https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ea4a5a5ed1c0dc868964255646ba8348.pdf ac4a3f296c51526d7a87f351e1a3cf15 PDF Text Text y I FM NATOPARIS MAR 9162 SECRET INFO CCOS OPIMMED LDN 15 BAG BERLIN FM BONN REF OURTEL 592 MAR3 NI\TO DEFENCE PLI\NNING . -tlll BRU HAGUE 0 .. v \ . f1 il, V?'J(;:: tQ(c.,)' SECGEN LED OFF COUNCILS MTG IN PRIV 1\T£ SESSION Ml\ll8 WITH A LONG . \) \ OUTLINING PROGRESS so FAR IN ___\ t;)UOTE STOCK-TAKING / COUNCILS CONSIDERI\TION OF THIS WHOLE SUBJECT 1\ND MAKING SEVERI\L t SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE PROCEDURESeWHILE HE WAS AT FIRST SOMEWHAT RELUCTANT TO CIRCULATE FULL STATEMENT, HE DID AGREE AS A RESULT OF REQUESTS FROM SEVERAL PERMREPS TO CIRCULATE SECTIONS OF IT AS SOON AS SUCH SECTION ON QUOTE GUIDELINES UNQUOTE HAS ALREADY FORWARD IN A SEPARATE MSG. 2. IN CIRCUMSTANCES WE SHALL INCLUDE IN THIS MSG ONLY A BRIEF SKETCH OF HIS 45 MINUTE SET HIS STATEMENT AGAINST NEED TO PRODUCE A SUITABLE PAPER FOR CONSIDERATION OF MINISTERS AT ATHENS SINCE IT NOW WAS AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE A JOINT MTG OF FOREIGN AND DEFENCE MINISTERSeHE WAS NOT RPT NOT CERTAIN THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PRODUCE AN AGREED DOCU FOR THE ATHENS MTG BUT EVEN IF THERE WAS ONLY TO BE A BACKGROUND DOCU PREPARED IN THE NAME OF THE SECGEN IT WOULD HAVE TO CAREFULLY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF MEMBER GOVTS. 3. AFTER SU"lM ARIZING THE MAIN TRENDS IN THE DISCUSS ION SO FAR OF NATO DEFENCE PLANNING,THE SAID HE THOUGHT THREE QUESTIONS EMERGED FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION.THE FIRST OF THESE WAS TO PROVIDE A MEANS FOR HANDLING THE ON NUCLEAR MATTERS WHICH THE USA HAD INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY.THE DIFFERING FACTORS OF THE NEED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE INF 0 TO ALL 'GOVTS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME TAKING CARE OF ESS·-;;;EN:;;T;::I:-::A:-L-::SE::C:::-U-:R::. :RE:M:-:E::N:'f:S . . E.. . ,.D.-. . .S.....,!N,.,_..C,E THE USA HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE QUALITY OF THE INFO TO BE PRO· VIDED WOULD BE RELATED DIRECTED TO THE SECURITY PROCEDURES IN FORCE. • e e 2 I 0 G 0 A0012893_117-000556 ,j \ <j. �PAGE TWO 658 THE SECOND WAS TO DISCUSS HOW FAR ANY COLLECTIVE MECHANISM ESTA• BLISHED FOR RECEIPT OF -ADDITIONAL INFO COULD BE USED IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITYoTHE THIRD QUESTION WAS HOW TO TACKLE THE SECURITY PROBLEM ITSELF o 4o INSOFAR AS THE FIRST QUESTION WAS CONCERNED HE THOUGHT THAT THERE THREE NEEDS WHICH HAD EMERGED FROM THE DISCUSS! ON. THE FIRST OF THESE WAS TO ENSURE THAT ALL GOVTS HAD ENOUGH GENERAL INFO'ON NUCLEAR MATTERS TO ENABLE THEM TO APPRECIATE FULLY THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISE OF CONTROL AND IN THE ASSUMPTION OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE DIRECTION OF NATOS NUCLEAR EFFORTSa THE SECOND NEED WAS TO PROVIDE MEMBER COUNTRI'ES IN A PAR• TICULAR GEOGRAPHICAL AREA WITH SOMEWHAT MORE SPECIALIZED INFO WITH RELEVANCE TO THAT AREA AND MILITARY OPERATIONS THEREIN.THE THIRD CATEGORY OF NEED WAS FOR DETAILED INFO OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHO HAD NUCLEAR STOCKPILES ON THEIR TERRITORIES OR WHOSE FORCES WERE EQUIPPPED TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.THE FIRST NEED COULD CLEARLY ONLY BE MET THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CTTEE OF THE WHOLE POSIT! ON OF \IJOULD RECEIVE INFO ON SUCH THINGS AS THE DIS· THEIR QUANTITY, THEIR OVERALL STRIKING_ POWER AND A GENERAL INDICATION OF THE TARGETS AGAINST WHICH THEY MIGHT BE DIRECTED.SIMILARLY IT WOULD BE OF GENERAL INTEREST TO HAVE THE INFO WHICH THE USA SEEMED WILLING TO PROVIDE