https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/229ad360b360b56f561fb732dde68367.pdf db2e7b61b4b1e8bb4dd8ed0d10e04941 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgffe^athvertu de la Loi sur I'acces a Finformation BEST AVAILABLE COPY TOP SECRET ^ O E DO ° ^^v— Bonn, June 3 0 , 1955 \ • W T a g * ? jPjear B e r t , 5J_±A Study of National Security Policy I am sorry not to have replied sooner with my __j:omments to your letter of March 28" enclosing the Department's Memorandum on the Strategic Concept of the Nuclear Deterrent, et me first of all say that this strikes me as an absolutely irst-class document, a most closely reasoned and comprehensive examination of the problem. For this very reason I have very little to contribute to it as I am in full agreement with the main lines of its argument. I perhaps might, however, take this opportunity to make a point which, though it may not fit directly into this paper, seems to me to arise out of it. 2. If partly as a result of mutual fear of atomic warfare we may hope not only to avoid war but even for an improvement in East-West relations, this very development would in itself raise new problems for Canadian foreign policy. 3. I am thinking at the moment primarily of Canada's future relations with its present partners in the North Atlantic alliance. If,, on the most hopeful assumption, a measure of disarmament and perhaps a scaling down of NATO military commitments in Europe came about this would lead to a decline in the military importance of NATO. Meanwhile It might in these circumstances be possible to foresee a period more or less long in duration when some sort of disarmament system linked with a European security scheme was in the process of evolution. During this period it seems most unlikely that the United States would relax its requirements in continental defence in which Canada is so inextricably involved. But there might be a gradual withdrawal of American military commitments in Europe parallel with Russian withdrawal within her own frontiers. In such a situation it would presumably be unlikely that Canada would maintain its military commitments in Europe at their present level. The necessity to strike a balance between European defence and North American defence is mentioned in paragraph 30 of the Department's memorandum in terms of the present international situation of ice-cold war; it does not look forward to conditions in a possible thaw. 4. " In such a period of lessened international tension and controlled and declining armaments, the tendency would be towards a "normalization" of conditions in Europe. Certainly in terms of European history nothing could be less normal than the presence of American armed forces in France and Germany and Russian control of half of Germany and of Czechoslovakia. In such a "normalized" Europe, of which a \ R.A. MacKay, Esquire, Associate j/nder-Secretary of State for ExWrnal Affairs, Ottafc * * * t & 000226 6 . ?. n ? j J; r �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en verturd§|a L^^r^teces a Finformation BEST AVAILABLE COPY - 2 - reunited Germany might eventually be a part, there might be a tendency to return to old patterns in European relations. When Europe is no longer so rigidly divided into two military camps there will obviously be much more middle ground and more countries conducting their own national policies on that middle ground. What in these circumstances becomes of NATO? Must its hard earned achievements in the political field be sacrificed if its military importance declines? What is its future as a long-term alliance? This is certainly a question of the first importance for Canada. Indeed our emphasis since the beginning on the non-military aspects of NATO may prove very important in the future (even if Article 2 remains unimplemented in any precise fashion). Is not the continued existence of NATO as a grouping of Western nations essential to our foreign policy? Particularly essential perhaps in a situation in which North American military commitments in Europe were declining while continental defence requirements remained important. An eventual withdrawal of Canada onto the North American continent may be natural and desirable in military terms. In the political sphere it would completely unbalance our foreign.policy. That policy requires a political framework which includes the United States, the United Kingdom and the middle powers of continental Europe. Otherwise we might be confined to a form of North American isolationism in which the overwhelming wealth and power of the United States would completely dwarf us. 5. If the maintenance and indeed the strengthening of NATO as a political organism is a Canadian interest it is also an essential Western interest, particularly in terms of the German problem. NATO affords the only satisfactory framework in which Germany can be associated with not only Western European powers but also the United States and ourselves. One can of course visualize a Germany continuing in WEU or some similar purely European equivalent and linked by separate treaty with the United States. I think there would be dangers and inconvenience in such an arrangement. Worst of all, of course, would be a Germany freed of all its present commitments and in a position to play off (or attempt to play off) the United States against Russia while simultaneously aspiring to the leadership of Western continental Europe. 6. If this line of though is valid we should be thinking now of ways in which NATO can be associated with the whole process of pacification and disarmament which we hope may emerge over these next years. For if NATO is associated mainly with cold war aims and policies it may not survive into a more hopeful future. We are of course doing this already by pressing for prior NATO association with the forthcoming Four Poller talks and in general by our emphasis on political consultation. The more remote question is whether NATO can stand up as a political reality if its military importance diminishes. It perhaps may be argued that ultimately we should wish NATO to wither away entirely so that all European and other nations should gather together in amity and freedom under the sole sign of the United Nations. But this prospect seems too remote for present consideration and its achievement would not be hastened by the dissolution of the main political grouping which now links Europe and North America.. �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a Finformation BEST AVAILABLE COPY TOP SECRET V 3 7. No doubt these reflections look forward to a pretty remote and perhaps improbable future when disarmament is under way and tensions have relaxed. I only put them forward because it seems important that we should in our interest be thinking about the future of NATO in such a period and about the positive functions it might perform in a more peaceful world. 8. Twd other more general remarks. The Departmental memorandum rather assumes that nuclear capacity will remain concentrated in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States or their respective allies. Is it worth mentioning the possibility that in the not too remote future smaller countries, perhaps not at present attached to either power bloc, may have at their command nuclear or atomic weapons? I do not know whether the experts in this field ever foresee a period when some tin-pot dictator of a comparatively minor power would be able to start a nuclear or atom war of his own? 9. The "nightmare" (as the Departmental memorandum rightly calls it) in the shape of things to come in warfare certainly overshadows the future and makes the case for disarmament imperative. However, lest these fears should paralize not only our policy but also our enjoyment of life, it is worth remembering that most of our forebears lived their lives on earth in the conviction that by a slip in theology or morals they would find themselves pitchforked into hell's fires for all eternity. Compared to this fate atomic obliteration seems merciful. On the other hand it may be argued that if we are sinful and foolish enough to become involved in atomic war we shall not only be obliterated physically but also punished eternally. Yours sincerely, ^a** r c% C.S.A. Ritchie. 000228 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00124 Title A name given to the resource Letter, C.S.A. Ritchie to R.A. MacKay Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 6/30/1955 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Study on Canadian National Security Policy, RG25, file 50333-40, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Canadian National Security Description An account of the resource Ottawa Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en