https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d3e6924796f199aa1c09051274e9569f.pdf 7ca43d853e6411b92cbc818f33a4851b PDF Text Text TOP SECRET September 5, 1952. Visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to Washington September Zi.-5. 1952 Summary of Conversation at Dinner at the Embassy Residence. September 5 The following were present at the dinner: Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Pearson Acheson Wrong Freeman Matthews Perkins Ignatieff The following subjects were discussed: 1. 2. 3. NATO problems; British economic problems; Question of the postponement of the general debate at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. 1. NATO Problems: Mr. Pearson explained that one of the purposes of his forthcoming visit to Europe was to turn over the Chairmanship of the North Atlantic Council at the end of his tenure of this office for a calendar year to the Foreign Minister of Denmark. He said that since he was a candidate for election to the presidency of the forthcoming General Assembly of the U.N. he thought that it was particularly important that he should turn over his office now, rather than wait until the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting on December 15. Mr. Acheson readily agreed that this was desirable. Mr. Pearson said that he also wished to discuss current NATO problems with Lord Ismay, with particular reference to preparations for the annual review and the decisions which would have to be taken at the Ministerial meeting on force targets. He hoped that it would be possible this time to avoid the kind of controversy which arose before and after the Lisbon Council meeting as a result of statements which appeared in the press comparing the alleged performances of the respective signatories in meeting the recommendations of the Temporary Council Committee; and to avoid as well the issue of ambiguous announcements of military objectives. While he recognized that decisions would have to be taken by the Ministers to complete the Lisbon 1952 programme as quickly as possible and to continue the military buildup, balancing military, economic and political considerations, he hoped that it would not be necessary to confront governments with specific qualitative targets which they would be urged publicly to fulfil in 1953. This was not meant to imply that firm figures might not be set for 1953, but we should avoid public debate on the subject prior to NATO agreement, and also avoid as far as possible the projection of figures beyond 1953 in such a way that we appear to accept them as agreed. He also wished to examine, while he was in Europe, the implications of the announced cutback in the British defence programme with particular reference to the thesis which had been put forward in justifying it. He was worried about the effect 000074 �- 2 of this and recent French statements on NATO objectives and NATO morale. This thesis assumed a revision of the strategic concept governing North Atlantic military planning by assuming a greater reliance upon the strategic and tactical use of new weapons and of air power. This thesis, while it had certain superficial attractions, as it seemed to justify reductions in overall military expenditures and particularly the reduction of ground forces which would have to be made available after the first 60 to 90-day period following D-Day, had serious political implications, particularly in respect of probable reactions in continental Europe where once again they might think they were being considered as expendable. Mr. Acheson made it clear that he had no sympathy for the British thesis. It seemed to him that it was a rationalization advanced to justify the decision taken by the British Government for political reasons to cut back its defence programme. The British argument, he said, could not be justified by the facts. The strategic use of atomic weapons would not materially affect the campaign which would have to be fought to stop the advance of the Soviet forces in Europe. The strategic counter-offensive which would be launched from the United States would only have longer-term effects upon the Soviet war potential. In the meantime, it was essential that there should be sufficient ground forces with tactical air support to stop the Soviet advance. No one had suggested that these forces should be of a magnitude which would permit them to mount a counter-offensive to drive the Soviet forces into the Soviet Union. The assumption was that, initially, the Soviet forces would advance a considerable distance into Western Europe and it would be necessary to launch at least an initial counter-offensive in order to stop the momentum of the Soviet advance. This explains the necessity of having covering forces immediately available for combat, with forces in reserve which would be made available within 30, 60, or 90 days of the beginning of the battle. Mr. Acheson said that the British thesis also seemed to assume the existence of new types of special weapons which could be used tactically in the land battle to compensate for the numerical superiority of the Soviet ground forces. Mr. Acheson said that while it was true that the United States was experimenting with the development of a number of what he called "Buck Rogers" gadgets, none of these could be counted upon for use in the field until about 1956. Mr. Acheson said that the British thesis also seemed to assume that the Soviet Union has no intention of launching a general war in the next two or three years. If by this it was meant that the Soviet leaders were not likely to decide to go to war on the calculation that Western military power now being built up might later place them at a greater military disadvantage, he was inclined to agree. This, however, he suggested, was not the real danger. The risks of general war were more likely, in his opinion, to arise from a different set of circumstances. There were certain circumstances, he particularly mentioned Korea and Berlin, in which the national security interests of the Soviet Union and the United States and other powers were so directly engaged that some unforeseen development might unloose a chain of events (none of which by themselves might be decisive), but which, taken together, might precipitate a general war. For instance, a serious air offensive launched against the U.N. forces in Korea from across the Yalu River would represent a most serious challenge to the security of U.S. forces in Korea that might well precipitate a chain of events. In Berlin, Mr. Acheson thought it was unthinkable that Western Powers could give up a position which the Soviet Government had in its power to make untenable from a military point of