https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2a4fe8a7db6cfd18de1784b60d0097f3.pdf 9d5c2ef87b11f2c7fd6e6eded0dec9f3 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T Hay 6 , 1963 Storage of Nuclear Weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon for United States Interceptors Commentary on Draft Exchange of Notes The following comments relate to Annex nBn of the Memorandum to Cabinet Defence Committee. The enclosure to that document had originally been approved by the United States in July i960, subject to certain Canadian explanatory remarks being given more formal status. The attached re-draft incorporates the explanations and attempts to remove earlier ambiguities. Paragraph 1: This paragraph is unchanged. Paragraph 2: The reference to "custody" after "ownership" has boen added to reflect the actual arrangements which will obtain and to point up that Canada is not really "acquiring1' nuclear weapons, with all that acquisition suggests. An earlier reference to conformity with United States law has been omitted to avoid any implication of the direct application of United States law In Canada. Paragraph 3; The earlier draft enunciated the principle of "joint responsibility*' and would have required the presence of Canadian representatives at each base to ensure implementation of provisions regarding safety standards and removal of weapons from base Installations. The United Statos undertakes specific obligations in these fields by means of the Exchange of Hotes. The requirement for the stationing of Canadian representatives on the United States bases would accomplish no more than to provide a Canadian presence which would have no value as a guarantee of the fulfilment of the Exchange of Notes, which in the final analysis rests on Unltod States integrity, and has been dropped. while the United States will be responsible for construction, the present practice at both bases ...2 000707 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 is to afford Canadian and United States contractors an equal opportunity to undertake the work and w h e r e United States contractors are selected t h e bulk of construction labour and tradesmen have b e e n Canadian. Paragraph 4 : The language of the draft general agreement o n safeguards (paragraph 1 2 , A n n e x " A n ) h a s b e e n substituted. I n substance it covers the same ground as the paragraph in the earlier draft except that t h e requirement t o conform with Canadian law h a s been Injected. In particular this refers to the regulations of the Atomic Energy Control Board and to customs (National Revenue) and export (Trade and Commerce) requirements. Those w h o negotiate the .final agreement w i t h the United States will h a v e to b e familiar with the requirements o f Canadian l a w . Paragraph 5i A t t h e present time, the only provisions for overflight o f Canadian territory o f United States aircraft w i t h nuclear weapons on board r e l a t e t o S A C bombers and S A C transport aircraft moving weapons to and from Europe f o r logistic p u r p o s e s. This is provided for b y a n Order-in-Council (PC 2307 of A p r i l 1 7 , 1 9 5 2 , Schedule B ) which contemplates t h e submission through diplomatic channels of requests f o r programmes of overflights (e.g , regular S A C training f l i g h t s ) and f o r individual flights n o t included in a programme (usually logistic f l i g h t s ) . If the provisions of t h e existing Order-In-Council were to b e m a d e applicable, it would m e a n that every supply flight in and out o f C a n a d a would require to b e approved t h r o u g h diplomatic c h a n n e l s . A s the present agreement contemplates supply flights, and as overflight by SAC (at least of SAC b o m b e r s ) raises different considerations, an amendment will b e required to t h e Order-in-Counc11 to provide f o r flights between the United States and Goose Bay and H a r m o n contemplated by the Exchange of N o t e s . It m a y b e desirable, w h e n amending the Order-in-Council, to require less stringent clearance procedures, e . g . approval b y the Ilinister of National Defence o r h i s representative. « . .3 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 3 Paragraph 6: Removal for possible use has been related to the existing agreement (EIB*1 Overflight agreement of June 30, 1959) providing for USAF interceptors stationed in the United States to overfly and land in Canada with their nuclear armament when NORAD moves to an alert stage known as a defence condition 1 (DEFCON 1 ) . This is a high stag© of alert (normal readiness is DEFCON 5) intended to be Implemented sshan attack Is imminent. There seems no valid reason to insist on more stringent conditions for permitting USAF interceptors stationed in Canada to be airborne with nuclear weapons than exist for USAF Interceptors stationed in the United States. If the 1959 agreements requiring prior consultation between the two governments, where practical, on increasing NORAD's states of readiness are fully observed, RCAF interceptors will be moving to the various stages of alert with their USAF counterparts, and will have their nuclear armament released to them at the same time as to USAF. The reference to "areas utilized by United States forces", i.e. the base, rather than "storage sites" appeared in the previous draft and is intended to permit the United States to practice arming aircraft and taxiing down runways but not take-off. Paragraph 7: This paragraph was requested by the United States to ensure that the imprecise provisions of the previous draft would not interfere with the return of the weapons to the United States. It has been retained to re-assure the United States that the requirements specified in paragraph 6 for removal of the weapons for operational reasons will not prevent return of the weapons to ths United States for use there, if the United States should see fit. Paragraph 8t This provision for review and termination is patterned on paragraph 15 (Canadian) Annex "A" in the draft general agreement. