https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/67d828e4310c6eaf4f2a5e71909fe354.pdf 65a6c56634ffef479384189b84d76a4a PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ' SECRET July 1 1 , 1963 DRAFT CANADIAN NOTE CONCERNING NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES I have the honour to refer to Articles 20 and 21 of the communique issued by the North Atlantic Council on December 19, 1957, and to discussions which have taken place between the appropriate authorities of the Canadian and United States Governments regarding the general principles under which nuclear warheads will be made available for the Canadian Forces. It is the understanding of my Government that in the course of these discussions agreement was reached regarding these general principles. (l) In order to implement this agreement my Government suggests the following arrangements^ The United States shall provide and maintain stockpiles of nuclear warheads for the use of the Canadian Forces in respect of tbe weapons and weapons systems shown in the attached Annex, which may be amended from time to time by agreement between the two governments. In this agreement the expression "nuclear warhead" includes the associated weapon where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components. NOTE: Except where indicated the text is that of the original Canadian draft approved by the Cabinet on . .^??y.?*.12§3i.. A square bracket indicates a deletion, and underlining an addition to or rewording of the original Canadian draft. Relevant paragraphs of" ther^d^txx^bSidsxSsia^X' are incorporated immediately below the paragraph of the general agreement to which they relate. Letter of Understanding 001063 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Original Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft (2) Stockpiles of nuclear warheads will (2) Stockpiles of nuclear weapons, to meet be established ^/in quantities and_7 at the needs of approved defence plans, will locations to be determined by the Allied be established at locations to be deter- Commanders concerned in accordance with mined by the'Allied Commanders concerned their approved plans or by the Canadian with their approved plans and in agreement and United States military authorities with Canadian and U.S. military authorities, as appropriate. or as determined by the U.S, and Canadian military authorities when appropriate. Letter of Understanding Comment (2) The d e l e t i o n of a reference t o " q u a n t i t i e s " i s i n l i n e with the U.S, d e s i r e t o have the t e x t of the general agreement conform a s nearly a s possible t o the usual NATO stockpile a g r e e ments wherein no commitment i s given regarding quantities. I t s d e l e t i o n was agreed subject t o the explanatory note contained i n the L e t t e r of Understanding a s supplemented by the f u r t h e r communication attached as Annex "BM. It is intended by the provision "to meet the needs of approved defence plans" that the quantities of nuclear warheads to be made available to the Canadian Forces in the defence of North America shall be jointly agreed and shall not be altered without full prior consultation. 001064 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET (3) Except as otherwise agreed, the costs of construction, administration and maintenance of the storage sites and associated facilities, including those required for the support of the United States custodial and support personnel, shall be borne by Canada, Provision, without cost to the United States, of land required will be the responsibility of Canada. To the extent that the North Atlantic Council approves the establishment of nuclear stockpile sites under NATO common infrastructure, the apportionment of costs will be subject to NATO infrastructure procedures. Installations and facilities for nuclear warhead storage and maintenance will be built and maintained to satisfy NATO or U.S. standards and criteria as applicable. Installations and facilities for normal logistic support (housing, messing, offices, etc.) which may not be specified under NATO criteria, will be provided and maintained as mutually a greed. (k) It is recognized that the custody of any stocks of nuclear warheads provided by the United States will be the responsibility of the United States and that United States personnel will be provided for this purpose. The status of such personnel in Canada will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon. 001065 �_ Original Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft _ _ _ Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Comment (5) The release of warheads to meet opera (5) The release of nuclear warheads to tional requirements will be the subject, meet operational requirements will be the where practical, of prior intergovern- subject, where practical, of prior inter- mental consultation. /They governmental consultation. will be used They will be as may be authorized by the Canadian used, when authorized by both Governments, Government and in accordance with pro- only in accordance with procedures estab- cedures7 established by the appropriate lished by the appropriate Allied Commander Allied Commander or by the Canadian and or by the Canadian and United States United States military authorities as military authorities as applicable. applicable. Letter of Understanding It is understood that in respect of North American defence, consultation in accordance with the procedures set out in the secret Exchange of Letters dated September 30 and October 2, 1959, between the Canadian Ambassador in Washington and the Secretary of State and supplementary correspondence dated January 11 4' (5) There are two elements in this provision: release