https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/247a9c145f8916017a0904f2d9e626c8.pdf 5c6a1f971d3101b1d73991ac0d02b5c8 PDF Text Text v. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - r >^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation D E L E ^ ^ - I O N OF CANADA T O T»> DELEGATION DU CANADA ORT'H A T L A N T I C C O U N C I L AU CONSEIL DE L ' A T L A N T I Q U E - N O R D .&HMAD3 N KEDUr A 77 rue d'Auteuil, ^ Paris, I6e.--n U TOP SECRET ^ June 15, 1955 Dear Bert: I was grateful to receive your letter of May 6th, forwarding a copy of Canada House Telegram No. 537 of April 18th and a copy of the related Departmental memorandum of May 5th concerning the U.K. proposal for a joint approach to the United States on certain questions relating to the employment of nuclear weapons. In my letter of May 5th, I sent you our views on some of the broader questions relating to the employment of nuclear weapons, and I shall confine myself now to observations relating directly to the U.K. suggestion. - / j i Jt&iluS '£0 7 f 1 — The question of whether a valid military ^\d>stinction can be drawn between large and small tactical nuclear weapons is not one I can answer definitively, and perhaps It can be answered only by competent experts on the basis of full technical data. So far, the U.S. has not made such data available to its Allies, and it is, therefore, difficult to offer a firm view. We do know, how*& 3ever, that the U.S. has given to SACEUR for use by M/v NATO certain information designed to enable him to carry on the kind of planning contemplated in MC.-48. This information is conveniently summarized in a book of instructions prepared by USAREUR for the NATO School of Special Weapons. A NATO Staff Officers' Course was held at this school recently, and was attended by Group Captain Birchall of my staff. The book of instructions issued contains , a table listing a mythical "Weapons Family" designed fy^trJkQ «, to indicate reasonably accurately the types of atomic tt ^ .yVeapons which NATO commanders may, for planning /)vr purposes, assume they would have available in time M ^ R. A. MacKay, Esquire, Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, O t t a w a , Ont. . . 2 000271 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - *^_ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation - 2 of war. The table is, of course, hypothetical, but undoubtedly gives a fairly clear picture of what U.S. military leaders mean when they speak of tactical nuclear weapons. Leaving aside means of delivery, . the weapons listed are of six main types covering a range of explosive yield from 2 kilotons to 500 kilotons. These are clearly not "small weapons", and the justification for referring to them as tactical weapons is probably that they can be delivered with a relatively high degree of precision. If the lower limit of U.S. I tactical nuclear weapons is about 2,000 tons of T.N.T., the psychological effect of their use might well be much the same as for larger nuclear weapons. Clearly, there are risks in seeking to draw a political distinction between peripheral and global wars as far as such weapons are concerned. Despite Mr. Dulles' assurances, any use whatever of weapons of this nature would be-highly likely to lead to retaliation in kind, and any local war in which they might be introduced would have every prospect of developing into a conflict of global proportions. t To this extent, therefore, the position outlined in the U.K. tentative draft paper is partly justified. On the other hand, the difficulties in operational terms of distinguishing between large and tactical nuclear weapons must have been recognized by U.S. authorities, and I am led to wonder why they have considered the distinction a useful one to put before the public. The answer must surely be a political one. As suggested in the Departmental memorandum, the United States authorities probably became alarmed at the unfavourable reaction to the original "massive retaliation concept". Thus the concept, politically more acceptable, that local wars would be met by the use of tactical nuclear weapons, employed on a scale similar to that of conventional weapons, may have been put forward in an effort to allay the fear of the Allies of the U.S. One may venture the opinion that this more subtle concept should not, in the minds of the U.S. authorities, be taken at its face value. It serves notice to the Russians that the West will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons, and at the same time it reassures the Allies of the United States that total atomic warfare need not be unleashed unless our very survival is at stake. -000272 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - s Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformatio - 3Another political consideration (if perhaps a less likely one) which the U.S. may have had in mind in their attempt to assimilate tactical nuclear weapons to conventional weapons, could be a desire to attenuate the resistance of their NATO Allies to the gradual "nuclearization" of SACEUR's forces. Original reluctance concerning MC.48 translated itself into two main provisos: (a) as approved, MC.48 provides a ,basis for planning only; 'N , (b) its approval does not involve the delegation of the responsibility of Governments for deciding when it becomes necessary to put the • contemplated plans into effect. Part of the reluctance leading to these conditions rested on the sentiment that nuclear weapons are different in kind from conventional weapons, and that therefore a different set of rules should govern their use. Opposed to this view is the logical consequence of the recent U.S. effort to minimize any distinction between tactical nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. If no such distinction exists, there is no more reason why NATO Council authority should be required for the use of tactical nuclear weapons than for the use of any other weapons at SACEUR's disposal. It is ray own impression that the only real distinction which can be applied in the field of nuclear weapons, and_lt is notL a_ clear one, relates not to the weapons themselves but rather to the manner ! of their use. Certainly a distinction does exist be- 1 tween the use of nuclear weapons, against mass targets anywhere throughout a war theatre, in a manner designed to crush the general capacity for resistance, and the use of nuclear weapons against tangible military targets such as concentrations of troops. Even this distinction, however, would certainly be very difficult to apply in practice, as cities behind the front line but constituting major supply and communications centres would fall in a no-man's land between the two extremes I have indicated. A further possibility might lie in a distinction between the use of weapons in a combat zone . . 