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T May 6 , 1963 Nuclear Weapons for the Canadian Forces Commentary on Draft Exchange of Notes The draft Hot© prepared by the Inter-departmental committee was based on the draft of a Not© provided by th© United States in October 1959 which is known to be still valid from a united States point of view. It was decided that the general principles affecting Canadian forces in both Europe and North America could be incorporated in a single agreement* From a Canadian point of view tho draft is thought to be broad enough to bo applicable to nuclear ASV7 weapons for RCN forces on the Host Coast, should the Government decide that such weapons should be sought. There is some suggestion in United States quarters that a separate inter-governmental agreement may be necessary in respect of the provision of AST7 weapons. It Is understood to be a United States requirement that th© general agreeaent remain classified. (The paragraph references below are to the Canadian re-draft) Preamble; Th© reference to the 1957 NATO communique Is to the decision of the Alliance to establish stocks of warheads readily available in case of need. Th© reference to "allied commanders" has been propped from the United States draft as inaccurate. Th© reference to "general principles" replaces the more restrictive "stockpile" language of the United States draft. Paragraph 1; This paragraph was added for the purpose of defining th© subject matter of th© agreement and indicating the weapons and weapons systems (listed In the Annex) for which nuclear warheads will b© provided. It was thought th© Government would wish some limitation placed on th© weapons to which the agreement should apply, without being unduly restrictive. 000710 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 Paragraph 2: It is necessary to make a distinction between "Allied Coxmanders" and Canadian and United States military authorities because the agreement x&. 11 apply to iiurope and to North America whero th©r© are no Allied Commanders except SACLANT. Th© addition of "quantities" is intended to provide that there should be adequate warheads available at any given time, and not merely agreement as to location of stockpiles. Paragraph 3t This provision (and paragraph 10) outlines In general terms th© financial responsibilities being incurred by th© Canadian Government. Generally, speaking, Canada will be responsible for tho storage sites including th© land and for storage costs for custodial personnel. It Is understood that the minister of National Defence will have available preliminary estimates on the total cost to Canada of th© proposed arrangements. Elor© particularly, the United States draft had indicated "development" of the s torag© sites as a Canadian responsibility. It was not considered that w© should commit ourselves in so general a fashion to future expenditures. Installations and facilities are to be built end maintained to satisfy NATO and United States standards. This does not mean they will not measure up to Canadian standards. In general terms the United States Is responsible for th© provision and maintenance of the warheads, their transport to and from storage sites in Canada, and pay and allowances of custodial personnel* Paragraph 4: This paragraph establishes United States responsibility for custody (control of access to nuclear weapons) which Is a requirement of th© United States atomic Energy Act. The status of United States custodial personnel will be governed as usual by th© NATO Status of Forces Agreement, Paragraph 5: This paragraph, as noted in th© kemorandum for Cabinet Defence Committee, was not agreed by th© Department of National Defence, who oppose its inclusion because they bellev© that such a clause Is inappropriate in a stockpile agreement; will revive United States fears of Canadian inactivity in a crisis; and does not require spoiling out as it is self-evident that, one© the weapons are released by ,. .,,• 3 000711 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information 3 the President the Canadian Government will have sol© authority over their use by Canadian forces* Ue do not agree that the clans© is inappropriate in this agreement because: (a) this is not just a stockpile agreement but a statement of th© general principles under which nuclear warheads will be made available to Canadian forces; (b) there is no other single "enabling" document in which the important principles governing release and use can b© stated; (c) such a paragraph already appeprs in the United States draft, which is a standard text used in other agreements.] Thus, we are not "initiating" inclusion of a paragraph on release and use. If there Is to b© such a clause, National Defence prefers the United States language. Our objection Is that as it stands, the United States draft is inaccurate. It refers only to two stages — release by appropriate authority; and thereafter use in accordance with the procedures of the appropriate commander. Under United States law, th© "appropriate authority" is th© United States President a|.one. Thus in th© United States draft you have presidential release and use according to commander's directive. In fact, the sequence for release to Canadian forces has three stages: presidential release; Canadian Government authority to use; and flnaliyuse