https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/028e232a174b2d82b7b268b79672c096.pdf 0b09c3b50695c175aff862859628565f PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vea&d^l&Mdfaiirq'S&fe&cyi'information j BEST AVAILABLE COPY ££L-J TOP SECRET April 25, 1955. Notes on a discussion between representatives of the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence on views received from London about distinction between large and tactical nuclear weapons and a study of national security policy This meeting was called to the Cabinet, and took place in Thursday, April 21. Also present Dr. Ma eft. ay, General Foulkes, Dr. Ignatieff, by Mr. R.B. Bryce, Secretary the Privy Council Offices on were Mr. Leger, Mr. Drury, Solandt, Mr. Martin and Mr. Distinction between large and tactical nuclear weapons 2. Mr. Bryce, in opening the discussion, said that he understood that all present had received copies of telegrams 536 and 537 of April 18 and 547 of April 19 from Canada House and of WA-633 of April 20 from the Canadian Embassy in Washington, which contained the subject matter for consideration. Also relevant excerpts from a memorandum dated March 17 reporting a conversation between Mr. Dulles and Mr. Pearson had been circulated. 3. Mr. Drury said that the problem at issue was not so much a distinction between the types of nuclear weaponsthat might be used, but between the types of wars in which the United States might be engaged and its effects on Canada. The United States apparently wants to be in a position to fight limited wars in Asia and to use nuclear weapons, if necessary. For this reason, United States leaders sought to draw a distinction between tactical and large nuclear weapons in order to obtain general public approval for the use of the former in limited wars. 4. General Foulkes said that the United States had no intention of fighting any other kind but a nuclear war for the reasons given by Mr. Dulles to Mr. Pearson in their talk of March 17. On the moral issue, the United States took the view that there was no difference in killing people with nuclear rather than with conventional weapons. 5. -Mr. Leger said that while there was an agreement between the United States and its allies regarding the use of nuclear weapons in NATO, there was no similar agreement covering local or peripheral wars. 6. General Foulkes said that the position about the use of nuclear weapons by NATO in the event of war was quite s\ I clear as a result of the adoption of MC.48 at the last miniV- sterial meeting. Once the political decision had been made to go to war, it was understood that nuclear weapons would \ \ be used from the outset. General Gruenther had explained > that the only limiting factor was the political decision whether there had been an act of war; the strategy which would then be put into operation would include the use of nuclear weapons. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatio BEST AVAILABLE COPY TOP SECRET -2- 7. Mr. Ignatieff recalled that General Gruenther, in recording his understanding of the implications of the approval of MC.48, had said that it would be a matter for political decision not only whether there should be belligerent action, but also whether the nature of the threat posed should be dealt with by a "limited" or by an "all-out" defence. He read the relevant extract from General Gruenther's comment on MC.48. 8. General Foulkes said that General Gruenther, in referring to the possibility of "local"-military operations in the NATO area, no doubt had in mind-some fracas in Berlin or the like. The main lines of NATO, strategy were clear enough. The Soviet Union, because of its superiority in conventional forces, had the capability of overrunning Western Europe without using nuclear weapons. To meet this treat, the Allies relied on two elements of strategy: a shield of groundair forces in being and. the deterrent of the strategic airnuclear power of the United States Air Force maintained in readiness to'retaliate against agression. In this strategy, no distinction could be drawn between large and tactical nuclear iveapons. ' ' •^" 9. Mr. Bryce asked whether it was possible to draw./a distinction between large and tactical nuclear weapons in relation to limited wars which might arise in Asia. He was inclined to agree with the British view that in the gradation of nuclear weapons there was no point at which one could draw a clear dividing line. If this was the opinion of those present, should it be communicated to the United States authorities as the British had suggested? He pointed out that there was a question of timing of such an approach to be considered. For instance, it might have been more opportune to convey Canadian views on this issue to Mr. Dulles when he had discussed the matter with Mr. Pearson last month. If representations were made now, it might be more difficult to explain the reason for doing so. 10. General Foulkes said that he had received information through a Canadian officer posted to a United States aircraft carrier that the carriers in the U.S. 7th Fleet patrolling the Formosa Straits were armed with tactical nuclear weapons and that their crews were trained to use them. He added that in his opinion the important implication of using nuclear weapons was the impact which this would have on Asian opinion; this opinion would not distinguish between small or large nuclear weapons. 11. Mr. Leger asked whether the United States military authorities had.the authority to use these nuclear weapons in the event of.hostilities. 12. General Foulkes said that it was his understanding that the authorization has to be given by the President. 