s , except those r e q u i r e d for the
D e t e r r e n t F o r c e . The UK Chiefs of Staff conclude this portion of their
review with the following conclusions. They consider that if the total
forces r e q u i r e d w e r e r e a s s e s s e d in the light of p r e s e n t developments a
policy on the following lines might e m e r g e :
(a)
Maximum number of r e g u l a r f i r s t line divisions which NATO
can afford should be deployed on the continent in p e a c e .
(b)
Reductions should be mad e in the subsequent build up of land
forces and p a r t i c u l a r l y those which a r e unlikely to be ready
to fight in time to affect the issue on the continent.
(c)
The divisions r e t a i n ed might be supplemented in the forward
a r e a by localized static t e r r i t o r i a l units on a light scale of
equipment, designed to a s s i s t in imposing delay on the R u s s i a n
advance, p a r t i c u l a r l y in the anti-tank r o l e .
(d)
The build up of Tactical Air F o r c e s and Light Bomber support
should be r e d u c e d to a level which v a r i o u s NATO c o u n t r i es can
afford both to provide and maintain in an efficient s t a n d a r d .
5
It will be r e c a l l e d that at the Lisbon m e e t i n g s the Council r e q u e s t e d
the Military Committee to p r e p a r e a r e p o r t dealing with the effect of atomic
weapons on the shape and size of NATO f o r c e s . The Standing Group h as been
attempting for some time to s e c u r e from the US Chiefs of Staff this s t a t e ment as this is the only sourc e from which the information r e g a r d i n g the
availability and the effect of atomic weapons is a v a i l a b l e. The US Chiefs of
Staff produced a paper in e a r l y July to the effect that in their opinion the
introduction of tactical atomic weapons would not in any way change the
f o r c e s build up for 1954, and therefore they did not p r o p o s e to a s k for any
r e a s s e s s m e n t of the forces r e q u i r e d by G e n e r a l Ridgway at this t i m e .
6
As a r e s u l t of the UK d i s c u s s i o n s in Washington the US Chiefs of
Staff agreed to send a further paper to General Ridgway including c e r t a i n
information as to the allotment of atomic weapons and r e q u e s t i ng him to
make a new plan and a r e a s s e s s m e n t for the forces r e q u i r e d , taking into
c o n s i d e r a t i o n the new types of weapons and to b a s e his r e a s s e s s m e n t on
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1956. This r e a s s e s s m e n t to he m a d e available by October. It has s u b sequently, been l e a r n e d that the information provided to G e n e r a l Ridgway
was in his.opinion insufficient to allow him to make a new plan and r e a s s e s s m e n t , and G e n e r a l Ridgway has therefore r e q u e s t e d m o r e information from, the US Chiefs of Staff. It is now m o s t improbable that the
new r e a s s e s s m e n t will be read y for a c o n s i d e r a b le time after the
December .meetings. In any event it is the c o n s i d e r e d opinion of the US
Chiefs of Staff that the force s r e q u i r e d in MC 2 6 / 1 for 1954, i . e . 46
divisions to-be, built up to 98 divisions , a r e the m i n i m u m which will be
r e q u i r e d for a D e t e r r e n t F o r c e , and in the event of war the m i n i m u m
that will be r e q u i r e d to hold the front and force enemy concentrations
which will provide t a r g e t s suitable for the employment of special type
weapons.-;.Thi.s view has been endorsed by G e n e r a l Ridgway who cons i d e r s that on-the b a s i s of the b e s t information available to him r e g a r d i n g
the a p p r a i s a l of the effect of the. tactical employment of new weapons that
there is no m i l i t a r y justification for any relaxation of m a x i m u m effort
over the next two y e a r s towards achievement of the 1954 r e q u i r e m e n t s .
He is undertaking a study of the effect of these weapons on f o r c e s for
1956 which m a y alter m a t e r i a l l y the e s t i m a t e d force r e q u i r e m e n t s for
that y e a r and the following y e a r s .
7
The Chiefs of Staff therefore conclude:
(a)
that the r e a s s e s s m e n t will not be available in time for d i s c u s sion at the Annual Review, and
(b)
it will .not m a t e r i a l l y alter the force r e q u i r e m e n t s until 1956.
It is also likely that any r e a s s e s s m e n t made by SACEUR will follow the
p r e v i o u s p r o c e d u r e and will m a k e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for force s to be
r a i s e d from M day to M plus 180 d a y s , with the possibility that this m a y
be further r e s t r i c t e d to M plus 90 d a y s .