CONCERNING TH NUCLEAR CAPACITY OF ITS STRATEGIC FORCES.FOR SUCH INFO AS MIGHT BE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO A GEOGRAPHICAL AREA,PERHAPS CERTAIN REGIONAL SUBCTTEES MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED.FOR THE THIRD CATEGORY IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT PROVISIONS FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF INFO COULD . BE ON A BILATERAL BASIS BETWEEN THE USA AND THE CONCERNED ' SINCE THIS CATEGORY OF INFO \40ULD BE OF A VERY DETAILED SORT, HAVING TO DO WITH THE EXACT LOCA-TION AND HANDLING ARRANGEMENTS FOR STOCKPILES AND WEAPONS. HE HOPED IT COULD BE AGREED THAT THE SECGEN MIGHT BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE CTTEE OF THE WHOLE AND THE VARIOUS ••• 3 A0012893_118-000557 �.. PAGE THREE 658 .. SUBCTTEES.HE SAW NO RPT NO REASON HOWEVER FOR THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF TO BE MADE AWARE OF THE DETAILS OF INFO PROVIDED ON A BILATERAL BASIS. 5. INSOFAR AS THE SECOND GENERAL 9UESTI ON WAS CON CERN ED< PARA 3 ABOVE>HE DID NOT RPT NOT FEEL IN A POSITION TO REFLECT COUNCIL OPINION SINCE THERE HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT DISCUSSION AS YET. PERHAPS DISCUSSION OF THE UK PAPER WOULD HELP IN THIS REGARD. ON THE THIRD GENERAL QUESTION,IE THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY ITSELF, HE SUGGESTED THE SETTING UP OF A WORKING GROUP TO COOSIDER WHAT COULD BE DONE TO ,THE USA REQUIREMENT FOR SPECIAL HANDLING OF INFO.HE SUGGESTED THAT SUCH A WORKING GROUP MIGHT BE CHAIRED BY THE EXECUTIVE SECTY WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE HEAD OF THE SECURITY BUREAU,AND THAT IT SHOULD MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO COUNCIL IN DUE COURSE.IT WAS HIS SUGGESTION THAT IT SHOULD STUDY SUCH QUESTIONS AS WHAT RESTRICTIONS FOR THE HANDLING OF INFO MIGHT BE FEASIBLE BOTH IN PARIS AND IN NATIONAL CAPITALS,WHAT MEANS OF TRANSMISSION SHOULD BE USED,WHAT SPECIAL CLASSIFICATIONS MIGHT BE GIVEN TO THE INFO AND WHAT SPECIAL FILING ARRANGEMENTS BE CALLED FORo 6.A FINAL SECTION OF THE SECGENS OUTLINE WAS DEVOTED TO A SUMMATION OF WHAT HAD BEEN SAID SO FAR. ON THE QUESTION OF GUIDELINES AND HIS SUBMISSION OF A REVISED DRAFT OF PARA 13. 7eAS A RESULT OF THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE SECGENS INTRODUCTION, THE DISCUSS I ON FOLLOWING RANGED OVER A NUMBER OF TOPICS. IN THE INTERESTS OF ORDERLY C (}JS!DERATI ON WE SHALL SEPARATE OUT IN AN 0· THER TEL COMMENTS WHICH WERE MADE WITH RESPECT TO THE UK PAPER ON A NUCLEAR CTTEE. B.THE USA REP ACCEPTED THE GENERAL OUTLINE PUT FORWARD BY THE (( l\ SECGEN AND WENT ON TO SPEAK MORE SPECIFICALLY OF GUIDELINES.IN A LONG STATEMENT HE REPTD MUCH OF WHAT HE HAD SAID ON MAR2<PARAS7•10 ••• 4 A0012893_119-000558 �PAGE FOUR 658 OF OURTEL 592 MAR3), THIS TIME INDICATING THAT THE STATEMENT WAS MADE WITH THE FORMAL BACKING OF THE USA GOVT.THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF COURSE WAS FINLETTERS INDICATION THAT HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO INDICATE THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA WOULD AGREE THAT,IF TIME PERM IT TED, HE WOULD C OOSULT MEMBERS OF THE .ALLIANCE THROUGH THE COUNCIL ON QUOTE THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANYWHERE. WITHIN OR \HTHOUT THE TERRITORY OF THE ALLIANCE UNQUOTE. IN ADDITION FINLETLER GAYE EMPHASIS THAN HE HAD ON MAR2 TO THAT PART OF HIS STATEMENT TO COUNCIL OF. APR26/61 THE PRESIDENTS INTEN- TION TO DIRECT OR AUTHORIZE THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PARTICULAR NEW EMPHASIS GIVEN BY FINLETTER -WAS TO INDI- CATE THAT THESE WERE THE QUOTE EX !STING GUIDELINES UNQUOTE SO FAR AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA WAS CONCERNED WHICH MIGHT BE REAFFIR• MED BY THE COUNCIL AS ACCEPTABLE ON AN INTERIM BASIS UNTIL THEY COULD BE REFINED OR EXTENDED,AS A RESULT OF CURRENT CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION IN THE COUNCIL. HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF REAF'FIRMATI ON ON AN INTERIM BASIS OF THESE GUIDELINES AND THE PRESIDENTS COMMITMENTS '\ WITH RESPECT TO- CONSULTATION C(l\JCERNING THE USE OF USA STRATEGIC FORCES WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE COUNCIL. 