13. Mr. Drury said that the United States authorities, in trying to draw a distinction between tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons, apparently intended to restrict the use of these weapons to military targets such as troop or naval concentrations. They realized that if they attacked a strategic target such as Peking, this would mean all-out war. �-, Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information BEST AVAILABLE COPY TOP SECRET -314. Mr. Bryce stressed the view that in its psychological impact upon Asian opinion, the fact that large*or small weapons had been used or whether they had been employed strategically or tactically would make little difference. 15. General Foulkes recalled that the attempt to draw a distinction between large and small nuclear weapons arose from the unfavourable reactions to the doctrine of "massive" retaliation as expounded originally by Mr. Dulles. The idea that any kind of Communist military threat would be met by all-out nuclear warfare was obviously indefensible and it was now being superseded by the idea of "measured" retaliation, in which nuclear weapons of limited power would be used in limited quantities against military targets. 16. Mr. Drury pointed out that if a limited use of force failed to accomplish the required objective, would not the nuclear attacks be extended? 17. General Foulkes said that there could be no'assurance that civilians would not suffer casualties, even if nuclear weapons were confined to so-called military targets. 18. Mr. Legerfsaid that while the intention to limit and localize a war in Asia may be present in the minds of the *United States leaders, would these intentions be clear to the Chinese? Do the Chinese realize the effects of nuclear weapons as we do? Also would the use of nuclear weapons against China bring the USSR into the war? These are some of the important questions, he said, which need to be considered in connection with the possible use of nuclear weapons against Communist China. 19. Mr. Drury said that it via.s obviously a matter of concern to Canada lest opinion should grow that the use of nuclear weapons is immoral, for this might tend to rule out or place a restraint upon the use of our main arm • of defence the nuclear deterrent - as being immoral. If the United States were determined to use nuclear weapons in limited wars in Asia,should we not aim at discouraging the United States from becoming engaged in limited wars in Asia, rather than trying .to draw a distinction between the kind of weapons that should be used? 20. Mr. Ignatieff said that since the threat by the United States to use nuclear weapons partly arose from the fact that the United States Government was acting unilaterally in the Formosa issue and against potentially superior conventional forces, the remedy might lie in collective approaches to such situations. 21. Mr. Leger recalled that Korea had shown that if the United States were engaged in hostilities under U.N. auspices, its freedom of action was limited; if it engaged in hostilities on the basis of a unilateral policy, it was more difficult for other governments to exercise control over U.S. actions. 22. General Foulkes recalled that, since Korea, nuclear armaments had been increasingly integrated with conventional armaments in the United States armed forces. The Eisenhower Administration had told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they would have to plan on the basis of lower financial and manpower ceilings for the armed forces, but in compensation could count upon the use of nuclear weapons in any type of military operation. 4 000017 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatio BEST AVAILABLE COPY . TOP SECRET/ -4- 'y if \ 23.. Mr. Bryce said that surely a strategy based upon the use of nuclear weapons in all types of military operations failed to take into account Soviet nuclear capability and the possibility of Soviet nuclear retaliation. r 24. Mr. Drury recalled, as Mr. Dulles had explained to Mr. Pearson, that the decision to rely on atomic weapons was based largely on economic considerations. t. 25. Dr. MacKay suggested that another difference between aggression in the NATO area and possible local conflicts in , the Far Tgast was that while in Europe certain defined areas .' had been guaranteed by the Allies, there was no such agreed line guaranteed in the Formosa area. '' ? 26. Mr. Bryce added that another difference was that none of the other Western powers were in a position to put . adequate conventional forces into the Far East to act as a shield. He wondered, whether in view of this fact the other Western powers were in a strong position to tell the United States how to resist Communist attacks in the Far East. 27. Mr. Drury said that the purpose of the statements made by the President and Mr. Dulles regarding the distinction between small and large nuclear weapons was clearly to have the public accept the idea of using nuclear weapons in local wars, 28. Dr. Solandt said that surely the United States should be told that statements such as these, which might be useful in dealing with local aggression in the Far East, tended to reduce the deterrent value of nuclear weapons and therefore conflicted fundamentally with allied interests in NATO. 29. General Foulkes said that Canada had a direct interest in the matter because of the Canadian responsibilities for contributing to the defence of United States nuclear retaliatory potential. He thought that we should say to our United States friends that statements dividing nuclear weapons into small and large, with inferences that the use of the small is morally justifiable while the use of the large may not be, might prejudice the effectiveness of the deterrent value of the United States nuclear capability. 