https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/9942ec911e3f66af967ad45b867ac63a.pdf f64afd2c3ff08ab6bf03f4184101ff26 PDF Text Text TOP SECRET holms for •- hlefs of .staff Mooting 17 Sop St Report or Tho MinUter require* the chiefs view* oo tho UK strategy paper, particularly any questions which tho government should consider regarding this paper concerning any adjustments thai might ho required la tho Canadian defence programme should this or a sim liar concept ho accepted. There i s no doubt that the BW will attempt to put forward to the NATO organisation flee view s expressed in its paper to back up the position they are going to take in the Annual Review ia regard to the UK contributions, here are indications that the Secretary General's background paper has boon draws up along similar liaoa and information secured from Air : hlef Marshal Sir William Elliot indicates that certain of the consideration:* of the UK paper regarding European strategy will no doubt be brought out at the time of tha Annual Review. Therefore, it s e e m s profitable for the Chiefs of Staff to give consideration to the UP view s and try and reconcile these with the US views and arrive at some conclusions which can be put to the government a s preliminary views before tho NAT© meetings. There are certain things which can be isolated ir. this paper for consider ation. Th* first one i s the risk of war. Has this been lessened a s suggested in the U* paper or i s it that we are getting hardened to it a s suggested by the US Chiefs of Staff There s e a m s to ha little doubt in either the American or Fritish caaap that first priority must he given to the setting up of the Deterrent Force to a s U e which will prevent an immediate Russian break. IIWsajo> �TOP SECRET Oa this point there s e e m s to be very little disagreement except there are some people who are considering that a reorganisation of the types of f o r c es le overdue. Understand that (Meld Marshal Montgomery Is working an a paper and s o ts BAOR which deals with a reordenization of a division. Another paint that c o m e s out of tha paper i s ia relation to forces required after M day. hl» point the US aad UK views do not agree. However, it does look a s If it will be w i s e to try aad work out ways aad m e a n s for shortening the time between M day and tha time any additional Canadian forces are available. These are the types of questions to which the Chiefs of Staff might give consideration. It s c u m s ta m o that the following ara tha types of questions that emerge from tha UK paper that we might ba required to answer. 1 No doubt that greater priority and emphasis will be given to tha provision of adequate forces for tha Deterrent f o r c e which may include greater pressur e on c anada to have its division more readily available; and a s the RCAF air division Is being provided an a time phased b a s i s this l e not a s applicable. 2 We may he requested to re-examine our programme to s e e If more cea be done to provide pro AS day f o r c e s , taking greater rleks with r e s e r v e s and the build up after M day. 3 What steps can be taken to shorten the time for tbe provision of forces after M day 1 This may lead to consideration whether our r e s e r v e forces are properly organised to m e e t this concept If this concept Is accepted. It would s e e m that the first role of our r e s e r v e s will be to provide an immediate trained reinforcement element for our f o r c e s In being; and secondly a s additional forces for internal security aad the defence of North America . 000063 �TOP SECRET - 3Those are the kind of questions which I feel the Chiefs of Staff may be required to answer in considering the UK concept. it seems ta me that the question of streteglc bombing and the prosecution of flee Cold Rar are not such vital questions for Canadian consideration. Chairman, Chiefs of Staff 17 Sep 52 000064 �J-Co-' Special circulation to members only. Owing to special security of information recipient Is requested not to circulate or have extracts made. COPY NO. f TOP SECRET CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE Minutes of a Special Meeting held on 17 September, 1952 in the Defence Council Room, No. 2200, National Defence , Headquarters PRESENT The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff (Lieutenant-General Foulkes) The Chief of the Air Staff (Air Marshal Curtis) The Chief of the General Staff (Lieutenant-General Simonds) The Chief of the Naval Staff (Vice Admiral Mainguy) The Acting Chairman, Defence Research Board (Mr. Davies) ALSO PRESENT C M . Drury, Esq., Deputy Minister of National Defence. L.D. Wilgress, Esq., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. R.A.J. Phillips, Esq., representing Secretary to the Cabinet. Commodore Rayner, Coordinator, Joint Staff. Secretary, Chiefs of Staff (Lieutenant-Colonel Kingstone) Assistant Secretary, Chiefs of Staff (Wing Commander Bell) I. REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN ON THE UK GLOBAL STRATEGY PAPER TOP SECRET 1. The Chairman said that the Minister desired the Chiefs of Staff views on the UK strategic concept, particularly in regard to any adjustments that might be required in the Canadian defence programme should the UK concept, or a similar one, be accepted by the North Atlantic Treaty nations. There was no doubt that the UK would attempt to express their views on strategy to the NATO organization to back up the position they were going to take In the annual review with regard to their NATO