https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f38d10a4440d79fcca1cb456952c347f.pdf 3e824a56e43843bf70b2d2edfc4e015f PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - OkuA 6->^ D~ i~ t^ st\ Document ^"^wm^f/SH"'''occ"6nnformatio THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA SECRET June 17, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE CONSULTATION CONCERNING AND AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES An agreement with the United States was concluded on August 16, 1963 concerning nuclear weapons to be available to the Canadian forces for use with four weapons systems, the F-101 "Voodoo" interceptor aircraft, the Bomarc, the CF-104 aircraft and the Honest John artillery rocket. Aw Exchange of Notes of September 28 and 30, 1963 constituted a second agreement concerning the storage of nuclear weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon for U.S. interceptor aircraft stationed at those leased base areas. In both agreements It was provided that the nuclear weapons concerned would be used "when authorized by both Governments", and with regard to the nuclear weapons to be available to Canadian forces that their release from U.S. custody "to meet operational requirements will be the subject, where practical, of prior inter-governmental consultation." Neither agreement dealt with how or in what circumstances the operational use of the nuclear weapons In question would be authorized by the two Governments. In an Exchange of Letters supplementary to the August 16 agreement, however, It was specified that the "procedures and means whereby the two Governments will authorize use of these weapons operationally will be reviewed at an early date by appropriate officials of the two Governments." On March 18, 1964 President Johnson wrote to the Prime Minister to inform him that he had issued instructions for bilateral discussions to be undertaken through military channels with a view to reaching agreement upon detailed procedures for control of nuclear weapons assigned in support of NORAD air defence units in Canada, and suggested that when matters had been sufficiently prepared it would be useful for the President and the Prime Minister to have a discussion in order to endorse the arrangements worked out before their adoption. Following an initial acknowledgment agreeing to military discussions, the Prime Minister pointed out in a second letter dated April 21 that there were really two requirements in this matter, the first for procedures to govern the operational use of the nuclear weapons and the • /2 000067 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T - 2 - second for arrangements for consultation between the two Governments concerning situations in which their use might become necessary. He proposed concurrent negotiations through diplomatic channels concerning inter-governmental consultation and authorization for use. Following these exchanges, discussions were undertaken between military and civilian officials of the two Governments which have led to the negotiation of the attached draft agreement. As stated in the text, it would be the object of this agreement: (a) to consolidate relevant provisions of existing agreements and to define more precisely (1) the relationship between such consultation and measures relating to North American defence which might be undertaken in a situation of rising tension or to prepare for possible war, and (2) the procedural arrangements and channels of communication applicable to such consultation; (b) to specify the procedures for authorizing CINCNORAD to use operationally forces equipped with nuclear weapons. In connection with (b), the crux of the problem has been to define the emergency circumstances in which CINCNORAD would be given prior authorization by both the President and the Prime Minister to use nuclear air defence weapons if necessary when time or failure of communications prevented his consulting Governments. PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT The draft agreement provides for inter-governmental consultation through a meeting if possible, or in an emergency by telephone, concerning situations of increasing international tension which could give rise to hostilities involving North America. It also provides for periodic meetings of senior officials of the two Governments to discuss situations which might so develop as to lead in due course to a risk of hostilities Involving North America. The agreement then refers to various measures which might be proposed by either Government or by the Commander in Chief of NORAD (CINCNORAD) in preparation for possible hostilities involving North America, specifies that where time permits there shall be prior consultation concerning such measures, and adds that, should it be necessary in an emergency for such measures to be taken by either Government in advance of consultation, that Government will immediately inform the other and will consult as soon as possible. In particular, there is a specific requirement for prior consultation where possible with regard to an increase in the state of readiness of the NORAD command and hence to the various measures preparatory to the use of nuclear weapons by NORAD forces. . . ./ 3 000068 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T - 3 - The agreement then specifies procedures whereby the inter-governmental consultation proposed could be undertaken promptly and effectively in case of need. The concluding paragraph of this section of the agreement (paragraph 7 appearing on pages 4 and 5) deals with the specific question of authorization for the operational use of nuclear weapons by NORAD forces. This paragraph specifies that United States authority for release of nuclear weapons from custody and authorization by the Canadian and United States Governments for their use by NORAD forces will not be given except in emergency circumstances or upon declaration of DEF CON 1 (the second highest state of readiness of NORAD, to be declared when strategic attack against North America is imminent) or Air Defence Emergency (to be declared when strategic attack against North America is occurring.) The paragraph goes on to specify that in the case of a gradual buildup in international tension the state of readiness of the NORAD command could be raised by agreement in the course of inter-governmental consultation . Paragraph 7 then