4 000273 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation - 4 (say twenty-five miles on either side of the line of contact between opposing forces) and weapons used outside such a combat area. On the assumption that our main purpose is to seek an effective political control over the putting into effect of plans and preparations for nuclear warfare, the considerations above would suggest that the problem is two-fold. As a first problem, the U.S. should be brought to agree that it will not use nuclear weapons against strategic or non-combat targets without consultation with its principal Allies. This condition would, of course, relate to a situation of global war, and the procedures now being studied for immediate consultation between London, Washington, Ottawa and perhaps Paris in case of a threat probably offer the most realistic approach to reducing the possibility of unilateral U.S. action. The second phase of the problem relating to local or limited wars is much more complicated, particularly if it is true that even tactical nuclear weapons are of such explosive yield that their use is highly likely to lead to a conflict of global proportions. In this connection it may be useful to distinguish between local wars that might develop in Europe, and those that might arise in Asia. With regard to the ^ former, i.e. local wars in the NATO area, we may consider that the terms of approval of MG.48 bind the. U.S. to consult its NATO Allies in case of a serious threat, and that at least the principle of multinational political control over the use of nuclear weapons in that area is already established. No parallel situation exists with regard to local wars \ji that might develop in Asia, and this is unfortunately i/1 the region where such small wars are likely to develop.f> It seems to me that there are two possible approaches which might be considered. One is to take up with the United States, in an effort to obtain clarification, the question of whether or not the principle is accepted that there must be consultation (circumstances permitting) before tactical or mass use of nuclear weapons in Europe. It would be difficult for the United States to reject this principle, 5 000274 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - ~ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformatio - 5 although acceptance in principle would not necessarily mean observance in practice. If, however, the principle is accepted, then the question might be put whether the United States would not consider it wise to consult, if possible, with its principal Allies (London, Ottawa and perhaps Paris, as indicated above) concerning the strategic or mass use of atomic weapons anywhere in the world, since such uses would in any case pre-suppose a global conflict which would put the problem in exactly the same form as it would have for a situation originating within the NATO area. It might then be possible to point out the fact, as suggested above, that even the "tactical" use of atomic weapons in local wars is so likely to lead to world conflict that it would be i highly desirable that consultation with these Allies I should precede any use of atomic weapons anywhere in I the world, even though the principle of consultation f has been initially established in the NATO context. An alternative and perhaps less realistic method of approach would start in the same way by seeking confirmation that the principle of consultation is accepted for any use, strategic or tactical, of atomic weapons in the NATO theatre. It might then be suggested that this- principle is of such value in reassuring the Allies of the United States that consideration should be given to its expansion to other parts of the world. Probably the U.K. is the only country in a position even to consider putting the suggestion forward, but for what it is worth one might specifically suggest to the U.S. that this principle should be extended to SEATO. The same general consent might be sought of the SEATO powers to base military planning within the SEATO area on the possibility or even probability that nuclear weapons might be used within the SEATO area in the event of war, subject, of course, to such reservations as those under which MC.48 was approved within NATO. The adoption of such a formula within the context of SEATO would, on the one hand, afford some guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used in Asia except when really vital interests were threatened, and on the other hand, it would not prevent the nuclear deterrent process from having its maximum effect in a particularly sensitive �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a Finformation 6region. Such a formula, moreover, would open the possibility of extension as circumstances might warrant to other regional organizations of which the U.S. is or may become a member (e.g. defence organizations in the Middle East). Either of these possible lines of approach, which I certainly do not advocate but which I put forward merely as ground for thought, would lead to j the critical question of how far the U.S. is' prepared to go or can be persuaded to go, in taking its Allies into its confidence. But if some sort of international H political control, however tenuous, is to be established over the United States, then this question inevitably arises. Any effort to establish international control over the use of nuclear weapons must face this question squarely at the start, and the choice of any particular approach (I have suggested two, but undoubtedly others can be put forward) must rest on an assessment of the answer. In conclusion, I think a more rewarding approach is to be found in an effort to come to some kind of understanding with the United States about consultation than in bluntly rejecting, as the U.K. suggestion undoubtedly does, concepts which the U.S. Administration for good or bad reasons had considered it desirable to make public. No doubt the distinction which Mr. Dulles has attempted to make between large and tactical atomic weapons is somewhat unreal, but to adhere to this simple military fact and fail to seek an understanding of U.S. purposes can lead only to exclusion from U.S. thinking. It will avail us little to have the right ideas on these subjects if our presentation of them serves only to alienate U.S. planners. There is no reason to hesitate in privately expressing to the U.S. our concern about these problems, and in being prepared to put forward our thoughts as opportunity affords, but it would be fatal to do this in a manner which would lead the U.S.. authorities, to "plan it alone". IV Yours sincerely^ L.D. WilgresSy Permanent Representative. 000276 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00114 Title A name given to the resource Letter, L.D. Wilgress to R.A. MacKay Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 6/15/1955 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Study on Canadian National Security Policy, RG25, file 50333-40, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Canadian National Security Description An account of the resource Paris to Ottawa Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en