9. THE FRENCH -REP SAID THAT THE INTERIM SOLUTION SUGGESTED BY THE USA WAS ACPEPTABLE ALTHOUGH THE LONGER TERt1 REFINEMENT OF' GUIDELINES WOULD REQUIRE CCNSIDERABLE GENERAL TERMS . THE REPS OF THE UK,NETHERLANDS,NORWAY,GERMA-NY,GREECE,BELGIUM AND TUR. KEY TOOK MUCH THE SAME LINE IN THEIR ·PERSONAL CAPACITIES. l0o THE GERMAN REP,REFERR!NG TO MR RUSKS STATEMENT.DEC14CCVR<61>69) . ... ·. . ' AND TO THE USA STATEMENT OF PAR26, HIGHLIGHTED-. THE IDEA BEHIND THE PHRASE IN THE LATTER QUOTE AN ATTACK WITH WHICH THEY CANNOT COPE UNr;}UOTEo HE SAIQ WOULD LIKE TO RAISE- FOR STUDY THE QUEST! 00 OF \mETHER IT MIGHT NOT RPT NOT BE TOO LATE TO MAKE A DECISION ' A0012893_120-000559 �PAGE FIVE 658 WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHEN IT WAS CLEAR THAT NATO FORCES COULD NOT. RPT NOT COPE WITH A NON-NUCLEAR ATTACK.BY THAT TIME THE QUOTE INTEGRITY OF OUR FORCES AND TERRITORIES UNQUOTE<MR RUSKS PHRASE >l1IGrlT BE SO DAi''l AGED AS TO BRING INTO SERIOUS DOUBT THE VALIDITY OF THE ORIGINAL IT BE POSSIBLE THEREFORE IN THE REFINEMENT OF GUIDELINES TO INTRODUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EVENT OF A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE INTEGRITY OF NATO FORCES AND TERRITORIES.USA REP SAID IT WAS FUNDA£1ENTAL IN USA THINKING THAT USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE DELAYED UNTIL IT WAS TOO LATE. IN ITS OWN CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM USA WAS TRYING TO REACH THE BEST AND MOST BALANCED JUDGMENT BETWEEN THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT TO PaESERVE THE INTEGRlTY OF THE NATO AREA AND THE AWESOME RESPONSIBILITIES INHERENT IN THE DECISION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. USA AUTHORITIES FULLY REALIZED THE IMPRECISION OF THE FORMULATION IN BOTH MR RUSKS STATEMENT AND THE APR26 STATEMENT AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ALL FURTHER SUGGESTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE CONI IN UING STUDY OF THE GUIDELINES ll.NETHERLANDS REP MADE TL{E .. THAT PERHAPS A CLOSER RELATION- SHIP COULD BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE CATEGORIES COVERED IN PARA13 AND THOSE ESTABLISHED BY MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN MC•95.IT SEEMED ESSENTIAL TO AUTHORITIES THAT THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CATEGORIES SHOULD COINCIDE .. A NUMBER OF PERMREPS SUGGESTED THAT WHILE THE STUDY OF THE GU!DELINE S CONCEPT SHOULD BE PURSUED AS A MATTER OF SOME URGENCY IT WOULD PROBABLY BE UN\HSE TO ATTEMPT TO BRING THIS PARTICULAR WHiiJr_A___ NUM3R FOR SETTLEMENT TO THE ATHENS MIG. OF OTHER ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION MIGHT BE RIPE FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION,IT MIGHT BE HARMFUL TO ATTEMPT TO SEEK ' DECISIONS TOO SOON ON TrlE PARTICULAR MATTER OF GUIDELINES SINCE MEMBER GOVTS WOULD WISH FIRST TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS THE SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF ADDITIONAL INFO WHICH THEY WERE TO RECEIVE FROM USA IN THE WEEKS TO COME.! ASSOCIATED MYSELF WITH A0012893_121-000560 •• 0 6 �..·- .