https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/9da2ff2da57b5db86a0edcbcdab0e99b.pdf 3975d92e1a9be6944119eda9704fff17 PDF Text Text Document divulgue en v ation REDRAFT OF PROPOSED CANADIAN NOTE S E C R E T June 5 t h , 1964 Sir: 1. I have the honour to refer to the Exchange of Notes of August 16, 1963 between our two Governmentsj in particular to paragraph 5 of the Secretary of State for External Affairs' Note No. 125 of that date; to the Letters of Understanding of the same date, concerning consultation prior to the release of nuclear warheads to, and authorization for their operational use by NORAD forces in Canada; to the Exchange of Notes of September 28 and 30, 1963; in particular to paragraph 6. , of the Secretary of State for External Affairs* Note No. 162 of September 28j and to the review by officials of the two Governments of existing arrangements between our two Governments providing for certain measures which might be' taken when hostilities involving North America appeared likely or possible and for various forms of consultation concerning situations which might lead to the outbreak of such hostilities. 2. The general pattern reflected in these various arrangements is that the measures envisaged require governmental authorization, which normally would be given only at the time and following inter-governmental consultation* The possibility of surprise attack is reflected by the qualification, explicit or implied, that the time factor might not always permit prior inter-governmental consultation and might in certain circumstances require some of these measures to be undertaken on the basis of prior authorization. 3. The Canadian Government wishes to propose the conclusion of a comprehensive Agreement with the United States Government, in the terms set out below, both concerning bilateral consultation between the two Governments with regard to situations which might lead to the outbreak of hostilities involving North America, and hence might call for the release of nuclear warheads to NORAD forces, and concerning procedures relating to the authorization to CINCNORAD for operational use of nuclear weapons. The object of this Agreement would be: (a) to consolidate relevant provisions of existing agreements and to define more precisely (1) the relationship between such consultation and measures relating to North American defence which might be undertaken in a situation of rising tension or to prepare for possible war, and (2) the procedural arrangements and channels of communication applicable to such consultation; The Honourable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States of America, WASHINGTON, D.C. ... 2 000091 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T - 2(b) to specify the procedures for authorizing CINCNORAD to use operationally forces equipped with nuclear weapons. CONSULTATION 4. (a) As the NORAD Agreement recognizes that the air defence of North America is single and indivisible, there is a special obligation on both Governments to maintain the closest consultation in any situation which could develop into a direct military threat to North America and consequently would lead to such precautionary steps as the raising of NORAD's state of readiness. It is agreed that, in a situation of increasing international tension which could give rise to hostilities involving North America, a meeting of representatives of our two Governments will be convened, on the initiative of either Government, (i) to examine jointly that situation in both its political and military aspects, and (ii) to consider, and to coordinate as appropriate, the courses of action which the two Governments might decide to undertake in relation to that situation. '(b) In a situation involving so urgent a risk of hostilities involving North America that it is not considered possible to convene such a meeting, either Government may initiate consultation concerning that situation through the medium of telecommunications, this to be known as "emergency consultation". (c) Rapid and reliable telecommunications facilities will be provided which will, with due regard for security, permit the simultaneous participation in such emergency consultation of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the United States, and the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff for Canada, and the Commander-in-Chief, NORAD (CINCNORAD). (d) Consultation between our two Governments in a situation of increasing international tension will be fully effective only if each has an adequate understanding of the views of the other concerning the background of that situation. Accordingly senior civilian and military representatives of our two Governments shall be prepared to meet at intervals of approximately six months to discuss situations which, in the view of either Government, might so develop as to lead in due course to a risk of hostilities involving North America. These discussions will be informal and exploratory and will not be regarded as involving or implying any commitment on the part of either Government as to the action it would take or the position it would adopt in particular circumstances not yet arisen. PREPARATORY MEASURES 5. (a) In the course of consultation undertaken as provided in 4, (a) or 4, (b) above consideration shall be given to the . advisability of implementing measures which might be proposed \ by either Government or by CINCNORAD in preparation for possible hostilities involving North America. Such measures could include .. . 3 000092 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T - 3(i) the institution by either country of military or civil alert measures on a national basis, (ii) the increase by CINCNORAD of the state of readiness of the North American Air Defence Command, (iii) measures by national authorities preliminary to operational use of nuclear weapons by NORAD forces, (iv) the release by the United States Government of nuclear weapons to Canadian forces committed to NORAD, and the concurrent authorization by both Governments to CINCNORAD for the operational use of nuclear weapons. (b) Except as provided in 9. hereunder and in 5* (c) and (d) hereunder, measures of a joint nature such as those listed in 5. (a) (ii) and (iv) above shall not be undertaken until they have been discussed and agreed in the course of inter-governmental consultation as provided in 4» above. (c) If an attack on North America appears imminent or probable in a matter of hours rather than days inter-governmental consultation and consultation between CINCNORAD and the two Governments might, of necessity, coincide with or even follow certain actions of a preparatory nature such as those listed in 5- (a) above. In that event, the other parties concerned will immediately be informed of the action taken, and consultation will take place as soon as possible. (d) Where time or other factors preclude his first consulting national authorities, CINCNORAD1s authority, as set out in his terms of reference, to increase the state of readiness of his forces is reaffirmed, and his authority in an emergency to authorize the use of nuclear warheads is affirmed in the manner hereinafter prescribed. (e) In a situation in which general war appeared likely or