https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f1e020ced5e6ccd6f0d346b32d904a9e.pdf 98e5bbe1bd09c8c463f3491610e2044c PDF Text Text ,_ . --;. . ... FM WASHDC FEB9/62 SECRET CON EYES ONLY TO EXTERNAL 395 OPIMMED INFO PERMISNY EMBPARIS LDN PRIORITY TI BONN PRIORITY FM OTT CCOS OTT PRIORITY FM OTT NAIO-SECGEN STIKKERS VISIT TO WASHDC FESSENDENBKDIRECTOR,EUROPEAN RCGIONAL AFFAIRS)TOLD US YESTERDAY CFEB8>THAf THE MAIN PURPOSE OF SECGEN STIKKERS VISIT HAD BEEN TO IMPRESS UPON USA AIJTHORITIES HIS CONCERN THAT SOr•lETHING BE DONE SOON WITHIN A NATO CONTEXT TO ACCOMMODATE THE GROWING PRESSURE IN GERMANY TO PARTICIPATE IN SOi"iE FASHION If\: RESPONSIBILITY FOR NUCL-EAR WEAPONS.STIKKER FELT THAT HE KNE\1! THE GER'·1ANS WELL AND .'1E SENSED A. GROWING NATIONALISM WHICH MIGHT EVENTUALLY INSIST ON A NATIONAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY UNLESS SUITABLE ALTERNATIVES WERE AGREED ON IN THE MEANTH1E.A FURTliER URGENCY,STIKKER THOUGHT,AROSE OUT OF THE FACT THAT ADENAUER WAS THE ONLY MAN WHO COULD PREVAIL GERMANY TO ACCEPT AN ALTERNATIVE.THE DANGER,OF COURSE, WAS THAT IF GERMANY SHOULD DEVELOP A NATIONAL NUCLEAR CAPABiLITY, THE RUSSIANS WOULD PROBABLY REGARD IT AS A CASUS BELLiuSTIKKER HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN PRIMARILY CONCERNED A?iOUf A NATO FORCE; THE URGENT QUESTION WAS CONTROL OF NATOS EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPONRY. 2.FESSENDEN SAID THAT USA AGREED WITH STIKKERS ASSESSMENT AND IT \·JAS THUS THAT THEY SUPPORTED THE URGENCY OF ECONOMIC Ar!D POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF WESTERN EUROPE,THAT IS TO ENSURE THAT GERMANY f3£COf1£S IRREVOCt\BLY INCORPORATED IN A .:T '.vAS ALSO EUROPEAN USA WAS CONCERNED TO WORK OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SUITABLE CONTROL SYSTEM FOR NATO NUCLEAR r;ONFIRZ"1ED 9 INCIDENTALLY,TKAT USP. WAS i•lUCK CONCERNED OVER POSSIBiLITY THAT,IF SOME NATO PLAN WERE SOON NOT RPT NNOT WORKED OUT AGREED·, I HERE r1 IGHT BE COLLABORATION BETI!JEEN THE GE AN S AND FRENCH IN THE CREATION OF A BILATERAL QUOTE NUCLEAR FORCE UNQUGTE. ... 2 A0012901_104-000315 �,..;:.·-: PAGE 395 SO FAR AS FRANCE·ITSELF WAS CONCERNED,USA HAD THAT THEY DIRECT THEIR ATTENTION MORE TO POST -DEGAULLE FRANCE RATHER THAN THE PRESENToFESSENDEN ALSO SAID THAT IN WORKING OUT A PLAN FOR NATO CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOR A NATO NUCLEAR FORCE, THE WILLINGNESS OF BRITAIN TO SURRENDER SOME Of ITS NATIONAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY TO NATO CONTROL WOULD BE A MOST 1.!JELCOME AND PERSUASIVE PRECEDENT. HE, PERSONALLY, THOUGHT THAT USA SHOULD PE PREPARED TO ALLOCATE MORE OF ITS OWN CAPABILITY TO NATOo 3.RETURNING TO THE PRESENT FESSENDEN SAID THAT USA INSISTED THAT THE COI\VENTIONAL BUILDUP \VAS OF THE UHWST THE QUESTION OF A NATO MRBM AND URGENCY" IT BE THE INITIAL FORCE Of FIVE POLARIS SUBMARINES WHICH PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD OFFERED AT OTT OR THE ULTI\ilATE MULTILATERAL MRBM IMPORTANT; BUT IT COULD AWAIT,AND WOULD INDEED HAVE TO AWAIT,IHE WORKING OUT Of A CONTROL SYSTEM. SAID THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION·WITH STIKKER OF SPECIFIC CONTROL SCHEMES AND IN PARTICULAR 9 STIKKERS PAPER ON THE SUBJECT. BY AND LARGE,USA COULD GO ALONG WITH SOME OF STIKKERS SUGGESTIONS. FESSENDEN MENTIONED THE FOLLOWING:CA)A GUARANTEE BY USA TO MAINTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE;(B)A GUARANTEE THAT THESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE USED AGAINST SPECIFIED IARGETS;CC)PROVISION OF INFO TO ALLIES,ON A NEED TO KNOW BASIS 7 0F OVERALL TARGETING Of WEAPONS WHICH WOULD BE Of CONCERN TO EUROPEAN WAS NOT RPT NOT CNTIRELY CLEAR WHETHER THIS WOULD INFOLVE INFO CONCERNING THE OVERALL TARGETING OF USA STRATEGIC JETERRENT FORCE OR ONLY THOSE TARGERS NOT RPT NOT INVOLVED IN CB>ABOVE BUT STILL OF INTEREST TO vJESTERN EUROPE). 5.STIKKER HAD EXPRESSED THE VIEVJ THAT SO FAR AS POLITICAL CONTROL :J{j,S CONCERNED IT WOULD BE UNDESIRA8LE TO PRESS FOR AGREH1ENT ON \ SCHEM.E INVOLVING WEIGHTED VOTING 9 A CONTROL GROUP COMPRISING LESS fHAN THE FIFTEEN OR QUOTE FIFTEEN fINGERS 0 0 THE. TRIGGER UNQUOTL 3 A0012901_105-000316 .,.,. �..,, PAGE THREE. 395 HE BELIEVED IT PREFERABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON GUIDE LINES :NCORPORATING CONTINGENCIES IN WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE 'JSED.-FESSENDEN THOUGHT THAT USA WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN OBLIGATION TO AUTHORIZE THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CERTAIN DID NOT RPT NOT HOWEVER VOLUNTEER ANY INFO JN THE NATURE OF THESE CONTINGENCIESo }.INCIDENTALLY 9 WE SOUGHT TO CLARIFY WITH FESSENDEN fiNLETTERS STATEltlENT IN COUNCIL ON JAN18<NATOPARIS TEL160 JAN19)THAT QUOTE THE USA CONTINUES IN THE STRONG CONVICTION THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE ARE NOT RPT NOT SERVED BY FURTHER PROLIFERATION ON A NATIONAL BASIS OR SYSTEMS SERVING PREDOMINANTLY STRATEGIC PURPOSES UNQUOTE.FESSENDEN CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO RPT NO INTENTION TO CONVEY THE IDEA THAT USA WAS NOT RPT NOT CONCERNED WITH THE PROLIFERATION OF QUOTE TACTICAL WEAPONS UNQUOTE.THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROLIFERATION OF ANY AND ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON A NATIONAL BASIS AND THAT \vAS WHY USA WOULD NEVER ASSIST THE FRENCH TO BUILD UP THEIR NATIONAL '.J UCLEAR FORCE HEENEY A0012901_106-000317 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW02894 Title A name given to the resource CDNW02894 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy - NATO long term planning," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5959, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 3-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en