https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/aad08b301aff493b11bd3b30acd6d79d.pdf 10610e3baf5bc4a10b32f769a2aa2bc5 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation MASS DESTRUCTION - GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Present Policy The main objections to it ares(a) In a few years it will become too much like bluff and too great a gamble. ** . . (b) With'the extremes of 'conventional * retaliation for minor aggression and "H" warfare for major aggression, there, will be much scope for misunderstanding in drawing the line between these two types of aggression, and insufficient grading of deterrents to meet the various aggressions.which may arise. •' (c) It makes no provision for the limited and local use of tactical atomic weapons"so urgently required to deter and, if necessary, defeat minor aggression* The Solution This lies in establishing (by dictation, without waiting for agreement) a distinction between the use of mass destruction weapons against armed forces and their use against cities. This would largely-obviate the above (and other) objections, and enable the use of "H" "and "B" weapons to be ruled out altogether, unless the enemy use them. Once we have' built up "our tactical strength with "A" and "C" weapons, and with German divisions, we--would, by concentrating on the enemy's armed forces' and keeping off citiess~ .s (a) Make both major and minor wars less likely. (b) Justify the economies in Civil and" Air Defence and in conventional forces, which we are forced to make.anyway.'. Although the practicability of: maintaining this distinction would,'admittedly, be difficult in major war, it should be attempted, because?= v (a) In^the'cold war the attempt would improve our position with and against the Communists, clear ' our consciences and strengthen our unity. (b) Against jiinor aggression we urgently need the - distinction. (c) In major war it might well.work for a short period^ and every day that it did so would be ' a great gain. Of these three, the cold war is with*us, minor, aggression is threatening now, and major war = if we handle the^ other two properly - is most unlikely. Therefore, despite the uncertainty of the distinction being maintained in major war, there is much to be gained and nothing to be lost by making the attempt, provided we, at the same time, build.up the necessary tactical strength to deter the Red Army from aggression. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur. Faeces a Finformation ,. 2 . - » We should certainly be prepared to put as much effort into this attempt to ensure the "Hw bomb is never used, as we do into our efforts to: make it. The Principles Unlike the present policy, such a proposal complies withs- (a) The Moral Principle of not using, or threatening to uses more force than Is necessary to deter and defeat aggression. (b) The Political Principle of punishing all aggression as locally and"In as limited way . as is consistent with the punishment being brought home. Only thus, in the long, run, can the spread of Communism be stopped without having World War three. (c) The Strategic Principle of concentrating on the enemy's armed forces, as opposed to his people. . . , Relation to Disarmament If it is right to try and limit the possession of arms, it should be right to try and limit their use, until disarmament becomes possible. Indeed the latter may help the former, for the more both sides get accustomed to the idea of not using weapons, the more are they likely to accept this idea of not possessing them. Moreover, we may well have to keep the peace without, the deterrent of mass destruction against cities, when and if the initial stages of disarmament begin, AboliAion__Qf War - This 'step by step-, hard way, of abolishing war" seems more practicable, and less of a gamble, than the present attractive dream of abolishing it at one stroke, by threatening to bring down the whole world about our-ears,"which is likely to end in either bluff or disaster, and meanwhile weakens our hand against the real and urgent menace of Communist "nibbles", , The Time Factor " • i r r .1 -i I I II i n I I i . . , - " • • • : 4 Although we may not-yet-have the tactical strength to execute this proposal, unless.we adopt it now, as an agreed NoA.T00o aim, we will not have time to build up sufficient tactical strength to-execute It.by the time the Russians can inflict mortal injury "on the U,S,A0S In about three years, .* " Indeed the logical-consequence of the present policy, would be to lower, the priority of tactical "A" and "C" weapons, since it envisages little between conventional weapons, for minor aggression and "H" weapons;"for major aggressions. . �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a Finfdrmation The early establishment of a correct and united N.Ao.TbOo policy for the future is also essential in the light of the ratification of the Paris and Bonn agreements, the subsequent progress envisaged In the 'Europeanisation', the projected Four" Power talks, Mr0 Stassen's fresh approach to disarmament, and"the" threat of aggression in Fo$mosas to meet which the U.S.J is already trying to establish the limited'use of tactical atomic weapons, in order to implement their new policy of "measured" as, opposed to "massive" retaliation. April, 1Q??« 000463 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00134 Title A name given to the resource Report, "Mass Destruction - General Considerations" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955/04 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Study on Canadian National Security Policy, RG25, file 50333-40, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Canadian National Security Description An account of the resource Ottawa Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en