view. ip^Q 000075 �> - 3 The second type of situation which Mr. Acheson regarded as inherently containing the risks of general war was a local conflict in which the interests of the United States, as well as the Soviet Union, became increasingly and directly involved. He cited as an example the present situation in Indo-China and in the Middle East. Neither in Indo-China nor in the Middle East had the United States sufficient resources to take preventive action in advance. The United States, therefore, had to improvise with the military resources available such action as was necessary to impede the fulfilment of Communist designs. Returning to the question of the NATO force targets, Mr. Acheson said that the main object of NATO military planning at present was to build up the minimum forces necessary to stop the initial Soviet attack. In order to provide the basis for the necessary request to Parliaments for the authorization of funds, force targets seemed to him essential. Mr. Pearson then said it was the process of establishing them and the publicity given to that process which worried him. Mr. Acheson suggested that a distinction might be made between the tactics employed in the presentation of such targets to the public and their use by governments for supporting defence appropriations. He did not see, however, how it was possible to avoid establishing firm force targets for 1953; otherwise, the United States, for example, would not have any firm basis on which to request Congress for foreign military aid in support of the NATO defence programme. He implied that it might be possible to reduce to some extent NATO targets insofar as the military requirements recommended by the Standing Group proved to be beyond the economic capabilities of the respective NATO members. It was necessary, however, in his view, to continue the buildup of forces to the extent that the economic resources of the member nations would permit. The possibility of using new atomic weapons, tactical and strategic, could not affect NATO military planning in the next two or three years. 2. British Economic Problems: Mr. Pearson outlined as a matter bearing on NATO defence questions the plans for the Commonwealth economic conference to be held in London at the beginning of November, and the preparatory official talks which were to precede this conference. He also Indicated in general terms the approach of the Canadian Government to the problems raised at this conference, emphasizing that it was the Canadian view that the conference would have to examine both external and domestic policies of the members, in order to find remedies rather than palliatives. Canada's attitude would, he thought, be constructive, co-operative but realistic. Mr. Acheson expressed very gloomy views about British economic prospects. He suggested that there were two main problems involved (a) the domestic decisions which confront the members of the sterling bloc, particularly the United Kingdom; and (b) the question of the sterling debt. He was not optimistic about the prospects of the United Kingdom Government taking the necessary domestic decisions which would serve to establish British solvency. The sharp division within the country between those who were firmly committed to Socialist doctrine and those who sought to maintain Capitalist free enterprise resulted in an unstable political situation in which no government could maintain itself in power for a time „ ^. r, • • 000076 sufficit„_ �- 4sufficient to permit either doctrine to be applied effectively. He thought that it was most improbable that Mr. Churchill's administration could, in fact, take the kind of actions which, were necessary to stem the inflationary trend in Britain. Cuts in the food subsidies and social services, for example, would affect approximately 80% of the population that were benefiting from the subsidized prive level and would almost certainly lose the next election for the Conservatives. He suggested that the British Government had missed its best opportunity to revise its economic policy immediately after the last election. As regards the question of the sterling debt, it was his understanding that the remedy would have to depend on the co-operation of governments such as India, Pakistan and Egypt in agreeing to the refunding of this debt, and he doubted whether these agreements would be forthcoming. 3. Question of the Postponement of the General Debate at the forthcoming Session of the General Assembly: Mr. Pearson said that he was rather concerned about the insistence of Messrs. Eden and Schuman that the general debate, which was usually held at the beginning of the session of the General Assembly, should be postponed until after the U.S. Presidential elections. He thought it was most undesirable that the U.S. general elections should be advanced as the reason for changing the plans of the General Assembly. He doubted whether such an argument would be acceptable to a majority at the General Assembly. Mr. Acheson said that he agreed that it was undesirable that such a reason should be advanced for a postponement of the general debate. However, he suggested that the problem might be approached from a pragmatic point of view. He suggested that it should be quite feasible to arrange consideration of the various items on the agenda so that it would not be necessary for Messrs. Eden and Schuman to come to New York until after the elections. He said that he was definitely sympathetic to the request of Messrs. Eden and Schuman. If the roles were reversed and he had to attend a conference in either the United Kingdom or France while elections were proceeding there, he would hesitate about attending the conference for fear that he would inevitably, by some remark, become Involved in a political controversy. He suggested that it was unnecessary to make any a priori decision on the question of postponement. Mr. Pearson suggested a compromise might be found in beginning the general debate, allowing it to go on for a couple of days, then postponing it for a couple of weeks, on the ground that some delegations have stated they are not ready to proceed; then go ahead with Committee work until Eden and Schuman arrive. 000077 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NATO Global Strategy / 5 SEPTEMBER 1952 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952-09-05 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00095 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Pearson, Acheson, et al. memorandum of conversation, "Summary of Conversation at Dinner at the Embassy Residence, September 5," 5 Sept. 1952, LAC, RG 2, vol. 223, file no. I-60-1. Acheson British defence Global Strategy paper Pearson