https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3db86fa3e3f307d3e8c95b0c4e49d831.pdf 51d86e025028ee1f89c02bbbf0c00b78 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to_ Infogmaffbn Act Document divulgue en veftp els \at*Lpj surfaccls afuitfofmation Xf CONFIDENTIAL CSC 2196-6 (JS/DSS) 22 Jfan 62 THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUE INTRODUCTIONS 1. It is widely believed that the choice confronting Canada lies between acquiring nuclear weapons and not acquiring them = black or white. This comment applies to nearly all public discussion and to most discussion within official circles. 2. In fact there are at least four options available to Canada; namelys (a) Tb refuse to make a decision ioe<> to do as we have been doing; (b) To become a full nuclear power; (c) To adopt a policy of nuclear virginity; or (d) To enter into joint stockpiling arrangements with the USA. 3. It appears that much confusion has arisen owing to the fact that the full range of options has not been correctly appreciated. If the Gordian knot is to be cut it seems likely that the issue must be redefined in terms of the courses of action which are actually availableo This seems to be especially true in terms of justifying the decision reached before Canadian public opinion. AIM 4« The purpose of this paper is to state and to analyse the options which are available to Canada with regard to nuclear weapons. NO DECISION 5« As long as the Canadian services had no nuclear-capable armament there was much to be said for postponing a decision.. This was more particularly the case in view of the strong positions which had been adopted by Canada with regard to disarmament and the expectation (reasonable or otherwise) of many Canadians that material progress was likely to be made in the field of disarmament. 6. Now that the Canadian forces are acquiring nuclear eapable systems the situation has changed. Refusal to make a decision will expose Canada to the charge that she has repudiated an obligation - specifically the commitment accepted at the NATO Heads of Government Meeting in 1957. This would be bound to weaken Canada's position within NATO. It would also, in all probability, prove an embarrassment in all important dealings with the USA. 7. Continued refusal to make a decision would certainly prove a domestic embarrassment to the Canadian Governmento The issue would be kept alive and would be the subject of highly emotional debate. The Government would be vulnerable to the most damaging of all charges, namely that it was afraid to face the issue and was incapable of accepting its responsibilities. 8. Continued refusal to make a decision might be justified on the basis of expected progress in the field of disarmamento From the point of view of logic it cannot be argued that the.possibility of agreement on disarmament is an adequate reason for repudiating Canada's obligations under collective defence. Such a policy is therefore logically indefensible and is probably politically indefensible unless there are real prospects for meaningful agreement in the very near future. O O 0-/JC 000421 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - CONFIDENTIAL 9. Although there is the possibility of some limited agreement on disarmament the prospects are so remote as to be non-existent for any comprehensive agreement which would render it less than a breach of faith for Canada to withdraw from her existing collective defence commitments. To hinge the Canadian policy upon expected progress in the field of disarmament must therefore be regarded as a very short-term policy. If progress in the field of disarmament failed to eventuate the Government would be exposed to the charge that its entire foreign policy was unrealistic and irresponsible. 10. Failure to take a decision is clearly a feasible policy in the sense that it is a course of action which could be followed. However, this policy would involve a substantial price* This price would be payable in terms of domestic embarrassment to the Canadian government, the undermining of public support for Canada's defence commitments and programmes, and the corroding of Canada's international prestige and influence. A. NUCLEAR POWER 11. In order that a nation may rank as a nuclear power it must have the ability to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. This means that it must possess nuclear warheads and delivery systems which are wholly its own, the use of which is not subject to veto by any other nation. 12. Given sufficient time and resources it would be possible for Canada to develop nuclear warheads and at least one strategic delivery system. This would require a very large increase in the proportion of resources devoted to defence, as well as something like ten years before Canada could possess a significant operational capability. It is worth stressing that such a programme is within Canada's technical and economic capability. If it were a matter of vital national necessity Canada could become a nuclear power. 