https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f2a5233fe19f957f5bde8e61966db335.pdf 3e6ab736886ecf9e2828a0b326022633 PDF Text Text Document Copy N o . / 0 O « P NCOMING txnfi' of 25 copies. OR ed under the Access to Information Act Security Classification FROM: THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON \RY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CAN; ETARY TOP SECRET File No. 3S333 ^TSr-y Priority System No. IMMEDIATE Departmental Circulation THE MINISTER UNDER-SEC'Y ASSOC/U/SECY ASS1ST/U/SECS POL COOR SECT, i ^^^-^^mm^3^Date... TOTt-S^" References AM H*4U~ Aw Q»«fe» Aw&fcjAe ftww._v¥a/t v '4 ?xt. 230 <rev. IO/53J >3 P. t * a Date A p r i l 1 8 , 1955- Reference: My immediately p r e c e d i n g t e l e g r a m No.' 536 of April 18. Subject: D i s t i n c t i o n between l a r g p and t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r weapons. Following is text of tentative draft paper referred to in paragraph 2 of my telegram under reference, Begins i 1, Her Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom and Canada are disturbed at the divergence between their views and those of the United States Government on this very important matter and its practical Implications. 20 President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles have both publicly advanced the thesis that a clear distinction can be drawn between small and precise nuclear weapons on the one hand, and large thermo-nuclear weapons on the other. The suggestion had been made on the American side that Her Majesty1s Government in the United Kingdom should also consider taking suitable opportunities to make clear the technical and moral justification for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. 3. It is true that the NATO powers have decided that military planning should be based on the use of nuclear weapons and are reorganising and re-equipping their forces on that basis. It is also true that the NATO powers cannot afford to be strong in both nuclear and conventional means of waging global war. The process of re-equipping will be a gradual ones but in the not far distant future a stage will be.reached In the reequipment of the forces at which to deny them the use of nuclear weapons would hamstring their operations. This position was accepted by the NATO Council in December 1954, with the proviso that the decision to use nuclear weapons shall remain with the governments concerned. to* fVUVvvd CYPHER - AUTO 537 4. Her Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom and in Canada have considered the American proposition. In their view there is no point in the gradation of nuclear weapons at which any such dividing line can be drawn, and it is not necessarily true that the smaller ones produce no fall-out. In addition, the precision of any weapons is in no way related to its contents, • • • • • «s 000052 ( �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Faeces a I'information - 2 - but to the means of delivery. Furthermore, the American suggestion that the smaller weapons can legit iriately be used in the framework of conventional armaments and only against military targets leads to the sterile argument as to what constitutes a military target. 5. Even if it were possible scientifically and militarily to draw the suggested distinction between small and large nuclear weapons the two governments consider that there are grave objections from the point of view of the West to doing so. The possession by the West of a stock of nuclear weapons of all kinds and the ability to deliver them is at present the most important factor In achieving the aim of preventing war. An attempt to divide them into those which are small and therefore morally justifiable, and those which are large and therefore immoral, would inevitably reduce their deterrent value as a whole. It would be fatal to give the impression that as long as no hydrogen bomb was dropped on allied territory none would be used against Russia, or that the only likely victims of nuclear weapons in a new global war would be the armed forces and not the civilian populations or centres of government and industry. Moreover, for the deterrent to achieve its maximum effect, the Russians must be left in no doubt that the use against the West of any of their nuclear weapons would immediately bring upon them retaliation from the whole allied armoury. 6. The conclusions of Her Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom and Canada are as follows. 7« The time is coming when the Western forces will only be able to fight a global war with nuclear weapons. The decision to us© these weapons will remain under political control. 8. It is not possible to draw any definite dividing line between small and large nuclear weapons« Even if it were possible to do so, it would be gravely against the interests of the West, because it would reduce their deterrent value and would encourage the Russians to think that they might be able to resort to aggression without receiving the full weight of allied retaliation. Ends. 000053 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00063 Title A name given to the resource Telegram No. 537, Office of the High Commisioner for Canada, London, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, "Distinction between large and tactical nuclear weapons" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955-04-18 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Study on Canadian National Security Policy, RG25, file 50333-40, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Canadian National Security Description An account of the resource Department of External Affairs, Ottawa Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en