https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/817bf1e5ee92b292ffbbbf3d5c5b40e0.pdf 1f1153438cfc69687cbb1ededb261a53 PDF Text Text StLe (1) Div./ft-P- Caraeron/bm 3SCRST September 10, -ItSf* M03RMTOUM Wll» 7amiiW*MliBWWiiPM FRANCE Ml® KA3KJ— II, SPAAK'S AIDE MEMORS M* Spaak*s paper represents aa attempt to saeet Seaeral de"0aaXXer« position by devising, few arrangements for consultation within tho MkW fra®e*» worfe»- He-- ale© jaaiees a piaa for American co-operation tp France's efforts to make her own nuclear weapons. Brief If stated his suggestions relating to NAfO ares (3L| A special committee of NATO w M s k would fee responsible for decisions relating to the. '• • mo of strategic nuclear weapona |" therule ef ima&iMty, however* would aot apply* The Goffiiaittee would be composed of member states whieh have permitted the establish* aient of strategie weapons on their territories* C2) 3orae aachinery should be devised within so that ateffiber states could be .tef craed* and consultedfeythe nuclear powers, regarding their intentions ia. respect- of using nuclear weapons outside the HATO area* 131 Special committees on the Middle East, Far ' East, Africa and South East Asia, with ' restricted iaenberehip laight be devised within HAf® to study thoroughly political aad military problems arising: ia these areas* Such eoisaittees might even formulate common policies which could in ^ihole or ia part be submitted for the infonaatioa of all iAf0 countries* 2* While one cannot bub adn&re H* Spaak* a ingenuity and appreciate the solid reasons uadsrlyisjfcg most of his suggestions, we are rather sceptical ©f their practicability. Of the three ideas put forward in the HAT© eonteiet, we are inclined to favour the first. S. Ia considering the problem of Mf©'® response ia the rather improbable eveat of a Soviet conventional attack ia lurope, M. Spaak assumes *» aad rightly so * that under present"defence plans, NATO forces would have ao alternative but to use tactical nuclear weapons in defence. He therefore directs his attention to the question of the decision which would have to be taken fconcerning the use of MATO strategic weapons {IRBM s} * M e h would have the effect of enlarging the area of nuclear conflict pos* cibly to proportions of an all*»out nuclear war* Since such decisions are presently on aa unsatisfactory bilateral basis, the Seeretary-£Iea©ral»s idea is that a • • •X �- 2 - special committee should be established so that the members possessing such weapons on their territories would have a direct voice (although not necessarily a veto) in the important decision, 4* This suggestion appears to have a number of advantages from a political point of view, (Me are not, however, convinced that his basic assumption is within the realm of reality, i.e,» that the Soviet Union would give up the advantage of surprise by launching a limited war in Europe and risk provoking a full scale nuclear bombardment of the USSR by SAGj nor do we believe that a tactical nuclear response to a Soviet conventional attack would not foree or persuade the latter to us© nuclear weapons,) It would provide for a greater measure of consultation between the governments and prevent a decision being taken bilaterally which iould have the effect of involving the alliance in an all-out nuclear war, While it is true that the present HAT© pattern with respect to strategic weapons provides for joint decisions, which in effect would mean the right of veto by the govern* meats on whose territories they are located* the present arrangement would not permit the United King* dom, for example, to have a voice in a decision to launch IRBM missiles from Italian sites* Second* the establishment of a special committee within NATO could give treater substance to the claim that the IRBM*© in Italy and later in Turkey) are part of the NATO defensive arrangement. At the present time no provisions exist for NATO political supervision or control over the use of these weapons* Third, it would go part way. towards meeting General de £aullefs insistence in a voice in any decision to use the deterrent; France's eligibility would, however, depend on their willingness to accept IRBM's on French territory* The Spaak formula would also avoid acceptance of French demands for unilateral control over IEBM*s on French territory, 5* There may, however, be a number of military objections to such an arrangement* SACEUR might well argue that he could not be restricted to the point where he would have to await consultation between a number of governments before proceeding to use such weapons* Moreover, he might insist that IRBM sites would be a prime target for attack by the Soviet Union should it decide to employ nuclear weapons and eonse* quently it would be necessary to launch such missiles before the sites are destroyed* However, these ob» jections might well be offset by the political advantages to be gained from the Spaak suggestion* 6* From a strictly Canadian point of view we would have to recognize that the Spaak formula, if accepteds mi^it