https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1aea31bbfe8200a9efb212ea3d2ec41a.pdf e3edb18ad679eefc4d6bb4168759fdba PDF Text Text '/ London, September 82, 1952 TOP SECRET ^ S " MEMORANDUM BY MR. PEAHSON REG-AR51H5 TALKS IK LONDON AHD <L ^ PARIS OH NATO DEFENCE PHOPftAMMBS AHD STRATEGY. The first discussion of these matters was during my conference with Mr. Eden on Friday morning, September 12, but it was general In character. He did, however, express emphatic appreciation of the Importance of the permanent NATO Council and of the desirability of using it for political discussions* Xn this connection he referred with satisfaction to the discussion which had recently been held on Germany. This surprised both Mr. Robertson and myself because of the attitude that the foreign Office had taken ••towards such discussions, an attitude vfaich had apparently been expressed in Instructions to Hoyer-Hlllar, which were almost rudely negative In character. Incidentally, Mr. Eden repeated this favourable view of Council political discussions at his luncheon on that day. The opposition to these seems to come from officials In the Foreign Office, a fact which was confirmed by the Intervention of PiersonDlxon at the luncheon In question. At this luncheon, which was attended, among others, by Lord Alexander, Sir Ian Jacob, the United States Ambassador and William Draper, there was a general conversation over a number of NATO military and political subjects. Draper Indeed made quite a speech in v&lch he emphasized the Importance of the United Kingdom pushing ahead with their defence programme and completing their review of this programs in time to have the NATO Annual Heview completed by December IS. The United Kingdom persons present, however, were doubtful whether this would be possible, and were also inclined to emphasize economic and financial difficulties* While Draper emphasized the need for speed In this matter, ho took the opposite view in respect of the strategic reassessment which was underway by the Standing Group and which was to take account of "new weapons*. H© did not think that this would be completed in time to affect NATO firm planning for 1953. In fact he added - to the obvious disappointment of the other guests * that Washington would need from six to nine months more for this re-assessment (a view which incidentally he reaffirmed In Paris). The United Kingdom obviously found this news discouraging and somewhat mystifying and felt that they have not been given the real reasons which would Justify such a delay. At tho luncheon Mr. Eden repeated what he had said to Mr. Robertson and to me earlier, that the current "recasting" of the United Kingdom defence programme would not likely save them much money, but it would make possible the more efficient use of the funds to be appropriated. This view was later confirmed by Lord Alexander and Sir Ian Jacob. It was agreed, however, though not with any enthusiasm, by both Mr. Eden and Lord Alexander that Draper was correct In assessing that the curve of NATO defence effort must still continue to move upward. I have my own doubts, however, whether the United Kingdom really accept this so far as their own effort Is concerned, and these ftoubts were strengthened by the discussion Mr. Heeney and I had with Lord Alexander and sir Ian Jacob after lunch the same afternoon. • • •2 000044 �— a * This was an Interesting discussion at which both Lord Alexander and Sir Ian Jacob, who did a good deal of the talking, argued that it would not be possible to agree on any realistic NATO programme for 1953 until the re-assessment referred to above had been received; any planning would be largely artificial which did not take into account the new weapons and strategy. Lord Alexander emphasized several times his conviction that "quality, not quantity'* should be the objective In NATO planning for the defence of the West. He and Jacob both felt that it would be better to concentrate on having the SO divisions for 1952 properly equipped, trained and supported, than to agree or plan for a larger number of which a proportion would only be "cardboard divisions"* - c\ There was a good deal of talk In this connection about the inadequacy of the equipment and logistic support for the existing divisions and about the importance of hew weapons in NATO strategy and tactics. Both Lord Alexander and Jacob were pretty optimistic about the effectiveness of the strategic atomic counter-attack in the early stages of the battle for Europe and argued that this was an element In planning which had to be taken into account. They recognised, however, the American difficulty arising out of the MaoHahon Act, and indeed out of other circumstances which made it impossible to have a satisfactory NATO appreciation made at the present time with all existing atomic information made available for that purpose* In speaking of the technical advances being made and supporting his argument in favour of "quality", Lord Alexander indicated that the U.K. Government regarded heavy anti-aircraft weapons as