8
In spite, of ..the fact that the r e a s s e s s m e n t by G e n e r a l Ridgway
may not be available for d i s c u s s i on at the Annual Review it is still felt
that the UK a u t h o r i t i es will attempt to put forward either during the
Annual Review^discussions or at the subsequent NATO m e e t i n g s in
December their concept a s a m i l i t a r y justification for some of the
reductions which.,they a r e proposing in their contribution. The Chiefs
of Staff have, t h e r e f o r e , considered the type of p r o b l e m s which may
a r i s e out of the:_Annual Review or from a d i s c u s s i o n of the UK concept,
or a r i s i n g out of^the Ismay paper on the Background of the Annual
Review, especiall y .the p r o b l e m s affecting Canadian defence policy.
The f i r s t m ai n c o n s i d e r a t i o n in which there a p p e a r s to be no d i s a g r e e ment is that f i r s t p r i o r i t y m u s t be given to the r a p i d build up in p e a c e time of the D e t e r r e n t . F o r c e . If the Annual Review r e v e a l s that c e r t a i n
nations a r e forced-to r e d u c e their contributions to the D e t e r r e n t F o r c e
because of economic-difficulties it would s e e m probable that i n c r e a s e d
p r e s s u r e will be place d on Canada to r e - e x a m i n e our p r o g r a m m e to see
if m o r e can be done-to provide p r e M day f o r c e s , taking g r e a t e r r i s k s
in r e s e r v e s and build up after M day p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r c e s to be ready
after D plus 90 d a y s . The second consideratio n is to a s c e r t a i n what
steps can be taken t o , s h o r t en the time lag for the provision of forces
after M day. This will l e a d to consideratio n being given a s to whether
our r e s e r v e f o r c e s a r e p r o p e r l y organized to m e e t the concept of
Canadian f o r c e s in being in E u r o p e , and that we have the capacity to
quickly r e i n f o r c e from the r e s e r v e the f o r c e s which m a y be committed
to battle on M day.
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- 5 9
The Ismay paper on the Background of the Annual Review ha s
been considered by the Joint Planning Committee and its p r e l i m i n a r y
r e p o r t is shown in Appendix " B " attached. This r e p o r t shows that
some of the same deductions in r e g a r d to the build up of NATO force s
can be drawn from the Ismay paper as a r e put forward in the UK p a p e r .
10
In addition to the conclusions m a d e by the Joint Planning C o m m i t t e e on the Ismay paper the Chiefs of Staff would like to draw attention
to the implications a r i s i n g out of the acceptance of p a r a g r a p h 9 quoted
herewith:
"9
To sum up, the b e s t chance of preventin g R u s s i a n
a g g r e s s i o n in E u r o p e , and the only chance of a s u c c e s s ful r e s i s t a n c e to such a g g r e s s i o n if it should o c c u r , l i e s
in the continued d e t e r m i n a t i on of the North Atlantic
Community to build.,up at the e a r l i e s t possible date the
s t r o n g e s t possible collective strength in E u r o p e , subject
to the following limitations-:
(a)
No country m u s t undertake c o m m i t m e n t s which
would bankrupt its-national economy.
•(b)
The capacity to hold the ring in the Cold War
m u s t not be i m p a i r e d . "
This p a r a g r a p h a p p e a r s to indicate that the,capacity to hold the " r i n g "
in the Cold War takes p r e c e d e n c e o v e r the build up. of force s in E u r o p e .