13. Nothing short of such a programme would in fact render Canada a nuclear power. However, there is no suggestion whatever that such a programme should be undertaken. Given the present nature of Western defence arrangements such a programme would not add to the security of NATO or of Canada herself. No one ^ literally no one - is seriously proposing that Canada should develop) an independent nuclear capability. NUCIEAR VIRGINITY LV« On the other extreme, it is urged in some quarters that Canada should have nothing whatever to do with nuclear weapons. This would mean that Canada would not produce nuclear.weapons, permit their stockpiling on-Canadian territory or envisage their use by the Canadian services in any circumstances whatsoever. Such a policy can be described as nuclear virginity. 15. The first comment which must be made concerning this policy is that it is now rather late in the day to consider its adoption. Canada played a subordinate but significant role in the development of the first atomic bomb. The Canadian contribution was recognized by the participation of the Canadian Prime Minister in the Truman=Attlee-King Declaration of November 1945 and by Canada's membership, with the permanent members of the Security Council, on the UN Atomic Energy Commission. Since 1945* Canada has been engaged in selling uranium with the result that the sizable proportion of the US and UK nuclear stockpiles is made out uranium furnished by Canada. We have also sold to the USA a not insignificant amount of -piutonium* If the production of nuclear weapons is an international crime Canada is quite clearly an accomplice. It is difficult to believe that we can now return to a condition of pristine innocence. 16. It has been argued that if Canada were to repudiate nuclear armaments it would still be possible for Canada to make an important contribution to Western collective defence. This is highly debatable. It would be possible .../3 000422 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 3 - CONFIDENTIAL for Ganada to make some contribution. It is questionable whether this contribution could be at all commensurate with Canada's resources and potential strength. In this respect an analogy with Norway, Denmark or even Sweden is unsound. Canada lays claim to half a continent, and in terms of economic potential is currently the ninth most powerful nation in the world. Such very great potential strength implies responsibilities. 17. leaving the above argument on one side, there is an even more fundamental point. It is impossible to reconcile effective political participation in NATO, which must for the foreseeable future rely upon the use of nuclear weapons in some circumstances, with a stated policy which repudiates nuclear weapons in every shape and form* As long as Canada remains a member of NATO the attempt to pursue a policy of nuclear virginity is for all practical purposes only an oblique way of attempting to avoid a decision. 18. Some advocates of a policy of nuclear purity advocate that Canada should withdraw from NATO or alternatively that Canadian participation in NATO should be made open contingent upon conditions which are incapable of realisation. Assuming that nuclear virginity is the overriding consideration this position is logical. The consequences of Canada's withdrawal from NATO therefore deserve to be considered. 19* Viewed strictly from the point of view of military security the consequences of Canada's withdrawal from NATO would not be disastrous. At least for the foreseeable future the USA must defend Canada regardless of what Canada may or may not do on her own behalf. The effect of the loss of Canada's military and financial contribution within NATO would not be trivial, but it is most unlikely that this would in itself have a disastrous effect upon Western security. It should be added, however, that the political effects are unpredictable and could be very serious from the point of view of all countries including Canada. 20. Withdrawal from NATO, which would of necessity be a positive act, would impair Canada's bargaining power in Washington, London, Paris and Brussels. This might be damaging to Canada's economic position, but it is again doubtful if it would be disastrous. The economic relations between Canada and other nations of the North Atlantic community are a matter of mutual interests. Other nations could not ignore their own interests however much they might disapprove of Canadian actions. 21. The real penalty would lie in what Canadians would think of themselves and the impairment of the sense of national purpose and identity. Whatever Canadians may wish, it is clear that Canada's major interests and destiny lie within the North Atlantic community. It is also clear that this community is being subjected to sustained military pressure. For Canada to withdraw from NATO would be an act of historic irresponsibility. A nation guilty of such an action would in some very real sense have ceased to be a nation. Such a formulation of the issue may seem unduly rhetorical. However, one should remember that a nation is a political community which exists for the protection and advan6ement of certain interests, institutions and standards of value. A nation which loses sight of this fact has very largely renounced its raison d'etre. 22. It has been claimed that a clear repudiation of nuclear weapons by Canada would