·. I PAGE SIX 658 THIS POSITION AND AGREED THAT THE OF GUIDELINES WOULD NEED FURTHER STUDY.! SAID IT STRUCK ME AS WELL THE MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION WOULD BE REQUIRED ON THE PART OF GOVTS ' ' ' OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF USA WILLINGNESS TO CONSULT WI_TH RESPECT TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR . ANYW.HERE IN THE WORLD. OUR STUDY HAD SO FAR BEEN BASED,AS INDICATED IN PARA9 OF NDP/6212,0N THE . . . PROBLEMS-CONNECTED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOW IN POSSESSION OF THE ' ' FORCES ASSIGNED OR EARMARKED TO 12. IN THAT .PART OF THE DISCUSSION DEALING WITH SECGENS SUGGESTIONS ... ..... '. ; REGARDING T}1E RECEIPT OF THE PROMISED INFO FROM USA ON THE SECURITY PROBLEM . . - INVOLVED, MOST REPS SUPPORTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPECIAL 'iORKING GROUP. OTHERS GAVE MORE SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE ; DIFFERING 1 NEEDS-FOR INFO AS ANALYSED BY SECGENC PARA4 ABOVE>. NORWEGIAN ·REP AGREED THAT IT .WAS NOT RPT NOT ESSENTIAL THAT ALL MEMBERS BE IN POSSESSION OF THE VERY DETAILED INFO WHICH WAS OF INTEREST TO COUNTRIES ON WHOSE SOIL A GOOD DEAL OF THE NATO ATOMIC ARSENAL WAS ESTABLISHEDoTHE COUNCIL WOULD BE DOING ALL THAT \4AS REQUIRED OF IT IN THIS RESPECT IF IT SIMPLY TOOK RESPOOSIBILITY TO COUNTRIES WHICH REQUIRED DETAILED INFO RECEIVED IT. MEMBER GOVTS AS A GROUP HOWEVER WOULD REQUIRE TO RECEIVE THROUGH COUNCIL ALL THE GENERAL INFO WHICH WOULD PUT. THEM IN A POOITION IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY TO EXERCISE THEIR PROPER RESPONSIBILITIESo . DANISH REP TOOK MUCH THE SAME LINE AND INDICATED THAT HE BELIEVED ' HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD ACCEPT THE PROCEDURES TENTATIVELY OUTLINED • ; I : BY SECGEN.BELGIAN REP AGREED THAT. THERE. WAS A GOOD DEAL OF' COMMON ' {" SENSE INVOLVED IN CCNSIDERING THE t ' • . '. • l ·. - \ -. ' . OF VERY DETAILED INFO .- . .- ON A REGIONAL AND BILATERAL BASIS SO LONG AS THE ALLIANCE AS A . . . -' .\ . (._ - ,- '- . ' WHOLE WAS GIVEN. THE ESSENTIAL HJFO REQUIRED ,FOR BY 1 OF IV !DUAL GOVTS._ 13. FIN ALLY THE. REPS OF BELGIUM AND NOR WAY EM PH AS !SED THE l I ••• 7 . ' ' " 'o e A0012893_122-000561 �PAGE SEVEN 658 COOCERN OF THEIR AUTHORITIES THAT CAREFUL PREPARATION BE MADE IN MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION OF DEFENCE PLANNING AT ATHENS.BOTH INDICATED THEIR BELIEF THAT THERE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT PROGRESS IN A NUMBER OF THE ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE HANDLING OF INFO TO BE PROVIDED BY USA AND THE GENERAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STATED USA WILLINGNESS TO SHARE WITH MEMBER GOVTS TO A GREATER DEGREE THAN EVER IN THE PAST THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SUPERVISION OF NUCLEAR MATTERS.BOTH PERMREPS WERE CLEAR HOWEVER THAT THE IDEA OF A MULTILATERAL FORCE WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE SUFF'ICIENTL Y ADVANCED TO WARRANT SPECIFIC ATTENTION OF THE MINISTERS AT ATHENS.BOTH AS WELL. DOUBTED THAT EXACT GUIDELINES COULD BE DEVELOPED FOR MINISTERIAL DECISION AT ATHENS;THEY DID NOT RPT NOT RULE OUT THE VALUE OF SOME·MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION WITH PERHAPS A PROCEDURAL DECISION TO RETURN THE NATTER FOR REFINEMENT TO THE PERMANENT COUNCIL IN THE COURSE OF THE YEAR. t4.THE REMAINDER Of COUNCILS DISCUSSION WAS MORE DIRECTLY RELATED TO UK PAPER AND,AS INDICATED ABOVE,IS DEALT WITH IN A SEPARATE MSG A0012893_123-000562 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW02940 Title A name given to the resource CDNW02940 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy - NATO long term planning," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5959, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 4-1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en