makes provision for prior authorization by the two Governments for the operational use of nuclear weapons by NORAD forces in emergency circumstances, and in sub-paragraph (e) defines the emergency circumstances concerned. The definition consists of four descriptive sections, outlining situations which would constitute evidence of a general strategic attack upon North America, followed by a more general clause which reads as follows: "(v) In any circumstances in which, in CINCNORAD1 s judgment, a strategic attack against North America (or an attack against Alaska), is imminent, or is occurring, and in which delay might seriously prejudice the defence of North America." In a concluding paragraph provision is made for the right of each Government to "retain for purposes of its own defence the freedom to take measures at home or abroad not inconsistent with the sovereignty of the other." In other words, this paragraph provides that either Government may in self-defence employ, on a national basis and not subject to any restriction arising from the agreement, its own national forces in its own territory and air space, but imposes upon each Government the obligation in such circumstances to inform the other immediately of the action taken. SIGNIFICANT POINTS It is to be noted in the first place that this draft agreement deals only with nuclear weapons available . . ./ 4 000069 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T _ 4 to NORAD forces for use in the air defence of North America, but not with nuclear weapons available to Canadian forces committed to NATO in Europe (i.e., for the CF-104s and Honest Johns). Many of the provisions of the draft agreement are adaptations of the provisions of more limited agreements hitherto in force. The text specifically supersedes a designated list of.existing agreements, the provisions of which either are adequately covered in the new text or are made redundant by it. Hence it is a single comprehensive document spelling out clearly and precisely all aspects of the relations between the two Governments with regard to the use of nuclear weapons for the air defence of North America. Unlike a number of agreements which it supersedes, the draft agreement provides a single system of consultative arrangements and operational procedures applicable to NORAD as a single integrated command without regard to the nationality, location or area of operation of its component forces. This concept has been inherent in the NORAD agreement, but has not been fully reflected in the various operational arrangements previously established pursuant to that agreement because hitherto forces in Canada have not had nuclear weapons available to them. The new text, in bringing the NORAD agreement to full, realization, establishes a truly equal basis for the participation of the two countries in the joint air defence of North America. Hitherto NORAD has been regarded as a joint command for certain purposes, but for others, when it has been convenient to the U.S. it has been used in practice very much as if it were an institution at the direct disposal of the U.S. Government. Such a view of the joint command is specifically excluded by the attached text. It has long been recognized that in the event of a surprise attack, where consultation might not be possible, CINCNORAD should have prior authority to take measures on his own responsibility for the air defence of North America, including resort to nuclear weapons if necessary. On the other hand, there has not until now been any definition agreed by the two Governments of the circumstances in which he would have authority to resort on his own responsibility to the use of nuclear weapons. The provision in the attached text on this subject was a matter of some difficulty in the negotiations, as U.S. authorities wished to leave the ultimate discretion in an emergency to the Commander in Chief, while Canadian officials considered it desirable to allow for limited forms of intrusion or surprise attack in which resort to nuclear weapons would not necessarily be desirable and in which, therefore, the authority for a decision should rest with Governments rather than with the . . ./ 5 000070 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T - 5 military commander. It is considered that the definition of emergency circumstances provided in the attached text represents an acceptable compromise on this point in that it ties the definition pretty closely to the concept of an actual or imminent strategic (i.e. general and massive) attack against North America. RECOMMENDATION It is considered that the attached draft agreement will provide both for inter-governmental consultation in a situation where there is a risk of hostilities involving North America, and for effective procedures for authorizing the operational use of nuclear weapons by NORAD forces in both emergency circumstances and those of mounting tension. It is intended that it should be supplemented by the communications facilities envisaged in it, and by suitable operational procedures for carrying out a decision that the use of nuclear weapons by NORAD forces is authorized. On the basis of military discussions held in parallel with the negotiation of the draft agreement, CINCNORAD has submitted proposals on such operational procedures, and these are now under consideration. Accordingly it is recommended that: (a) the Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized at the meeting on June 25 of the Canada-U.S. Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence to initial the attached draft agreement, provided the U.S. Government will do likewise, as an earnest of the willingness of the Canadian Government to enter into an agreement in those terms; (b) the Prime Minister be authorized to agree with the President of the United States how the draft agreement shall be concluded and brought into force; and (c) an Order in Council be issued in due course authorizing the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for External Affairs, as may be decided in accordance with (b) above, to sign the agreement on behalf of Canada. v Secretary of State for External Affairs. 000071 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01911 Title A name given to the resource Consultation Concerning and Authorization for the Use of Nuclear Weapons Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 17-Jun-64