It is p e r h a p s e s s e n t i a l for the Standing Group to consider global strateg y
and o v e r a l l - r e q u i r e m e n t s and their r e l a t i o n to NATO. However, it is
quite another m a t t e r for the Council to put itself on r e c o r d as supporting
the combat of C o m m u n i s m outside the North Atlantic a r e a a s an e s s e n t i a l
p a r t of North Atlantic s t r a t e g y ; If this s t a t e m e n t -is accepted and it
c o m e s into 5 the open it would appear to change the c h a r a c t e r of the North
Atlantic alliance from a type-of r e g i o n a l - s e c u r i t y a r r a n g e m e n t to a form
of a n t i - c o m m u n i s t bloc, the knowledge of which would provide the
R u s s i a n s with further propaganda m a t e r i a l against the North Atlantic
alliance- This would c r e a t e a m o s t difficult situation for some of the
s m a l l e r nations like Norway, and in some a s p e c t s Canada. It has been
the announced Canadian policy that-the defence of W e s t e r n Europe is
f i r s t p r i o r i t y . T h e r e a r e - o t h e r further d a n g e r s in the acceptance of
this p r i o r i t y for holding the "ring'.1.; T h e r e h a s been a suggestion in
some q u a r t e r s that if either•: B r i t i s h or A m e r i c a n ground, troops w e r e
used to support the F r e n c h in Indo-China this-might provoke m o r e wides p r e a d Chinese or e v e n Soviet action in South-East A s i a , it m a y be p r e ferable for the -French to withdraw divisions from the NATO a r e a and
send them to Indo-China.. The inference-being, tha i these F r e n c h f o r c e s
withdrawn from NATO should be m a d e up by other NATO.nations who a r e
r e l u c t a n t to a s s u m e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s outside the NATO a r e a . f o r fighting
C o m m u n i s m . This ma y have v e r y s e r i o u s implications insofar a s we
a r e c o n c e r n e d , t h e r e f o r e , the Chiefs of Staff consider that s e r i o u s
c o n s i d e r a t i o n should be given before we accept p a r a g r a p h nine of the
Ismay p a p e r .
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- 6 11
In a c c o r d a n c e with the p r o p o s a l s made in p a r a g r a p h eight the
Chiefs of Staff have r e - e x a m i n e d their-defence p r o g r a m m e s to see
what m o r e can be done to provide p r e - M - d a y forces* taking g r e a t e r
r i s k s in r e s e r v e s . a n d the build up after M day; and s e c o n d l y , have
c o n s i d e r e d what s t e p s can be taken.-to..shorten the time lag.for the
provision of f o r c e s after M day. The viefys of the three S e r v i c es a r e
shown in Appendices " C " , "D" and " E " attached.
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APPENDIX "A n
CSC 1571-KJIC)
TOP SECRET
COPY NO.
/
19 Sep. 52
JIG 58(52)
REVIEW OF THE RISKS OF WAR
1
Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee
to the
Chiefs of Staff.
1.
The JIC has considered the Chiefs of Staff requirements arising from the intelligence implications of Lord Ismay?s paper "The
Backgound of the Annual Review".
2.
The JIC considers that there has been no change in the current
risks of general war since CSC 3(52) "The Current Risks of General War*
was issued. The relevant conclusions.of this paper, with dates amended
to fill the present requirement, ares
(a) Although the Soviet Union has the capability
to embark on a major war at any time, we do
not consider that it will deliberately do so
during 1953. We consider that it will prefer
to employ covert methods and non-Russian
communist troops to expand communist influence.
(b) On the other hand, there continues to be a
danger of war arising through a miscalculation
by either side or by the acceptance of risks
in a local operation.
3.
There have been indications in recent months of increased
Soviet capabilities, particularly in the fields of air defence and the
Soviet strategic bomber force. We do not believe that these increases
have been sufficient to outweigh other considerations that make it
unlikely that the Soviet Union would deliberately start a general war
solely because of Its present military superiority.
4.
On the other hand, we do not believe there has been any
evidence to Indicate a diminution of the risks as expressed in paragraph
2 (a) and (b) above.
mm
—000031'
�APPENDIX " B "
lEXBMKSC- TOP SECRET
COPY NO.
9 R
CC 14-92-1 (JPG)
22 September 1952
BACKGROUND OF THE ANNUAL REVIEW
JPC REPORT TO THE CSC ON THE ISMAY PAPER
The Concept
1.
The Ismay,paper does not suggest any new approach to the problem,
but stresses the need for maximum forces in situ to meet the initial Soviet
thrust. This implies a morerapidbuild-up of forces than seems likely at
present. Since certain nations are, or may be, unable to meet their present
commitments and certainly cannot assume additional commitments without
the danger of courting national bankruptcy, the paper suggests or implies
that the problem can be met by the adoption of a combination of the following measurest
(a) early ratification of the EDO Treaty in order that
build-up of West German forces may be expedited;
(b) speed up the provision of initial forces at the
expense of reserves;
1
(c)
a possible re-allocation of responsibility for the
provision of forces based on national economic
capabilities.
The paper stresses that the capacity to continue to hold the ring in the
cold war must not be impaired.
2.
In respect to (a) above, Canadian national views have already
been expressed in regard to the EDC.