by the U.S, President to the operational commander concerned and authorization of use by both Governments, Regarding the latter, the U,S, draft is considered to come closer to the Canadian requirement, that operational use requires the specific authorization of the Canadian Government, In proposing that the authority of both Governments should be required for use, the U.S. was making provision for a situation in which release and authority to use would be simultaneous. The relevant provision in the Letter of Understanding establishes the need, wherever possible, for consultation prior to release and relates it to existing agreements and arrangements providing for consultation on increasing NORAD1s states of readiness in periods of international tension. The provision for review of the procedures and and January iii, I960, relative to 001066 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T Original Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft Comment increasing NORAD's states of readiness means whereby the two Governments would authorize will, in all situations except that of use is intended to clarify how and when autho- surprise attack, precede the release of rization is to be sought and communicated in nuclear warheads to meet operational re- various situations of attack. quirements. The procedures and means whereby the two Governments will authorize use of these weapons operationally will be reviewed at an early date by appropriate officials of the two Governments. Provision shall be made for any further communications and other facilities necessary to permit authorization procedures to be carried out effectively and rapidly. (6) The United States will be responsible for the maintenance, modification and assembly of nuclear warheads, including the pro- vision of personnel and technical equipment for the performance of these functions. 001067 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T Original Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft Comment (7) External security for all nuclear war- (7) External security for all nuclear war- (7) In substance the latest version does not heads in storage or during movement is the heads in storage or during movement is the differ from the original Canadian draft, Canada responsibility of Canada within Canada responsibility of Canada within Canada will be responsible for external security (i.e., ^and elsewhere as may be agreed.7 The de- and, except as otherwise agreed between tails of external security arrangements the appropriate authorities of the two securing the storage sites against any kind of within hostile element Vxxxxx Canada and, except as may will be determined by the United States Governments, elsewhere where there are be otherwise agreed, at Canadian bases in Europe and Canadian military authorities and in nuclear warheads for the support of the and also aboard ship in the event that ASW accordance with the directives of the Canadian Forces. The details of external weapons should later be provided. Allied Commander, where appropriate. security arrangements will be determined by the United States and Canadian military authorities and in accordance with the directives of the Allied Commander, where appropriate, (8) The United States will be responsible (8) The United States will be responsible (8) The modification is directed to clarifying for the movement, in accordance with for the movement, in accordance with responsibility for movement of warheads within agreed procedures and in conformity with agreed procedures and in conformity with NATO countries. 001068 �SECRET Original Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Comment applicable Canadian laws and regulations, applicable Canadian laws and regulations, The interpretation of "points of entry" is of the nuclear warheads between the of the nuclear warheads between the specified in the Letter of Understanding. United States and ^storage sites/ in United States and points of entry in Canada, Subject to the provisions of Canada. Article (k) above, Canada will be respon- Article (ii) above, Canada will be respon- sible for the transportation of nuclear sible for the transportation of nuclear warheads between points in Canada and warheads between points in Canada and elsewhere as may be agreed. In respect elsewhere as may be agreed. of Europe, the United States will be res- Europe, the United States will be respon- ponsible for the movement of nuclear war- sible for the movement of nuclear warheads heads into and from the /ACE area. Res- into and from the countries within the ponsibilities for movement within the ACE area. Subject to the provisions of ACE area will be as agreed between the Article (ii) above, the Canadian Forces, appropriate U.S, and Canadian military except as otherwise agreed between the author!ties,7 appropriate authorities of the two Govern- Subject to the provisions of In respect of ments, will be responsible for the movement of the weapons within countries in the ACE area. 001069 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Original Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft Comment Letter of Understanding It is understood that the expression "points of entry" means, in respect of airlift of nuclear warheads, the airport of landing in Canadian territory from which warheads are to be transported by other means than by air, (9) Where necessary to meet the pur- (9) Except as otherwise agreed by the (9) The explanatory note in the Letter of Under- poses of this agreement, /a reliable appropriate authorities of the two standing is intended to provide that any pro- system of signal communications will be Governments, a reliable system of signal visions for cost sharing on communications