contributions. The Chiefs of Staff should, therefore, give this matter TOP SECRET 000065 5 >«. - <i. \ T U ljft �TOP SECRET - 2 their consideration with a view to reconciling UK and US views and arriving at some conclusions which could be discussed with the government. Lord Israay had prepared a paper as a background to the annual review which expressed a concept similar to that of the UK and this paper should also be considered. In reporting on his visit to Canada and the US, Marshal of the RAF, Sir John Slessor, would seem to have expressed an overly optimistic view of his discussions in Ottawa and Washington. With regard to his talks in Washington he had said that the US Chiefs of Staff in general accepted the UK strategic concept and the UK would bring the matter up at the next NATO meetings. The strategy previously accepted by the UK was for some 96 divisions and 9,000 aircraft in the first month of war,the UK contribution by 1955 was some 9 divisions and 1,550 aircraft. The new concept was that because of strategic and tactical atomic weapons the emphasis should be placed on forces available on M-day or shortly thereafter designed to hold the Russian advance until the atomic offensive could be launched and if this first battle were won there would be sufficient time to build up reserves. When discussing the UK paper In Washington, General Bradley had said"that the US Chiefs of Staff had only agreed to discuss the UK paper with Sir John Slessor in an informal manner and that there was no intention of producing a joint paper on a new strategic concept« The US Chiefs of Staff did not agree with the paper as presented. The disagreements were, firstly, in regard to the lessening of the risk of war. The US Chiefs of Staff felt that there was no Indication that Russia was not continuing to build up her forces and the tension in the Far East still remained acute. Secondly, the US Chiefs of Staff could not agree with the British views as to the size of the deterrent force required on M-day. The British views were that the forces which the countries could afford by 1954- coupled with the use of tactical atomic weapons would suffice to win the first battle. If the enemy could be held, there would be several months after the first onslaught, in which to build up due to the damage inflicted on Russia by the atomic counter-offensive. The US view was that the forces required to deter and hold Russia on M-day were those presented by SHAPE in M.C. 26/1 prior to the Lisbon conference, 4.6 divisions building to 98 divisions by D plus 30. Thirdly, General Bradley did not agree that the new UK strategy should be raised at the next NATO meetings, because this strategy was based upon the availability of tactical atomic weapons which would not be available in quantity until approximately 1956 and, hence, had no bearing on the size of the deterrent force required in 1954-• There was little disagreement between the US and UK views that first priority should be given to the forces required on M-day. General Bradley had said that the US Chiefs of Staff had asked General Rldgeway to produce a revised plan which would include the use of tactical atomic weapons. He had been asked to produce the plan by the first of October, but it is now clear that this date could not be met as the information required by General Ridgeway concerning the use of atomic weapons in a tactical role could not be supplied by the Pentagon for at least two months. Furthermore, the security restrictions placed on the release of atomic information by the McMahon Act meant that the plan must be drawn up by a small US team at SHAPE and thus would not be completed quickly. General Ridgeway had been asked to base his appreciation on 1956 because the weapons and qualified personnel to handle them would not be ready until about that time. There were certain questions arising from the UK paper on which the Chiefs of Staff should be prepared to give their views* These weres TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET (a) Is the UK view, as to the lessening of the risk of war, justified? (b) If the should force, forces Chiefs of Staff agree that the first priority be given to providing an acceptable deterrent what steps should Canada take to provide more in peacetime? (c) Could more forces be provided in peacetime by lowering the priority of reserves and post M-day forces? (d) Can reserve forces be re-organized to reinforce the forces which are in being more rapidly? (e) What would be the maintenance cost of forces which could be raised say by 1955? 2. The Chief of the General Staff suggested that one reason for the new UK concept was the desire on their part to participate in the atomic strategic offensive. The UK had been expending a considerable effort in the development of weapons and atomic carriers and they were now in the position where they wished to secure benefits from this effort. Moreover, their efforts in this direction were too costly to be sustained on top of their present announced defence programme. 3. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs suggested that the UK concept had been dictated by their difficult economic position which made necessary a curtailment in defence expenditures. This was also aggravated by the ending of the occupation of Germany as the cost of maintaining troops in Germany would now have to be borne by the UK. Uthat? The Committee, after considerable further discussion, agreed (a) The Joint Intelligence Committee would review the risks of war in the light of information contained in the Ismay paperj (b) The Joint Planning Committee would prepare a report on the military implications to Canada of the Ismay paperj and (c) The Chiefs of Staff would consider the UK strategic concept with a view to establishing the Canadian military position in the matter, and advising the government as to the adequacy of the Canadian defence plans to meet this new strategy, if it were accepted by NATO. Each Chief of Staff would prepare his views for discussion at a meeting of the Committee in the week of 22 to 27 September, 1952. DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF AND GENERAL BRADLEY ON US INSTALLATIONS IN CANADA TOP SECRET 5. The Chairman said that he explained to General Bradley that it might be useful if he knew the views of the Canadian Government on any further US installations In Canada. The Canadian Government did not wish to enter into any long term leases or agreements for further US installations in Canada. It would be more acceptable if the US could limit their requirements to the leased bases. It was stressed that in time of war it was a different matter, but in peacetime public TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET - U~ opinion had to be considered and that there was certain elements in Canada who voiced the view that Canada was allowing the US to defend certain parts of the country. Therefore, further requests for concessions in Canada would create a very difficult political problem. With regard to Torbay, it was emphasized that US requests for facilities at this base presented a difficult problem, because Torbay is the airport of St. John's and still a civil airfield. If large American installations were established at this airfield it would create a further requirement for defence arrangements for these installations including fighter squadrons. This would pose the question as to whether these fighter squadrons were American or Canadian and neither solution would be satisfactory. It would be difficult for the Canadian services to undertake the responsibility for the defence of US installations. On the other hand, it would be politically unacceptable to have a US fighter squadron stationed at Torbay as this would be Interpreted as a squadron for the defence of the city of St. John's as well as the base at Torbay. General Bradley said that he was not convinced that there was a real requirement for an USAF depot at Torbay. It appeared that this request had arisen because the USAF, who now had depot space at Argentia, had been requested by the USN to vacate this space. General Bradley undertook to discuss this matter with the USAF to see if their request could not be withdrawn. With regard to the question of fighter squadrons operating for the defence of Strategic Air Command operations, it was pointed out that it would be more acceptable if the US would avoid submitting requests for fighter squadrons to be permanently stationed on Canadian territory in peacetime. It would be more acceptable if fighter squadrons'were brought up periodically in support of Strategic Air Command exercises or to protect Strategic Air Command operations in case of an emergency. In this way it should be possible to familiarize the pilots with these areas of operations and to make all preliminary arrangements for use in an emergency. General Bradley had said that he would discuss the matter with General Walsh, USAF. The question of anti-aircraft sites on Canadian territory was also diseussed and it was pointed out that the actual stationing of troops on Canadian territory would be a very difficult proposal for the Canadian Government to accept. General Bradley had said that they were trying to provide defence against a sneak raid and suggested that perhaps a reciprocal arrangement could be worked out to provide alternative sites for both Canadian and US anti-aircraft artillery on both sides of the border. It was emphasized that this arrangement would create a difficult problem for Canada as Canadian anti-aircraft artillery was only a reserve organization and no Canadian troops could be stationed alongside US units in Canada. General Bradley had said that he was not aware of this situation and would undertake to discuss the matter with General Collins. With regard to additional early warning sites in Canada, General Bradley had said that it was his understanding that these new stations were to be in addition to the present integrated air defence scheme but that he thought they should form part of the Canadian/US air defence scheme. TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET - 56. The Chief of the Air Staff suggested that, in order to avoid having US fighter squadrons permanently stationed in Canada, the US might arrange to rotate their squadrons. 7. The Committee noted the remarks of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff. (R.G. Kingstone) Lieutenant-Colonel, Secretary. DISTRIBUTION Chairman, Chiefs of Staff C.A.S. C «G.S« C.N.S. C.D.R.B. Deputy Minister Secretary to the Cabinet Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Coordinator, Joint Staff - 1 2 3 U 5 6 7 - 8 - 9 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Global Strategy / 17 SEPTEMBER 1952 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952-09-17 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00096 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Notes for Chiefs of Staff Meeting 17 Sep 52," LAC, RG 2, vol. 223, file no. I-60-1. atomic strategic offensive Charles Foulkes Leolyn Dana Wilgress