obsolescent and spoke of the early effectiveness to be expected of the guided missile. We should rely on these for passive defence* I brought up the question of the minimum NATO force required for the defence of Western Europe* Jacob indicated, without any qualification, that 50 divisions effectively armed and supported was the maximum which the Western European economy (leaving Germany out) could support at the present time but that such a force plus the German divisions would be adequate for the purpose. That purpose was to hold off the attack while the air counteroffensive was operating. This seems to ma to be a most important statement of United Kingdom policy and It will be interesting to discover whether they maintain it in NATO discussions when the Americans put forward, as they are bound to do, larger totals of divisions and aircraft for 1953. I brought up the question of the advisability of the United kingdom engaging in strategio atom bombing. Would It not be hotter for this country, now that it had actually manufactured a bomb, to divert its energy and resources to the development of atomic energy in other fields leaving the military side entirely to the United States? certainly it would be difficult to understand the United Kingdom plea for economy In defence if thay now began to undertake this most expensive form of military operation, Jacob however stated that the United Kingdom authorities felt that unless the United Kingdom participated In atomic air bombing, they would be unable to influence the usetoi be made of this weapon and the United States would neglect targets of vital Importance to Britain, such as submarine bases, etc. It was a matter of national safety and not . , . 3 000045 �- 3 - national prestige. The answer to this Is, though I did not give it; why not approach the Americans to see whether agreement could not be reached on targets, e t c , which would satisfy the special United Kingdom defence needs* I mentioned to Lord Alexander and Jacob and. Indeed, to others both in London and Paris our worries about a minis* terial meeting of NATO in December in relation to the stage which the annual review was likely to reach by that time-* the danger of "spotlighting the gaps"— and not having sufficient time to complete the process of reconciliation. I am not sure that this danger is fully appreciated by the U.K. Ministers. They are anxious to have a revision of the Lisbon planning goals based on a new appreciation, but it Is difficult to sea how this can be expected by December 15* The determining factor, however, seems to be United States political exigencies. In Paris the subjects of NATO strategy and defenc© planning were discussed In a very interesting and frank manner at the informal" NATO Council meeting on Tuesday, September 16, about which a separate report has been made, I also had the benefit of informal discussions on the same subjects with General Ridgway, General Bradley and General Greunther at a luncheon given by Lord Ismay, though there was not time for anything more than casual exchanges of views. It seemed quite clear on my visit to London and Paris that there is a very real difference of opinion between the United States representatives, especially the military representatives, on the one hand, and the European members of NATO on the other, as to the need for an even greater defence buildup in 1953 and the desirability at the next meeting of NATO Ministers of establishing firm goals for that year wall in excess of the present 1952 figures. Reflecting this difference of opinion there is naturally a difference of opinion over the risk of war, whether it is now less than before. As was pointed out by Aiphand in our NATO informal meeting unless there con bo a general agreement on the assessment of this risk, there is not likely to be agreement on requirements to meet it. At the same time it is quite obvious that the approach to the problem of risk is Influenced to a very considerable extent by economic factors; especially in European countries and by their own national position in collective strategic planning; that is whether they are likely to be immediate victims of an attaok from land or from air and whether they are considered in Washington to be expendable, 1 found in my discussion with the NATO members a strong and growing reluctance to support or even discuss NATO defence plans without much more Information than has up to the present been made available regarding the strategy of the Pentagon both in regard to atomic warfare and European defenoe. It is impossible not to have some sympathy with this viewpoint. At the same time one should appreciate not only the normal reluctance of the military planners to put all their cards on a political table, but also thoir special reluctance to disclose their secret plans to governments whose security reputations vary. There is a real and an Increasingly important dilemma here and it cam© into the open in our NATO discussions on Tuesday and Thursday; especially I should think, in the remarks of the Netherlands , , . 