in accordance with SACEUR/HORAD plans. In addition, w© would find it most useful to take advantage of this paragraph to reiterate the standing requirement for prior inter-governmental consultation where practical, prior to release, and by this we mean presidential release. If inter-governmental consultation is observed as a regular practice, it will remove any likelihood of the Canadian Government reaching a different conclusion from the United States about the us© of those weapons in an emergency* It should be noted that th© Canadian draft Is not intended to impose a veto on th© Presidents right of release. It simply asserts that after the release by the President, about which we hop© there will have been consultation, there is still a Canadian Government decision to be made on use. It will be #..4 000712 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information • - 4 - a domestic m a t t e r of high p r i o r i t y t o work out s t r e a m - l i n e d methods by which Canadian Government a u t h o r i z a t i o n can be obtained quickly i f necessary. In g e n e r a l , i t w i l l be s a l u t a r y t o remind th© United S t a t e s and our own armed forces of th© u l t i m a t e Canadian Government r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r th© use of t h e s e weapons* Paragraph 6: This United States responsibility is Incidental to responsibility for custody referred to in th© comment under paragraph 4* Paragraph 7; External security is understood to encompass protection against hostile elements of any nature, and is a Canadian responsibility. It should not b© confused with "Internal security", i.e* access to th© warheads which is a United States responsibility (dealt with in paragraphs 4 and 6 ) , Paragraph 8: An amendment to existing regulations (PC 2307 of April 17, 1962) will b© required in respect of overflights of Canada by aircraft transporting these weapons to and from Canada, It Is proposed that regulations authorizing such transport should require that permission for flights be obtained from th© tiinister of National Defenc© or his designated representative. A fuller discussion is contained in the comment on paragraph 5 of the draft Exchange of Notes on United States requirements at Goose Bay and Harmon* The expression "and elsewhere as may b© agreed* is intended to cover Canadian responsibility for possible transport of ASEf weapons to sea* Paragraph 9 s The United States draft assumes Canadian responsibility for signals communications whereas th© Canadian position is that establishment, operation and maintenance of signals communications should b© subject to mutual agreement* It will also allow certain communications systems, already jointly operated, to be used if appropriate to th© purposes of this agreement* • • *b �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 5 Paragraph 10t Th© Canadian version is less specific about the type or" administrative and logistic support to be provided than tho United States version, it boing intended that the "reasonable" support specified should b© comparable to but not In excess of support which would be provided to Canadian personnel in similar circumstances. The reference to dependents has been dropped, so that w© will not bo bound in advance to anything more than Is "reasonable". Paragraph 11: In Europe, Canada will share storage facilities with the United Kingdom for instance, in respect of the Honest John warheads. A clause to cover this contingency was omitted from the United States draft» Paragraph 12t Arrangements for safety procedures will be of" concern to the Atomic Energy Control Board. They take account of th© limitations on information which can be passed to Canadians. Generally speaking it Is understood that sufficient information can bo mad© available under the 1959 Agreement for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Kutufel Defence Purposes, to enable Canadians to become adept In safety procedures. Vhero this may not be possible, It is a United States responsibility. It is thought th© interests of third countries in Europe should b© kept in mind. Paragraph 13; This is a more concise version of the United States equivalent providing for the supplementary detailed arrangements which will b© required to implement th© agreement. Paragraph 14: As a matter of Canadian policy, notification to third governments, wher© they are affected, should b© considered. It is understood that in the case of Germany there is no legal requirement for prior consultation and that th© United States wish es to avoid creating a precedent. This conflicts with past Canadian practice of treating Germany as fully sovereign. Paragraph 15i This is a review and termination clause normally included in all International agreements* .* .6 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 6 - Regarding publicity, It Is for consideration whether it would b© desirable to Include In the agreement a provision regulating any publicity of th© agreement after the Initial statements by both governments announcing th© agreement. Publicity on joint defenc© matters is already governed by a joint directive of Earch 1, 1961, proposed by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. This directive calls for prior consultation and agreement of the two Departments of Defence. Uhere important matters of policy ar© involved, consultation is required to b© initiated in th© diplomatic channel. 000715 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01840 Title A name given to the resource "Storage of Nuclear Weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon for United States Interceptors" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 6-May-63