https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e274cc337fb5f7eecd36026e3edd760c.pdf 17fff0f876ac671101c8581f38436a6a PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Document divulgue en vwtfrd V. s>^" e •>Sjfo Information, OrVacces a Finformation v T O P 1- i *DE O ^ zpp n r - ^i.G..,.-J>B D -| <y 2 % 7 3 S l S E S a s h i n g t o n , D. 0. U^ RSDOiT A SECRET S 4 Dear Jules, S 6 T 5 9 19- . May 1 9 , 1 9 5 5 . £T>#$lU* ^Tbt We were very glad to Have an opportunity of reading the able Departmental paper entitled "Distinction between Large and Tactical Weapons", a copy of which you sent with your letter of May 6. 1 2, I might first make a few remarks about the original United Kingdom paper, although this will add little to our original comments in telegram No. V/A-633 of April 20. .While no doubt it is misleading to discuss small bombs as precision instruments, we do see some distinction between these tactical weapons and the vastly more destructive strategic bombs. Such information as we have on the tests of the relatively small bombs in the United.States suggests tnat the amount of fall-out is not serious or comparable to that found in hydrogen bombs. In the second place, we are unable to.understand the emphasis placed on the argument that recent American remarks on tactical weapons would lead the Russians to believe that the deterrent created by tne t tare at of hydrogen bombs is no longer vaiid. This seems to be the main point in the United Kingdom paper and we find it hard to imagine the value of an approach to the United States authorities based on this, to us, slim argument. 3. Your own Departmental paper is, it seems to us, of a different calibre and without attempting to remark on all the many points made, we might comment on a few of them. J. Leger, Esquire, 2 Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario. 000296 ^r.jr.yVos) �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en verty |tje> la^^jjfj^jocce s a I'information - 2 - (a) Para. -9. Last sentence. The conclusion here would seem to us equally valid if only conventional weapons were involved and is not peculiarly applicable to nuclear weapons. (b) Para. 10.Surely the conclusion here is a matter of degree and not of absolutes, Indian opinion would be shocked by any United States intervention in the affairs of the coastal islands. It is then hostilities between the United States and Communist China which would bother Asian opinion, it seems to us, rather than nuclear or non-nuclear fighting. (c) Para. II. Last sentence on page 4. We doubt the truth of this argument. The problem of the use of nuclear weapons would arise just aa It has done in NATO if there was agreement on policy in the Far East between the various allies. (d) Para. 14. It does not seem to us that the British paper is justified on the question of the effect on the deterrent of nuclear warfare of the employment of small nuclear weapons. We do not see how the use of small nuclear weapons would tend to throw any doubt ontiielikelihood of the employment of all nuclear resources in the event of global war. 4, The portion of your paper included In paragraphs 19 to 25 seems to us to lead into the more general considerations that should apply in considering the use of atomic weapons. The points that you make concerning conventional and atomic forms of attack in paragraphs 24 and 25 strike us as valid, and I might carry this general line of thought a little further as a result of our discussions here. • * *O 000297 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu $@& LfitJSQlffigQtes a I'information 3 - 5. The Government of the United States has long since announced its decision to emphasize new weapons and to give priority to them. The policy of not maintaining as large conventional forces as existed at an earlier date is not, we think, due to any lack of economic capability of this country, but rather to a political decision to allocate a certain proportion of the budget to defence and a further decision that, within that budget, emphasis was to be laid on new weapons. 6. The result of this United States policy is that the Western allies are relatively weak In conventional forces. At the same time, however, the very recent information on the development of theSoviet Air Force, combined with the earlier knowledge of the possession of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union, suggests something approaching equality between Eastern and Western states in capacity to produce and deliver atomic bombs. We have, therefore, moved a long way from the point at which the great Soviet land forces were compensated by unique atomic capacity on the part of the United States. 7. The power of destruction by each side, therefore, is such as to provide a powerful deterrent at least to a major war, and by a major war is meant one in which the Soviet Union takes.a direct part. The indications of Soviet willingness to negotiate, although it is too early to estimate their validity, add to the evidence of mutual apprehension of atomic warfare, 8. The greatest danger now is probably found in the risk that a local or a minor war might so affect the main interests of the great powers as to lead to a general conflict. It is difficult to envisage a local conflict arising in Europe, but the same, of course, is not true of the Ear East, We would entirely agree with the suggestions In your paper that first consideration must be given to preventing warfare, however waged, from developing in the Far East, 9. Hostilities between the United States and Communist China could with difficulty be confined to the coastal area, in spite of the fact that the objective from the United States point of view would be the defence of Formosa (and related to this, of the Quemoys and the Matsus). �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vjejtjp d g ^ ^ y j s j r r I'acces a I'information 4 - It may be, as officials here have told us, that the United States forces would not be permitted to carry on an unlimited warfare into inland China any more than they were allowed to cross the Yalu River. To observe this distinction, however, would never be easy, nor do we fully share the confidence here that the risk of the Soviet Union being drawn in in defence of China is minor. 10. We find it difficult to make any assessment of the extent to which the use of small atomic weapons would' exaggerate the danger arising out of such hostilities. There is a general public feeling throughout the world - one which United States spokesmen have sought to dispel - that there Is an absolute distinction between conventional' and nuclear weapons. The effect on tha? uncommitted countries of Asia of any hostilities between the United States and China would be serious. It would no doubt be more serious if nuclear weapons were employed. There is also a consideration that, just as there would be a temptation to destroy by large conventional bombs the main sources of production within China, so there would be a temptation, if tactical atomic weapons were used, to go further and drop larger bombs on industrial targets. 11. The NATO countries have made their decisions on the use of atomic weapons in the event of a war in their area. This decision was virtually unavoidable, bearing in mind the extent to which the Western powers have become dependent on atomic weapons. The position in the Far East is hardly comparable if we are right in suggesting that as contrasted with Europe - there could be a local war in the Far East, 12. It does seem to us, however, that any conversations which might be initiated with the United States would be unreal if confined to the issues raised in the United Kingdom paper. Surely they would have little reality if they did not go to the heart of the question, which is in the initiation of warfare itself, rather than the type of weapons only. The Canadian view on the risk of any warfare on the Chinese coast has already been made clear to the United States Government, as has the United Kingdom view. It seems to us that to pursue this theme further would tend to have the effect of drawing from the Americans enquiries as to the willingness of the �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vgVflfdeSIKS^fgfl?" I'acces a I'information - 5 United Kingdom and Canadian authorities to find an alternative to the United States method of protecting Formosa. In short, it might bring forth a request for a joint guarantee. ' 13. We are s t i l l uncertain as to the reason which led the United Kingdom a u t h o r i t i e s to propose a b i l a t e r a l approach t o the United S t a t e s . We are a l s o , as we have suggested, equally puzzled as to the r e a l significance of the limited issue which they have r a i s e d . You may wish to consider the p o s s i b i l i t y of seeking c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the United Kingdom p o s i t i o n before reaching any conclusions as to what steps might be taken to arrange for discussions with the United S t a t e s . 14. F i n a l l y , i t does seem to us that the question that has been raised - however i t may f i n a l l y be formulated i s of such a major nature t h a t there i s some doubt whether i t could usefully be discussed at a l l except at a very high level. Yours s i n c e r e l y , lWv(J ( A. D . . P . Heeney) 000300 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00102 Title A name given to the resource Letter, A.D.P. Heeney to J. Leger Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 5/19/1955 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Study on Canadian National Security Policy, RG25, file 50333-40, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Canadian National Security Description An account of the resource Washington to Ottawa Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en