imminent, certain other preparatory measures, not relating directly to the defence of North America but nevertheless of concern to both Governments, would probably be considered. It would be appropriate that such measures be discussed in the course of the inter-governmental consultation for which provision is made in this agreement. PROCEDURES 6. (a) When time permits and communications and other facilities are available, the normal channel for the initiation by either Government of consultation as provided in 4. (a) and (d) above shall be between the United States Department of State and the Canadian Department of External Affairs via the Canadian Embassy, Washington. Procedures already established to permit rapid communication between our two Governments at any time by this channel may be used for this purpose. (b) In,addition to the channel indicated in 6. (a) above, channels which may be used to propose emergency consultation as provided in 4-(b) above include President-Prime Minister, Secretary of State-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 4 000093 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T - 4 - • Secretary of Defense-Minister of National Defence, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff-Chief of the Defence Staff or between designated officials of the Department of State and of the Department of External Affairs. Such emergency consultation may be initiated at the suggestion or request of CINCNORAD and, in such circumstances, CINCNORAD should normally be invited to participate in any discussions bearing on North American defence and involving other senior military advisers of the two Governments. In the event that emergency consultation is initiated, all agencies or persons listed above will immediately be informed. (c) Each Government shall establish and maintain such internal arrangements as will permit it te participate, at any time and on short notice, in such emergency consultation. Each Government shall inform the other of the nature of those internal arrangements, to the extent that such information would facilitate the prompt and effective conduct of such emergency consultation. (d) Arrangements will be made to provide for periodic exercises to test and practise the procedures for initiating and conducting such emergency consultation, such exercises to be held on occasion in conjunction with appropriate military and civil defence exercises. AUTHORIZATION FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NORAD FORCES 7. (a) Neither United States release of nuclear weapons nor Canadian Government authorization for use should be effected unless and until an attack against North America seemed imminent. Once the situation had deteriorated to this point, however, it would be imperative that the arrangements and procedures in force permit both release and authorization to be effected rapidly. (b) The need for release and authorization for use could arise either following a gradual build-up of international tension or in the event of a surprise attack against the forces or territory of the United States, Canada or their allies. In the case of a gradual build-up of tension, it may be presumed that decisions on the adoption of appropriate precautionary measures, including appropriate national and NORAD alert states (defence conditions) and a decision on the release and authorization for use of nuclear weapons, would be taken in consultation. (c) To provide for the possibility of the need for use arising suddenly in emergency circumstances as defined in paragraph (d) below, it is agreed that the President of the United States of America will provide for the timely release of nuclear warheads to Canadian forces committed to NORAD, and that the Prime Minister, acting on behalf of the Government of Canada, and the President will provide for the timely authorization to CINCNORAD to employ operationally nuclear armed forces^^The weapons thus made available to NORAD tvill be used only in accordance with NORAD Rules of Engagement. MA& 'IJ^A3 tZf~ "*- ^—OA^»-JLutAA^ &AA~%>ho\AUlr C COAAAA HA-a US, IAAAAX£A\A\ @fou CL*A\ dtAiAj^. l^O-hty^AO UJZXA^LB^LA-S. 000094 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act DocumenX,divulgue .ejojtejdtu_dft.Ja Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T - 5(d) The emergency circumstances referred' to in the preceding paragraph are as follows: (I) In the event that a surprise attack in force is undertaken against targets in Canada, or the United States, or both. In the absence of any advance warning that such an attack was imminent, or of any indication that large scale hostilities had started or were imminent in other theatres where United States or Canadian forces were involved, direct and unequivocal evidence that an attack in force had actually begun would be required. (Examples of developments which would be considered an "attack in force" would include the actual entry of substantial numbers of bombers into Canadian or United States sovereign airspace, or the detection of several missiles on trajectories originating in the Soviet Union and terminating in North America, or a combination of several missiles and bombers penetrating the BMEWS and DEW lines, respectively, on flight-paths patently directed towards North America.) (II) In the event that several nuclear bursts of unknown origin occur in the space of a few minutes within the confines dt^ the United States or Canada. (iii) In the event that reliable evidence is obtained that large numbers of bombers had taken off or several ICBMS had been launched from bases in the Soviet Union in circumstances preceded by a period of increased international tension. (iv) In the event that a properly authenticated communication is received from any major NATO or United States commander clearly indicating that attacks involving the use of nuclear weapons had been launched in at least one theatre directly involving NATO or United States forces. (v) In any circumstances which in CINCNORAD*s judgment involve a clear risk of imminent strategic attack against North America and in the case of Alaska, in the event of imminent attack and in which delay might seriously" prejudice the defence of North America. GENERAL CONDITIONS 8. This Agreement when it comes into force shall supersede the existing agreements listed in Annex A. 9. In any case, each Government shall retain, for purposes of its own defense, the freedom to take measures, at home or abroad, not inconsistent with the sovereignty of the other. 000095 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET - 610. This agreement may be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government, and after such review may be terminated upon six months' notice. It may be modified or amended at any time, by agreement, upon the proposal of either Government. 11. If the foregoing is I propose that this Note and stitute an Agreement between matter which shall come into reply. acceptable to your Government, your reply thereto shall conour two Governments on this effect on the date of your 000096 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01906 Title A name given to the resource Redraft of Proposed Canadian Note Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 5-Jun-64