We would point out, however, that
the provision of German forces should not result in a reduction of commitments by other nations. The inherent dangers of such action are obvious.
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The paper expresses the view that provided we are able to hold
the initial Soviet thrust until the full force of our atomic offensive
has been brought to bear, the situation will develop whereby the Russians
will have to pause prior to renewing the offensive, thereby giving the NATO
forces an opportunity to build up additional forces to meet the second
phase of the offensive or to counter-attack. It is - therefore suggested
that it is more important to place the emphasis on the build-up of forces
in being than on reserve forces. This approach assumes that the atomic
offensive will, in fact, bring about such a situation. However, if this
pause did not develop, then the Western countries would be unable to
build-up their forces rapidly enough to meet the Russian build-up.
Nevertheless, it is recognized that if a risk is involved, it would be
best to take it in respect to our capacity for providing reserves.
4.
The concept does not propose that national forces generally
should be increased, but rather that the countries which have the abilityr
to do so will make a greater portion of their forces available sooner.
It is appreciated that this will involve an acceleration of the build-up
of forces now planned. It is likely that any acceleration or intensification of effort sooner than planned will be made at the expense of the
reserves.
5*
It is recognized that it would be folly to permit any nation
to bankrupt itself in an endeavor to meet a military force goal. Therefore,
it appears justified that national economy must have a direct bearing on
the commitments of each nation.
6.
We agree with the principle that the capacity to hold the ring
in the cold war must not be impaired;; however, it is considered that the
detailed application of this principle must be the subject of continuous
review.
7.
Since it is obvious that the initial onslaught must be held,
Lord Ismay's concept is acceptable inasmuch as it advocates the timely
provision of adequate forces to resist the initial thrust by Russia.
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However, we would point out t h a t we have been unable t o assess the
degree of r i s k involved in delaying the build-up of reserve forces.
Military Implications to Canada
8.
It is considered that acceptance of Lord Ismay's paper would
result in requests being made on Canada to take one or all or a combination of the following measures;
(a)
to provide forces, now committed,' more rapidly
than planned?
(b) to provide larger forces than now committed. This "
is not explicitly stated, but is obviously implied and
therefore must be considered;
(c)
to provide additional economic assistance as an
alternative to providing additional forces.
9.
To provide forces in Europe more rapidly than planned (8(a)
above) will involve the raising of additional forces unless those Canadian
forces now engaged in Korea can be released.
The acceptance of an
additional commitment (8(b) above) would also require the raising of
additional forces. The effect of 8(c) above on Canadian force equipment
programme should be examined.
10.
It may not be possible to meet the additional requirements
for forces implied above within the existing financial and manpower policies
of the government, but this can only be determined by a further detailed
study. The following is a summary of the principal problems which will
require consideration to determine the extent to which additional requirements could be met within existing government policy:
(a) A revision of the time-phased build-up of Canadian
forces committed to NATO. The need for forces immediate*
ly would mean a greater emphasis on the active forces
with a consequent lessening of emphasis on the
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reserve forces (except those needed for the immediate
build-up) until the higher priority r equirement is
satisfied.
(b) A review of CIB regional plans to ascertain whether or
not some forces could be diverted to Europe.
(c) A review of present policies for rotation to determine
if larger forces could be made available for service
in Europe by extending the period of service overseas.
(d) A study of the feasibility of expanding the ./omon's
Services.
(e) A review of Service production and procurement schedules
with a view to accelerating the procurement of those
items of equipment needed to fulfil the requirements
of a more rapid build-up of the Services.
(f) Since it is planned, in some: cases, to stockpile essential
equipment in'Europe, consideration might be given to' ah
expansion of this policy in order that post M-Day forces
'could be brought into>action more quickly.
11.
A more rapid build-up of forces would require a speed up in
production.
In conjunction with appropriate government departments
consideration would have to be given to the relative demands on
industry in respect to civil and military requirements.
�
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NATO
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NATO Global Strategy / 25 SEPTEMBER 1952
Date
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1952-09-25
Format
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PDF
Language
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en
Type
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Text
Identifier
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CDTT00098
Source
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Canada. Privy Council Office. Canadian Comments on U.K. Paper on "Global Strategy and Defence Policy." 25 September 1952. Record Group 2, file no. I-60-1, dossier no. 1952. Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa.
1953 NATO Annual Review
Claxton
Foulkes
global strategy