30. Mr. Leger said that if it were true that the use of atomic weapons in local wars risked making them general and causing Soviet intervention, Xtai it was a matter of direct concern to Canada whether atomic weapons were used in local wars or not. He asked whether the others might agree to a reply being sent to London on the following lines: that instead of making a joint approach at a high level as suggested, we might make an enquiry at a lower level of the . State Department to obtain clarification of certain aspects of the remarks about United States defence policy made by f. Mr. Dulles to Mr. Pearson on March 17; from such an^enquiry, * the Canadian Government would be in a better position to^judgev whether further representations would be necessary, and in the meantime the British could go ahead with their own approach. 31. Mr. Bryce said that surely the United States already knew Canadian views on United States defence policy relating to Formosa. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information BEST AVAILABLE COPY TOP SECRET -532. Mr. Leger replied that although certain views had been expressed to the United States, the Canadian attitude could not be regarded as invariable, since the circumstances were constantly changing. For instance, out of the Australian initiative to find a solution, the idea had come up that a group of powers might offer a limited mutual guarantee of Formosa in return for a disengagement from the coastal islands and an international solution being worked out for Formosa and the Pescadores. 33. Mr. Drury asked whether, in the event that such a guarantee had to be carried out because of a Communist attack on Forncsa, the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons. 34. Dr. MacKay said that this did not necessarily follow, since it would then be a matter for collective political decision to determine what military action should be taken. 35* Mr. Leger made it clear that no approach had .so far been made to Canada to participate in a guarantee, but if this idea of a mutual guarantee offered real possibilities of avoiding an explosion over the coastal islands, it would be worth considering. 36. Mr. Drury said that if Canada participated in such a mutual guarantee, we would be in a far stronger position to intervene.in Washington about the way that local wars should be fought. The United States would resent an approach now, for in the absence of assistance from other Western powers, the only \tfay it could manage to shore up its defences in the Far East was to plan on the use of nuclear weapons. 37. Mr. Leger said if there could be any assurance that local wars could be kept localized, even if nuclear wea'pons were used, Canada would have perhaps poor ground for representations. The risk, however, was that the use of nuclear weapons in a local war might set off a chain reaction, leading to Soviet intervention and general war. 38. Mr. Bryce thought that the implications of using nuclear weapons in local wars was less dangerous in terms of the possible intervention of the Soviet Union than in terms of its impact on Asian opinion. 39. General Foulkes said that the Soviet Union would come into a war overtly only if they were sure of winning it. 40. Dr. MacKay said that if nuclear weapons were used in Asia, it would alienate all Asian opinion. The Soviet Union would probably come to the assistance of Communist China by all means short of all-out war and would exploit the psychological and political effects of using atomic weapons on Asians through its propaganda. 41. Mr. Bryce said that there seemed to be general ' agreement among those present with the British thesis that there was no clear dividing line in the gradation of nuclear weapons and none should be drawn; otherwise the inference may be made that the use of large weapons was morally unjustifiable. The question now to be decided was whether there �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information BEST AVAILABLE COPY „ , TOP SECRET -6was any prospect of accomplishing anything by approaching the United States with our views at this time. 42. Mr. Drury suggested that if there were a mutual guarantee of Formosa, then the question of unilateral United States military action would not arise and no representations would be called for. In the present circumstances, when Canada was making no contribution in the area and was withdrawing from Korea, our intervention might only be resented. 43. Dr. MacKay asked whether we should encourage the United Kingdom to proceed with its approach in Washington. * 44. Dr. Solandt wondered whether it would not be better, if any approach were to be made, that it would be done informally and at a lower level. It might be well to draw the attention of the United States authorities in this way to the effect of statements, drawing a distinction between larger and smaller nuclear weapons, on the effectiveness of the ,* nuclear deterrent in NATO. 45. General Foulkes suggested that he might-take the occasion of his meeting with General Gruenther next week to talk to him along these lines. 46. Mr. Bryce said that it seemed to be agreed that the Canadian approach would be limited to enquiries at the lower level of the State Department. Since there had. been. an. opportunity to express views direct to Mr. Dulles when he had raised these matters with Mr. Pearson and this had not been done, it would not seem opportune now to suggest making a formal approach. If any new circumstances should arise, or should Canada participate in the mutual guarantee Mr. Leger had mentioned, the -question of an approach might be reconsidered. Study of national security policy 47. Mr. Bryce invited Mr. Leger to introduce the discussion, as the matter had been first raised by External. 