in established, operated and maintained in communications will be provided by the existing or future agreements involving the two a manner to be agreed upon by the Government of Canada where necessary to countries will be deemed to apply to communica- appropriate authorities of the two meet the purposes of this agreement. tions required by this agreement. goveraments,7 Letter of Understanding It is understood that the phrase "except as otherwise agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments" is intended to take account of existing 001070 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T Original Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft Comment and future NATO and Canada-U.S. agreements where they may be applicable to the financing of communications required by the present agreement, (10) Canada will be responsible for pro (10) Canada will be responsible for pro- (10) The interpretive note regarding the level of viding reasonable administrative and viding reasonable administrative and support to be provided by Canada means that U.S, logistic support for the United logistic support for the United States personnel and their dependents will be accorded States personnel described in Articles personnel described in Articles (3) and the same standards as comparable Canadian per- (3) and (ii). (k) and their dependents. sonnel and dependents in Canada and in Europe, Letter of Understanding It is understood that "reasonable administrative and logistic support" means support provided on the same basis as, and of a standard not less than that provided for comparable Canadian personnel and dependents. 001071 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T (11) Where Canada is a joint user, with other members of NATO, of storage facilities in Europe, the division of responsibilities for the support and external security of such facilities will be as agreed between the governments concerned and the appropriate Allied Commander, Original Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft Comment (12) The safety procedures for maintenance, (12) The safety procedures for storage, (12) The addition of "storage" is intended to com- transport, loading, delivery and salvage maintenance, transport, loading, delivery plete the list of activities in respect of which of nuclear warheads will be at least and salvage of nuclear warheads will be safety procedures must apply. equivalent to U,S, standards and will be at least equivalent to U.S, standards the subject of arrangements between the and will be the subject of arrangements law and regulations was not pressed by the Canadian appropriate authorities of the United betvreen the appropriate authorities of the side on "ttie explicit understanding, recorded in the States and Canada, taking into considera- United States and Canada taking into con- agreed summary record, that the phrase, "will be tion classified (atomic) information sideration classified (atomic) informa- the subject of arrangements between the appropriate transferred under existing agreements tion which may be transferred under exist- authorities of the U.S, and Canada", would mean between the two governments and the ing agreements between the two governments that in the supplementary arrangements yet to be interests of other allied governments, and the interests of other allied govern- negotiated, agreed safety procedures would be in as applicable. ments, as applicable. conformity with Canadian laws and regulations and the would require the prior approval of' Atomic Energy A reference to the applicability of Canadian Control Board of Canada. The insertion of "which may be" is intended to indicate that the U.S. is only under an obligation to transfer such information as is relevant to the weapons systems under consideration. 001072 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T (13) Supplementary arrangements required to implement this agreement will be negotiated between the appropriate military autho- rities of the United States and Canada, Original Canadian Draft Agreed Redraft Comment (iii) Canada and the United States will (lli) Canada and the United States will (lit) The additional sentence is intended to pro- consult with regard to any notification consult with regard to any notification vide for consultation with third governments in or other form of diplomatic communica- or other form of diplomatic communication Europe as required; tion addressed to a third government addressed to a third government concern- concerning the proposed establishment ing the proposed establishment of any of any stockpiles of nuclear warheads stockpiles of nuclear warheads on its on its territory for possible Canadian territory for possible Canadian use. use. Agreement on the location of stockpile sites will also be obtained from the appropriate authorities of any third country in which stocks are to be located. (15) Publicity concerning this agreement and its implementation shall be governed by the Exchange of Notes of February 19 and 2ii, 1951 concerning publicity relating to joint Canadian-United States defence plans and operations. 001073 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Agreed Redraft Original Canadian Draft Comment — — — - 1 (16) ^The terms of this agreement may be (16) Letter of Understanding reviewed by the two governments at the re- The review and termination clause normally include its substance in the Letter of Under- quest of either government and after such inserted in any international agreement standing in order not to create a precedent not review may be terminated by either has been omitted from the Exchange of Notes found in other NATO stockpile arrangements. The government upon six months* notice.7 solely in the interests of conforming to U.S. asked that this provision which they NATO stockpile agreements. accepted in a North American context, be incor- It is under- stood however that the Exchange of Notes of (16) The U.S. desired to delete this article and porated in the Letter of Understanding. may be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated upon six months' notice. 