have a great moral effect particularly upon the new nations of Africa and Asia. This is almost certainly self-deception. Whether or not the new nations decide to develop nuclear weapons will depend upon their capabilities and their own assessment of their interests. They will not be greatly influenced by the example of a nation which is irrevocably within the Western camp> and which can afford a moralistic position because the USA is bound to defend it. The same is true of the distribution of nuclear weapons- to the Soviet satellites. Whether or not this occurs will be based upon a coldblooded assessment of Soviet interests. It may also be pointed out that there is nothing especially moral in placing the entire burden of Canadian security upon the United States. ...A 000423 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 4 - CONFIDENTIAL 23. Putting all these considerations together it seems clear that nuclear virginity is not really a feasible policy. It is not possible to wipe out the past. Neither is it possible for Canada to ignore the obligations which she has assumed. Whatever attractions such a policy may have in theory it is not possible for a nation of Canada's strength and potential influence to withdraw from the twentieth century. JOINT STOCKPILING ARRANGEMENTS 24. Acceptance of joint stockpiling arrangements would not render Canada a nuclear power. Ownership and control would remain in the hands of the USA, and Canada would have no ability to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. However, such arrangements would permit Canada to assume an equitable share in Western collective defence. The important point is that this is a major policy option which stands on its own feet and is not the same as becoming a nuclear power. 25. It has been argued that acceptance of joint stockpiling arrangements would detract from Canadian sovereignty. This argument has a good deal of emotional appeal, but when subjected to rational analysis it is seen to be essentially irrelevant. The fallacy lies in an extreme conception of sovereignty and in believing that this can be made an absolute principle of political conduct. This illusion can perhaps be afforded by very weak nations but it cannot be afforded by nations such as Canada which aspire to play a* significant role in world affairs. 26. In the strict legal sense joint stockpiling arrangements imply no greater limitation of Canadian sovereignty than any other treaty. In fact the obligation would be more strictly limited than is true of many treaties such as extradition or air traffic. The rights granted to the USA in Canada would be few and would be exercised in accordance with conditions prescribed by Canada. Such an arrangement cannot with accuracy be described as a major restriction upon sovereignty. 27. From a political point of view joint stockpiling arrangements would highlight the close community of interests between the USA and Canada and the ultimate dependence of Canada upon the USA for her security. However, this is a fact of life. Even if Canadians had the ability to alter the situation it is quite clear that they have no such disposition. 28. If it were possible to envisage circumstances in which Canada would wish to employ nuclear warheads but the USA might refuse to sanction their use, then joint stockpiling arrangements would genuinely infringe upon Canadian sovereignty. In fact it is virtually impossible to envisage such a situation. 29* It is worth pointing out that acceptance of joint stockpiling arrangements need not restrict the ability of the Canadian Government to pursue disarmament including the advancement of very far-reaching proposals. Until disarmament is achieved or at least in serious prospect every nation must take such measures as are necessary to its security. There is no contradiction in logic between defence and disarmament since these are alternative roads to security. 30. The statement made during Mr Kennedy's visit to Ottawa in May 1961 that the USA opposes the spread of nuclear weapons seems to have been generally misconstrued. Joint stockpiling arrangements do not involve the spread of nuclear weapons in any meaningful sense. They provide a, means by which US control and ownership are retained but by which other nations can contribute to Western security in accordance with their capabilities. They are therefore a genuine alternative to the spread of nuclear weapons. US policy is based on this point. .../5 000424 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 5 - CONFIDENTIAL CONCLUSION; 31. Although there are in principle four possible courses of action, two of these are not real competitors, namely an independent nuclear programme and a policy of complete virginity. The choice is between refusing to make a decision and acceptance of joint stockpiling arrangements. The key to the nuclear weapons issue lies in the recongition of this fact. 000425 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01690 Title A name given to the resource "The Nuclear Weapons Issue" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Use by Canadian Forces," RG2-B-2, Box 23-24, file D-1-5(f), Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 22-Jan-62