48. Mr. Leger said that he could not add anything significant to what had been said about the matter in the exchange of official correspondence. 49. General Foulkes intervened to ask whether Mr. Leger had said "exchange". 50. Mr. Leger said that it might be more accurate to say that the views of the Department of External Affairs had been fully set out in the successive letters and enclosures which had been sent to the Department of National Defence. A preliminary policy paper had also been prepared by Mr. Ignatieff as a basis for further discussion. This paper did not yet have the blessing of the Department, It was recognized by the Department that any study of national security must of necessity be a joint endeavour between the departments concerned. He suggested that the two departments should now get together as had been proposed so that agreed conclusions could be submitted to the Ministers. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatio BEST AVAILABLE COPY TOP SECRET -751Mr. Drury said that a study of national security policy had two aspects - the consideration of long-range policy questions and the immediate problems of the developing defence programme. The Department of External Affairs was more concerned with the former aspect in connection, for instance,' with statements by the Minister on the defence position of the free world. The Department of National Defence was more concerned with the immediate problems of making the best use of defence expenditure and planning defence "hardware". The Department of External Affairs would only, be aware of these" A immediate problems in. general terms. ,. // • ' A 52. Mr. Leger suggested that the long-range and more / \ immediate aspects of planning national security tended to intersect when decisions had to be made whether one.type of "hardware" should be made available within the next five years rather than another. Surely the interests of the two Departments in national security planning were more closely connected than had been suggested. 53. General Foulkes'said that the Department of External Affairs had suggested that in the proposed study the forecast should be projected over a period of ten years. This he said was quite impracticable. He admitted that the time had come when certain Canadian defence commitments required review. , He said (reading from a paper) that the aims of Canadian ' / defence policy were quite clear: (a) to defend the Canadian way of life through participation in continental defence and -' NATO, and (b) to be -in a position to make a contribution to fighting the. cold war through collective security action under United Nations auspices. There were certain consequent defence commitments which required urgent review. For instance, the decision to contribute a brigade group to NATO had been made in circumstances which had subsequently changed. For one thing a German defence contribution to NATO was shortly to be expected. Another problem which required urgent consideration was the inflexibility which now existed in the use of the RCAF in NATO and continental defence respectively. The squadrons were not interchangeable, and this might have serious political repercussions if it were decided to transfer any part of these forces from one employment to the other. He was also by no means happy about some of the implications of the plans for the defence of North America. He did not deny that a study of national security was necessary, but suggested that the study of long-range policy and of the defence' programme should be kept separate. 54T • Mr. Bryce suggested that it might be advisable to start with the re-examination .of the defence programme and then go on to consider the longer-term questions of policy. 55. General Foulkes said that the particular problems which he had mentioned were really urgent. Decisions about aircraft in fact were overdue. A study of this question would provide the background information which Ministers . would require in making their decisions. 56. Mr. Drury suggested that the study might start with the formulation of certain assumptions. For instance, it would only be realistic to assume that the defence programme would have to be planned on the basis of existing financial and manpower ceilings; otherwise the study would only be a paper exercise. '. ' 8 \ 000021 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act , Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information BEST AVAILABLE COPY TOP SECRET -8- 57. General Foulkes said that this study of the defence programme would in effect be addressed to making the most economical use of available manpower and other resources, 58. Mr. Bryce suggested that in comparison with some of the Allies, including the United States, Canadian manpower input into the defence programme, in relation .to other resources, might be considered too low. 59« Dr. MacKayjsaid that one field which required urgent study was continental defence and this involved some profoundly important policy considerations. 60. General Foulkes said that Canada had been expected to provide 18 squadrons for the interception role. Now it had been found that the reserve squadrons could not handle the jet aircraft which were assigned to them. This was something which should be sorted out at the official level. 