4 000046 �- 4 mombor. It was because the Secretary-General's paper on NATO strategy emphasized not only economic factors but the Importance of giving tho NATO Council all possible strategic information, that it was so heartily welcomed b^ the members of tho Council other than the United states representative who obviously found himself In a difficult position. There is also an increasing and an intelligent reluctance to agree, largely for American political consumption, on programmes and goals which are not likely to be reached, except in a very artificial way, In the time set. Surely it would be much bettor to take for our 1953 programme, as the first essential thing to do, the achievement of the 1952 objective; not achievement merely on paper but in fact. Once this has been done then additional firm goals could, if necessary, be decided and mode public. This, of oourse, would not remove the necessity of planning farther in advance than 12 months, but it would remove public attention from that necessity and relieve Governments from the duty of explaining and defending the gaps between promises and performances. I argued this thesis with everyboSy I encountered over here and found a very general acceptance of it except in United States quarters. It Is felt In such quarters that this courso would be, too dangerous because it would give the impression la tho United States that we were abandoning goals which we had previously agreed oh and indeed would encourage Europeans to relax rather than maintain the defence effort. There is, of oourse, something in this. Yet I feel that the two points of view can be reconciled. That, however, will not be done if wo accept under Amerioan pressure at the December meeting paper figures as a substitute for what wa really think can be done In the economic and politloal circumstances of 1953. We will hove to face this matter soon and more frankly than we have done in the past. 1 hope that defence planning can proceed steadily and effectively without slavish adherence to unrealistic and publicly declared totals even though they are said to be "for planning purposes only". In this way wo can getaway from our dangerous practice of concentrating in public on gaps and comparative performances. I think we should explore this whole matter very carefully so that at the December mooting, while a great deal of time will have to be devoted to the Annua! Review and there will havo to be confidential discussion of foroe totals, e t c , we might be able to eonflne our publio announcement to tho fact that v.e are pushing ahead with tho Lisbon 1952 totals until they are completed end making certain that thia completion is IQOfS effective; also that when this goal has been fully achieved further announcements will be made on sub sequent programmes. Among other things, this would mean that by the time such further announcement, etxxxtonxm^cxDnxmitmn^ntiiit is made we would have some necessary Information from the United States on the "new strategy" and "new weapons"* So far as the risk of war is concerned, my visit confirmed my feeling that there is a general disposition ia European quarters to feel that it has lessened during the last year or so; a feeling strengthened in the Council by Lord Ismay*s paper's reference to this subject. There is recognition however that the situation has worsened In the Far Seat, though this does not convey the same feeling of immediate crisis to Europeans. There is a danger in tnis feeling of easement being oarrlod too far; especially as It fits Into the desire to reduce defence expenditures because of economic considerations. So the Americans - through their representatives at N; TO and e ioe where in Europe and their steady stream of visitors from Washington, especially from the Pentagon keep pounding away at tho thesis that the danger is just as great and as immediate as ever. They make socio Impression 000047 �and it is well that these things should be said - but at times th© Americans say them In a way which strengthens the European feeling that there is just about as much to be feared from U.S. rashness as from Soviet aggression. Her© the development of consultation and frank discussion in the Council; tho strenthening of the prestige and authority of that body, can do much to help. For this reason - and because of the growing importance of the Council in the planning of defence and broad strategy - It was encouraging to learn that this central Agency of NATO after a shaky and somewhat discouraging start, Is becoming stronger, better organized and more effective. r* � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Global Strategy / 22 SEPTEMBER 1952 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952-09-22 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00097 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Memorandum by Mr. Pearson Regarding Talks in London and Paris on NATO Defence Programmes and Strategy," 22 Sept. 1952, LAC, RG 2, vol. 223, file no. I-60-1. London NATO Defence Programmes and Strategy Paris Pearson William Draper