https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f9feed0f654cfddb908448467a30d91d.pdf 3d79d0aca99795186005139483ca9df2 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ANNEX TOP SECRET DRAFT AIDE-MEMOIRE TO THE U.S.A. GOVERNMENT On January 11, the Embassy left with the Department an Aide-Memoire setting out the replies of the United States Government to a number of questions which had been posed at the last meeting of officials on December h, 1962. Clarification of certain points made in the U.S. Aide-Memoire of January 11 was requested by the Canadian side. This was supplied in the further Aide-Memoire of January ±5, 1963. The following Canadian comments are offered in connection with both documents. (1) Reference has been made to the meetings between Canadian and United States Ministers in Paris on December lhs 1962, in terms which suggest that there may have been a Canadian misunderstanding as to the main U.S. preoccupation. The Canadian understanding of these talks was that the United States was prepared to work out with the Canadian Government a stand-!;" arrangement for the arming of the Bomarcs and CF-lOls in case of need. There was no suggestion at the time that the "missing part" proposal was incapable of meeting the requirements of effective defence. (2) The Aide-Memoire of January 11 noted that if the "missing part" concept were to be applied, there was no practicable alternative to the umbilical cable for the Boin.TC or the ejector rack cartridge for the CF-101. The Canadian side agrees with the judgment in respect of the Bomarc and is prepared to explore further the best means of reducing to a minimum the time required to make the CF-101 operational with the MB-1 missile. (3) The Aide-Memoire of January 15 asserted that the movement of missing parts to Canadian bases at a DEFCON level as low as four, while representing a considerable improvement in the operation of the "missing part" concept, would still be insufficient to meet an urgent and effective defence requirement. The latter was defined as "the ability to respond within likely time of any warning without running the risks of possible lastminute difficulties in moving missing parts to Canada In time of emergency". The Canadian side has the following comments to offer in this connection. (a) A review of NORAD alerts shows that three times in the last six years NORAD has been placed on DEFCON-four alert in periods of sharply rising international tension (July 15 to August 2, 1958 - Lebanese crisis; May ljSO - U2 incident; October 1962 - Cuba crisis). On any of these occasions, which were not followed by immediate transition to higher states of alerts, the airlift of missing parts could in fact have been accomplished without encountering "last-minute difficulties in time of emergency". 000798 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET - 2 (b) Both of the Canadian delivery systems are effective only against bomber attack and the object of the negotiations to date has been to find the most effective arrangement for arming the Canadian delivery systems in under three hours, the likely warning time for impending bomber attack. The proposals under consideration as of the December *+, 1962 meeting of the negotiating teams demonstrated that it is possible to be well within this warning time. (k) The U.S.A., in its Aide-Memoire of January 15* has made a counter-proposal that essential missing parts be stored in Canada separately from the warhead, under either U.S.A. or Canadian custody. This counter-proposal fails to meet the Canadian objective of negotiating a stand-by arrangement which would not involve the storage on Canadian soil in peace-time of operational warheads. It is noted from the Aide-Memoire of January 15* that the United States Government had not thought of discontinuing the talks or of changing the channel of the talks. On its side, the Canadian Government is ready to continue the negotiations. 000799 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01797 Title A name given to the resource "Draft Aide-Memoire to the U.S.A. Government" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource [undated]