61. Dr. Solandt suggested that if the study were limited to a discussion of what could be most economically done under the existing financial ceiling, the government would not be informed, as it should be, .what additional measures might be provided to improve the security of Canada. For instance, the United States was aiming at providing equipment which might ensure a 95 per cent attrition rate in enemy carriers directed against North America. This kind of possibility should surely be taken into account in any study of Canadian national security policy. 62. Mr. Bryce said that there was apparently agreement that certain things needed to be looked at; it remained to decide on the priority which should govemthe order in which the various questions were examined. In any case, it would be necessary to look at least five years ahead, because of the CF105 problem. As to timing, Mr. Bryce suggested that it might be the aim to provide conclusions for the consideration of Ministers by next fall. Ministers would be in a better position to give these matters their attention after the Parliamentary session and the Dominion-Provincial Conference were out of the way. There would be several months, therefore, for pursuing the study. 63. Mr. Leger said that the discussion on the distinction between smaller and larger nuclear weapons and the policy implications of United States reliance on nuclear weapons pointed to the need for interdepartmental consultation. The sooner joint conclusions on these matters could be reached for submission to Ministers, the better, 64. Mr. Bryce said that there seemed to be general agreement to go ahead with the study, but the conclusions need not be ready until the fall. 65. Mr. Drury suggested that the aim of the study should be to develop the assumptions and criteria which should govern the Canadian defence programme. For instance, what should be the criteria for determining what Canada's share should be in the defence of North America or in Western Europe? At present, he suggested, each Minister considering �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information BEST AVAILABLE COPY TOP SECRET -9such problems has different sets of criteria upon which to base his decisions. The study should aim to produce a framework of criteria which would be available for the guidance of all Ministers concerned. 66, Mr. Bryce said that there was general agreement that the study should cover both a re-examination of the defence programme and a consideration of the broader questions of defence policy on which the government is required to take positions from time to time. Consideration should also be given to related problems of defence mobilization under conditions of nuclear warfare and civil defence. He asked whether it was not possible to agree on an order of business and set a group to work on it. Staff" 67> Mr. Drury said' that the Department of National Defence had difficulty in providing the necessary personnel. There were not many officers available qualified to do longrange thinking and those who were so qualified were all engaged,on urgent day-to-day duties. He said that the joint iplanningywas no good for this purpose and the separate ser~ vice planners would tend to "grind the axes of their respective Chiefs of Staff". It was hoped to improve the joint planners machinery. The Director of the Joint Staff would be replaced, but his replacement would not be available until August. It was "a terrible commentary" on the Department of National Defence, but the fact was that the personnel was just not available to do the job of finding the answers to such questions as: what should be the proportion of Canada's effort to that of the United States in continental defence? They knew what the questions were to be considered. 68.; Mr. Bryce asked whether the separate services could prepare papers on various aspects of the defence programme. 69. Mr. Drury said that the services could of course prepare background factual papers and discuss such questions as whether Canada should or should not be armed with guided missiles. It would require a group of senior officials like the present one to 'formulate conclusions and recommendations on the basis of the facts assembled in such papers. 70. Dr. Solandt suggested that if the services were to provide factual papers, it might be possible to have secretaries available to record the discussion in a group like the present one, out of which conclusions and recommendations might emerge. 71. Mr• Drury said that he might do a paper on the manpower problem. 72. Mr. Bryce, summing up, said that it was generally agreed to proceed with a study re-examining the defence programme as'well as the major issues of national security policy on which the government may be required to take positions. Since the Department of National Defence would find it difficult to provide individuals to make the study, the existing service and inter-service organizations would be used. As the next step he suggested that he should meet shortly with Mr. Drury and Dr. MacKay to formulate specific questions which would need to be studied. Thus some progress might be made pending the return of General Foulkes from the NATO military meetings. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00079 Title A name given to the resource Minutes, "Notes on a discussion between representatives of the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence on views received from London about distinction between large and tactical nuclear weapons and a study of national security policy" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955-04-25 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Study on Canadian National Security Policy, RG25, file 50333-40, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Canadian National Security Description An account of the resource Ottawa Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en