exclude us from such consultations, unless it were possible or desirable to expand the present rather restrictive definition of strategic nuclear weapons (generally used to describe IRBM's, SAC, and the United Kingdom Strategic Bomber Command) • * •3 �t© encompass strike aircraft carrying nuclear air* to-ground missiles* However, even if we-were not included in such consultations within HATO, the establishment of such a committee might meet our present concern that so provision appears to exist for a degree of political control within HAT© over the use of nuclear weapons* Indeed it .is f#r. consideration, whether we might not .suggest that -a firm understanding should be reached that,there should be consultation in HATO between those countries whose forces are equipped with tactical nuclear weapons and where there is time such consultation should extend to all members of the alliance whether they possess atomic weapons or not* f* Spaak*s second suggestion for a system of information and consultation relating to the use of_ nuclear weapons outside the NATO area (which has not been precisely defined) makes a good deal of sense, but we suspect that for reasons of security it is highly unlikely that the major powers would be prepared to divulge their intentions to many other members of the SATO Council* From a Canadian point of view the implementation of this suggestion would not be very advantageous since we are in. a rather privileged category in respect of present arrangements for periodic "meetings of consultation". As far as General de Gaulle is concerned, we are sceptical that the type of Consultation which would be possible in the MATO contest would meet his frequently expressed wish to have a direct vole© in any decision to use nuelear weapons, t* fhe Secretary^Cleaeral's critical analysis of the disadvantages of a tripartite directorate meets with our approval and should go some way towards convincing de Gaulle of the impossibility of his demands in this respect* The solutions which M» Spaak puts forward in a rather interrogative way are interesting in the sense he is suggesting the formation of special Committees in IATO, the membership of which would be restricted to those countries with direct interests in the areas concerned* This idea represents an attempt to meet in a. practical way de. Gaulle* s repeated insistence that MATO is not capable of handling global problems, but without going as far as his suggestion for a wdirectoiretta. In strategic terms, it is based on the assumption ~that the real threat to M T O is on the flanks and that the Communist danger in such areas should be considered in the NATO Context, 9* While we must recognise the vulnerability of the Western position in the areas mentioned, we wonder Aether it is either possible (granted the geographical area of the Treaty) or desirable tin the sense a number of countries, including Canada, are highly sensitive to suggestions that NAT©*s responsibilities should be extended) to demise such arrangements. It seems to us that such consultatinas would hardly achieve the Common policies that M, Spaak may have in mind or that, from de Saulie^s point of view, go much beyond the scope of the ambassadorial talks in Washington* In other words, .. .4 �«* .*%. it would be. too little for the purposes of the French and too •much for countries, like ©anada and the Seaa~ dinavian coiintries who are against steps to widen the area of responsibilities. It might,, of course, fee. argued that .such special committees would, not .commit HATO as a whole 'to their, recommendations or agreed' policies,.but it would seem to us inevitable that-the Alliance would become more .and more concerned. withplanning outside. MATO:, especially insofar as many areas outside are recognised as being especially vulnerable. WOT our part, we would answer M* % a a k by saying that we would, see some advantage .in closer active consultation and planning between'the powers directly concerned in. such areas, tat that such co** ordination of activities #ight better take place outside the framework of the Alliance* Me would at the same time indicate, however, that it would be • desirable wherever possible to keep the other members informed regularly through the Council or on a hi* lateral basis through diplomatic channels* On balance, we feel the disadvantages of this third suggestion of M, Spaak* s far outweigh any possible advantages,; 10» .Basically the French leader appears to be seeking recognition for' France as a great'power, .-His. present demands are directed primarily to the United.' States, and it woiild hardly seem likely that a re* organisation of NftT0 along the lines he has suggested would meet the French leader's aspirations* � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW02523 Title A name given to the resource CDNW02523 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived " NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5958, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 1-1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en