001074 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET I propose t h a t i f the foregoing i s acceptable t o your Government, t h i s note and your reply i n d i c a t i ng such acceptance w i l l c o n s t i t u t e an agreement between the two Governments on t h i s subject, the agreement t o enter i n t o force on the date of your note i n r e p l y . 001075 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information \ v S E C R E T ANNEX WEAPONS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS 1) The IM99B (Bomarc) 2) A i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l es for the CF-101 3) Air-to-surface weapons for the CF-lOU k) The 762 mm Rocket (Honest John) 001076 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET ANNEX "B" J u l y 1 5, 1963 NUCLEAR WARHEADS DRAFT LETTER FROM THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE . TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE You will no doubt be aware that at the meeting at Hyannls Port in May between Prime Minister Pearson and President Kennedy, the Prime Minister mentioned the controversy which had been aroused in Canada concerning the reported uncertainties surrounding the future of the BOMARC "B" anti-aircraft missile. He was reassured by President Kennedy's comment that any changes relative to the BOMARC would be undertaken jointly and be the subject of prior consultation between the two Governments. On the understanding that the BOMARC "B" is still regarded by the United States as a necessary and effective element In the air defence of North America, Canada and the United States have now signed a bilateral agreement which will enable nuclear warheads to be made available for the Canadian BOMARCS as well as for certain other weapons systems. I need not emphasize that a difficult situation would be created if there were untimely moves to abandon the BOMARC system. As you will know, the agreement of September 27, I96I, under which BOMARC and related facilities were to be installed in Canada, provides that the facilities shall be operated for a period of ten years or such shorter period as may be agreed between us in the light of our mutual defence interests. I recognize that effec- tive defence should be judged on Its merits, and that it may be desirable to re-examine the efficacy of the weapons �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - S E C R E T system before the expiry of ten years. I should, however, like to be assured that the BOMARC n B n In both countries will continue to feature in North American defence at least until I965. Furthermore, should it any time be deemed desirable to plan definitively to dispense with any nuclear weapons system in joint service of our two countries, I hope that the Canadian Government will be immediately informed and that we will be a full participant from the outset in any such planning and attendant publicity. I hope that the foregoing meets with your approval . 001078 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ANNEX "CT S E C R E T J u l y 15, 1963. NUCLEAR WARHEADS DRAFT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT The House will wish to know that the Canadian and United States Governments have today signed an agreement prescribing the general principles under which nuclear warheads will be made available for the Canadian Torces. The agreement applies both to forces engaged in North American defence and those assigned to NATO. It covers warheads for the BOMARC "B", the Voodoo interceptor, the "Honest John" artillery rocket and the CF-104 Starfighter strike-reconnaissance aircraft. This agreement will be followed-up by technical arrangements in respect of each of these systems. The agreement is to remain secret. To divulge its contents would be contrary to NATO practice and not in the interests of national security. Once delivered, the weapons will remain in U.S. custody, and for this purpose small units of U.S.A. custodial personnel will be stationed at the Canadian storage sites. Thus,Canada will not become a member of the so-called "nuclear club". For the U.S. to continue as custodian,in time of peace, is to be welcomed for the very important reason that the arrangement does not add to the numbers of governments having nuclear weapons at their independent disposal. I should also like to stress that the agreement provides that the most stringent of safety measures will be applied at all times. Finally, so far as operational use is concerned,should that ever prove necessary, the agreement provides that such action will require the Canadian Government's authorization. Joint control is thus assured. 001079 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ANNEX »D" SECRET PRESENT STRENGTH OF BOMARC ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES BOMARC "A" 2 squadrons BOMARC "B" 5 squadrons (including the two in Canada) MIXED BOMARC "A" AND "B" 3 squadrons There are in all 207 BOMARC "A" missiles and 250 BOMARC "B" missiles in service. Of the latter, 56 are deployed at the Canadian bases. Following the phase-out of BOMARC "A", the U.S. will be retaining approximately 200 BOMARC "B" missiles. 001080 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01871 Title A name given to the resource Draft Dipomatic Notes and Letters (some are dated July 15th) Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 11-Jul-63